Dokument #2092902

Freedom House (Autor)

Nations in Transit 2023 - Lithuania

CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY
78
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 77.98 / 100
Democracy Score 5.68 / 7
LAST YEAR'S DEMOCRACY PERCENTAGE & STATUS
77 / 100 Consolidated Democracy
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Author

Ieva Petronytė-Urbonavičienė

Score changes in 2023

  • Civil Society rating improved from 6.00 to 6.25 due to a multiyear trend of improvements to the legal, financial, and reputational sustainability of nongovernmental organizations, exemplified by improved cooperation between civil society and the government during the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

As a result, Lithuania's Democracy Score improved from 5.64 to 5.68.

Executive Summary

Lithuania experienced another consecutive year of multiple crises in 2022. Issues around the COVID-19 pandemic and “illegal migration” from 2021 were still at the top of the political agenda at the beginning of the year. After Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced on February 24, multifarious support for the attacked country and its people, as well as concerns for Lithuania’s own national defense, started to dominate and overlap many other topics for national and local government agendas, the media, and ordinary citizens alike. The situation was further complicated by a crisis in energy prices1 and record-high inflation.2 However, these challenges did not hinder the democratic character of the country, and to some degree caused even greater societal cohesion and focus on joint action as a result.3

All main Lithuanian institutions provided substantial and unwavering support to war-torn Ukraine during the year in sweeping ways: by condemning Russia’s actions, expressing solidarity with Ukraine,4 advocating its interests at various diplomatic levels (on the question of Ukraine’s European Union [EU] membership, for example) and in the public sphere, providing humanitarian support and munitions,5 and supporting tough sanctions against and seeking legal accountability for Russia.6

Significant and various forms of state support, both at the national and municipal levels, were complemented by civil society actions. These demonstrated, as in 2020 during the height of the pandemic, the self-mobilizing power of Lithuania’s civil society in a time of need. Civil society organizations (CSOs) reaffirmed their importance in crisis management and fundraised record sums of money, even over the course of a few days.7 Thousands of individuals volunteered, and two-thirds of the population8 contributed either individually or through communities and organizations to assist both the people in Ukraine and its war refugees. (At the end of the year, Ukrainian refugees comprised about 2.5 percent of Lithuania’s population.9 ) Moral support was widely expressed through symbolic actions, artistic performances, and ethical consumerism, and the government’s stand on the war in Ukraine received widespread public support.10

The war in Ukraine also raised the importance of national security concerns significantly. A state of emergency was reintroduced on February 24 and extended twice.11 With 90 percent of Lithuanian’s sharing the fear that the war in Ukraine would spread to other countries,12 the portion of the 2022 state budget allocated to defense was increased from 2.05 to 2.52 percent of GDP without resistance. Additionally, a strategy for preparing Lithuanian citizens for civil resistance was approved, the paramilitary Riflemen’s Union (Šauliai) was strengthened, and an all-parliamentary agreement on defense was signed.13 The topic of national security often spilled over into other areas; for example, the national Special Investigation Service (STT) presented the fight against corruption as a matter of national security in June.14

However, the most painful spillover of national security concerns remained in the field of human rights. Migrants (mostly from the Middle East and Africa15 ) seeking to cross the Belarusian border illegally continued to be perceived as part of the Belarusian regime’s hybrid attack and were turned away. Both national and international institutions and CSOs criticized this practice. Nevertheless, the Interior Ministry and the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense staunchly defended this political course,16 which did not change until the end of the year. Meanwhile, despite facing severe criticism in the first half of the year, the conditions of accommodations for detained migrants gradually improved.

Societal attitudes towards migrants who crossed the Belarusian border into Lithuania contrasted sharply with the positive and open attitude towards Ukrainian war refugees.17 In fact, public opinion research indicated that the overall openness of society towards the provision of assistance to refugees had increased, while social distancing in relation to other migrant groups, such as Iraqis, Syrians, and Muslims, had decreased.18

