Internet usage and smartphone adoption in Cambodia has boomed in recent years but decreased during the coverage period. As of January 2023, Cambodia’s internet penetration rate was 67.5 percent, a 11.3 percent decrease from previous year.1 Ookla recorded Cambodia’s median mobile internet download speed at 22.79 megabits per second (Mbps) in May 20232 ; Cambodia ranked 96th globally for mobile internet download speeds. The country’s median fixed-line broadband download speed was 22.81 Mbps; it ranked 126th globally in this category.3 Telecommunications companies have attributed the increase in penetration rate to the heightened use of social media, with 88 percent of the country’s over-18 population regularly using such services. 4

Internet access, however, is constrained by poor infrastructure. Nationwide power outages have posed challenges to telecommunications companies and impose additional constraints on computer and internet use.5 In March and May 2023, Électricité du Cambodge (EdC), the power utility, announced plans for maintenance work, causing planned blackouts that lasted as long as eight hours in parts of Phnom Penh.6 Outages continued in Phnom Penh and Kandal Province in June 2023, after the coverage period.7 EdC coordinated repair-related blackouts in 2021 and 2022.8

Some other infrastructure improvements, such as the rollout of a “smart-grid” electrical system in the last 10 percent of households in remote villages living without electricity, started in December 2020.9 However, internet connections can still be extremely slow, especially in remote and rural areas (see A2). Broadband internet services depend on fixed-line networks that are not as readily available in rural areas, thus inhibiting wider internet penetration. As a result, in 2018, internet service providers (ISPs) constructed two submarine fiber-optic internet networks connecting to high-speed international connections, the Malaysia-Cambodia-Thailand (MCT) cable and the Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1) cable, covering over 23,000 miles.10 In February 2020, Telecom Cambodia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Cambodia Fiber-Optic Communication Network Co., Ltd. (CFOCN) to construct a metropolitan and regional fiber-optic backbone network.11 There were no significant updates to the project’s construction by the end of the coverage period.

The Cambodian government has demonstrated a commitment to introduce fifth-generation (5G) technology for mobile networks across the country.12 In April 2020, it signed a MoU with the Chinese firm Huawei to build a 5G network in Cambodia.13 Several mobile service providers have also aimed to introduce 5G services, including Cellcard, Smart Axiata, and Metfone.14 However, the 5G rollout stalled as the government has not issued a 5G policy, roadmap, or approvals to permit the operation of 5G networks by the end of the coverage period.15 In its Cambodia Digital Economy and Social Policy Framework 2022–2035, the government reiterated its intention to develop 5G infrastructure.16

While internet service remains relatively expensive in Cambodia, it has become more affordable over time, though a gap in access remains between urban and rural areas. According to Cable, the average monthly cost of a fixed-line broadband subscription was $28.13 in 2023,17 while 1 gigabyte (GB) of mobile data cost $0.42 on average in 2022.18 These costs are expensive for many Cambodians, which had an estimated poverty rate of 15.2 percent in 2022 per the UN Development Programme.19 In 2022, the monthly minimum wage was set at $194 for workers in the formal economy.20 Some 85 percent of Cambodians work in the informal sector with no minimum wage or protections, often earning far less than the monthly minimum.21 ISPs have sought to make their services more affordable, though the introduction of 5G services is expected to increase prices.22

Those living in urban areas are considerably more likely to have mobile internet access than those in rural areas.23 In December 2019, then prime minister Hun Sen met with the president of Axiata Group Berhad, the Malaysian firm that operates Smart Axiata, and called on the firm to expand services in rural regions, schools, libraries, and hospitals.24 Despite infrastructure improvements, the geographical digital divide led to rural Cambodians being disproportionately impacted by COVID-19-related remote-learning and -working policies. Some two million children living in the countryside were unable to access online education programs used for distance learning because they did not have access to smartphones or satellite dishes.25

A gender gap in internet usage persists in Cambodia. As of January 2023, women represented 45 percent of social media users but 50.5 percent of the population.26 In 2018, 52 percent of men owned a smartphone, representing 45 percent of internet users in the country, and 46 percent of women owned a smartphone, representing 30 percent of Cambodia’s internet users.27

Internet use also varies based on education. In 2016, 27 percent of people with no formal education owned a smartphone; that figure stood at 82 percent for those with a university degree or studying at a university.28 The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the inequalities of smartphone ownership and internet access.29 A government study revealed that over 80 percent of students reported having no access to a smartphone or tablet and lacking sufficient internet bandwidth at home.30 In December 2022, Chea Vandeth, who heads the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPTC), announced plans to launch 158 community technology centers across the country to benefit educators and students.31

No government shutdowns of internet or mobile access have been documented in Cambodia, although broad provisions in the laws governing the telecommunications sector could provide the government with the power to do so.

In October 2019, Hun Sen instructed the MPTC to address the need for Cambodia to gain direct access to the international internet gateway without relying on Vietnam or Thailand, for national security reasons.32 Three operators constitute Cambodia’s backbone network: Telecom Cambodia, Viettel Cambodia, and CFOCN.33 These operators interconnect with smaller networks, allowing exchanges of information through Wi-Fi, local area network (LAN) lines, or other means. Telecom Cambodia operates under the jurisdiction of the MPTC and the Ministry of Economy and Finance.34

In February 2022, the government announced a delay in the implementation of the highly controversial subdecree on the Establishment of the National Internet Gateway (NIG subdecree), which was adopted in February 2021 (see B3, C2, C5, and C6).35 The NIG subdecree seeks to centralize the government’s control over all incoming and outgoing domestic and international web traffic through a single internet gateway. The government-appointed NIG operators and regulatory authorities, specifically the MPTC and the Telecommunication Regulator Cambodia (TRC), were given monitoring powers.36 The NIG subdecree was not implemented as of the end of the coverage period.

