The president is elected to a six-year term and cannot be reelected. Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the left-leaning National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) won the 2018 poll with a commanding 53 percent of the vote. His closest rival, Ricardo Anaya—the candidate of the National Action Party (PAN) as well as of the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and Citizens’ Movement (MC)—took 22 percent. The results of the 2018 poll represented a stark repudiation of outgoing president Enrique Peña Nieto and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which took just 16 percent of the vote. The 2018 election campaign was marked by violence and threats against candidates for state and local offices; at least 145 people died because of election-related violence. Accusations of illicit campaign activities remained frequent at the state and municipal level.

A 2019 constitutional amendment enables citizens to initiate a recall referendum halfway through the president’s term. López Obrador considers the recall an opportunity to reinforce his political authority, and in December 2021 both the Supreme Court and the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) ordered the National Electoral Institute (INE) to move forward with planning the referendum for April 2022, despite the INE’s claim that the state had budgeted insufficient resources to undertake the balloting. The country’s first-ever recall referendum was ultimately held as planned in April 2022, and saw López Obrador win approximately 90 percent of the vote. The referendum garnered a turnout of roughly 17 percent, significantly less than the 40 percent needed to validate the results. Opposition leaders discouraged their supporters from participating in the referendum, which they condemned as a propaganda exercise and a distraction from the country’s real problems.

Senators are elected for six-year terms through a mix of direct voting and proportional representation, with at least two parties represented in each state’s delegation. In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the bicameral Congress, 300 members are elected through direct representation and 200 through proportional representation, each for three-year terms. Under a reform that took effect for legislators elected in 2018, senators are eligible to serve up to two six-year terms, and deputies are permitted to serve up to four three-year terms.

Since 2018, the MORENA–led coalition has commanded a majority in the 128-member Senate with 70 seats, compared to 24 for the PAN and 15 for the PRI. In the 2021 Chamber of Deputies balloting, MORENA won 198 seats; combined with its allies in the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Green Party (PVEM), the governing coalition maintained a majority with 278 seats, but lost the supermajority that had allowed it to pursue constitutional changes. The PAN led the opposition, winning 114 seats, while its electoral coalition partners in the PRI and PRD won 70 and 15 seats, respectively. MORENA candidates won 11 of the 15 gubernatorial races held in 2021, as well as 4 of the 6 governorships up for election in 2022.

Accusations of illicit campaign activities are frequent at the state and federal level, and violations reported in 2021 included misuse of public funds, vote buying, and widespread flouting of campaign finance laws. Allegations of illicit campaign financing persisted ahead of local elections held in June 2022.

The INE supervises elections and enforces political party laws, including strict regulations on campaign financing and the content of political advertising, although control is uneven in practice. While the 2018 and 2021 elections were both generally considered free and fair, the INE and the TEPJF struggled to comprehensively address problems including misuse of public funds, vote buying, and nontransparent campaign financing. Throughout 2021, the INE and the TEPJF were subjected to frequent verbal attacks by López Obrador and MORENA supporters. However, the administration of the 2021 balloting was considered successful.

In April 2022, President López Obrador presented a constitutional reform plan that, if adopted, would significantly alter the Mexican electoral system. Among other things, the proposal included provisions that would eliminate all state-level electoral institutes and transfer their responsibilities to the INE and TEPJF; remove the INE’s constitutional mandate to administer the electoral registry; and amend the appointment procedures for INE and TEPJF officials, removing staggered terms. Rights groups expressed concern that the reforms would substantially weaken the independence of the electoral authorities. Congress rejected the proposed reforms in December. However, López Obrador then presented another electoral reform plan that would not involve amending the constitution; the new reform plan, known as “Plan B,” remained awaiting approval at year’s end.

Mexico’s multiparty system features few official restrictions on political organization and activity. Opposition parties are competitive in many states, and independent candidacies are becoming more common, though independents achieved few wins in 2021. MORENA includes a wide range of ideological and political currents, and internal tensions were visible during the 2021 campaign. Most opposition parties, meanwhile, base their strategies around mobilizing anti–MORENA sentiment rather than proposing coherent policy agendas.

MORENA candidates won in 11 of the 15 gubernatorial races held in 2021, cementing the party’s strength at the subnational level. However, opposition candidates demonstrated strength in many urban areas and won a majority of Mexico City’s boroughs, reversing previous MORENA dominance in the city.

Power has routinely changed hands at the national level since 2000. The dominant victory of López Obrador and MORENA in 2018 followed six years of government control by the PRI, which had ruled Mexico without interruption from 1929 to 2000, before losing consecutive presidential races to the right-leaning PAN in 2000 and 2006.

