The 2014 constitution laid out a semipresidential system in which a popularly elected president served as head of state and exercised circumscribed powers, while the majority party in the parliament selected a prime minister, who served as head of government. The president was directly elected for up to two five-year terms.

The last presidential election held under the 2014 constitution took place in October 2019, following the death of President Beji Caid Essebsi that July. Kaïs Saïed, an independent candidate and former constitutional law professor, won a runoff against businessman and media owner Nabil Karoui with 73 percent of the vote.

Saïed has exercised greatly expanded powers since July 2021, when, claiming emergency authority under the 2014 constitution, he unilaterally decided to dismiss Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspend the elected parliament. That October, Saïed installed a new government headed by Prime Minister Najla Bouden without parliamentary approval. Under the new constitution adopted in July 2022, the prime minister and cabinet are appointed and dismissed by the president. The presidential term limit remained in place. In August 2023, Saïed dismissed Bouden without explanation, naming former central bank executive Ahmed al-Hachani as her replacement.

Tunisia’s 2014 constitution established a unicameral parliament, the 217-seat Assembly of the Representatives of the People (ARP); 199 members were directly elected in domestic multimember constituencies, while 18 represented multimember constituencies abroad via a party-list system. The last legislative elections under the old constitution took place in 2019. International and national observers declared the balloting to be generally competitive and credible. President Saïed unilaterally suspended this elected parliament in 2021 as part of a broader set of emergency measures aimed at concentrating power in the presidency. Saïed formally dissolved the parliament in March 2022.

In the fall of 2022, Saïed announced legislative elections for a new, significantly weakened parliament under the new constitution and electoral law. The first round of voting took place in December 2022, and the second round in January 2023. Only 1,058 candidates campaigned for office—a steep drop-off from prior legislative elections. Due in large part to onerous candidacy restrictions and a boycott led by major opposition parties, turnout was extremely low—roughly 11 percent in both the first and second rounds. The new parliament includes 161 members elected in single-member constituencies, including 10 representing Tunisians living abroad. After the new parliament was inaugurated in March, the main opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front, announced that they would not recognize the legitimacy of this body.

The 2022 constitution also envisioned the creation of a second legislative body, the National Council of Regions and Districts, made up of nested local, regional, and district chambers. Elections for the local councils were held in December 2023 and were marked by low turnout rates of about 11.7 percent. These local councils will replace Tunisia’s first-ever democratic municipal councils, which were elected in 2018 and dissolved by presidential decree in March 2023. Notably, the new local councils will enjoy considerably less financial and administrative autonomy than the prior municipal councils had.

From the 2011 revolution through the last elections under the 2014 constitution in 2019, the supervision of parliamentary and presidential balloting by the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) was well regarded by Tunisian and international observers, and the authority itself was seen as politically independent.

In May 2022, Saïed replaced the ISIE’s executive committee, and the newly appointed body was tasked with organizing the referendum on his draft constitution in July. Watchdog groups criticized the ISIE’s handling of the referendum, citing a lack of transparency regarding the release of station-level results. The new constitution, promulgated in 2022, removed the rules governing the process by which ISIE members must be appointed, leaving the ISIE open to greater presidential interference in its composition.

Saïed issued a new electoral law by decree in September 2022. In addition to replacing the proportional-representation system with voting in single-member districts, the law imposed new requirements on candidates. For example, each potential candidate must collect 400 signatures of registered voters who do not endorse any other candidate. The decree also eliminated public funding for campaigns, removed a ceiling on private fundraising, barred anyone ever charged with a legal violation from candidacy, and revoked prior laws promoting gender parity and youth representation on electoral lists. Finally, the decree ramped up punishments for vaguely defined “electoral crimes,” including receiving illegal donations or “intentionally exploiting another candidate’s honor or familial or geographic affiliation.”

In the decade following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia’s numerous political parties represented a wide range of ideologies and interests. However, since President Saïed seized extraordinary powers in July 2021, opposition politicians and political parties have experienced serious restrictions on their ability to operate. The new electoral framework, including the 2022 electoral law, was widely seen as a blow to the strength of political parties as opposed to individual candidates with access to private resources.