In the context of strong public solidarity with Ukraine, another inter-ethnic distrust towards Russians grew. Yet the potential strife between ethnic groups was contained by clear and unambiguous public reminders from top leaders that Lithuanian Russians (who constitute 5 percent of Lithuania’s population) are an integral part of the community and citizens of Lithuania first.19 The actions of some well-known Lithuanian Russian-speakers and Russian communities, who declared their pro-Ukrainian stance, helped to further alleviate tensions,20 allowing the public to understand the diversity of this minority group in Lithuania. At the same time, an acknowledgment that not all of the Russian minority takes the same approach21 and the portrayal of Russians in the media22 caused some distrust; at year’s end, researchers reported that the attitudes of 75 percent of the population towards Russians had worsened, and social distance in relation to this group had risen quickly during the year.23 This distrust was especially visible towards newly arriving Russians,24 while Russia as a country had become even less favorably viewed by Lithuanians.25

In the context of war, there was a sharp rise in the question of whether freedom of speech protections extend to disinformation, warmongering, and inciting discord. Lithuania firmly rejected this notion and adopted the public position that a lie is not “another opinion.” The country took measures to prohibit the rebroadcast of Russian state media and introduced stricter supervision of other sources on the internet, while efforts were made to offer new sources of information.26 Some observers worried that these tighter controls could set a dangerous precedent for other contexts. Meanwhile, disinformation debunking initiatives and investigative journalism continued to grow stronger and provided accurate and objective information on various topics during the year.

The cleavage of traditional versus liberal values that was prevalent in 2021 was much less prominent in 2022. This change is due partly to the internally uniting geopolitical context and the diminished mobilizing power of the right-wing Lithuanian Family Movement (LŠS, Lietuvos šeimų sąjūdis). However, this sharp division was still visible in the Seimas, Lithuania’s unicameral parliament, where the opposition tried to delay the hearing and adoption of liberal laws (namely, the Law on Civil Union, which includes same-sex couples27 ) by arguing that society should not be further divided in the face of war. The governing liberal Freedom Party (LP, Laisvės partija) and Liberals’ Movement (LRLS, Liberalų sąjūdis), on the other hand, emphasized the need to “finally establish the values of free Western society” in the clash between a democratic West and authoritarian cultures of the East.28 Since the most triggering laws have yet to be adopted—in particular, the Civil Union law, which passed the first reading in the Seimas but lacked firm support even among the governing coalition partners LRLS and the center-right TS-LKD (Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats) and was destined for further committee discussions29 —the active potential remains for future cleavages.

The multiple crises in Lithuania slowed the country’s progress on major reforms—namely, in civil service, education, and health provision—and even suspended others, like tax reform, altogether. However, the Seimas still managed to pass a number of important laws, and the government was able to execute important decisions.30 These included constitutional amendments on age and other criteria for parliamentary candidacy as well as the newly adopted electoral code. Additionally, a loophole in referendum regulations, which had opened up the previous year, was closed albeit without substantive improvements to the law.

Other important legislation passed in 2022 related to minority groups in Lithuania: the parliament finally allowed ethnic minorities to officially write their names with some non-Lithuanian letters,31 and in December, a long-awaited reform of the disability system was introduced.32 Although largely symbolic, some steps were taken towards greater recognition of sexual minorities.33 And by the end of the year, the Seimas had approved €37 million in compensation claims for Jewish personal property expropriated in earlier eras by the Nazis and Soviets.34

The parliament also introduced a new model of local self-government power-sharing and imposed stricter legal requirements for public electoral committees. These changes could affect local democratic governance practices after the local elections in 2023. This is particularly significant given that municipalities attained greater financial and managerial independence in 2022.

The spheres of judicial independence and corruption experienced relatively few changes during the year. Lithuania’s justice system remained at or above the EU average in efficiency and quality. However, courts continued to raise the issue of underfunding, while public trust in the court system, diminished since 2019,35 remained quite low.36 Meanwhile the lengthy process of high-profile corruption cases, coupled with court decisions that have fallen short of public expectations, met with controversy. In 2022, new strategic planning and approaches were formalized and implemented as part of the ongoing fight against corruption; with these preventive measures in place, experts are now calling for some practical results.

