Access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Rwanda has improved notably in recent years. The government has invested in building its internet and other ICT infrastructure to develop a robust information economy.

The Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Agency (RURA), the sector regulator, reported an increase in internet usage by Rwandans, from 62.5 percent in 2020 to 66.0 percent in December 2021.1 DataReportal Digital 2021 report from Hootsuite and We Are Social, in contrast, reported a 31.4 percent internet penetration rate in January 2021.2 Most Rwandans access the internet via smartphones.

According to the joint partnership between the government of Rwanda and the Korea Telecom-Rwanda Network (KTRN), over 97 percent of the population lives in areas covered by fourth-generation (4G) broadband technology networks.3 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) data reported that less than 0.13 percent of the population used fixed-broadband internet as of 2020.4 In December 2021, the Rwandan government received $100 million from the World Bank Group to support increasing access to broadband and select digital public services, and to strengthen the digital innovation ecosystem in the country.5 The ITU is collaborating with RURA to further expand broadband coverage (see A2).6

According to the internet speeds aggregator Ookla Speedtest Global Index, Rwandans saw a median mobile download speeds of 16.9 megabits per second (Mbps) and upload speeds of 6 Mbps as of November 2020, the most recent available data; and median fixed broadband download speeds of 23.49 Mbps and upload speeds of 19.13 Mbps as of June 2021.7 During the COVID-19 pandemic, mobile broadband subscribers experienced drastic internet slowdowns. Subscribers of service providers MTN Rwanda and Airtel reported service disruptions and speeds as low as 55 kilobits per second (Kbps) in April 2020.8

Limited fixed-line internet infrastructure has negatively impacted internet access. Nevertheless, developments in the fixed-network market have improved connectivity and reliability. Operators rolled out national fiber-optic backbone networks to connect to the international submarine fiber-optic cables on the east coast of Africa. These cables have provided the entire region with fiber-optic-based international bandwidth for the first time, ending the dependency on satellites. As of September 2020, internet service provider (ISP) Liquid Telecom continued to expand fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) services in the capital city of Kigali and some small towns.9

In December 2019, Korea Telecom Rwanda Networks (KTRN), a broadband provider, announced a $10 million project aimed at improving connectivity across the country.10 National Long-Term Evolution (LTE) 4G coverage was achieved in 2018.11

Improved access to electricity via hydropower and solar energy projects has helped increase internet connection speeds and decrease costs. However, according to the government, 73 percent of the population had access to electricity as of June 2022,12 which falls far short of the government’s ambitious plan to achieve 100-percent electrification by 2024.

Internet access is primarily concentrated in Kigali and remains beyond the reach of many citizens, particularly those in rural areas who are limited by low income and low levels of ICT awareness.13 However, there have been efforts to reduce costs and expand service to underserved communities. Poverty continues to be the primary impediment to internet access, with the majority of the population engaged in subsistence agriculture.14

Expatistan, an online index that measures the cost of living across countries, estimated that the price of internet service at 8 Mbps in Kigali was around 15,850 Rwandan francs ($15) per month as of February 2022, which remains prohibitively expensive for the majority of residents.15 In March 2020, Liquid Telecom launched new fiber-optic broadband services in Kigali, which company officials claimed would include significant price reductions and free installation.16 The company also announced a significant reduction in FTTP internet service costs, with prices starting at nearly 29,300 francs ($28) for a month of unlimited connectivity at 5 Mbps.17 This remains on the costlier side for many Kigali residents. In October 2021, MTN Rwanda, another ISP, launched a home fiber-optic service that delivers higher speed internet at more affordable prices than other plans.18

Rwandans were critical about the poor quality of internet service amid the government’s COVID-19 pandemic lockdown measures, as most office workers were forced to work from home. When schools closed during the lockdown, learning shifted online, primarily through content distributed via radio, television, and YouTube.19

Fewer than 10 percent of Rwandans were digitally literate as of 2019,20 but the country has ambitious plans to achieve 60 percent adult digital literacy by 2024. 21 Currently, over 70 percent of the population speaks only Kinyarwanda, making internet content in English inaccessible to most Rwandans.22