After the 2021 suspension of the old parliament and parliamentary immunity, some lawmakers and political figures were immediately subjected to repressive measures, including travel bans, detention, and politically motivated prosecutions. Such harassment intensified in 2023, targeting prominent opposition figures from an array of political parties, including Islamist Ennahda and social democratic Ettakatol. Although Ennahda, the country’s largest opposition party, has not been formally banned, authorities have significantly hindered its ability to operate and in 2023, prohibited meetings at party offices and targeted many of the party’s prominent members with arbitrary arrests.

The regime has exploited broad antiterrorism and anticorruption laws to advance political prosecutions. In May 2023, Ennahda president Rached Ghannouchi, who had been arrested in April, was fined and sentenced to a year in prison on specious terrorism-related charges. Many of President Saïed’s opponents, including Ghannouchi, remained imprisoned at year’s end.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to an intensified campaign of legal harassment and detentions of President Kaïs Saïed’s political opponents.

In the decade following the 2011 revolution, opposition parties and independents generally participated actively in political processes, resulting in multiple rotations of power at the executive and legislative levels. However, major opposition parties boycotted the 2022–23 parliamentary elections to protest adverse conditions created by the new constitution and electoral law. The lack of meaningful competition contributed to an extremely low voter turnout. Many of Tunisia’s major political parties are not represented in the current national legislature.

Members of the opposition have become targets of politically motivated detention and prosecution. In February 2023, Tunisian authorities conducted a large round of political arrests, targeting government critics, including opposition politicians and journalists. Arrests of perceived government critics continued during the year. Although some political detainees were released during the year, many others remained in pretrial detention through year’s end. These measures, coupled with restrictive electoral laws and expanded executive powers, make it difficult for the opposition to increase its representation within the current framework.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 1 based on the lack of representation for opposition parties within the current legislature, and on arrests, criminal prosecutions, and other repressive measures that undermined the ability of opposition figures to operate in 2023.

Voters are generally able to exercise their political choices without undue interference. However, powerful domestic economic interests have exercised a high degree of influence over politics. Foreign groups also reportedly supply funds to preferred parties and candidates, though these channels of support are opaque.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations have worked to increase the political participation of marginalized groups. A 2017 law required an equal number of men and women at the top of candidate lists, as well as at least one candidate with a disability and three people under the age of 35 on each list. Representation of women in subsequent elections was comparatively high, and legislation aimed at protecting the rights of women was passed.

However, the September 2022 electoral law eliminated the 2017 quotas, and in the December 2022 parliamentary elections, only 11 percent of the candidates were women, 4 percent were aged 35 or younger, and two were people with disabilities. Following the January 2023 second-round elections, women hold 25 of 161 seats in the parliament.

Other segments of the population, including the Amazigh ethnic community, Black Tunisians, and LGBT+ people, remain underrepresented in electoral politics. Black Tunisians have achieved some progress in advancing their political interests, including passage of an antiracism law in 2018, but they are largely excluded from leadership positions and often conflated with foreign migrants. Societal discrimination and laws criminalizing same-sex sexual activity impede active political participation for LGBT+ people, and political parties largely fail to address LGBT+ issues.

Both the 2014 constitution and the new charter adopted in 2022 state that the president must be a Muslim.

Conflict over the division of powers between the legislative and executive branches has undermined policymaking and governance since 2011. Clashes between the executive and legislative branches intensified under President Saïed, culminating in his emergency powers declaration in July 2021.

Saïed continued to rule by decree in 2023. The 2022 constitution formally concentrated power in the presidency. Among other changes, it eliminated the parliament’s ability to impeach the president and requires a two-thirds majority for the parliament to remove the prime minister and cabinet. Bills promoted by the president will also be given priority over those promoted by legislators.

In March 2023, Saïed dissolved Tunisia’s 350 democratically elected municipal councils. Some analysts have expressed concern that the creation of the National Council of Regions and Districts, which will replace the municipal councils, will further concentrate legislative and agenda-setting power in the hands of the president.

Tunisia’s anticorruption legislation has historically been considered weak. The Economic Reconciliation Law of 2017 effectively offered amnesty for those implicated in corruption under the pre-2011 regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, though its initial provisions were partly rolled back due to public disapproval.

The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption (INLUCC) was established in 2011, and has continued its operations with inadequate funding and little authority to compel legal action. Police shut down INLUCC’s headquarters in August 2021, and in March 2022 INLUCC employees organized a sit-in to protest the nonpayment of their salaries and the freezing of their work. In October 2022, President Saïed installed Nadia Saadi as temporary head of INLUCC by decree, but the organization’s future remained uncertain.