At-A-Glance

In Lithuania, national governance is democratic and stable, with a system of checks and balances in place to ensure accountability and prevent abuse of power. However, institutions still lack greater openness and cooperation with civil society in decision-making. Elections are free and fair, although at the local level, competitiveness in some municipalities is limited by entrenched political forces. Civil society is independent, and while not very active under normal conditions, the sector has demonstrated a high degree of self-mobilization under extraordinary circumstances. CSOs enjoy increasing public trust and growing partnerships with public authorities, businesses, and within the sector, but many still face funding difficulties. Generally, the media operate freely, yet there have been isolated incidents of politicians attempting to restrict press freedom, as well as cases of political and business pressure, especially at the local level. Though local self-governments operate freely, the system is highly centralized. Municipalities have only limited independence (legislative amendments in 2022 should bring greater financial and managerial independence), and, as in years past, the lowest level of self-government remains disabled. The principle of equality before the law is maintained by an effective justice system. However, low funding and public distrust in courts remain concerning issues. While the public’s experience of bribe-giving has decreased significantly over the last decade, the perception of corruption in some institutions (such as health care, courts, and the parliament) remains high. This is also confirmed by “grand corruption” scandals that often undergo lengthy court proceedings but are ultimately overturned.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 5.50 / 7.00
  • After the outbreak of war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Lithuania’s governing parliamentary majority, the opposition, the government, and the president all took a remarkably united position by collectively condemning the Russian invasion, organizing support for Ukraine and Ukrainian people, and vowing to strengthen Lithuania’s national defense.37 However, the diversity of opinions on other topics in Lithuania did not disappear: voices of dissent were still heard between and within the country’s main institutions, indicating continuing political and social competition marked by moments of heightened internal tension and disagreements.
  • Appeals by the government (specifically, coalition partner TS-LKD) and the president to the power-center in Lithuania’s semi-presidential political system brought ongoing discord between the two institutions during the year. President Gitanas Nausėda continued to position himself as a protector of the common people and a counterweight to the government.38 Increased focus on international issues in the political agenda gave him more visibility and informal levers of power as the country’s current most popular political figure.39 The government, on the other side, actively dealt with a wave of crises during the year,40 firmly backed by the majority in the Seimas, Lithuania’s unicameral parliament. Disharmony between the branches of power was exacerbated by mutual public criticisms,41 rejected proposals,42 and limited direct communication between Nausėda and Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė.43 However, despite prolonged disagreements, consensus was finally found on important judicial and international appointments, such as judges to the Supreme Court (LAT, Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas), Ambassador to the European Union (EU), and a candidate member for the European Court of Auditors.44 Furthermore, towards the end of the year, both sides reluctantly acknowledged that the main governance decisions adopted in 2022 were appropriate.45
  • Similarly, parliamentarians from both the governing coalition and opposition parties voted together to adopt major decisions regarding the country’s defense, energy security, resolutions related to the war in Ukraine, constitutional amendments, and other important matters.46 However, at the same time, the opposition occasionally complained about the governing majority’s arrogance and disregard for other opinions.47 A low point in relations came in June when the majority played with procedural rules to keep the interpellated Minister of Agriculture in office. In response, the opposition parties boycotted parliamentary sessions for two weeks, leaving the Seimas hall and holding separate meetings in another area of the parliament, the historic Act of March 11th (“Independence”) hall.48 The opposition also actively criticized the governing majority during the year’s biggest domestic scandals, the Kaliningrad transit crisis in June–July49 and the public conflict between the Interior Minister and the former head of the Public Security Service in October.50
  • In 2022, the opposition held three no-confidence votes against the Agriculture Minister Kęstutis Navickas,51 Energy Minister Dainius Kreivys,52 and Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, respectively.53 All retained their posts, setting a new record since the restoration of independence for a government cabinet to reach the term’s halfway mark intact.54 Experts viewed this as reflecting the year’s extraordinary circumstances, and strong leadership from PM Šimonytė.55 Likewise, intentions to initiate a no-confidence vote for the entire government at once lacked support, even among opposition parties.56
  • Despite cases of open annoyance within the coalition in the previous year, the alliance between the largest parliamentary party, the conservative TS-LKD, and its two liberal partners, LRLS and LP, remained strong. Smaller coalition partners noted cases of unequal treatment and inadequate coordination of decisions,57 and LP was especially disappointed with the lack of support for its liberal law proposals (like the introduction of civil union for same-sex couples, and the decriminalization of soft drugs).58 Although TS-LKD was occasionally dissatisfied with its partners, this did not escalate into more serious discord among the coalition partners. For example, the TS-LKD presidium claimed in a statement that LP violated the coalition agreement in voting for the budget proposal not approved by the government, but it did not threaten the overall stability of the coalition.59 As the largest coalition party, TS-LKD itself was publicly shaken by cases of internal disunity,60 which it addressed directly.61 This diminished the number of coalition mandates from 74 to 73 in the 141-seat Seimas by year’s end.