The joint ITU and RURA broadband expansion project aims to increase connectivity in rural areas and improve access to government services and information. According to the ITU, the project also aims to provide free or low-cost internet access to schools, hospitals, and underserved populations;23 in February 2019, OneWeb, a United Kingdom–based company, launched a satellite to do so.24 In April 2020, OneWeb filed a bankruptcy relief case in a US bankruptcy court, which could disrupt its projects globally; Paula Ingabire, the minister of information and community technology and innovation, said Rwanda’s partnership with OneWeb would continue.25

There were no restrictions on connectivity reported in Rwanda during the coverage period, though Article 52 of the 2001 Law Governing Telecommunications gives the government excessive powers over telecommunications networks in the name of preserving “national integrity.” These powers include the ability to “suspend a telecommunications service for an indeterminate period, either generally or for certain communications.”26

The local internet exchange point (IXP), the Rwanda Internet Exchange (RINEX),27 is managed by the Rwanda Information & Communications Technology Association, a nonprofit organization comprised of ICT institutions and professionals.28

Since 2013, IHS Towers, Africa’s largest operator of telecommunications towers, has managed most of these assets in Rwanda, acquiring hundreds of towers from other providers in 2014.29 Internet activists believe the consolidation of telecommunications infrastructure under one company’s ownership may permit the government to exercise greater control over these assets, and that the government collects massive intelligence data with the company’s help.30

RURA is not transparent in its oversight of ISPs.

As of September 2021, Rwanda had at least 23 licensed ISPs,31 though in 2019, an anonymous source from within RURA’s legal department said that most were no longer operational due to the dominance of MTN Rwanda and Airtel. According to the source, the state has interest in maintaining the dominance of these two companies because they allow RURA to more easily monitor users.32 According to local sources, government officials and agencies have shares in some telecommunications companies, which may enable the state to interfere in their operations.

There are no legal guarantees for the autonomy of RURA. RURA reports directly to the office of the prime minister. The government audits RURA’s budget, while the president nominates its seven board members, supervisory board, and director general, limiting its autonomy in practice.33 Ernest Nsabimana, previously a vice mayor of Kigali, was appointed director general of RURA in December 2020.34

Appointments to RURA have raised concerns about the influence of the military and intelligence services over the regulation of the ICT sector.35 Prior to Nsabimana, RURA’s director general was Patrick Nyirishema, a senior military officer.36 Former assistant police commissioner Anthony Kulamba, who also served as the Rwanda National Police (RNP) commissioner for Interpol,37 currently serves as RURA’s head of media regulation and consumer affairs.38

There are no mechanisms for ISPs or other companies regulated by RURA to appeal its decisions.39 Furthermore, no self-regulatory mechanism is available for ISPs.40

The government restricts the types of online content that users can access, particularly material that strays from the government’s official narrative.

As of March 2022, 15 online radio stations and websites owned by Rwandan critics living in exile were inaccessible. 41 The Rwandan Senate previously accused these and 11 other online radio stations and websites of genocide denial (see C7).42 As of February 2022, numerous independent news outlets and opposition blogs that have been blocked for years reportedly remained inaccessible,43 including the website of The Rwandan newspaper, as well as online publications Inyenyeri News and Le Prophete.44

In 2019, RURA blocked several Ugandan news sites, including the websites of the Daily Monitor, the Observer, and the Independent, reciprocating the Uganda Communications Commission’s (UCC) blocking of two Rwandan news sites, the New Times and Igihe.45 As of March 2022, the Daily Monitor, Independent, and two other Ugandan news sites—ChimpReports and Nile Post—were still inaccessible in Rwanda. The website of SoftPower News, a Ugandan digital media company that had previously been blocked in 2018, also remained inaccessible as of March 2022.

The websites for independent regional news outlets, such as Great Lakes Voice, and websites of the Rwandan diaspora, such as Rugali, are also blocked. However, most international news sources, some of which are critical of the Rwandan government, are available online.

Social networking sites and communications apps such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp are generally accessible.

The extent to which the government forces websites or digital platforms to delete content is unknown, though anecdotal evidence in recent years suggests the practice is common. According to journalists who have spoken on condition of anonymity, authorities often pressure editors of news sites to delete content that is critical of the government or avoid publishing such content altogether, threatening to block sites that do not comply.46 Local journalists refer to the practice as kunyonga (meaning “shutting down anonymously”).