In order to avoid fragmenting the anti–MORENA vote in the 2021 elections, the PAN, PRI, and PRD united in an electoral coalition, resulting in increased seat share, though the PRI’s precipitous decline at all levels continued. The opposition also made gains in large cities and among middle-class voters, revealing possible shifts in the electorate that could increase competitiveness in subsequent elections.

Criminal groups, while increasingly fragmented, exert powerful influence on the country’s politics through threats and violence against candidates, election officials, and campaign workers, particularly at the local level. At least 102 political officials were killed in campaign-related violence during the 2021 election season. Significant levels of political violence were also recorded in 2022.

The López Obrador administration has assigned an increasing number of governance tasks to the military, one of Mexico’s least accountable institutions. The army is involved in the construction of several of the president’s signature projects, and in 2021 the government announced that the army would maintain control of a tourist railroad in the Yucatán Peninsula known as the Maya Train—and receive any profits—upon the project’s completion, heightening concerns about military politicization.

In September 2022, Congress approved reforms transferring control of the National Guard—nominally a civilian-led force—to the Ministry of Defense, removing civilian control of the force despite the fact that it was legally required to undergo a process of civilianization. Rights groups and opposition legislators criticized the reforms, expressing concern that the changes gave too much power to the armed forces. A constitutional challenge of the reform brought before the SCJN remained awaiting a ruling as of year’s end.

Mexico has a large Indigenous population, and Indigenous people and groups are free to participate in politics. There are some provisions for the integration of Indigenous community customs in electing leaders in some states, though only for local authorities. In practice, Indigenous people remain severely underrepresented in political institutions. Mexico’s small Afro-Mexican population is similarly underrepresented in national politics, though they are recognized in the constitution.

The 2018 and 2021 elections confirmed the success of gender requirements for candidacies and party lists: following the 2021 elections, 50 percent of representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and 49 percent in the Senate are women. Women also won an unprecedented six gubernatorial elections in 2021.

Organized crime and related violence have limited the effective governing authority of elected officials in some areas of the country, as well as of the federal government. Members of organized crime groups have persisted in their attempts to infiltrate local governments in order to plunder municipal coffers and ensure their own impunity, a practice that has influenced electoral dynamics. The notorious mass disappearance of 43 students in 2014 was linked to a deeply corrupt local government collaborating with a drug gang, as well as corrupt or complicit members of various state security forces. In the most violent regions, the provision of public services has become more difficult, as public sector employees face extortion and pressure to divert public funds.

Official corruption remains a serious problem. Despite Mexico’s relatively comprehensive anticorruption framework, implementation of existing mechanisms is lacking in practice and high levels of impunity persist. The billions of dollars in illegal drug money that enter the country each year from the United States profoundly affect politics, as does rampant public-contract fraud and other forms of siphoning off state funds. Attempts to prosecute officials for alleged involvement in corrupt or criminal activity have often failed due to the weakness of police and judicial capacity.

The López Obrador administration has made the pursuit of corruption a mantra, and a series of prominent figures from the Peña Nieto administration have been indicted or arrested on graft charges. However, critics describe López Obrador’s anticorruption efforts as politicized and generally ineffective. Political opponents are arrested with great fanfare, but few convictions have occurred. In contrast, investigations involving government allies and favored institutions are rare or perfunctory.

Despite some limitations, several freedom of information laws passed since 2002 have successfully strengthened transparency at the federal level, though enforcement is uneven across states. In recent years, the government has failed to release relevant information on some of the country’s most controversial issues, including abuses by the security forces. The military, assigned ever-expanding roles under López Obrador, is one of the least transparent state institutions. A 2021 decree shielding public infrastructure projects from transparency and other administrative requirements was vocally denounced by transparency advocates. President López Obrador has repeatedly suggested shuttering the INAI in recent years, prompting criticism by transparency advocates.

The security environment for journalists remains highly challenging. Reporters probing police issues, drug trafficking, and official corruption face serious, sustained risk of physical harm. At least 15 journalists were killed in Mexico in 2022—including several who were killed in retaliation for their reporting—making it the deadliest year on record for journalists in the country. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has recorded at least nine journalists killed in Mexico every year since 2016.

Self-censorship has increased, with many newspapers in violent areas avoiding publishing stories concerning organized crime. Despite several convictions in prominent cases of murdered journalists in recent years, approximately 90 percent of cases of journalists who are killed are unresolved.

The Federal Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists within the Interior Secretariat has successfully protected hundreds of activists and reporters, providing them safe houses, panic buttons, and bodyguards. However, the mechanism is underfunded and has not always proved effective: at least two of the journalists killed in 2022 were receiving official protection.