  • The parliamentary opposition remained fragmented during the year.62 In January, the former prime minister in the previous LVŽS government, Saulius Skvernelis, established his own “economically center-left, socio-culturally moderately conservative”63 party, DSVL.64 The new party enlisted national and municipal-level former members of LVŽS65 as well as LSDP,66 TS-LKD,67 and other parties.68 DSVL instantly rose in the ratings as one of the three most popular parties during the year, along with TS-LKD and the oldest left-wing party, LSDP, thereby besting LVŽS for the country’s center-left votes.69
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 6.25 / 7.00
  • Although no elections took place in Lithuania in 2022, a few important changes to electoral regulations were adopted. In April, a united Seimas adopted 3 constitutional amendments, which is noteworthy since only 12 articles of the constitution have been changed in the past 30 years.70 The first amendment related to a 2022 Constitutional Court decision to relegitimize direct mayoral elections, which had been introduced in 2015.71 The next amendment reflected the broader aim to encourage younger participation in politics, lowering the age for candidacy to the Seimas to 21 years.72 The final amendment allows individuals to run for constitutionally sworn office 10 years after impeachment. This amendment implements a 2011 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decision on Lithuania’s impeached former president Rolandas Paksas; the court had ruled that the previous lifelong prohibition from running for office for impeached officials was disproportionate.73
  • In June, the Seimas adopted an electoral code, a constitutional law drafted by a special parliamentary working group74 that consolidated previously separate election statutes.75 The new regulations unify principles of election organization, shorten the campaign ban period, extend the number of early voting days, expand advertising regulation, reduce election deposits,76 and encourage more active diaspora voting with the possibility of additional single-mandate constituencies elsewhere in the world,77 among other measures.78 These changes did not engender much debate, with the government, Seimas lawyers, and some opposition representatives only raising objections that the regulations seemed too insignificant for a constitutional law.79
  • The amendments to the Law on Political Organizations were much more controversial, as they helped level the playing field for competitors and tightened requirements for establishing public electoral committees ahead of the municipal elections in March 2023. For both European Parliament and municipal elections, the changes require that electoral committees be established as legal units and set up before the start of the election campaign, with the minimum number of signatures set to at least 0.1 percent of residents of the respective municipality,80 or 1,000 residents for EP elections (the minimum number of signatures to found political parties remains 2,000).81 These changes were widely criticized for introducing more bureaucracy and discouraging the participation of citizens as nonpartisan candidates82 —the exact criticisms raised in a presidential veto that was nonetheless rejected by the Seimas.83 The parliament relented somewhat after another veto, temporarily allowing less strict registration deadlines for electoral committees before the 2023 elections.84 By the end of the year, statistics from the Central Electoral Commission (VRK, Vyriausioji rinkimų komisija) showed that the tightened regulations had had an effect: the number of registered electoral committees decreased significantly.85 Some committees decried the new regulation as unconstitutional, violating their citizen’s right to political representation.86
  • In June, the Seimas adopted the Law on Referendums as a constitutional law,87 filling a legal vacuum created in the previous year.88 However, the law did not encompass fundamental changes that would make it easier for citizens to exercise this right.89 Meanwhile, the Law on Petitions, updated in December, expanded the list of institutions to which petitions may be submitted and which must consider them, and the publicity and transparency of the petition review process was increased.90
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 6.25 / 7.00
  • Since 2020, Lithuania’s civil society has demonstrated cohesion, high self-mobilization, and considerable strength in times of need. The biggest civic initiatives and communal actions in 2022 were directed towards helping Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, in their homeland and as war refugees in Lithuania. Under the initiative “Strong Together,” Lithuanians offered shelter to refugees in more than 10,000 private dwellings.91 The Lithuanian Red Cross unexpectedly had to halt its three-day campaign after only a few hours, collecting more aid than logistically able to deliver.92 Five major CSOs reported more than 45,000 volunteers involved in their initiatives.93 Record high sums were donated to funds established for Ukraine assistance: in a country of 2.8 million, almost €40.5 million was donated to Blue/Yellow,94 €2.5 million to 1k95 funds, and more than €2.5 million to five major CSO initiatives.96 One particularly notable effort crowdfunded more than €5 million in three days to buy a Bayraktar unmanned combat aerial vehicle for the Ukrainian military in response to a stalled supply of Western armaments.97
