The directly elected president serves as both head of state and head of government. Presidents and vice presidents can serve up to two five-year terms. Jokowi, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) candidate, won a second term as president in April 2019 with 55.5 percent of the vote, defeating former general Prabowo Subianto, the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) candidate.

Limited voting irregularities were reported, but the contest was largely considered free and fair by international election monitors. Prabowo’s campaign claimed the election was marred by widespread fraud and vote rigging, but this claim was rejected by the Constitutional Court that June. Jokowi appointed Prabowo as his defense minister.

The House of Representatives (DPR), the main parliamentary chamber, consisted of 575 members as of December 2023. Members are elected in 34 multimember districts. The 136-member House of Regional Representatives (DPD) is responsible for monitoring laws related to regional autonomy and may propose bills on the topic. All legislators serve five-year terms with no term limits.

Legislative elections were held concurrently with the presidential and local contests in April 2019. The PDI-P, led by former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, won 19.3 percent of the vote and 128 seats. Golkar, the party of former authoritarian president Suharto, won 85 seats on 12.3 percent, followed by Gerindra with 78 seats and 12.6 percent. Partai NasDem won 59 seats, while the Democratic Party (PD) of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won 54.

Two Islamic parties—the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the United Development Party (PPP)—lost seats from the last parliament, returning with 44 and 19 seats, respectively. Two other Islamic parties, the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), increased their representation, respectively winning 58 and 50 seats.

The legal framework for elections is largely democratic, and electoral authorities are mostly seen as impartial. Under a 2012 law, the hereditary sultan of Yogyakarta is that province’s unelected governor.

A 2016 revision to the law governing local elections requires the Election Oversight Agency and the General Elections Commission to conduct a binding consultation with the parliament and the government before issuing any new regulations or decisions. Activists expressed concerns that the rules would reduce electoral authorities’ independence.

The right to organize political parties is respected, and several major parties compete for power. Eligibility requirements favor large parties. The 2017 UU PU requires new parties to undergo a “factual verification” process confirming the accuracy of submitted documents on parties’ management, membership, and operations.

Communist parties are banned. The promotion of communism is banned under the criminal code passed in 2022; that code will take effect in 2026.

Indonesia has established a pattern of democratic power transfers between rival parties since 1999. The most recent handover occurred in 2014, when the PDI-P returned to power after losing the previous two presidential elections. The UU PU requires parties or coalitions fielding presidential candidates to hold 20 percent of the seats in the parliament or 25 percent of the national vote in the most recent parliamentary election. The provision effectively bars new or smaller parties from fielding candidates in the presidential race.

The UU PU had prevented people younger than the age of 40 from running for president or vice president. In October 2023, the Constitutional Court allowed individuals who had already held elected office to run for those posts even if they were not old enough per the UU PU. That exception allowed Gibran Rakabuming Raka, Jokowi’s then 36-year-old son, to run for vice president in the 2024 election alongside Defense Minister Prabowo. Also in October, the Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to introduce age limits for presidential candidates, which would have led to Prabowo’s disqualification.

While voters and candidates are generally free from undue interference, the military remains influential, with former commanders playing prominent roles in politics. Intimidation by nonstate actors—including Islamist groups—remains a problem, as is the growing use of online propaganda in political campaigns.

Political choices are also influenced by dynastic dynamics, with children of Jokowi and of former presidents taking key political roles. Jokowi’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, was named chief of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) in September 2023, two days after becoming a party member. Jokowi’s brother-in-law, Constitutional Court chief justice Anwar Usman, did not recuse himself from the petition that ultimately allowed his nephew, Gibran, to become Prabowo’s running mate.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the constitutional court, then headed by a relative of President Jokowi, effectively created an exception to an elections law that allowed one of Jokowi’s sons to run for vice president in 2024, and because relatives of top politicians are entering key roles in a manner that affects Indonesians’ political choices.

Women enjoy full political rights, and political parties are subject to 30 percent gender quotas for steering committees and candidates. However, women remain underrepresented in electoral politics, holding 21.6 percent of the DPR’s seats as of December 2023. Women do sometimes win leadership positions. Puan Maharani, daughter of former president Megawati and granddaughter of former president Sukarno, became the first female DPR speaker in 2019.

Ethnic Chinese are poorly represented in politics and often abstain from voting. Two parties that then had ethnic Chinese leaders, the PSI and United Indonesian Party (Perindo), contested the April 2019 elections; neither exceeded the 4-percent parliamentary threshold for seats.