Diversity of viewpoints in print and online media remains high, but broadcast television has long been dominated by the duopoly of Televisa and TV Azteca. Media outlets depend on government advertising and subsidies. Congress enacted legislation to regulate the distribution of state publicity in 2018; such advertising subsequently diminished significantly, but distribution remains heavily skewed toward a few of the largest outlets. In 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress must pass more detailed rules governing state publicity.

Since taking office, López Obrador has persistently and publicly attacked the press, often chastising and demeaning specific reporters and news outlets. According to an Article 19 report published in April 2022, attacks against the press increased by nearly 85 percent in the first three years of López Obrador’s presidency; the group recorded a record 696 crimes against media workers in 2022. Article 19 has also documented an increase in judicial harassment of journalists and activists in recent years.

Mexico has been at the forefront of citizen-led efforts to ensure internet access. The 2013 amendments to Article 6 of the constitution made internet access a civil right. However, gangs have engaged in threats and violence against bloggers and online journalists who report on organized crime.

Religious freedom is protected by the constitution and is generally respected in practice, though religious minorities, particularly Indigenous Evangelical communities in Chiapas, face occasional persecution by local authorities.

While the government has generally refrained from restricting academic freedom, friction between the government and the academic community rose sharply in 2021, with President López Obrador and other officials frequently stigmatizing universities as “neoliberal” institutions whose political orientation had “moved right.” More ominously, that August, prosecutors began requesting arrest orders against 31 academic scientists for allegedly misusing public funds. Amid domestic and international outcry over the seemingly disproportionate charges—which included organized crime and money laundering—judges denied the requests, but academics and free expression advocates warned of an increasing atmosphere of intimidation facing university researchers and administrators. That November, students at a prestigious public university, the Center for Economic Teaching and Research, initiated a series of protests challenging the irregular appointment of new administrators perceived to be aligned with the government and arbitrary dismissals of several professors.

While there are no formal impediments to free and open discussion, fear of criminal monitoring restricts citizens’ willingness to converse publicly about crime in some areas of the country.

The constitution guarantees the right to peacefully assemble. Protests are frequent, though political and civic expression is restricted in some regions, and police frequently use excessive force and detain protesters arbitrarily.

During the López Obrador administration, controversy regarding protest-related violence has often centered on women’s rights demonstrations. On several occasions in 2022, police officers violently assaulted protesters who were demonstrating against gender-based violence; police sprayed tear gas at peaceful protesters, beat several women participants, and arbitrarily detained dozens of demonstrators. Additionally, Amnesty International has reported that members of law enforcement have used sexual violence as a form of oppression against women protesters in recent years.

Although highly active, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sometimes face violent resistance. Environmental activists and representatives of Indigenous groups contesting large-scale infrastructure projects have been particularly vulnerable. Revelations emerged in 2017 that government agencies had purchased Israeli Pegasus spyware, potentially to surveil the electronic communications of civil society activists; activists continue to demand consequences amid ongoing investigative delays and news of additional potential victims.

The Federal Protection Mechanism for Human Rights Defenders and Journalists has provided physical security for hundreds of activists since its 2012 inception, though rights groups consider it sluggish and subject to government neglect. According to a September 2022 report by environmental watchdog organization Global Witness, at least 54 environmental and land rights activists were killed in Mexico in 2021, making it the world’s deadliest country for such activists.

Civil society members freely criticize state policies, but López Obrador’s penchant for dismissing criticism and insulting perceived opponents has generated tension between the president and civil society organizations during his presidency. In March 2022, MORENA legislators introduced a bill that, if adopted, would prohibit nonprofit groups from attempting to “influence or change laws either through lobbying or through strategic litigation” if they receive foreign funding. Human rights groups say that the proposed legislation could be used to arbitrarily restrict the activity of civil society groups and human rights defenders.

Trade union membership has diminished significantly in recent decades. In 2019, major labor reform brought hope of an end to the rampant use of informal, nontransparent negotiations between employers and politically connected union leaders creating “protection contracts” never seen by workers. Labor rights provisions of the 2020 United States–Mexico–Canada free trade agreement have facilitated workers’ demands against abusive employers and complicit unions. In 2021, the United States demanded review of a vote on an alleged protection contract at a General Motors plant in Guanajuato; following the determination that voting conditions were unfair, an August revote resulted in the rejection of the contract.

The SCJN has been regarded in recent years as generally independent, but a series of appointments of justices viewed as close to the government has raised concerns about diminished autonomy under López Obrador. Such concerns persisted in 2022; in April, four US congresspeople expressed concern that the Mexican judiciary has become increasingly politicized during the López Obrador administration. The congresspeople alleged that the Attorney General’s Office (FGR), an autonomous entity, has aligned with the president in practice, an allegation that López Obrador denied.