  • These mass actions were supplemented by countless private, public, and citizen-led initiatives.98 Well-known athletes, artists, and other famous professionals raised support for Ukraine by selling their trophies and works of art or donating prizes. Dozens of businesses and local communities sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. For example, metalwork companies collected scrap metal from residents to be welded into emergency stoves sent to Ukraine.99 Businesses, and cultural, transport, scientific, and other institutions cared for war refugees by offering free services100 or raising other forms of expert support.101 By the end of the year, 58 percent of the population and 35 percent of small businesses had reported donating for such causes.102 Numerous manifestations of citizen solidarity with Ukraine and Ukrainians occurred: for example, around 10,000 individuals gathered for the rally “Freedom Shines” in the capital Vilnius in February.103 There was also high public visibility of Ukrainian symbols, boycotts of businesses that had not withdrawn from Russia,104 numerous symbolic public demonstrations,105 and artistic performances, among other actions.106
  • Beyond civil mobilization for Ukraine, there were other actions, including pro-democratic Belarus demonstrations throughout the year.107 In June, thousands gathered for “Baltic Pride,” a multiday festival and rally supporting the LGBT+ community.108 Uncharacteristic for the typically more passive Lithuanian context, two major strikes by trade unions broke out in 2022.109 Prominent citizen initiatives also included the usual environmental actions110 and various other protests, including by business associations, farmers, and environmentalists, as well as demonstrations on education reform, energy issues, and immigration policy.111
  • The right-wing Lithuanian Family Movement (LŠS, Lietuvos šeimų sąjūdis), which had mobilized huge crowds in 2021, discredited itself with organized booing of national leaders at an honorary public event in January112 and continued to dramatically lose support during the year.113 Even so, the denial of permits by the Vilnius municipality for some LŠS protests stirred controversy and was examined by the courts.114
  • In the current tense geopolitical situation, the Lithuanian state has become increasingly suspicious of some protests, resulting in the large mobilization of police in advance of demonstrations to maintain order.115 Increased public focus also shifted to a newly formed marginal pro-Kremlin organization.116
  • Amid Lithuania’s several major crises, the year once again showed the value and importance of CSOs to the state and society in coping with the challenges ahead. CSOs not only involved themselves heavily in actions but also forged strong intra-sectoral partnerships and alliances with the business sector and the state at national and local levels, expanding the latter’s infrastructural capabilities and increasing resilience. Recent crises have highlighted the growing strength of the civic sector, which has been gradually growing as CSOs become more organized, provide improved and better services, and actively advocate for and participate in state decision-making processes. The public image of CSOs has also improved. However, many organizations continue to face financial difficulties, especially with the high inflation in 2022.117 Some financial relief may come from an amendment to the 2004 law whereby citizens may allocate 1.2 percent of their income tax to support nonprofits, the public funds now focused solely on CSOs and excluding previously allowed state-financed institutions.118
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 5.75 / 7.00
  • After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the main concerns in Lithuania’s media field in 2022 shifted towards containment of disinformation, hate speech, war propaganda, and warmongering. For this purpose, the Seimas temporarily banned rebroadcasting of Russian and Belarusian state media in February and then extended the ban to September,119 along with the EU-imposed bans.120 Already in February, the national media regulatory commission, the Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania (LRTK, Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija), had stopped reception for eight Russian state channels121 (adding to the five banned in 2020122 ), and during the year expanded this list123 and imposed additional fines for spreading disinformation.124 Oversight institutions, such as the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, received expanded powers to limit war propaganda in April125 but still faced obstacles from the courts.126 While these actions received widespread support, some parliamentarians and experts saw them as a troubling precedent for freedom of expression, which could be transferred to other contexts such as any criticism of the government. As an alternative strategy, they recommended to focus on strengthening citizens’ critical thinking skills.127
  • Meanwhile, the state and the private sector took additional actions to support foreign independent media: they offered refuge to independent media retreating from Russia,128 expressed solidarity with such voices,129 started rebroadcasting Ukrainian national radio in April,130 introduced a new channel in Russian in June,131 and expanded Polish TV broadcasting in August.132 To combat increased cases of disinformation, incitement of hatred, and non-democratic actions, members of the Internet Media Association temporarily disabled comments on the largest Lithuanian news portals on February 24,133 while several internet providers extended restrictions on their own retransmissions even without a legal obligation to do so.134 By the end of the summer, Kantar surveys showed that Russian-speaking programs had lost half of their audience.135
