The president is chief of state and is directly elected for up to two five-year terms. In the March 2023 elections, Milatović defeated Đukanović by a substantial margin in the second-round runoff, becoming the first elected president who was not a member of the DPS since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1990. Endorsed by the unsuccessful first-round candidates and prime minister Dritan Abazović, Milatović took 59 percent of the popular vote. Turnout was relatively high, at 64 percent in the first round and 70 percent in the second. An Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) election monitoring mission found the election competitive, transparent, and well-managed, but noted persistent “gaps and ambiguities” in the electoral framework, and concerns about misuse of state resources by parties that controlled state institutions.

The president nominates the prime minister, who requires legislative approval. Early parliamentary elections were held in June 2023. After weeks of negotiations, parliament approved a coalition government and Milojko Spajić of the PES became prime minister.

Members of the unicameral, 81-seat parliament—the Skupština—are directly elected for four-year terms.

An opposition coalition came to power in 2020, ending three decades of rule by the DPS. At the start of 2023 politics were in gridlock, after two governments collapsed in 2022 following no-confidence votes, and lawmakers had been unable to form a new government or call snap elections. A legal impasse was resolved after the appointment of new Constitutional Court judges, and Đukanović called early parliamentary elections in March.

The elections, held in June, featured historically low voter turnout at 56 percent. Fifteen electoral lists participated, and nine secured parliamentary seats. The PES won 24 seats, the DPS-led Together coalition won 21; the For the Future of Montenegro coalition won 13 seats, and the Bravery Counts coalition won 11 seats. The remainder went to other parties.

An OSCE mission assessed the polls as competitive, transparent, and well-managed, but again noted unaddressed deficiencies in the electoral framework, as well as low representation of women and insufficient institutional support for encouraging their participation. It also noted that laws preventing misuse of state resources during elections are easily circumvented through the issuing of public contracts.

The electoral framework allows credible elections but contains inconsistencies and ambiguities, and attempts to reform it through a Committee on Comprehensive Electoral Reform have not resulted in progress. A new committee was voted in in December 2023, but opposition representatives withdrew from it.

In 2023, Đukanović faced a legal challenge from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civic activists who claimed that he was ineligible for a third presidential term, but there was virtually no institutional response to the complaint. Spajić, the original PES presidential candidate, was eliminated from the race because he held dual citizenship. His disqualification by the State Election Commission (DIK), which was mostly composed of DPS and Democratic Front (DF) loyalists, was criticized by activists and lawyers as a breach of its authority, inconsistent with legislation, de facto Serbian interference in Montenegro’s electoral process, and as a case of selectivity, since the commission did not check the citizenship status of other candidates. Shortly afterward, Milatović was nominated as the new PES candidate.

In 2022, the parliament adopted controversial legislation that restricted presidential powers by enabling a majority of lawmakers to propose a prime minister if the president refuses to do so. In June 2023, the Constitutional Court annulled the measure after ruling it unconstitutional.

Political parties are for the most part able to form and operate without direct interference.

Unlike the DPS regime, recent governments have generally refrained from trying to delegitimize political criticism and opposition activity by equating it with threats to the state or to public order—though Abazović has engaged in such rhetoric. Amid a calmer political environment, new groups have been able to emerge, compete in elections, and participate in the public sphere without being smeared as “enemies of the state.”

Despite some issues during the campaign, the 2023 presidential and parliamentary election results reflected significantly improved opportunities for the opposition to increase its support and gain power through elections. Opposition forces won enough popular support to end the DPS’s longtime grip on the presidency, and to shift the balance of power in the parliament.

Score Change: The score improved from 3 to 4 because the year’s presidential and parliamentary election results reflected significantly improved opportunities for the opposition to increase its support and gain power through elections.

While voters are generally free to express their political choices, the DPS has fostered extensive patronage networks in both public companies and private companies with links to the state. Serbian President Aleksandr Vučić exerts influence on parties representing Serbs in Montenegro. The US Embassy in Montenegro and some US officials made statements aimed at influencing government formation in 2023, contributing to postelection delays.

All citizens have full political rights and electoral opportunities. Small political parties representing interests of ethnic, religious, and other minority groups participate in the political sphere, and members of these minorities are also represented within larger parties, though the Romany population remains underrepresented. Women are underrepresented in political leadership positions and politics generally.

The dependency of the recent governments of Zdravko Krivokapić and Dritan Abazović on narrow majorities pushed them to be more responsive to lawmakers than their predecessors, and enabled the parliament to be stronger in its oversight functions. In both instances, when the executive stopped delivering what it promised or was seen as misusing powers vested in it, it was ousted in a no-confidence vote.