Civil society stakeholders have raised doubts regarding the government’s capacity to implement its ambitious NIG at scale.37

Under Article 7 of the 2015 Law on Telecommunications, the MPTC or other relevant ministries have the authority to order telecommunications providers to “take necessary measures” in undefined circumstances of force majeure. The law separately established an enforcement body of “telecommunications inspection officials” to investigate alleged offenses under the law, with authority to call in support from the armed forces.38 Under the law, these officials can temporarily suspend telecommunications firms’ services and “suspend or fire their staff.”39

There has been an increasing diversity of service providers in Cambodia, although some obstacles restricting entry into the market persist. The telecommunications market has become increasingly competitive since it opened to private investment in 2006.40 As of November 2022, there were 42 ISPs and 5 mobile service providers.41

According to the TRC, Metfone, Smart, and Cellcard account for approximately 90 percent of mobile users.42 During the coverage period, Metfone reported having 10 million mobile subscribers,43 Smart Axiata reported 8 million,44 and Cellcard reported 4 million.45

In October 2020, the MPTC suspended or revoked the licenses of 17 telecommunications operators for allegedly inaccurately reporting their revenue.46 In May 2021, the MPTC levied heavy tax penalties against Cambodian ISPs over purported miscalculation of tax revenues since 2017. Some of these penalties were projected to cost millions of dollars, resulting in deterred investment, higher prices for consumers, and the possible collapse of smaller firms.47 In February 2022, the MPTC and the TRC suspended the license of King Technologies, which operates the ISP Opennet, and forbade them from signing up new customers over the company’s purported failure to pay $6.6 million owed to the government.48

Cambodia’s regulatory body lacks independence, notably due to provisions contained in the 2015 Law on Telecommunications and the NIG subdecree.

The TRC is the main regulatory body for the telecommunications sector in Cambodia. Its objective is ostensibly to regulate the operations of telecommunications networks and services in order to “promote fair, efficient, and transparent competition” in Cambodia.49 Although the TRC proclaims itself to be an autonomous public entity, the Law on Telecommunications significantly undermined its independence by granting the MPTC ultimate authority over the regulator in a relationship that lacks transparency.50 The TRC’s lack of independence was demonstrated in the blocks of several news sites ahead of the July 2023 election (see B1).51

News and other websites are periodically blocked in Cambodia, particularly those that disseminate information that could be perceived as a threat to the ruling government. The NIG increases the risk that more websites and content will be blocked in the future (see A3 and B3).

In July 2023, after the coverage period, the government ordered the blocking of the news outlets RFA and Cambodia Daily and the public information portal Kamnotra. The order came in the week before the general election, stating that the blocked outlets’ reporting could “make confusion, affect the government’s honor and prestige, and fail to govern the operating conditions of the Information Ministry.”52

In June 2023, after the coverage period, Hun Sen threatened to block Cambodians’ access to Facebook and urged users to migrate to other platforms.53 The statements, issued ahead of the July 2023 elections, came after Meta’s Oversight Board recommended that his Facebook and Instagram accounts be suspended for six months for using language that could incite violence.54

In February 2023, the TRC ordered ISPs to block the English- and Khmer-language news sites belonging to VOD. The blocks came after Hun Sen ordered the revocation of the license of VOD’s parent organization (see B2 and B6).55 The websites remained inactive at the end of the coverage period for some users.56 News outlets perceived as less critical of the government were not blocked ahead of the July 2023 elections. Ahead of the 2018 polls, the government similarly ordered the temporary blocking of 17 websites, including the Phnom Penh Post, Voice of America (VOA), and VOD for 48 hours.57

In the immediate wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Cambodian government reportedly blocked access to news sites. In March 2020, Monoroom.info, a Khmer-language news site based in France, was blocked after it published numerous articles on the impact of the coronavirus in Cambodia.58 The site was accessible as of April 2021.59 The TRC blocked two websites owned by news outlet TVFB in April 2020 after the outlet’s media license was cancelled and its editor was arrested (see B2);60 the websites appeared to be inactive at the end of the coverage period.

Websites hosting pornography or sexually explicit images are subject to blocking in Cambodia under the Law on Suppression of Human Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation.61 The government banned online gambling in 2019, citing concerns that the industry was being used for criminal extortion.62 The TRC blocked 79 online gambling websites in November 2021 and 123 such websites in January 2022.63

Social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter were freely available during the coverage period.64

The amount of online content removed at the behest of state or nonstate actors remains difficult to assess, as the process is unofficial and nontransparent. Content was removed following government pressure or user complaints during the coverage period, and the government revoked the licenses of online media outlets in apparent retaliation for their content (see B6).

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, “fake news” allegations became the standard for cracking down on dissent or criticism of the government. In July 2022, the Ministry of Information’s Fake News Monitoring Committee said it had investigated 1,376 cases in the first half of the year.65 The committee reportedly responds to reports by warning people of misconduct, filing lawsuits, revoking or suspending media licenses, and seeking to restrict content or accounts responsible.66 In December 2021, the committee announced that it had recorded 1,938 instances that year, including 1,023 that it said were meant to provoke criticism of the government, 809 cases of insults to King Norodom Sihamoni and political leaders, and 106 deemed to cause social chaos. Most of this content was posted to social platforms.67 The government reported documenting 1,343 cases of purportedly false or “objectionable” news from social media posts throughout all of 2020.68