  • Various fact-checking initiatives and strong investigative journalism teams worked tirelessly to combat the flow of disinformation and provided objective information to the public during the year. Often, on the basis of their investigations, authorities took further actions, including imposing fines or launching legal investigations.136 As information battles increasingly moved to social networks, various initiatives emerged to make this environment more transparent as well. In 2022, after individual scandals,137 CSOs and state institutions began to inquire into cases of unjustified blocking on Facebook and the extent of the problem.138 LRTK also sought to regulate video bloggers, equating some with mass media, which sparked debate during the year.139
  • In 2022, experts noted that state institutions continued to hide behind the EU’s “General Data Protection Regulation” (GDPR) by withholding important information from journalists and the general public.140 However, the journalist community and CSOs achieved several precedent-setting victories: in February, after again reviewing an important 2021 case, the Supreme Administrative Court (LVAT) annulled the decision of the Inspector of Journalist Ethics that news portal Atvira Klaipėda had violated data protection rules in its investigation into public procurement abuse.141 In the same month, after Justice Ministry interference, the State Data Protection Inspectorate (VDAI) decided not to impose an administrative fine on the creators of the database Karštos Pėdos.142 In December, the parliament granted journalists the right to receive detailed data on real estate ownership.143 Meanwhile, the quality and use of open data remained modest.144
  • Lithuania’s public broadcaster, LRT, remained an object of discontent among some groups. In May, the European Commission rejected a commercial media complaint about the LRT financing model.145 However, in December, a group of opposition parliamentarians applied to the Constitutional Court to assess LRT’s controls, which the public broadcaster viewed as another campaign to limit its independence.146
  • Two other legislative initiatives drew attention in 2022. In November, the Seimas discussed a new media self-regulation model, which sparked debate and drew harsh criticism from the media, who argued that it would compromise press freedom by reducing the number of seats for media and journalist organizations within the self-regulation body.147 As a result, the proposal was suspended. In December, the parliament also began to consider a new media financing model, which would create a clear division between the public broadcaster and the national media and minimize the representation of public authorities in the allocation of public funds.148
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 5.75 / 7.00
  • After years of advocacy by municipalities, two important steps were taken towards greater independence for local self-governance in 2022. In June, the parliament transferred to municipalities the right of state land management. Municipalities called this decision historic and stated that it will allow more efficient planning of territories and construction processes, quicker decision-making, increased investment opportunities, and better service provision.149 In the last days of December, the Seimas also alleviated the previously excessive regulation of municipal fiscal discipline and introduced more flexible borrowing for investment projects. Critics warned this move could lead to an increase of debt in the national budget, and complained these changes should have been made many years ago. Nevertheless, municipalities, the president, and most parliamentarians celebrated these changes as the opportunity to carry out more public investments that will improve the quality of public services as well as the appeal and openness of regions.150 The two aforementioned amendments were in line with a memorandum signed by political parties to strengthen local self-government, which was initiated by the president and signed in 2020.151
  • A new model of self-governance was also in the spotlight in 2022. The Constitutional Court’s demand to amend the constitution to reintroduce direct election of mayors152 became an opportunity to review the powers and relationship between mayors and municipal councils. The compromise model adopted in the new Local Self-Government Law separates the legislative function of municipal councils from the executive function of mayors. The new law grants mayors additional powers (like the ability to veto and unilaterally appoint key officials) and defines their term limits, as well as provides more rights for the opposition in municipal councils.153 The assessment of these changes was mixed: some praised the strengthening of mayoral powers as a clearer assignment of responsibility, while others criticized these moves as weakening municipal councils and creating conditions for undemocratic dominance by a single leader.154 The new model will come into effect after the 2023 local elections.
  • Lithuanian local government played a significant role in helping Ukrainian war refugees by organizing transportation, housing, financial and material aid, providing various benefits, organizing recruitment fairs, and offering education and kindergarten services, among other assistance.155 Aid was organized and sent to Ukraine (including food, medicines, hygiene products, and other necessities) in cooperation with CSOs, local communities, and businesses.156 Local governments also took a moral and political stance. For example, many municipalities cut their ties with partner cities and towns in Russia and Belarus, decided to remove the remaining USSR monuments from public spaces, and refused to host cultural events or withdrew awards from prominent Russians who did not condemn the invasion.157
  • Tensions between local and national governments seemed to decline in 2022, likely due to the adopted reforms mentioned above.158 The government called for partnership in dealing with the war-refugee crisis and, taking into account the lessons of previous years, prepared a new crisis management model that involves municipalities even more.159 Nevertheless, some complications still emerged, such as when the Šalčininkai municipality ignored national directives regarding the implementation of education reform.160 Furthermore, the general atmosphere has become heated in the run-up to the local elections in March 2023.