President Saïed justified his seizure of power in 2021 in part by arguing that it was necessary to uproot corruption in the political establishment, but his administration’s subsequent steps led critics to accuse the president of instrumentalizing anticorruption efforts to eliminate his political enemies. Saïed issued a decree in 2022 that expanded the concept of “criminal reconciliation,” allowing businesspeople facing corruption charges to avoid punishment by repaying allegedly stolen funds or investing them in designated regional development projects. The process was to be managed by a commission appointed by the president.

President Saïed’s centralization of power after July 2021 exacerbated the government’s existing opacity regarding official decision-making and actions by law enforcement agencies. A 2016 freedom of information law was faulted by watchdog groups for its security-related exemptions.

Al-Bawsala, an NGO that promotes transparency and accountability, has likewise criticized ruling elites from all parties over their lack of responsiveness to the public. An academic study of budgetary processes, published in May 2023 by a researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), criticized the government for “untransparent, ad-hoc, volatile, and arbitrary decision-making.” Saïed often rules by decree and engages in little consultation with legislative or nongovernmental actors. Authorities have also increasingly banned journalists from observing government activities, including parliamentary committee meetings and certain court cases related to national security.

In 2023, Saïed’s dissolution of Tunisia’s 350 municipal councils undermined transparency and participation at the local level. The municipal councils were designed to increase citizen participation in matters of local government, but will be replaced with local councils that enjoy far less autonomy.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the dissolution of the democratic municipal councils and ongoing opacity in budgetary negotiations.

The 2014 constitution and its 2022 replacement guarantee freedom of opinion, thought, expression, information, and publication, subject to some restrictions. During the 2011–21 period, independent outlets proliferated, including online. However, it remained difficult to obtain data about the ownership of media companies, their audiences, or the allocation of public advertising.

Since Saïed’s seizure of extraordinary powers in 2021, journalists have faced increasing pressure and intimidation from government officials in connection with their work, including criminal penalties for defamation and other alleged offenses. According to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Tunisian authorities arrested over 30 journalists during 2023. Radio host Zied el-Heni, a prominent critic of President Saïed, was arrested in June for allegedly insulting the president; el-Heni was released after two days, and the trial remained ongoing at year’s end. In May, radio journalist Khalifa Guesmi was sentenced to five years in prison—reportedly the longest sentence of any journalist since the 2011 revolution— for reporting on counterterrorism operations and refusing to reveal his sources.

Both the 2014 constitution and the new charter adopted in 2022 call for freedom of belief and conscience, but they also contain provisions that give Islam an official status. Blasphemy remains illegal, and police may invoke it as a pretext for arrests. Islamic education remains a required component of the curriculum in public schools. Converts to Christianity often experience harassment and discrimination.

Article 33 of the 2014 constitution protected academic freedom, which improved in practice after 2011, and Article 45 of the 2022 constitution provides a similar guarantee. However, self-censorship by academics persists in some instances. Students have reported being unable to pursue dissertation research on topics including sexuality and gender identity, or to engage in critiques of Islam’s role in violent extremism.

Private discussion is generally open and free, though public speech on certain topics, including criticism of the military, can draw official reprisals. The criminal ban on same-sex sexual activity also discourages open discussion of issues affecting LGBT+ people.

Since 2021, the authorities have increasingly prosecuted individuals for speech-related offenses, including insulting the president and defaming the military. The accused, who have been tried in military as well as civilian courts, have generally been individuals with significant online or offline platforms, as opposed to ordinary citizens or social media users. However, the high-profile cases effectively discouraged critical speech more broadly, as did a new presidential decree issued in 2022 that imposed heavier prison sentences and monetary penalties on individuals who spread “false information or rumors” through online or offline communication networks. Those convicted can face up to 10 years in prison if the content targets public officials. The law also grants civilian and military law enforcement greater latitude to access and search private devices and materials.

Like the 2014 constitution, the 2022 constitution guarantees the rights to assembly and peaceful demonstration. During the postrevolutionary period, public protests on political, social, and economic issues were frequent and well-attended. However, a 2015 counterterrorism law and successive states of emergency imposed significant constraints on such gatherings.