Corruption and cronyism remain widespread. European Commission progress reports have consistently questioned the integrity, credibility, impartiality, independence, accountability, and priority-setting of the Anti-Corruption Agency. Civil society organizations and independent media provide some accountability by reporting on official corruption and its effects.

In March 2022, the state prosecutor’s council elected a new special state prosecutor who has prioritized high-level corruption and financial investigations, as well as improving public trust in the institution. In 2023, there were several high-profile arrests of officials allegedly involved in corruption scandals and organized crime, including two former heads of Montenegro’s police force, an assistant director of the police force; and Budva’s mayor, among others. In June and July, the daily Vijesti published transcripts it reported were of conversations between a former senior police officer and an organized crime figure, which appeared to expose links between former state officials and criminal groups during the officials’ time in power. Abazović called for an investigation.

Citizens still have few opportunities for meaningful participation in public consultations on legislation and policy reforms. Budget plans remain widely unavailable, as does information on government contracts.

A variety of independent media operate in Montenegro, and media coverage is partisan and combative on certain issues.

The state broadcaster, Radio and Television of Montenegro (RTCG), has pursued a more balanced editorial policy and has been more inclusive of diverse political content. Recent statistics reflect increasing public trust and viewership. As of 2022, all other national broadcasters in Montenegro were majority or completely foreign-owned, often by groups associated with Serbian businesses. Two out of the three major daily newspapers are foreign-owned.

Internal censorship within media houses and self-censorship among journalists has receded since 2020. Reporters who cover corruption and organized crime still risk violence.

The constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief. During the final years of the DPS government, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in Montenegro and its adherents were subject to discrimination and hate speech, and its clergy has been characterized by the DPS as enemies of the state. More recently, the SPC has enjoyed strong political influence.

Academic freedom is guaranteed by law and generally upheld. After decades of isolation from public life, Montenegro’s state university has increasingly engaged with the public, including critical voices, through regular events.

People are generally free to engage in public discussions. Individuals’ fear of retribution for expressing their opinions online has diminished since the DPS era, and open criticism of the parliamentary majority and the government has become commonplace.

Citizens generally enjoy freedom of assembly. However, incidents of violence, excessive police force, or interference with demonstrations occasionally take place.

The Abazović government recognized civil society actors as strategic partners in crafting government reforms, though some civil society members criticized its stated reform commitments as superficial. In a similar fashion to Đukanović, Abazović also accused some NGOs critical of his policies of working against Montenegro.

There is freedom for trade unions, which remain relatively strong in the public sector. However, reports of intimidation of labor activists by employers continue.

Efforts to bolster judicial independence continue. The judiciary remains susceptible to pressure from DPS power structures, as well as the Abazović government, and judicial corruption is still a problem.

The new special state prosecutor is faced with a large case backlog that his predecessor had refused to process. While prosecution has been freed from the DPS’s grip, selective justice remains a systemic problem. There are still serious deficiencies in transparency, openness, professionalism, and accountability in the judicial system.

Constitutional guarantees of due process are inconsistently upheld. Legal proceedings are lengthy and often highly bureaucratic, particularly when involving business dealings. Police frequently hold suspects in extended pretrial detention while completing investigations. Courts are poorly funded and often overburdened.

After years of institutional crisis, a backlog of more than 3,000 constitutional appeals for the protection of human rights was unblocked in February 2023 when three new judges were appointed to Montenegro’s highest legal authority, the Constitutional Court. The court’s final, seventh judge was appointed in November 2023.

The retrial of Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, two DF leaders who were charged with plotting a coup in 2016, continued in 2023.

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because lawmakers filled all vacancies on the Constitutional Court, allowing it to resume progress on resolving a large backlog of cases.

Violent crime is not a significant problem for the general population, although several apparent executions by criminal gangs of rivals have taken place in recent years. Prison conditions do not meet international standards for education or health care, and prison guards reportedly abuse inmates with impunity.

Members of the Romany, Ashkali, Egyptian, and other ethnic minority groups, as well as LGBT+ people, face discrimination. Women in Montenegro are legally entitled to equal pay for equal work, but patriarchal social norms often limit their salary levels, as well as their educational opportunities.

The freedom of movement and the right of citizens to change their residence, employment, and institution of higher education are generally respected in practice.

The state sector dominates much of Montenegro’s economy, and related clientelism, as well as corruption, pose obstacles to normal business activity.

The government for the most part does not place restrictions on personal social freedoms. In July 2020, Montenegro legalized same-sex civil partnerships.

Domestic violence and femicide are an increasingly severe problem.

Jobs in the public sector are still awarded through patronage networks, undermining meritocracy and limiting access for those without connections. Most workers employed in the private sector remain unprotected from exploitation and arbitrary decisions of their employers. Human trafficking for the purposes of prostitution and forced labor remains a problem.