Credible sources claim that the Office of the Government Spokesperson (OGS), an official propaganda entity, has administrative access to the websites of some nominally independent newspapers. Designated government employees from the OGS reportedly remove stories deemed critical of the Kagame administration on a routine basis.

RURA generally does not provide explanations when local and international news sites are blocked. Website owners have no avenue of appeal when their sites are blocked.

In May 2019, the Rwandan government announced its intention to start regulating social media content, arguing that regulation was necessary to protect citizens from misinformation and that social media platforms were being used to rally people to disrupt society. Critics said the move would target the government’s opponents and independent journalists.47 However, as of May 2022 the regulations had not yet been announced.

According to a 2010 law relating to electronic messages, signatures, and transactions, intermediaries and service providers are not held liable for content transmitted through their networks.48 Nonetheless, service providers are required to remove content when handed a takedown notice, and there are no mechanisms for appeal.

While Rwandans are active on Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms, self-censorship has become more pervasive among both online journalists and ordinary users in recent years due to increasing government repression, social pressure to support the government, and fear of reprisals for those who criticize the authorities. The hostile environment for journalists, who risk prosecution and imprisonment for critical, independent reporting, contributes to self-censorship. The disappearance and murder of numerous opposition members similarly reinforces self-censorship (see C7).49 Internet users typically avoid topics that can be construed as critical of the government or disruptive to national unity and reconciliation.50

President Kagame has frequently threatened his critics and accused them of destabilizing the country, further entrenching self-censorship. In a 2019 speech, Kagame warned opponents of his government in the diaspora when he said, “those making noise on the internet do so because they're far from the fire. If they dare get close to it, they’ll face its heat.”51 Observers argued that Kagame’s threats were genuine, as a number of Rwandan dissidents abroad have been killed, disappeared, or kidnapped and brought back to Rwanda.52

Financial challenges in Rwanda’s media sector have driven many media houses and journalists to YouTube channels for monetization. In March 2020, one editor reported that their outlet is “exercising extreme caution” because of government restrictions on online speech (see C2). They stated that “the government started cracking down on youtubers—especially those who go against the official narrative."53

Online information is manipulated by the government through editorial influence and coordinated social media campaigns.

Security officials and other government authorities frequently interfere with editors at online outlets to prevent the publication of stories on certain topics and alter content that criticizes the government.54 Journalists say that editorial decisions are heavily influenced by government forces—including police and army officers and powerful political leaders—whose demands are colloquially known as “I say this.” For example, two anonymous sources confirmed that during the 2017 presidential campaign, editors of Igihe, an online news outlet, were not allowed to publish articles on candidates challenging President Kagame. According to journalists who were interviewed anonymously, security officials often review journalists’ stories and photographs before they are published. One respondent said that authorities have tightened their control of the media by ensuring that each news organization employs a government representative to monitor editorial content.55 A wide range of institutions are required to employ government agents, especially those that the government deems to handle potentially sensitive information.

Social media accounts with government affiliations regularly debate and harass individuals who post online comments considered critical of the government.56 For instance, in July 2020, Edouard Bamporiki, culture and youth minister, targeted Aimable Karasira, then a University of Rwanda lecturer and YouTube commentator, with social media attacks and called for his dismissal (see C7). Karasira was dismissed a month later and subsequently arrested on genocide denial charges (see C3).57

President Kagame regularly encourages supporters to represent the government’s interests online. In April 2021, for instance, he chastised party cadres for not attacking those who criticize the government on social media.58

Progovernment accounts also mobilize to share and post on Twitter positive comments in response to President Kagame’s posts, to project an image of widespread support. Through Itorero, a state-run traditional school of values, and Intore, the graduates of this school, the government has mobilized social media users to counter the views of individuals deemed to be “enemies of the state.” This so-called “Twitter Army” has systematically attacked and discredited individuals and media outlets that criticize the government.

According to local sources, these social media users are rewarded for their attacks with appointments or nominations to jobs at government institutions and private companies that have ties to the ruling party. One source said that intelligence services monitor and report social media users who engage constructively with government critics.

In October 2019, the Rwandan Senate accused 26 online radio stations and websites owned by Rwandan critics in exile of denying the 1994 genocide (see C7); the report was followed by a February 2020 campaign to share the results.59 The accusations limited the reach of the websites named in the report, contributing to greater government control of the online media environment.