The government regularly revokes the licenses of online news outlets following their reporting, sometimes also requiring the news sites to remove online content (see B6). In February 2023, the government revoked the media operating license of VOD’s parent organization, the Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM), effectively shutting down VOD—one of the country’s last independent news outlets—and blocking its website over its reporting on Hun Manet’s role in the government. Before the website was blocked (see B1), the platform publicly apologized and removed the article.69 In April 2021, the Ministry of Information similarly revoked the media license of online news outlet K01 TV after it posted several videos that allegedly criticized the government’s coronavirus response. Hun Sen asked the outlet to delete the videos and forced the publishers to issue an apology.70

In March 2023, the government threatened legal action against CamboJa News if it did not correct alleged misrepresentations in their reporting on the government’s revocation of three Khmer-language news outlets’ licenses earlier that month (see B6). CamboJa News modified the article in response.71

Arresting and subsequently forcing individuals to make public apologies in lieu of criminal charges is a common tactic the government uses in response to dissent or opinions it considers unfavorable. For instance, in June 2022, the Phnom Penh Municipal Police summoned a Facebook user after he posted allegedly false information about the police. The police forced him to apologize publicly for “damaging the honor of the police” and retract the post.72 In September 2021, a TikTok user was arrested and forced to film a videotaped apology for allegedly insulting traffic police in Phnom Penh in a video that has since been removed.73

The Cambodian authorities also regularly attempt to prevent content from being published online by threatening anyone who takes pictures or videos of incidents to raise awareness of government wrongdoing or human rights abuses.74 In January 2023, authorities questioned CSOs for posting of the music video of “Workers Blood,” a song performed by rapper Kea Sokun marking the nine-year anniversary of deadly police crackdown on a peaceful garment worker protest in Phnom Penh.75 Authorities alleged the video contributed to social disorder and threatened legal action against the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) if it was not deleted. At least three CSOs, including LICADHO, removed the video from social media to avoid legal action.76 Sou Senghak of Samarakot News was physically assaulted by an army officer in the district of Choam Ksan, after observing the possibly illegal transportation of timber; the journalist then filed a complaint with authorities. Both parties agreed to resolve the matter out of court, averting a lawsuit, in August 2022; as part of that agreement, the news outlet retracted a story on the incident.77

The government’s restrictions on internet content lack transparency, are vaguely defined, and lack adequate judicial oversight. The MPTC can order ISPs to block websites at the request of other government departments. Implementation of censorship is nontransparent, apparently based on informal communications between government officials and service providers. There is limited avenue for appeal.

The NIG subdecree, adopted in February 2021, grants the government sweeping powers to restrict and block access to digital content (see A3). NIG operators are obligated to collaborate with the MPTC to block or disconnect network connections that affect “safety, social order, dignity, culture, or traditions.” If NIG operators or ISPs fail to comply with these broad conditions, they could incur a range of steep financial penalties and even have their licenses suspended or revoked.78 Although the implementation of the infrastructure for the NIG was delayed, the government still underscores its plans to move forward with its installation (see A3).

In February 2020, the Ministry of Information confirmed that a government “commission” monitors Cambodian media, including social media platforms. The commission operates under the legal authorization of a May 2018 interministerial Prakas (Proclamation) on Website and Social Media Control. If the commission deems online content to be unfit for publication or to contain false information, it will either force the publisher to remove the post or take legal action.

The government underscored its commitment to tightening its media-licensing regime during the coverage period. In September 2022, the Ministry of Information announced that it will apply greater scrutiny to online publications’ journalistic ethics, dissemination of information that is considered false, and organizational structure and scale when issuing media licenses.79 Several news outlets have already had licenses revoked (see B2).

In September 2022, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) announced plans to develop social media code of ethics to curb the posting of “provocative” and “immoral” images and videos by online users, particularly women. MoWA intends to partner with the MPTC to curb content violating the code of conduct.80 MoWA’s plans for implementation were not released by the end of the coverage period.

In August 2019, the government threatened to revoke the licenses of or shut down online news outlets purportedly spreading false information that threatened national security.81 Those that the government deems violate their license conditions can be ordered to remove offending content or post corrections.

In April 2020, the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts created the Disciplinary and Accolade Council to track “illicit content” online. 82

Self-censorship online among journalists, activists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), unionists, and ordinary users is widespread and has reportedly increased in recent years. A clampdown on civil society has created an environment in which NGOs have increasingly self-censored, restricted, or even completely ceased their activities online.

A poll of journalists and media outlets conducted by the CCIM and released in March 2022 noted that journalists fear reporting on sensitive issues because of repressive laws and regulations (see B5 and C2). The poll found that 72 percent of respondents are concerned with reporting on political issues, 64 percent are concerned about reporting on human rights abuses, and 61 percent are concerned about reporting on impunity cases.83 Additionally, 64 percent of respondents reported that they practiced self-censorship due to the political environment.84 Journalists have avoided reporting on sensitive issues including Hun Sen and his family, land disputes, corruption, drug trafficking, and political issues due to legal action, harassment, and intimidation by authorities (see C3 and C7).85

The government’s continued repression of dissenting voices and focus on the spread of purportedly false news86 were accompanied by an increase in online surveillance, as well as a rise in prosecutions linked to online speech. Arrests under COVID-19 legislation exacerbated Cambodians’ fears for their safety if they expressed opinions about the pandemic online (see C3).87 These factors have contributed to increased self-censorship. According to a 2021 survey conducted by the Cambodia Fundamental Freedoms Monitor Project (FFMP), only 47 percent of respondents felt free to speak on social media.”88 Additionally, 36 percent of NGOs and trade union leaders polled felt unsafe sharing information through social media.89 One-tenth of respondents reported they “always” avoided saying what they wanted to in public or online for fear of retaliation and 17 percent stated they “regularly” felt like they need to self-censor. 90

The spread of disinformation and misinformation has been a growing concern in recent years. A 2020 report from the Oxford Internet Institute noted the presence of coordinated cybertroop teams that manipulate information on social media on behalf of government agencies, politicians and parties, and citizens and influencers.91 The teams work to support progovernment messaging, attack the opposition, and spread disinformation.