In December 2022, Roberto Elías, a judge in Zacatecas, was shot and killed; four members of a drug cartel were charged with his murder later the same week. Authorities have alleged that Judge Elías’s assassination, which remained under investigation at year’s end, was ordered because of rulings he made in his official judicial capacity.

Mexico’s justice system is plagued by delays, unpredictability, and corruption, which often lead to impunity for perpetrators of crimes. Implementation of an adversarial system was technically completed in 2016 and generated some improvements, but judicial system capacity remains inadequate. A lack of political commitment to prosecutorial autonomy and disinterest in deep reform has limited the efficacy of a 2018 overhaul of the prosecutorial services. Attorney General Alejandro Gertz Manero has been subjected to increasing criticism in recent years as frustration has mounted with the contrast between the agency’s lethargy in matters including corruption and disappearance cases and its punitive zeal in pursuit of organized crime charges against scientists and other matters in which Gertz took personal interest.

Widespread bribery, limited capacity, and weak coordination undermine the integrity of the lower courts and law enforcement agencies. According to a 2021 government report, the vast majority of crimes committed in 2020 went unreported, largely because underpaid police were viewed as either inept or in league with criminals. Widely publicized raids often result in the release of accused criminals due to grave procedural deficiencies. Amid faltering efforts to improve investigative and prosecutorial competence and efficacy, the López Obrador administration has sought to harden penalties and limit defendants’ rights, producing a sharp rise in the use of preventive detention and a rapidly increasing rate of prisoners in pretrial detention, most of whom are poor people charged with minor crimes.

Mexicans are subject to the threat of violence at the hands of multiple actors, including individual criminals, criminal gangs that operate with impunity, and police officers who are often susceptible to bribery. A missing-persons registry—which continues to grow despite increased government efforts in recent years—reflects an epidemic of enforced disappearances. Mexicans in police or military custody are at risk of torture by the authorities, and must also navigate a prison system that respects neither due process nor physical safety.

Abuses during arrests and criminal investigations are rife, and detainees report routine physical abuse while being detained and held. The 2017 General Law on Torture established a prohibition on the use of torture and disqualified evidence obtained through its use. Though it has contributed to mild progress in excluding torture-based confessions from prosecutions, impunity remains almost universal.

Human rights advocates consistently express concern about a lack of accountability for abuses committed by members of the military, including torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. Only a handful of soldiers have been convicted in civilian courts for abuses against civilians, despite myriad reports implicating state security forces in grave human rights abuses.

Forced disappearances and killings remain a crisis. The 2017 General Law on Disappearances removed the statute of limitations on missing-persons crimes, but progress remains very limited. As of September 2022, missing-persons cases in the national registry numbered over 105,000, and at least 52,000 bodies remained unidentified. A 2021 report by the Washington Office on Latin America covering 26 states found only 25 convictions on disappearance charges between 2018 and 2020; federal prosecutors made even fewer advances.

The kidnapping and presumed deaths of 43 students in Guerrero in 2014 remains a watershed case. President López Obrador created a presidential commission to investigate the case after taking office, and in 2019 a new special prosecutor was assigned to manage it. In August 2022, the government published the preliminary findings of the commission, which alleged that the students’ disappearance was a “crime of the state.” Dozens of arrest warrants were issued, and former attorney general Jesús Murillo Karam was arrested on charges of forced disappearance, torture, and obstruction of justice. However, in September, the special prosecutor unexpectedly resigned, and days later, an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) group of experts released a report alleging that members of López Obrador’s administration had been obstructing the investigation, particularly by intervening to protect members of the military from prosecution. Critics have expressed concern that López Obrador’s administration rushed the commission for political reasons. Significant portions of the commission’s evidence could not be verified, causing the case against Murillo to be suspended and over a dozen arrest warrants for military suspects to be revoked by October. Investigations into the disappearance remained ongoing at year’s end.

As in previous years, the government’s primary response to insecurity hotspots was the deployment of militarized forces. In 2019, a law pushed by President López Obrador established a nominally civilian-led gendarmerie that drew from the Army, Navy, and federal police. This National Guard has been sharply criticized by rights advocates for reinforcing the militarization of public security.

Homicides have plateaued in recent years, but remained near historic highs in 2022. Violence linked to organized crime was particularly acute in Zacatecas, Baja California, and Colima. While large organizations like the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel continue to drive insecurity in some areas, the splintering of other criminal groups, along with the diversification of their revenue sources, has made efforts to combat the violence even more daunting.