Compared to their state-run counterparts, which receive income from government advertisements and direct subsidies, independent media outlets often struggle financially.60 Large businesses generally only advertise with state-owned or progovernment media outlets, based on an unspoken rule.

An increasing proportion of media houses and journalists rely on YouTube channels to finance their content. In December 2020, the Rwanda Media Commission (RMC) suspended plans to require YouTube channels to register with the RMC, which had originally been announced earlier that month.61 Registration reportedly required proof of journalist credentials and a fee of 50,000 francs ($48).62 Human rights groups argued that the proposed plans would give the government another avenue to target critics and censor online expression.63

In April 2020, the RMC had released a statement saying that individuals running personal YouTube channels did not qualify as journalists.64 One editor said disqualifying YouTube channels as professional media sources could limit the already sparse safeguards for online journalists, potentially causing the collapse of online journalism in the country.65

Government repression of the media greatly limits the diversity and reliability of the information landscape, both online and offline.

Critical and independent online journalism produced by opposition supporters overseas—mainly in Europe, the United States, and South Africa—is blocked in Rwanda. Proxy servers can be used to access blocked content, but few Rwandans are aware of the extent of blocking or the means to circumvent it.66

Though misinformation about COVID-19 spread on social media platforms, online fact-checking efforts coordinated by the Rwandan government mitigated the potential for harm.67

Digital activism on political and social issues is uncommon, despite the widespread availability of mobilization tools; no social media campaigns that criticize the government have been noted in recent years. Rampant surveillance and SIM card registration requirements have made users fearful of using digital tools for political activism that challenges the government (see C4 and C5).

Government-aligned accounts sometimes organize social media campaigns to spread progovernment narratives. For instance, the ndi Umunyarwanda (“I am Rwandan”) program purports to build national unity and counter the spread of “genocide ideology”—a criminal act in Rwandan law that bars incitement to genocide and ethnic divisionism but is often applied to silence any dissenting views of the government’s preferred narrative about the 1994 genocide (see C2). Ndi Umunyarwanda remained ongoing as of February 2022, with social media users posting in support of the campaign.68

Freedom of press, of expression, and of access to information are recognized and guaranteed by the state in Article 38 of the Rwandan Constitution,69 though Rwanda’s legal framework is used to restrict fundamental rights, including online. The Rwandan judiciary is not independent, and many journalists who publish material online view the threat of imprisonment as a significant constraint on their work.

In March 2020, the Rwandan government enforced measures to restrict the spread of COVID-19, including a lockdown directive that did not explicitly exempt the media.70 The government later issued statements to indicate that journalists must comply with the lockdown,71 which authorities enforced until it was lifted in March 2021.72 Journalists arrested under the directive as of July 2020 remained in prison as of May 2022 (see C3).

In April 2019, the Supreme Court repealed a law that banned the publication of political cartoons but upheld criminal defamation against the president (see C2). The decision draws an explicit distinction between the head of state and other public officials,73 and was viewed as evidence of the judiciary’s deference to the executive.

Rwandan law restricts free expression and imposes criminal and civil penalties for legitimate online activities, sometimes with high fines and maximum sentences.

A cybersecurity law passed in 2018 imposes up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine between 1 million francs ($960) and 3 million francs ($2,900) for publishing “rumors that may incite fear, insurrection, or violence or that may make a person lose their credibility.”74 Additionally, anyone who “establishes, publishes, or uses a site of a terrorist group” faces imprisonment of 15 to 20 years and a fine between 20 million francs ($19,000) and 50 million francs ($48,000).75 The government considers many exiled opposition organizations “terrorist groups,” which has contributed to concerns that the law will be used to further crack down on opposition activities.76

Defamation of the president is a criminal offense in Rwanda, for which 2018 revisions to the penal code impose penalties of five to seven years’ imprisonment.77 Many other often vaguely worded penal code provisions contain undue restrictions on freedom of expression that can be applied to online activities. Notably, the spread of “false information or harmful propaganda with intent to cause a hostile international opinion against [the] Rwanda government” carries penalties of between 7 and 10 years’ imprisonment in peacetime, and life imprisonment during wartime.78