Some local governments have discriminated against religious minorities by restricting access to identification cards, birth certificates, marriage licenses, and other bureaucratic necessities, limiting their political rights and electoral opportunities.

LGBT+ people are poorly represented in electoral politics.

Elected officials generally determine government policies, though national authorities have faced difficulties in implementing their decisions due to local resistance. Observers have warned that the military is regaining its influence over civilian governance and economic affairs.

Corruption remains endemic in the national and local legislatures, civil service, judiciary, and police. The most common offenses are embezzlement, bribery, and extortion. Acrimony between rival agencies—particularly the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the National Police—has hindered anticorruption efforts, and civilian investigators have no jurisdiction over the military. In 2019, the parliament passed legislation weakening the KPK, requiring all employees to join the civil service and investigators to be from the National Police.

By late 2023, six Jokowi-era ministers had been implicated in graft cases. In October, Syahrul Yasin Limpo resigned as agriculture minister and was arrested in a corruption case. In November, former communications minister Johnny G. Plate of Partai NasDem was found guilty of accepting bribes and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Partai NasDem had accused the government of targeting it because it endorsed an opposition politician for the 2024 presidential election. In late December, Jokowi dismissed KPK chairman Firli Bahuri, a month after the chairman had been accused of soliciting a bribe from Limpo in return for reducing or dismissing charges against him.

Although civil society groups comment on and influence pending policies or legislation, government transparency is limited by broad exemptions in the freedom of information law and obstacles such as a 2011 law criminalizing leaking vaguely defined “state secrets” to the public.

Indonesia hosts a vibrant and diverse media environment, though legal and regulatory restrictions hamper press freedom. The 2008 UU ITE extended libel to online media. It also criminalized distribution or accessibility of information or documents “contrary to the moral norms of Indonesia,” or involving gambling, blackmail, or defamation. Journalists carrying out legitimate reporting have been arrested under the UU ITE. Journalists also face physical and digital attack.

Foreign journalists visiting the Papua region face bureaucratic obstacles and deportation. Internet blackouts during protests and self-censorship have inhibited press activity. Journalists covering sensitive subjects, including LGBT+ issues, organized crime, sexual assault, and corruption, face harassment, violence, and threats.

While no journalists were killed in 2023, an explosive device was detonated outside the home of Papuan journalist Victor Mambor in January. An investigation identified no suspects before it was closed.

Indonesia officially recognizes Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Individuals may leave the “religion” section on their identity cards blank, but those who do—including adherents of unrecognized faiths—often face discrimination. Atheism is not accepted legally. The criminal code passed in 2022 and due to take effect in 2026 prohibits blasphemy; those who “incite” someone to convert or refrain from religious adherence would face imprisonment.

National and local governments often fail to protect religious minorities and exhibit bias in investigations and prosecutions. Building a new house of worship requires signatures of 90 congregation members and 60 local residents of different faiths. As of 2023, the government was still reconsidering the 2006 Joint Ministerial Decision on houses of worship, which has been cited as a driver of religious conflict.

Violence and intimidation against Ahmadi and Shiite communities persists.

Threats to academic freedom have increased in recent years. Hard-line groups and others are known to threaten discussions on LGBT+ matters, interfaith issues, Papua, police violence, and the 1965–66 anticommunist massacres. Academics have been charged with defamation and removed from their posts for criticism of public officials.

Public academic discussions regarding Papua have been canceled and organizers surveilled and threatened. Students, student union leaders, and others involved in Papua-related campus protests continue to face intimidation, arrest, and treason charges, with authorities linking protests to secessionist movements.

University rectors have reported pressure from the Ministry of Education to curb student protests. The education minister’s vote accounts for 35 percent of the total vote share in the election of university rectors, making selection dependent upon their relationship with the ministry.

A 2021 presidential regulation declared that Indonesia’s national philosophical ideology, Pancasila, would guide research and innovation policy. Academics fear authorities could use this decree to prohibit research deemed incompatible with Pancasila.

Laws against blasphemy, the criminalization of defamation, and certain other forms of speech inhibit expression of personal views on sensitive topics, especially online. Under the criminal code passed in 2022, those who insult government institutions verbally or in writing face imprisonment or fines. The code also prohibits public attacks on the “honor or dignity” of the president or vice president, including through technological means.

The UU ITE has also impacted online discourse in Indonesia. The DPR passed amendments to the UU ITE in December 2023; the International Commission of Jurists criticized the amended law’s provisions on purportedly false information and criminal defamation, though the law also contains a public-interest exception for the latter offense. The amended UU ITE also prohibits expression that fosters “feelings of hatred or hostility” for protected individuals. The amended law was not signed by the president by year’s end.