In July 2023, RFA reported that the CPP’s Cyber War Room, operated by Hun Manet, was coordinating pro-CPP disinformation on social media ahead of that month’s elections. The War Room leaders allegedly ordered supporters and government officials to post Facebook messages attacking CSOs and independent media outlets critical of the government.92

In December 2021, when over 1,000 union members began their weekslong protest after losing employment with the prominent casino company Nagaworld, suspicious Facebook accounts surfaced and were used to accuse the protesters of staging a “color revolution” and of having foreign influence. One of the Facebook accounts, known as “Brave Women Volunteers,” had only 100 friends and a single post from the day before the accusations were disseminated. These claims were also shared by progovernment media outlets and an Interior Ministry official.93 The day after the Facebook posts surfaced, the Brave Women Volunteers account disappeared.94

Hun Sen, who has more than 10 million followers on Facebook, has been accused of manipulating his page to create an exaggerated perception of his popularity.95 The Phnom Penh Post alleged that only 20 percent of Hun Sen’s new “likes” in February and March 2016 came from within Cambodia. The rest reportedly came from “click farms” based abroad, in which low-paid workers were employed to like his page.96

The owner of the Phnom Penh Post, a Malaysian businessman, has reportedly interfered with the paper’s editorial independence by demanding the removal of an article detailing his links to the Cambodian government from its website. The incident compelled 13 journalists and editors to resign and led to the firing of the paper’s chief editor in 2018.97

The government has also conducted disinformation campaigns against the CNRP. In November 2019, for example, online news outlet Coda Story reported that opposition supporters were forced to make videos “confessing” that they helped Sam Rainsy, the party’s former leader, attempt to return from self-imposed exile.98 In at least one case, a video was shared by progovernment news outlet Fresh News to its Facebook page.

Although economic and regulatory constraints generally do not prevent the publication of online content, a number of media outlets with an online presence have shut down due to high taxes. Separately, online outlets are required to obtain licenses, and four of these licenses were revoked due to the outlets’ reporting during the coverage period, which led to some removals of content (see B2).

The government regularly revokes the licenses of online news outlets following their reporting. In February 2023, the Ministry of Information revoked the media operating license of VOD’s parent company for allegedly violating journalistic ethics (see B2).99 The government’s highly politicized decision was strongly condemned by domestic and international CSOs.100

Similarly, in March 2023, the Ministry of Information revoked the media licenses of three Khmer language media outlets—Federation of Cambodia–ASEAN Journalists, Raksmey Kampong Cham, and Dumming Knonh Srok—for alleged ethics violations in reporting related to a senior government official’s role in land fraud.101

During the previous coverage period, the Ministry of Information revoked the media licenses of three news outlets that primarily operated online, the Bayong Times, KCTV, and Cambodia Today, following reporting on government corruption.102

Between September 2020 and August 2021, the Ministry of Information revoked seven media licenses.103 In March 2021, two online news outlets, Youth Techo and Stoeng Charl, had their licenses revoked because the government claimed they had spread false information that would cause social unrest.104 A Ministry of Information employee also had his media license revoked after he uploaded a picture on his Facebook page of what he erroneously thought was a body of a deceased COVID-19 patient. He took the post down but was later fired.105 Also in March 2021, a popular social media publisher lost his media license after posting a video exposing monks in Siem Reap physically beating junior monks.106

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because the revocation of the media licenses of four news publications, including that of Voice of Democracy, marked a significant decline in the availability of independent news.

The diversity of the online environment is undermined by the government’s censorship of critical voices and independence media. Authorities shut down radio stations and newspapers in 2017 and during the run-up to the 2018 and 2023 elections. The internet has become one of the main sources of news and information for Cambodians, and social media has allowed the proliferation of more diverse content that is free from government influence.107 Many Cambodians turn to Facebook, RFA, VOA, VOD (before its license revocation), and CamboJa News as key news sources. The Southeast Asia Globe and ASEAN Today are also independent news sources based in Cambodia.108

As of July 2023, VOD’s Khmer news site had more than 1.8 million followers on Facebook.109 RFA’s Khmer-language Facebook page had more than 7.5 million followers,110 and VOA Khmer had more than 7.8 million,111 making them some of Cambodia’s most-visited Facebook pages.112 In contrast, Fresh News, an outlet closely associated with the government, had over 4.4 million followers.113 Similarly, the Khmer-language Facebook pages of the progovernment Khmer Times114 and Phnom Penh Post115 respectively had 38,000 and 128,000 followers.

However, the limited number of independent media outlets remaining has affected the diversity of content online, and has increased self-censorship (see B1, B4, and B6).116 Media ownership is highly concentrated, and several major media outlets are affiliated with the ruling CPP. Ahead of the July 2023 general election, the information environment was further constrained. In February and March 2023, the government revoked the licenses of the CCIM and three Khmer-language news sites (see B6). In July 2023, after the coverage period, the websites and social media pages of RFA were temporarily blocked by some providers (see B1).117

In the leadup to the July 2023 polls, misinformation related to Hun Sen and Hun Manet spread online.118 The presence of misinformation in Cambodia likely acutely impacts Indigenous communities, in part due to limited digital literacy and a lack of reliable information in Indigenous languages.119

Amid heightened restrictions on freedom of assembly, communities, CSOs, and activists have turned to petition websites and social media, particularly Facebook, as platforms for advocacy and to organize assemblies. However, repressive laws, arrests, prosecutions, and increased harassment around digital campaigns have undermined the use of the internet for mobilization (see C2, C3, and C7).