Defamation against private individuals was decriminalized under the revised code. A provision in the code that criminalized the “humiliation of national authorities,” including through cartoons, was overturned by the Supreme Court in April 2019 (see C1).79

An ICT law enacted in 2016 created a new legal and regulatory framework for the ICT sector and codified specific restrictions on internet activities that are antithetical to internet freedom.80 Most notably, provisions in the law prohibit the dissemination of “grossly offensive” or “indecent” messages as well as the use of ICTs to cause “annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety.”81

The law against “genocide ideology”—amended in 2013—also threatens freedom of expression both online and off, prescribing heavy prison sentences of up to nine years and fines for any offender “who disseminates genocide ideology in public through documents, speeches, pictures, media, or any other means.”82

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to the sentencing of two online commentators to 15-year and 7-year prison sentences for criticizing the government on their YouTube channels.

Citizens and journalists are periodically arrested for online activities in Rwanda, though the high degree of self-censorship practiced by online journalists and ordinary users alike has resulted in fewer arrests in recent years. Cases may also be underreported or never reported given the government’s strict control of the media.

In September 2021, Idamange Iryamugwiza Yvonne, an online commentator, was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of inciting insurrections or public uprising, derogating genocide commemoration articles, and publishing rumors.83 Iryamugwiza was arrested in February 2021 because of comments she made on her YouTube channel criticizing government programs and the implementation of COVID-19 lockdown restrictions.

In November 2021, the court sentenced Dieudonne Niyonsenga to a 7-year prison sentence and a fine of 5 million francs ($4,800) on charges of humiliating state officials.84 Niyonsenga operated a YouTube channel, Ishema TV, where he discussed human rights abuses perpetrated by Rwandan authorities.

In October 2021, Théoneste Nsengimana, a journalist, was arrested ahead of a planned discussion on his YouTube channel with Victoria Ingabire, the leader of the Dalfa-Umurinzi unregistered opposition party.85 The Rwandan Investigation Bureau (RIB) later announced that Nsengimana and five others had been arrested and detained for “publication of rumors intended to cause uprising or unrest among the population.”

In June 2021, the Rwandan high court indefinitely postponed the case against Damascene Mutuyimana, Jean Baptiste Nshimiyimana, and Shadrack Niyonsenga, who were arrested in October 2018 charges of spreading rumors and propaganda against the president;86 all three worked as journalists for Iwacu TV, a Kinyarwanda-language news broadcaster on YouTube.87 An expert on Rwandan law noted that the three journalists pretrial detention had exceeded the potential punishment associated with the charges against them.88

In May 2021, police arrested Karasira Aimable, a YouTube commentator and former university professor, and charged him with genocide denial for his social media activity.89 He was later charged with “illicit enrichments” over funds that authorities allege he possessed with no adequate explanation. As of late May 2022, Karasira remained in prison as court proceedings continued.90

In March 2021, authorities arrested journalist Agnes Uwimana Nkusi, YouTuber and editor of the news site Umurabyo. Nkusi was arrested after refusing to delete a recording of Idamange Iryamugwiza Yvonne’s bail hearing, on which Nkusi was reporting.91

The authorities have used private conversations on mobile chat apps as evidence in prosecutions of dissidents, heightening concerns about the government’s ability to intercept communications on social media platforms.

The ability to communicate anonymously is compromised by mandatory SIM card registration requirements in place since 2013.92 Under the law, RURA has unfettered access to SIM card databases managed by operators, while other “authorized” individuals or institutions may also be granted access.93

In recent years, RURA has sought to revise regulations on SIM card registration, ostensibly to tackle fraud, including SIM boxing (a process that disguises an international call as a local one), identity theft, and phishing. In January 2019, RURA announced that mobile phone users could not use more than three SIM cards on each network. The new regulations required users to register each SIM card with their national identification by the end of the month. Foreigners, meanwhile, can use only one SIM card. RURA justified the regulations on security grounds, arguing that the proliferation of SIM cards made it more difficult to track criminal activity.94 Critics argued that the regulations were meant to collect users’ data, since many people have evaded state monitoring by buying and registering SIM cards with false identities. The various legal provisions that enable surveillance and limit anonymity are particularly troubling in the absence of a comprehensive data protection law (see C6).95