Judicial Framework

  • In 2022, the efficiency and quality of the Lithuanian justice system, as well as its perceived independence, remained consistent with previous years and corresponded generally to (or above) the EU average.161 However, the court system’s self-governance institutions and individual judges spoke out more loudly about the judiciary’s current financial situation as a threat to judicial independence.162 In 2022, despite efforts by judges to propose a national agreement on the courts, politicians remained unconvinced and the proposal was not adopted.163 Similarly, the civil service reform, which could have raised judicial salaries, was stalled.164 The Prosecutor’s Office also reported financial problems similar to those facing the courts.165
  • At the same time, the European Commission raised concerns about the selection process for some judges as being insufficiently public, which could create a possible niche for politicization.166 At the end of the year, the “precedent of the court’s politicization” was raised again by President Nausėda when he opposed the nomination of a current parliamentarian and chairman of the Committee on Legal Affairs as a judge to the Constitutional Court.167 On the bright side, several judicial appointments that had been stalled in recent years were finally moved forward.168 And the Justice Ministry, reacting to the abovementioned criticisms, took steps to change some appointment procedures, including increasing transparency, publicity, and a reduction in political influence.169
  • Amid Belarus’s government-orchestrated migrant crisis,170 the rights of “illegal migrants” (predominantly from the Middle East and Africa) remained the most complicated human rights issue in 2022. The government continued to confront the situation as a hybrid attack on Lithuania, thus national security was prioritized before human rights concerns. Insufficient attention to migrants’ rights was repeatedly criticized by both national and international institutions and CSOs.171 And although conditions in detention centers gradually improved, in response both to this criticism and the natural decline in numbers of migrants,172 the most worrisome issues remained the practice of turning migrants away at the Lithuanian-Belarus border173 and questions over asylum procedures.174 The EU Court of Justice (CJEU) ruled in June that Lithuania’s asylum policy was incompatible with EU law,175 and cases related to migrant detention and pushbacks have already reached the ECtHR.176 Nevertheless, Lithuania did not adjust the course of government policies in this area in 2022.177
  • In response to other high-profile ECtHR cases, Lithuania’s parliament finally changed the constitution to allow individuals to run for constitutionally sworn office 10 years after a previous impeachment (see “Electoral Process”). However, another attempt by the Seimas to implement the 2021 ECtHR decision related to religious pluralism, which would grant state-recognized religious community status to the ancient Baltic faith “Romuva,” was halted.178
  • In 2022, under its new chairperson, the Constitutional Court (KT) ruled on several pandemic containment measures. The KT received public criticism after terminating or returning cases regarding “opportunity passports” (COVID-19 immunity certificates), masks for children, and the requirement to have a negative test when returning to the country, all based on the reasoning that these restrictions were no longer valid.179 Some urged the KT not to forget its mission to actively form judicial doctrine, and by doing so, to ensure the clarity of the legal environment.180 Later in the year, the KT’s decisions on the mandatory testing of employees and the authority of the National Public Health Center (NVSC) to limit personal freedoms confirmed the legality of these measures during the pandemic.181
  • In December, the KT also ruled that the new Law on Intelligence Ombudspersons does not contradict the constitution, allowing appointment procedures for these positions to get underway. The Intelligence Ombudsperson was established in 2021 by the parliament but not in effect due to the opposition’s appeal to the KT on the law as possibly violating the rights of the Seimas Ombudspersons.182
  • The number of convicts in Lithuanian prisons was at a record low in 2022, and oversight institutions declared further reorientation towards mitigation of the penal policy, such as moving from simple isolation and guarding of prisoners to changing their modes of behavior, restoring their relations with society, and more.183 However, in December, after two high-profile cases, the possibility of the temporary restriction of convict communications was introduced by the Seimas.184 In the summer, the parliament approved the restructuring of the prison system, starting in 2023.185
  • Meanwhile, police reforms that were initiated earlier were criticized more broadly in 2022, that is, the path of optimization186 did not suit all police officials, and the reforms prompted a number to quit.187 Nevertheless, despite the criticisms, public trust in the police remained high. Crime and case resolution statistics continued to improve; meanwhile, police updated their technology, and the wider society showed a greater intolerance for offenders.188
 