The government’s monitoring of social media and frequent arrests of users for their online political activity have impeded Cambodians’ ability to mobilize and campaign on political issues (see C3 and C5). During the previous coverage period, in September 2021, Hun Sen tapped into a private Zoom call between former CNRP leaders, many of whom live in exile, to warn them that he had been monitoring them and to warn them against continuing their “disruptive activities.” He then stated that approximately 20 of their phone calls had been tapped.120 In October 2020, authorities threatened at least six journalists reporting on protests coinciding with the anniversary of the Paris Peace Agreements, which marked the end of the civil war; the journalists were told to stop shooting live footage and to surrender their phones and cameras.121

Users have mobilized through social media and online petitions to draw attention to issues including the electoral process, environmental justice, and gender equality. In August 2022, Cambodians expressed outrage on Facebook around the large-scale deforestation of Phnom Tamao forest.122 Hun Sen subsequently canceled land-development permits and ordered a reforestation of the area, citing requests from government officials.123 CSOs have used online petitions to call on the government to protect women's rights to assemble and to refrain from violently responding to their involvement in demonstrations, including through the use of sexual harassment.124

Throughout the coverage period, CSOs drafted several joint statements, open letters, and recommendations to the government on a range of issues, including the revocation of VOD’s license,125 gender-based violence against women journalists,126 and freedom of expression more broadly.127

Although some articles in the constitution guarantee freedom of expression, constitutional amendments passed in 2018 undermine these rights, and the legal framework imposes significant restrictions on press freedom and freedom of expression, including online.128

Amendments to the constitution and the criminal code129 adopted in February 2018 restrict fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression online.130 In particular, amendments to Articles 42 and 49 of the constitution state that individuals and political parties should only conduct activities that uphold Cambodia’s “national interest.”131 The broad, vague wording of the amendments leaves them open to abuse, as any legitimate online discourse could be deemed unconstitutional if it ostensibly impacts the national interest.

In April 2020, the government passed the Law on the Management of the Nation in a State of Emergency to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. This law empowers the government to monitor information online, ban or restrict news and media sharing, and implement other measures it deems necessary.132

A 2019 draft Law on Access to Information133 contained protections for whistleblowers and had the potential to positively impact free expression online if approved and enforced. However, an updated draft released in August 2019 raised concerns about the law’s adherence to international human rights standards,134 as well as its use of broad and unclear standards that could threaten access of information and freedom of expression.135 For example, the law narrowly defines the type of information and institutions it applies to; lacks effective oversight procedures; permits public authorities to deny disclosure in various overly broad situations; and contains a criminal libel and defamation provision.136 While the law was reportedly in the final review stage in November 2021,137 the government announced in January 2023 that it would be adopted within two years of the July polls.138

In January 2021, the General Commissariat of the National Police issued a directive barring journalists from filming, recording, or livestreaming ongoing police investigations and other duties performed by the police.139 If journalists are found to be in violation of this decree, authorities can take legal action against them under the Press Law. Three days before this directive was established, the information minister threatened journalists who took photos and covered news related to authorities in “prohibited areas.”140 The new directive is vaguely worded and open to broad interpretation, whereby journalists could be arrested for undertaking legitimate reporting and investigative activities.

Other directives have been presented in provinces outside of Phnom Penh. In November 2021, Kampot governor Mao Thonin ordered the provincial information department to increase its monitoring of journalists. Journalists were also required to report to that department before reporting on issues within Kampot. Following public outcry, the information minister called the directive “wrong” and warned that it may violate Article 40 of the constitution.141

While free-expression protections are enshrined in the constitution, expression is nonetheless threatened by provisions of Cambodian law, notably under parts of the criminal code.142

Recently passed laws and pending legislation impose a range of civil liability and criminal penalties. The NIG subdecree—which has yet to be implemented as of May 2023 (see A3)—imposes hefty financial penalties and media license suspension on NIG operators or ISPs who fail to comply with any of the stipulated provisions (see A3 and B3). Fines range from 50 million ($12,220) to 100 million riels ($24,440) for individuals, and from 500 million ($122,200) to one billion riels ($244,400) for legal entities. The NIG subdecree also includes a vague catch-all penalty clause, which subjects any natural or legal person to punishment under “applicable laws” for committing offenses that “affect national security, social order, or national revenue.”143 While the final version of the NIG subdecree added a judicial appeal process, CSOs have noted that the Cambodian judiciary lacks independence.144

In August 2020, the government released the draft Law on Public Order, which restricts freedom of expression online by prohibiting the use of writing, images, and other content on social media that endangers national tradition and dignity.145 The draft law targets women and LGBT+ people by criminalizing wearing clothes that are “too short” or “revealing” in public spaces, including online spaces. Individuals can be fined 100,000 ($24) to 500,000 riels ($122) and imprisoned from one to six days for engaging in prohibited activities.146 The bill had not been passed by the end of the coverage period.