Opponents of Saïed’s regime held large protests on several occasions during 2023. In early March, protesters rallied in response to the wave of political arrests in February despite an official ban on the demonstration. Though security forces warned the protesters that their rally was illegal, they also reportedly said they would not forcibly disperse participants. Other demonstrations during the year included protests over the decline of civic freedoms and socioeconomic grievances, as well as pro-Palestinian demonstrations.

Police routinely use violent tactics to disperse public demonstrations. Journalists have photographed officers at various times using batons, tear gas, and armored vehicles against protesters.

Tens of thousands of new NGOs began operating after the revolution, holding conferences, trainings, educational programs, and other events throughout Tunisia in subsequent years. However, a 2018 law effectively equated NGOs with businesses and required them to submit to onerous reporting requirements. Under the law, all NGOs (and businesses) are required to register with a National Registry of Institutions, and to provide data on staff, assets, decisions to merge or dissolve, and operations. Failure to register may result in a year of imprisonment and a fine.

In October 2023, several parliamentarians introduced a draft law that would give the prime minister broad authority to suspend, dissolve, or deny the establishment of NGOs. The draft law also includes provisions to monitor NGO funding. Tunisian associations accepting foreign funding without prior authorization would face sanctions and possible dissolution. Rights advocates have expressed concern that if passed, this law would significantly suppress Tunisian civil society.

The constitution adopted in 2022, like its 2014 predecessor, guarantees the right to form labor unions and to strike, with exceptions for the military, security forces, and customs officials. The new charter also prohibits strikes by judges, who had mounted a strike that June to protest the president’s purge of the judiciary. Large-scale strike actions have occurred across all sectors of the economy since the 2011 revolution, with participants demanding labor reform, better wages, and improved workplace conditions. Unions have reported that some employers take steps to discourage union activities, including the dismissal of union activists.

The Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) is the predominant union organization, though independent unions also exist. The UGTT has played a significant role in brokering political agreements during moments of crisis since 2011. In 2021 it began to push President Saïed to move toward a broader political dialogue, and in 2022 it criticized the conduct of the December parliamentary elections and galvanized societal opposition to a multibillion-dollar International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan agreement championed by the president. In 2023, the UGTT maintained its opposition toward several key policies of the Saïed regime and protested the arrest of at least one union official in February.

Between the 2011 revolution and President Saïed’s seizure of extraordinary powers in 2021, elected officials took steps to institutionalize an independent judiciary. Legislation adopted in 2016 established the High Judicial Council (HJC), a body tasked with ensuring the independence of the judiciary and appointing a third of the Constitutional Court judges. Council members were elected that year by thousands of legal professionals. However, governments and lawmakers repeatedly failed to establish the Constitutional Court as envisioned by the 2014 constitution; its role would have been to evaluate the constitutionality of decrees and laws. The absence of such a court became especially problematic in 2021, as there was no authoritative mechanism for assessing the constitutionality of Saïed’s emergency measures.

In 2022, Saïed dissolved the professionally elected HJC and issued a decree creating a new, appointed body to replace it. That June, he issued a decree allowing the president to unilaterally dismiss judges, then immediately fired 57 judges on grounds of alleged corruption. An administrative court ordered the reinstatement of 49 of the dismissed magistrates in August, citing a lack of due process, but the government had not yet complied with the order as of year-end 2023.

While the 2022 constitution preserved both an HJC and a Constitutional Court in name, it granted the president final authority over judicial appointments following nominations by the HJC. In addition, the new constitution removed a clause of the 2014 constitution that granted the Constitutional Court authority to rule on the extent of the president’s powers.

Saïed’s attacks on judicial independence continued in 2023 with baseless arrests and judicial prosecutions on vague grounds. Saïed has also publicly pressured judges and prosecutors to rule against his opponents.

Though civil and criminal procedures have improved significantly since 2011, a state of emergency in place since 2015 and renewed repeatedly has given police broad license to arrest and detain people on security- or terrorism-related charges. In some cases, civilians are tried in military courts, particularly on charges of defaming the army. President Saïed has pursued politically motivated prosecutions against real and perceived opponents, including journalists, lawyers, businessmen, and opposition politicians. Many such individuals remained incarcerated at year-end 2023.