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 4.50 / 7.00
  • According to data from the national Special Investigation Service (STT), released at the beginning of 2022, Lithuania’s population found corruption to be in the top five most pressing problems facing the country.189 The trend over the last decade of diminishing public experience with corruption halted,190 with 10 percent of the population, 5 percent of business people, and 2 percent of civil servants indicating they had given a bribe in the last 12 months. However, business representatives reported an improved business environment in terms of corruption.191 Meanwhile, healthcare, courts, the parliament, and municipalities were perceived as the most corrupt sectors.192
  • With all main institutions showing support for the fight against corruption, the Seimas adopted a new “National Agenda on Corruption Prevention for 2022–33” in June. Prepared by the Justice Ministry with the STT and coordinated with social partners, this new strategy focuses on education, prevention, and control.193 In response to the new Law on Corruption Prevention, adopted in 2021, changes were made to the rules for anticorruption assessment of legal acts,194 updates were made to the preparation of corruption prevention planning documents,195 and new positions for corruption prevention were established in some institutions.196
  • Nonetheless, experts who contributed to these changes noted the need to shift attention from legislation and bureaucracy to practical implementation. They emphasized the importance of ensuring that anticorruption measures are “taken seriously” and enforced on the ground.197 The STT’s investigation, announced in November, illustrated this underlying problem, revealing that corruption reporting channels established in most municipalities do not actually function effectively.198 Additionally, experts criticized limitations on another preventive measure, open data.199
  • In April, a verdict was reached in one of Lithuania’s most resonant political corruption cases of recent decades. This sprawling case involves the parliamentary Liberals’ Movement (LRLS) and Labor Party (DP), one of the country’s largest business concerns (MG Baltic), several parliamentarians, and businessman Raimondas Kurlianskis, all of whom were accused of influence peddling. After six years of proceedings and 330 court hearings, all of the accused were acquitted.200 This verdict drew a stormy reaction and contradicted prior public expectations, raising doubts about the quality of investigators’ evidence collection and the “threshold” for evidence applied by the courts.201 Lawyers came to the defense of those judges under pressure,202 and the STT noted that, in 2021, the courts had found 86 percent of persons investigated by the STT guilty.203 In any case, the long-delayed outcome did not increase public confidence in the courts, politicians, business, or the fight against corruption in Lithuania.204 It also failed to restore the reputations of the accused. In May, some on both sides appealed the verdict.205
  • In 2022, the investigation and examination of individuals continued in the high-profile “judges’ corruption” case.206 By July, the courts acquitted 2 defendants, and 9 others were found guilty.207 During the year, a new prominent political corruption scandal arose in Kaunas, where the director of the municipal administration was accused of taking a record-breaking bribe.208 Meanwhile, for the first time in the health sector, doctors convicted of bribery had their licenses temporarily revoked.209

Author: Ieva Petronytė-Urbonavičienė, PhD, is an Assistant Professor and Researcher at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, and Director of Civil Society Institute, Lithuania.

Footnotes

ecoi.net-Beschreibung:
Bericht über Demokratisierung (Wahlen, Zivilgesellschaft, Medien, Staatsführung) und Rechtsstaatlichkeit (Korruption) im Jahr 2022
Land:
Litauen
Quelle:
Freedom House (Autor)
Originallink:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/nations-transit/2023
Dokumentart:
Periodischer Bericht
Sprache:
Englisch
Veröffentlicht:
24. Mai 2023
Verfügbar auf ecoi.net seit:
13. Juni 2023
Dokument-ID:
2092902

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