In 2020, the National Police issued instructions to surveil activists online and engage in creating progovernment counternarratives. The 2021 creation of the Virtual Police unit within the National Police has reportedly led to self-censorship.

Ministerial Regulation 5 (MR5) requires private digital services and platforms to register with the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology or risk being blocked. Critics allege that MR5 poses privacy and freedom-of-speech risks and provides a tool for government to censor legitimate speech by placing undue burdens on platforms and services.

Civil servants are subject to restrictions on online activity. A government task force reviews “radical” social media comments from civil servants, including perceived insults or criticisms of Pancasila, the state motto, the constitution, or the government. Civil servants cannot join organizations deemed to insult the country’s governing principles.

The government is known to surveil and detain individuals who discuss separatism in Maluku or Papua or fly the Papuan Morning Star or the Republic of South Maluku flag. Such individuals continue to face charges of treason and lengthy prison sentences if found guilty.

Protests are common and freedom of assembly is generally upheld, but recent years have seen increasing use of protest-related internet disruptions. Assemblies addressing sensitive political topics—such as the 1965–66 massacres or regional separatism—are regularly dispersed, with participants facing intimidation or violence from vigilantes or police. Freedom of assembly in Papua is increasingly restricted with violence used to disperse protests.

In September 2023, protesters opposing a development project on the island of Rempang held a demonstration in Batam. Protesters clashed with security forces, who used tear gas and water cannon. At least 40 people were arrested.

A 2013 law requires nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to register with the government and submit to regular reviews of their activities. The law targets NGOs that commit blasphemy or espouse ideas conflicting with Pancasila, such as atheism and communism. The government can dissolve noncompliant organizations without judicial oversight.

Authorities and influential Muslim organizations continue to intimidate and harass LGBT+ communities, organizations, and activists, hampering groups seeking to provide services to LGBT+ people.

Activists working to address human rights violations in Papua and expose endemic corruption are often targeted by authorities or progovernment supporters. In 2022, human rights activists Haris Azhar and Fatia Maulidiyanti were formally charged with defaming a government minister under the UU ITE. The charges stemmed from a 2021 YouTube video in which Azhar and Maulidiyanti discussed the military’s involvement in mining activity in Papua. The trial began in April 2023 and was ongoing at year’s end.

Workers can join unions, bargain collectively, and, with the exception of civil servants, stage strikes. Strikes can be unduly delayed by obligatory arbitration processes, and laws against antiunion discrimination and retaliation are poorly enforced. Under a memorandum of understanding signed in 2018, the military can assist police in dealing with strikes and demonstrations.

The 2020 omnibus law abolished sectoral minimum wages and limits unions’ negotiating power, with wages set by geography. The law, which was formulated without union consultation, extends outsourcing and reduced the number of statutory days off.

The judiciary has demonstrated its independence in some cases, particularly in the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. However, the court system remains plagued by corruption and other weaknesses. Judicial decisions can be influenced by religious considerations.

Indonesia’s Human Rights Court heard its first case since 2004 in 2022, in which a retired military officer was accused of unlawfully killing Papuan protesters in 2014. The defendant was acquitted. Some observers considered the judges’ performance promising, though the lawyer representing victims’ families voiced distrust over the trial.

In November 2023, an ethics panel of the Constitutional Court found that Chief Justice Usman committed ethical violations over his handling of the October UU PU case that allowed Gibran, his nephew, to run for vice president. Usman was demoted from the position of chief justice and barred from adjudicating any electoral disputes in 2024. However, the panel had no authority to reverse the decision in question.

Police reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions, particularly of protesters or activists suspected of separatism. Existing safeguards against coerced confessions are ineffective, and defendants are sometimes denied proper access to legal counsel, including in death penalty cases. Lawyers representing Azhar and Maulidiyanti in their defamation trial were prevented from entering the court during a June 2023 hearing.

In 2021, the government began designating Papuan separatists as terrorists under the 2018 antiterrorism law; such individuals had previously faced treason charges under the criminal code. Activists criticized the move, warning it would allow the authorities to hold people without charge for long periods.

Aceh Province uses an interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) to guide punishments and regulations. A number of districts and provinces additionally have unconstitutional Sharia-based ordinances that contradict Indonesia’s international human rights commitments.