The full extent of the authorities’ surveillance capabilities is unknown, though the government is known to use commercial spyware tools and there is a strong sense among observers that surveillance is pervasive. The government closely monitors social media discussions, as evidenced by the prevalence of progovernment commenters that frequently appear on social media platforms (see B5). Exiled dissidents have been attacked and murdered, despite their efforts to protect their identities, following threats from individuals inside or associated with the government.96

The Rwandan government is known to use Pegasus, a surveillance software developed by Israeli technology firm NSO Group, against opposition figures, journalists, and human rights defenders. In September 2021, Belgium’s military intelligence service assessed that a Belgian journalist and his wife’s devices were likely targeted by Pegasus software, and that the attack was probably initiated by Rwandan authorities.97 In July 2021, Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories (a nonprofit organization that supports the publication of stories by journalists facing physical threats including imprisonment and murder) identified more than 3,500 phone numbers linked to Rwandan activists, journalists, and politicians in a leaked dataset.98 Investigators describe the dataset as a list of people of interest to NSO Group clients; the investigation identified the Rwandan government as likely client, though the government denied this accusation.99

In October 2019, WhatsApp disclosed that a vulnerability in the application was exploited to target Rwandan dissents through Pegasus. At least 1,400 people were identified as having been targeted by the vulnerability, of which a “considerable number” were Rwandan.100

Dissidents and other targets of the Rwandan government report credible fears that their devices have been compromised by Pegasus. These include David Batenga, nephew of assassinated Kagame critic and former intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya, and members of the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) and the United Democratic Forces–Inkingi, opposition parties the government has accused of terrorism.101 Members of opposition groups in exile suspect that devices belonging to Paul Rusesabagina, a prominent critic of Kagame who was abducted while traveling through the United Arab Emirates, were compromised, possibly by Pegasus.102 A July 2021 investigation found that Carine Kanimba, Rusesabagina’s daughter and an advocate for his freedom, was targeted by attempted Pegasus attacks throughout 2021, and identified several Pegasus infections on Kanimba’s phone.103

In July 2018, the government passed a law that extended surveillance powers to a civilian institution, the Office of the Ombudsman, to investigate corruption-related crimes.104 The law came into effect as part of the new penal code in September 2018.105 Previously, interception powers were only held by security agencies such as the police, military, intelligence services, and the Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB). The legislation was vague about whose communications could be intercepted. Press freedom advocates believe that the law could further threaten independent journalism (see C2). The interception of communications without prior authorization of a judge is still legally permissible.

The 2013 Law Relating to the Interception of Communications expanded the government’s surveillance powers, authorizing high-ranking security officials to tap the communications, including online activity, of individuals considered potential threats to “public security.”106 While the law requires government officials to apply for an interception warrant, warrants are issued by the national prosecutor, who is appointed by the justice minister. The national prosecutor can also issue warrants verbally in urgent security investigations, to be followed by a written warrant within 24 hours. The law also provides for the appointment of “inspectors” to ensure that authorized interceptions are carried out in accordance with the law, though the inspectors are appointed by the president and lack independence.107 There is no requirement to justify surveillance as necessary and proportionate to a legitimate aim.108

Rwandan authorities are presumed to compel service providers to assist in monitoring and surveillance.

In October 2021, the Chamber of Deputies enacted the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy law,109 which includes provisions on user’s data rights, general rules for data collection and processing, and a requirement to store personal data in Rwanda.110 ARTICLE 19 East Africa, a freedom of expression organization, noted that the bill would harm digital and traditional media outlets, which are not granted a public interest exception under the law and would face risk of criminal and civil sanction for reporting. The organization’s analysis also raised concerns that the bill designates Rwanda’s cybersecurity authority, which is not independent from government influence, as the data protection authority.111

Under the 2013 Law Relating to the Interception of Communications (see C5), communications service providers are required to ensure that their systems have the technical capability to intercept communications on demand. Security officials also have the power to “intercept communications using equipment that is not facilitated by communication service providers,” which effectively allows the authorities to hack into a telecommunications network without a provider’s knowledge or assistance.112

In 2018, interviews with anonymous local sources confirmed that government representatives are systematically embedded within the operations of telecommunications companies for the purposes of surveillance. Telecommunications technicians also routinely intercept communications on behalf of the military.