The government’s revised draft Law on Cybercrime—which an August 2020 leak revealed had been heavily revised and broadened in scope—raised alarm from rights groups for its potential to intensify the government’s crackdown on free expression (see C6).147 While the draft law outlaws a few genuine issues such as child sexual abuse imagery, Article 45 permits authorities to fine or imprison persons if they knowingly make or spread a “false statement or disinformation through information technology,” potentially justifying arrests for allegedly false information about national security, public health or safety, relations between Cambodia and other countries, the outcome of a national election, public confidence in the functioning of the government, or other sensitive political issues.148 If passed, the law would impose a prison sentence of two to three years and a fine from 4 million ($950) to 10 million riels ($2,380) for those allegedly spreading disinformation,149 and a one- to six-month prison sentence and a fine of 100,000 ($24) to one million riels ($237) for defamation offenses, online or offline (see C1).150 As of September 2022, the draft was reportedly nearly final.151

Under Article 495 of the criminal code, individuals can be arrested for incitement to disturb public order or affecting the dignity of individuals and public officials—a broadly worded provision that can be used to prosecute online critics of the government.152 Articles 305 and 307,153 which govern defamation and public insult respectively, are frequently used against those engaged in online discourse. Under the criminal code, individuals can also be prosecuted in connection with written documents or pictures that are released online unintentionally or without their consent.154 Those convicted for defamation or public insult can be fined up to $2,500.155 Defamation by media outlets, which is covered in the 1995 Press Law, is punishable with a fine of between $250 to $1,200, and outlets convicted must publish a retraction.156 People can face prison time in connection with online expression under a variety of criminal charges including forgery, which carries a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, and incitement to disturb social security or discriminate against a person or group, punishable by up to two and three years in prison, respectively.157

A 2018 amendment to the criminal code introduced a lèse-majesté offense (Article 437) that criminalizes defamation of, insults of, and threats against the king. The crime is punishable by between one and five years in prison and a fine of $500 to $2,500. It also applies to media outlets carrying allegedly insulting content.

The 2015 Law on Telecommunications further increased government control over the information and communication technologies (ICT) sector and threatened the rights to privacy and freedom of expression. Using telecommunications to plan criminal activity or damage property can result in a prison sentence of up to six months and fines of up to $8,800. Article 80 punishes the “establishment, installation, and utilization of equipment in the telecommunications sector” leading to “national insecurity” with 7 to 15 years in prison.

The 2015 Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO) contains provisions—including Article 24, which requires CSOs to act neutrally toward political parties—that have the potential to restrict freedom of expression, including online.

Article 1 of the current Press Law “assures freedom of the press and freedom of publication in conformity with Articles 31 and 41 of the constitution,” but the law does not explicitly cover online media. The law also allows civil action against broadly defined activities; for example, it restricts content that does not promote “the good custom of society” under Article 14,158 violations of which can incur a fine of between $250 to $1,200.159

In December 2020, the government announced that updates to the Press Law were being drafted, though they were not released as of the end of the coverage period.160

The government has signaled its intent to legislate so-called fake news.161 In March 2019, Hun Sen called on relevant ministries to consider drafting a law.162 Later that year, the Ministry of Information began research to inform new policies related to the dissemination of false news.163

Different articles of the criminal code include charges for “plotting,” “defamation,” “falsifying information,” and “incitement to commit a felony”.164

Article 11 of the March 2021 Law on Measures to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 and other Severe and Dangerous Contagious Diseases165 imposes a prison sentence of up to five years and a fine of up to 20 million riels ($4,760) for “intentionally obstructing” the implementation of COVID-19 measures. Though Article 11 does not explicitly restrict online freedoms, authorities have used this provision to target and silence online speech relating to COVID-19 and vaccines (see C3).166

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because extreme prison sentences were not imposed against internet users during the coverage period, though people still faced arrest for their online activities, and mass trials against opposition figures continued.

Prosecutions for online speech continued as the government targeted dissenting voices in the political opposition and among the general public, as well as human rights defenders and journalists.167 Individuals faced several charges, including defamation, insult of a public official, and incitement to commit a felony.168

Authorities continued to arrest and prosecute former CNRP members en masse for their online activities. Following the politicized conviction of Kem Sokha, the primary opposition candidate to current premier Hun Manet, in March 2023,169 authorities arrested opposition figures Yim Sinorn and Hun Kosal for Facebook comments critiquing the government. Yim Sinorn was released after posting a public apology video and later joined the ruling CPP; Hun Kosal reportedly remained in custody at the end of the coverage period.170 In February 2023, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court upheld the 18-month prison sentence of former CNRP official Kem Tola for Facebook comments critiquing the government in 2019.171 In December 2022, 36 former opposition members received sentences from the Phnom Penh Municipal Court for plotting against the government; their convictions were based in part on their Facebook posts.172 Of the four members who were in Cambodia, three received five-year sentences.173 Members tried in absentia faced up to seven years in prison, while former CNRP member Heng Sokleng was released on bail. In a June 2022 trial, 50 people received five-to-eight-year terms; the trial reportedly dealt with social media comments critical of the government.174 In October 2022, Sam Rainsy received a life term in absentia for allegedly ceding territory to a foreign entity.175 In March 2022, during the previous coverage period, a court convicted 20 CNRP members over their opposition activism, including criticism of the government posted on social media. Twelve of those sentenced were already detained and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment; seven were in exile and sentenced in absentia to 10 years in prison.176

Individuals are also subjected to criminal procedures when denouncing violations of free and fair election principles, corruption, and irregularities on the part of officials. In December 2022, the Phnom Penh Appeal Court upheld the Phnom Penh Municipal Court’s conviction against Son Chhay, a member of the opposition Candlelight Party who was found guilty defaming the CPP and the National Election Committee. Son Chhay had discussed alleged fraud that marred the June 2022 commune elections with Cambodia Daily.177 The Appeal Court ordered Son Chhay to pay $1 million in damages. Days after the appeal was decided, Hun Sen warned that those defaming the ruling party would be sued, stating that the lawsuit against Son Chhay was meant to deter others.178

Internet users have faced arrests and convictions for their online activity. For example, in November 2021, a 16-year-old boy with autism—who is the son of detained CNRP official Kak Komphear—was arrested and convicted for criticizing government leaders through a voice message in a Telegram group.179 His sentence, including an eight-month prison term, was upheld by the Phnom Penh Appeal Court in March 2022.180