Deadly confrontations involving security forces remain common in the Papua region, and have increased in geographic scope, intensity, and frequency since 2018. Security forces have been implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings, particularly in Papua. Military personnel accused of crimes against civilians are tried in military courts, which lack impartiality and often impose light punishments, even for serious human rights violations. Torture by law enforcement agencies is not explicitly criminalized. Prisons are overcrowded and corrupt, leading to riots, protests, fires, and jailbreaks. Violence related to natural-resource extraction and land disputes remains a problem.

In 2021, the government designated “armed criminal groups,” the government moniker used for armed Papuan groups, as terrorist organizations, granting law enforcement greater detention powers and more resources. In August 2023, Human Rights Monitor said that security forces’ conduct in 2021 operations in Papua may amount to crimes against humanity.

Papuan separatists have targeted security forces and civilians. An armed group took Philip Mehrtens, a New Zealander pilot, hostage in February 2023 after destroying his plane; he reportedly remained their hostage at year’s end. In October, the same group attacked miners in Yahukimo Regency, killing at least 13 people in the worst attack on civilians by Papuan separatists since 2018.

Under Sharia-based regulations, Aceh provincial authorities may use caning as punishment for offenses related to gambling, alcohol consumption, and illicit sexual activity.

Papuans face racial discrimination, including from authorities and political parties.

Some national laws and numerous local ordinances discriminate against women either explicitly or in effect. LGBT+ people suffer from widespread discrimination, inflammatory and discriminatory rhetoric from authorities, and attacks by hard-line Islamist groups. Ethnic Chinese, who make up approximately 1 percent of the population, are vulnerable to harassment.

Indonesia grants temporary protection to refugees and migrants but is not party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and does not accept refugees for asylum and resettlement. However, over 13,000 registered refugees and asylum seekers currently reside in Indonesia, most in transit to their ultimate destination. Those in transit have no access to the formal labor market and limited health care. While the Indonesian government recognizes the principle of nonrefoulement, these individuals are at risk of deportation in practice.

In January 2023, Jokowi acknowledged 12 major human rights abuses committed by the government, including the 1965–66 massacres, and promised compensation, though he did not offer a formal apology. Papuan activists criticized the government, saying it did not sufficiently acknowledge abuses committed against Papuans. In March, the government vowed to restore the citizenship of exiles who fled over suspected communist ties in the 1960s and had their citizenship revoked.

Freedoms to travel and change one’s place of residence, employment, or higher education are generally respected. However, Indonesians engaging in these administrative processes are sometimes vulnerable to bribery. Papuans face restrictions on movement from security forces.

UN experts have expressed concern over ongoing violence and internal displacement in the Papua region. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre counted 72,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict at the end of 2022. IDPs often flee without their identity cards, leaving them without access to services, while aid groups have documented poor living conditions in camps.

Despite a robust private sector, corruption hampers business activity. Property rights are threatened by state appropriation and licensing of communally owned land to companies, particularly impacting Indigenous communities and others with unregistered or customary land rights. Women have relatively poor rights to marital property. Ethnic Chinese in Yogyakarta face restrictions on private property ownership under a 1975 decree contravening national laws.

Indonesian authorities sought to evict several thousand residents on Rempang—including Indigenous people lacking titles on their land—to make way for the Rempang Eco-City development project in September 2023. Jokowi reversed course on forcibly evicting residents after protesters and authorities clashed at a demonstration that month, but residents reported that officials were subsequently pressuring them to accept a relocation offer.

Abortion is illegal except as life-saving treatment or in instances of rape. Adults over the age of 15 must have corroboration and witnesses to bring rape charges.

In 2022, the parliament passed a sexual violence bill, which criminalizes sexual harassment, forced contraception and sterilization, forced marriage, sexual torture, slavery and exploitation, and online sexual violence. The 2022 law criminalizes both marital rape and addresses sexual violence perpetrated against men and boys.

The criminal code approved in 2022, which comes into effect in 2026, prohibits cohabitation of unmarried people as well as consensual extramarital sex; Human Rights Watch (HRW) warned that millions of couples without marriage certificates would run afoul of the new code. The criminal code also prohibits the dissemination of information on contraception to minors.

The minimum age for marriage is set at 19. Marriages must be conducted under the supervision of a recognized religion, which obstructs interfaith marriages.

Local Sharia-based ordinances in many districts impose restrictions on dress, gambling, alcohol use, public displays of affection, and sexual activity; these ordinances are disproportionately enforced against women and LGBT+ people.

Authorities set working conditions and compensation standards, but enforcement is inconsistent. Indonesian workers are trafficked domestically and abroad, including women in domestic service and men in the fishing industry.