According to a staff member of a major telecommunications company active in Rwanda interviewed in 2015, security agents routinely provide the company with phone numbers to target for monitoring. In most cases, these are phone numbers of journalists, opposition politicians, or government officials suspected to have ties to the opposition in exile.113

Independent journalists frequently face violence and harassment when attempting to cover news stories. As a result, many journalists have fled the country.114 Progovernment trolls regularly harass journalists and ordinary users on social media for posts that are critical of the authorities.

Human rights organizations allege that Rwandan security forces perpetrate human rights violations, including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment of detained people, torture, and forced disappearances.115 Government officials regularly question, threaten, and arrest journalists and bloggers who express critical views on sensitive topics online.116 In his May 2022 court hearing, Aimable Karasira, a commentator on the YouTube channel Ukuri Mbona TV who was arrested in May 2021, accused prison authorities of torturing him through sleep deprivation and beatings. He also claimed he was denied medical treatment for his diabetes and mental health issues.117 In June 2022, Dieudonné Niyonsenga, a YouTube commentator, reportedly showed his sister the injuries he received from beatings and claimed he had been subjected to sexual torture while in prison. He received a seven-year prison sentence in November 2021 for comments he made on his YouTube channel, Ishema TV (see C3).118 In May 2022, Agnes Uwimana Nkusi, the owner of the newspaper and online channel Umurabyo TV, claimed she was stripped and searched when she went to visit Niyonsenga in prison.119

YouTube journalists and commentators increasingly face online harassment for posting videos that discuss the 1994 genocide or crimes committed by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in its aftermath. In May 2021, Aimable Karasira and Etienne Gatanazi, a commentator on the Real Talk YouTube Channel, were subject to online harassment campaigns accusing them of working for dissident groups in exile after they posted YouTube videos expressing views critical of the government.120 Gatanazi reported that he was threatened with prosecution for genocide denial.121 Aimable was summarily dismissed from his position as a lecturer at the University of Rwanda over the allegations.122

Extralegal violence against dissidents, including journalists and other government critics, creates an atmosphere of intimidation. In February 2021, Innocent Bahati, a poet and singer who published poems on YouTube that are critical of the government, went missing. His location was still unknown as of May 2022. In February 2022, authorities claimed that Bahati had crossed the border and joined an opposition group in Uganda fighting the Rwandan government.123

In February 2020, prominent gospel singer Kizito Mihigo was found dead in police custody. While the authorities claim he died by suicide after attempting to cross the border into Burundi, critics and human rights groups fear he was killed by security forces.124 Mihigo first faced government scrutiny after a song of his that grieved both Tutsi and Hutu deaths during the 1994 genocide was distributed, including online; he was previously convicted of conspiring to overthrow the government in 2015 after prosecutors used private Skype and WhatsApp messages against him.125

In October 2019, the Rwandan Senate released a report on genocide denial in foreign countries, defining genocide denial to include claims of a second genocide against the Hutu ethnic group. The report listed the social media accounts and websites of 26 groups and individuals that it claims deny the genocide. The list includes prominent opposition politicians and parties in exile, online radio stations, and online news sites. The report called for government agencies to monitor genocide denialism in newspapers and online, and for young people to use social media to protest genocide deniers.126 The report prompted a wave of online harassment that targeted the websites named by the Senate. The media websites are no longer accessible in Rwanda (see B1).

Incidents of hacking and cyberattacks occur frequently in Rwanda, though there were no reported hacking attempts or cyberattacks against online news outlets or government websites during the coverage period.

Based on a 2020 report by the RIB, between January and March 2020, cybercrime-related losses totaled 25.9 million francs ($25,000). In comparison, cybercrime-related losses amounted to 6 billion francs ($5.8 million) in 2018 and 2.6 billion francs ($2.5 million) in 2017.127

In February 2020, news site Tarifaa reported a cyberattack against a Rwandan government data center that hosts sensitive servers. The attack reportedly brought down government websites, including those of the president and the ministry of defense.128

The cybersecurity law passed in 2018 includes provisions that address hacking and other threats to online security (see C2). The law was passed during a period when hacking had increased. According to the authorities, hackers most commonly target financial institutions.

There were no reported technical attacks against online news outlets during the coverage period. The last reported attack occurred in April 2014, when investigative news site Ireme faced a seemingly targeted cyberattack from an unknown source.