Mexican prisons remain highly unsafe, with inmates commonly engaging in criminal activity while incarcerated.

Mexican law bans discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, age, religion, and sexual orientation. Nevertheless, lighter-skinned Mexicans enjoy substantial social advantage compared to Indigenous people and other distinct groups. The large Indigenous population experiences social and economic discrimination, and approximately 77 percent of Indigenous people live in poverty. Southern states with high concentrations of Indigenous residents suffer from deficient services. Because Indigenous groups are in particular danger from criminal violence, communities in Guerrero and Michoacán have formed self-defense groups, some of which were subsequently legalized. In 2021, a sharp rise in organized crime threats and violence targeting Indigenous communities prompted a wave of self-defense group formation in Chiapas. Afro-Mexicans face discrimination; the 2020 census included an option for Afro-Mexican self-identification for the first time.

LGBT+ people have strong legal protections, but they are unevenly enforced. Transgender women in particular face discrimination and violence.

Migrants from Central America and other regions, many of whom move through Mexico to reach the United States, have long faced persecution and criminal predation. The López Obrador administration initially sought to protect migrants, but reversed course in 2019 under US threats of punitive economic measures. In response, the National Guard was ordered to block or arrest migrants moving northward, a policy that led to both record detentions and numerous complaints of serious rights abuses in 2021. In January 2021, the bodies of 19 murder victims, including multiple migrants, were found in Tamaulipas, leading to murder charges against 12 Tamaulipas police officers.

The combination of increasing migration and a series of US policies, including the 2019 Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) and the rapid deportations implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, have resulted in tens of thousands of people stranded in border cities like Ciudad Juárez and Nuevo Laredo and facing extreme risk of kidnapping and extortion. The government has made some remediation efforts, but conditions along the border have remained highly precarious.

Citizens are generally free to change their place of residence, employment, or education. However, criminals have impeded freedom of movement by blocking major roads in several states in recent years, and ordinary citizens avoid roads in many rural areas after dark.

Property rights in Mexico are protected by a modern legal framework, but the weakness of the judicial system, frequent solicitation of bribes by bureaucrats and officials, and the high incidence of criminal extortion harm security of property for many individuals and businesses. Large-scale development projects, including high-priority López Obrador initiatives, have been accompanied by corruption and rights-related controversy in recent years.

Sexual abuse and domestic violence against women are common, and perpetrators are rarely punished. Implementation of a 2007 law designed to protect women from such crimes remains halting, particularly at the state level, and impunity is the norm for the killers of hundreds of women each year. State authorities can issue “gender alerts” that trigger greater scrutiny and an influx of resources to combat an epidemic of violence against women, but the mechanism has proven ineffective. According to official statistics, 968 femicides were recorded in 2022; some nongovernmental sources say the true number is likely much higher.

The government has made some efforts to combat violence and promote gender equality, but the López Obrador administration has also cut funding for women’s services, and in 2022, as in previous years, the president frequently dismissed feminists as allies of the political opposition.

Abortion has been a contentious issue in recent years. Many states reacted to Mexico City’s 2007 liberalization of abortion laws by strengthening their own criminal bans on the procedure. In a landmark ruling in September 2021, the SCJN declared laws criminalizing abortion unconstitutional, though state-by-state legislative reforms or judicial challenges will be required to give the ruling effect. As of November 2022, 11 states have decriminalized abortion.

Mexico has taken steps toward equality for LGBT+ people, though significant cultural and legal barriers persist. A 2015 SCJN decision overruled state laws defining the purpose of marriage as procreation. Legislators in the states of Guerrero and Tamaulipas voted to legalize same-sex marriage in October 2022, becoming the last of Mexico’s 32 states to do so. As of August 2022, 19 states allow gender changes on identification documents.

Economic opportunity is limited in Mexico, which maintains a high rate of economic inequality. Migrant agricultural workers face brutally exploitative conditions in several northern states. In 2018, the SCJN ruled that Mexico’s millions of domestic workers—the vast majority of whom are women—must be incorporated into the formal sector and receive social security and health benefits. The López Obrador administration has increased some forms of redistributive spending, and in recent years has sharply increased Mexico’s minimum wage.

Mexico is a major source, transit, and destination country for trafficking in persons, including women and children, many of whom are subject to forced labor and sexual exploitation. Organized criminal gangs are heavily involved in human trafficking in Mexico and into the United States. This danger has been exacerbated since 2019 by the United States’ denial of entry to migrants and asylum seekers, which has forced thousands of migrants to wait in dangerous nearby cities, as well as by the economic disruption associated with the COVID-19 pandemic.