Authorities have previously targeted internet users for sharing allegedly false information related to the coronavirus pandemic and the government's response. In February 2022, during the previous coverage period, CNRP activist Voeurn Veasna was sentenced to a year in prison for incitement over Facebook posts in which he criticized the government’s pandemic response and said Hun Sen sought to appoint his son as his successor.181

Journalists across Cambodia continued to be arrested or harassed for their online reporting. In August 2022, five VOD journalists, one of whom was physically assaulted (see C7), were detained for seven hours while reporting on deforestation at Phnom Tamao (see B8). Authorities claimed the reporters had entered a prohibited area; other journalists in recent weeks had freely reported on the situation.182 In July 2022, an appeals court upheld a provincial court’s sentencing of journalist Kao Piseth for accusing Hun Sen of corruption and questioning Sinopharm coronavirus vaccines in a December 2021 Facebook post. Kao Piseth received a two-year prison sentence and a 3-million-riel ($713) fine.183

Authorities continue to charge users under the lèse-majesté amendment of 2018 to Article 437 of the criminal code. In February 2023, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court upheld the in absentia 18-month conviction against CNRP official Kem Tola over a series of social media comments against the government and the king; Tola was convicted of incitement to overthrow the government.184 In January 2023, Hun Sen called for a police investigation and detention of a Facebook user who criticized him on a picture of an official trip to the Maldives.185 In March 2023, opposition activists Yim Sinorn and Hun Kosal were placed in detention in Prey Sar prison on charges of insulting the king and inciting serious social unrest. The charges are connected with social media posts about the relative positions of Hun Sen and the monarch at the SEA Games torch-lighting ceremony at Angkor Wat. 186

Encryption technology is freely available. There are some limits on anonymous communication.

The 2015 Regulation on Cell Phone Data threatens suspensions and fines for mobile service providers who do not register the identities of customers.187 The regulation obliges companies to supply police with identification details of SIM card holders on request.188 In August 2022, the MPTC issued a final warning to mobile service providers to stop selling unregistered SIM cards by January 2023.189 As of May 2022, Cambodia recorded over 19 million registered SIM cards. The authorities have cracked down on retailers who failed to register SIM card owners since 2017.190 In 2016, a TRC spokesman said that the government would monitor telecommunications operators’ databases to prevent unregistered SIM cards from being distributed that year.191 According to the TRC, the stricter implementation of the regulation led to a decrease in the number of mobile subscribers between 2016 and 2018.192

Responding to heightened surveillance, Cambodians have increasingly turned to encrypted applications such as WhatsApp to communicate. Government officials also increasingly use encrypted applications.193 However, under the NIG subdecree (see A3), ISPs will be required to make users complete online forms with accurate, identifiable information, including names and birthdates, thus undermining anonymous communication.194

The government monitors residents’ publicly visible activity online and extralegally surveils private communications, despite the existence of some legal safeguards.

Article 97 of the 2015 Law on Telecommunications criminalizes eavesdropping by private individuals but permits secret surveillance with approval from an undefined “legitimate authority.” The law includes no legal or procedural safeguards and appears to authorize undeclared monitoring of “any private speech via telecommunications.”195 The passing of the NIG subdecree allows for the government’s unfettered surveillance of individuals’ online activity, but the extent to which this law will be implemented is not yet known (see A3 and B3).

Under the September 2022 draft of the proposed Cybersecurity Law, authorities can seize computer systems and access user data in response to suspected threats or incidents that could cause “significant harm” to “national security, national defense, foreign relations, the economy, public health, safety or public order.” 196 The draft outlines the penalties for those who fail to comply with the provisions as up to one year of imprisonment and a fine of 150 million riels ($35,670). The draft remains under stakeholder review as of the end of the coverage period. 197

Private communications have been monitored and published online to discredit public figures in recent years. While members of the ruling CPP have been targeted, individuals affiliated with the CNRP have more often been affected. For example, in October 2017, the progovernment online media outlet Fresh News published purported leaks of CNRP lawmakers’ private conversations; Fresh News obtained the messages from the Sei Ha Facebook page, an anonymous page often accused of being a vehicle for government propaganda.198

Monitoring of CNRP members’ private communications continued during the coverage period. In December 2022, authorities relied in part on recordings of private phone calls to prosecute 36 former CNRP leaders and members in a mass trial (see C3).199 In December 2020, former CNRP activist Kong Mas was arrested in connection with the mass trial of CNRP officials on “plotting” charges. The authorities confiscated his cell phone. Later, he discovered his Facebook passwords were changed and his account had been hacked. The hackers used his account to send messages to other CNRP members in an apparent attempt to manipulate recipients of the messages into incriminating themselves.200

In 2019, the National Police announced they were monitoring the social media activity of CNRP supporters ahead of Sam Rainsy’s expected return to Cambodia, while the Ministry of Interior confirmed the government was monitoring phone communications between Rainsy and his supporters.201 In September 2019, two CNRP members, Sun Bunthon and Nou Phoeun, were questioned by police; officials addressed the transcript of their private phone conversation, which focused on Cambodia’s political situation and Rainsy’s expected return, during questioning.202 In January 2018, amid claims of illicit affairs allegedly involving high-ranking government officials, Hun Sen implied that the government could access private phone records.203