In 2014, Tunisia established a Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD) to examine political, economic, and social crimes committed since 1956, and it soon began collecting testimony. In early 2018, the parliament voted against extending the commission’s mandate, a decision that drew criticism from rights activists for weakening transitional justice efforts. The commission officially published its final report in 2020, drawing on over 62,000 complaints filed by Tunisian citizens against the state for human rights abuses. Tunisian courts began reviewing 69 indictments and 131 referrals from the IVD, but the president’s emergency measures in 2021 created uncertainty about the future of the transitional justice process.

The police force is the subject of long-standing brutality complaints, with officers accused of abusing civilians and detainees with impunity. Police unions have resisted reform efforts aimed at addressing the problem.

Physical security has been periodically threatened by terrorist attacks in recent years, including some claimed by the Islamic State (IS) militant group.

While some offenses can still draw the death penalty under Tunisian law, the authorities have not carried out an execution since 1991.

Although the constitution guarantees gender equality, women experience discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment in public spaces remains prevalent. Black Tunisians face chronic disparities on indicators including employment and education; societal bias remains a widespread problem, though a 2018 law criminalized racial discrimination.

Tunisia faces pressure from the European Union (EU) to block African migration through the Mediterranean to European countries, a dynamic that has contributed to Tunisia’s mistreatment of migrant communities. Tunisia has no asylum law, leaving the United Nations (UN) as the sole entity processing claims of refugee status in the country. Irregular migrants and asylum seekers are often housed in informal detention centers, where they suffer from substandard living conditions. Delays in the issuance of residency permits make it impossible for many to work legally, forcing them to take informal jobs with no labor protections.

Extreme levels of violence against Black and African migrants in Tunisia were recorded during 2023. In July, more than 1,000 migrants were forcibly expelled and stranded in the desert between Tunisia and Libya, subject to high temperatures without basic provisions. Acts of violence and dispossession against Black workers and suspected migrants were documented in several cities across Tunisia during the year. Rights defenders say that these actions have been effectively sanctioned by xenophobic and anti-Black rhetoric from President Saïed, who in a February speech to his national security council claimed that migration poses a threat to Tunisia’s “demographic makeup,” in addition to blaming migrants for crime and violence in Tunisia.

LGBT+ people continue to face legal discrimination. Same-sex sexual activity remains illegal, with the penal code calling for prison sentences of up to three years for “sodomy.” This law has been enforced in practice in recent years.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to an extreme climate of violence and dispossession targeting Black migrants.

The constitution guarantees freedom of movement within the country, as well as the freedom to travel abroad. However, authorities have broad license under the state of emergency to restrict individuals’ movement without initiating formal charges, and thousands of people have been affected by such orders. Human rights groups criticized the travel bans imposed after the president’s seizure of extraordinary powers in 2021 as arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movement.

The protection of property rights and the freedom to operate businesses are impeded in part by high levels of corruption and a large court backlog of property disputes.

Under existing law, women are granted half the share of inheritance that men receive, and efforts to establish gender equality in inheritance rights have failed to make progress in the parliament.

Tunisia has long been praised for relatively progressive social policies, especially in the areas of family law and women’s rights. In 2017, the Justice Ministry repealed a decree that had banned Tunisian women from marrying non-Muslim men. However, women face high rates of domestic abuse. The 2017 Law on Eliminating Violence against Women addressed domestic violence and included language intended to protect women from harassment in public and from economic discrimination. The law’s implementation has been limited by shortcomings including a lack of awareness of its provisions, a shortage of trained agents to handle complaints, pressure on women from some agents to avoid taking abusive husbands to court, and logistical barriers to reporting abuse.

Public displays of affection can lead to charges of violating public morality laws, which carry penalties including jail time.

Despite efforts by civil society groups to combat such problems, Tunisian women and children are subject to sex trafficking and forced domestic work both in Tunisia and abroad. Refugees and other migrants are also susceptible to exploitation by traffickers. Cases of exploitation in the agriculture and textile sectors are prevalent; women often work long hours with no contracts, benefits, or legal recourse, and many are reportedly transported to work sites under dangerous conditions.

Many people in Tunisia (by some estimates, nearly half) are informally employed. Informal employees usually lack work contracts, leaving them open to exploitation by employers.

Protests continue to call attention to the lack of economic opportunity associated with high inflation, unemployment, and a dearth of meaningful reform to address such issues.