In recent years, authorities have stated on numerous occasions that they were monitoring online content.204 In 2017, the National Police announced that it was monitoring Facebook to detect and deter “rebel movements against the government.”205 The ruling CPP’s five-year strategic plan, adopted in January 2018, strongly emphasizes the need for increased surveillance.206 The 2018 interministerial Prakas on Website and Social Media Control gives extensive surveillance powers to the government and mandates that the MPTC, the Ministry of Information, and the Ministry of Interior form a special unit to effectively “police” social media, ostensibly to fight against purportedly false news (see B3).207 In October 2019, the Ministry of Interior’s information technology department announced plans to create a Security Operation Center, which it said would monitor online threats on all digital platforms.208 In January 2021, the Ministry of Information announced its intention to increase monitoring of TikTok and private communications platforms, including WhatsApp, Telegram, and Messenger.209 As a result of this increased monitoring, the government has targeted individuals for their speech on Telegram and a Ministry of Labor government official was fired for spreading “fake news” via Telegram voice messages about the number of COVID-19 infections in Cambodia.210

In September 2021, the Ministry of Interior and Chinese law enforcement officials agreed to form an “anti-crime plan” whereby Beijing would provide the National Police with equipment, including biometric surveillance technology.211 This has led to fears that the surveillance technology could be used against dissidents or those perceived critical of the Cambodian government. These concerns were reiterated by Cambodian labor activists who claimed that their online and offline activities were being tracked by authorities employing Chinese surveillance technology. A government official denied this claim.212

Service providers are required to provide communication information to the government, though this process lacks judicial oversight. Article 6 of the 2015 Law on Telecommunications mandates that all telecommunications operators provide ICT service data to the MPTC.213 There is no requirement for a judicial warrant or other safeguards, and the law places no limits on how long data can be stored.214

The NIG subdecree contains a catch-all clause requiring NIG operators to maintain technical records, lists of internet protocol (IP) addresses, and internet traffic records (see A3, B3, and C2). Under this clause, bulk data must be collected and maintained with no clear purpose.215 One source reported that ISPs are struggling to identify affordable options for storing the bulk data required by the subdecree.216

The draft Law on Cybercrime obliges all ISPs to retain and maintain the data of internet users for a minimum of 180 days and obliges ISPs to provide the user-identifiable data upon request from the competent authorities (see C2). 217

The interministerial Prakas on Website and Social Media Control also obliges ISPs to “install software programs and equip internet surveillance tools to easily filter and block any social media accounts or pages” deemed illegal.218 The Prakas does not provide for any right to challenge a decision taken pursuant to its mandates, nor does it provide for judicial recourse for users whose rights are negatively affected by its implementation.219 There were no updates on its implementation during the coverage period.

In June 2021, the Asia Times reported that Chinese government officials had sought access to the personal data collected by Cambodia’s “Stop COVID-19” contact tracing system.220 The MPTC and the Health Ministry denied the outlet’s reporting.221 The allegations highlighted the lack of privacy safeguards in the system.222

Journalists, activists, and individuals face increasing harassment, smear campaigns, and violence in Cambodia, including at times instigated by state officials. A threat-assessment survey conducted by the CCIM in 2022 found that 39 percent of surveyed journalists reported being verbally attacked or physically assaulted while carrying out their duties, while 56 percent said they had experienced legal harassment resulting from their work.223

Physical attacks against online journalists and activists were also reported during the coverage period. In January 2023, the editor in chief of BTN Media was reportedly pushed into a canal by a military officer who owned a sand-dredging site; the journalist was reporting on the impact of sand dredging on nearby rice fields.224 In August 2022, a VOD video journalist was slapped in the face and had his phone taken by an officer after recording the detention of his colleagues (see C3). The journalists were reporting on the Phnom Tamao forest clearing (see B8).225 The Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association (CJAA) reported that in August 2022, the car of a Penh Chet Media journalist was shot by an unknown assailant after the journalist published an article on illegal cockfighting; the journalist alleged that authorities may have been involved in the activity.226

RFA reported that CPP supporters and government officials were encouraged by Hun Manet’s Cyber War Room to harass CSOs and critical media outlets via social media ahead of the July 2023 elections (see B5).227 In a June 2023 Facebook livestream, after the coverage period, Hun Sen threatened political opponents with violence, stating that he would “gather CPP people to protest and beat you up” and send “gangsters to [your] house” if they did not choose the “legal system.” Meta’s Oversight Board subsequently recommended Hun Sen’s accounts be temporarily suspended in part for his amplification of violent threats (see A3).228

Online harassment is increasingly common in Cambodia. A November 2021 survey of 700 Cambodian internet users found that 38 percent reported experiencing online harassment, with LGBT+ people and women more likely to be sexually harassed.229 In February 2023, Hun Sen criticized a civil society coalition after it released a joint statement condemning a social media creator’s online sexual harassment of a woman VOD reporter.230

Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 due to a lack of reported cyberattacks against civil society groups, human rights defenders, and media outlets during the coverage period.

Government bodies, private entities, and government officials were subject to technical attacks during the coverage period. The social media accounts of activists, human rights organizations, and media outlets have been reportedly hacked in recent years.231 Though the human rights organization LICADHO reported that its website was briefly defaced by a hacker in August 2022, no serious attacks were publicly reported during the coverage period.232

In May 2023, the website of Cambodia Angkor Air faced a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, temporarily halting its online services.233 In April 2023, the official Facebook page of Deputy Prime Minister Men Sam An was temporarily overtaken by an anonymous hacker.234 The Facebook page of Poipet City governor Keat Hul was overtaken the same month, reportedly by a Vietnamese clothing store.235

There are also reports of hacking attempts by actors abroad. In November 2022, a group known as “Dark Pink” launched a malware and phishing attack against the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Targets in other countries also faced cyberattacks.236 In May 2021, the US Justice Department indicted four Chinese hackers with cyberespionage for targeting Cambodian government ministries in 2018.237