1. April 2022

In dieser Anfragebeantwortung wurden nur wenige russische bzw. sich tatsächlich noch in Russland aufhältige Quellen verwendet. Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass russische Quellen aufgrund der aktuellen russischen Gesetzeslage entweder zu bestimmten Themen keine Artikel veröffentlichen, da sie mit Strafen und möglicherweise Schließung rechnen müssen, offensichtlich nicht der Realität entsprechende, propagandistische Artikel veröffentlichen oder überhaupt ihre Berichterstattung aufgrund des staatlichen Drucks eingestellt bzw. Journalist·innen das Land verlassen haben. Zudem wurden keine Expert·innen in Russland zu den Fragestellungen kontaktiert, da sie dies möglicherweise in Gefahr bringen könnte.

Die folgenden Ausschnitte aus ausgewählten Quellen enthalten Informationen zu oben genannter Fragestellung (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 1. April 2022):

Gesetze zu „Fake News“

·      AI – Amnesty International: Russian Federation: End censorship on voices against the war [EUR 46/5345/2022], 14. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069461/EUR4653452022ENGLISH.pdf

„New laws speedily passed on 4 March, in a matter of just one day, by both chambers of the Russian parliament and signed by President Putin, introduced amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences severely limiting the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. These legislative initiatives were rushed through in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that will have far-reaching and devastating consequences for human rights in Russia beyond the armed conflict.

The legislation introduces Article 207.3 into the Criminal Code, which widens the scope of Russia’s already existing ‘fake news’ legislation and establishes heavy penalties for ‘public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Russian armed forces with the aim to protect interests of the Russian Federation, its citizens and in support of international peace and security’. Penalties include heavy fines that range from RUB 700,000 to RUB 5,000,000 (US$ 5,220 to US$ 37,283) and imprisonment from three to 15 years if the dissemination of information has caused ‘grave consequences’.

The law does not contain a definition of what constitutes ‘knowingly false information’ or any criteria for its assessment. However, Russian mass media and the communications regulator Roskomnadzor issued a statement whereby all media outlets are obliged to use only information received from official sources. It is therefore understood that any information published that does not come from official sources or that contradicts information distributed by Russian authorities would be considered ‘false’. Notably, official information regarding Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine has been riddled with false and deliberately misleading messages and claims. Accordingly, debunking such information and providing independent analysis of the situation has been effectively criminalized.

The law also introduced Article 280.3 into the Criminal Code, which establishes criminal liability for ‘public actions aimed at discrediting of the use of Russian armed forces’. There is no explanation of what could constitute ‘discrediting’ and the vague wording of the article could lead to politically motivated prosecutions. The law expressly prohibits carrying out ‘public calls to oppose the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation’, further criminalising anti-war protests and other initiatives calling for the end of the armed conflict in a way that suppresses the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

Individuals can be prosecuted under this offence if they have already been found in violation of the equivalent administrative offence (Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Violations) within a year. Those who are criminally prosecuted could face fines that range from RUB 100,000 to RUB 1,000,000 (US$746 to US$7,457), or imprisonment from three to five years or other sanctions, including forced labour. Those who are prosecuted under the administrative code could face fines ranging from RUB 30,000 to RUB 1,000,000 (US$224 to US$7,457) depending on whether the offender is an individual, a public official or a legal entity.

While public actions ‘aimed at discreditation of the use of armed forces’ and ‘public calls to prevent the use of armed forces’ already constitute an administrative offence, the new law provides for heavier penalties if these are accompanied by ‘calls to conduct unsanctioned public events’ or constitute a ‘threat to life and/or health of citizens, property, threat of mass violation of the public order and/or public security, or a threat to create obstacles to functioning or preventing from functioning’ of various facilities. There is no clarity in the law as to how such ‘threats’ will be ascertained.

The new law also introduced a new criminal and administrative offence of ‘calling for restrictive measures in relation to the Russian Federation, its citizens or legal entities’, which is understood to criminalize any calls for sanctions. A Russian citizen, public official or a legal entity could face administrative fines ranging from RUB 30,000 to RUB 500,000 (US$224 to US$ 3,728) and, if a Russian citizen is found to be calling for sanctions against Russian entities again within a year, they could face criminal prosecution, including fines of up to RUB 500,000 (US$3,728) or imprisonment of up to three years.” (AI, 14. März 2022, S. 1-2)

Der Spiegel fasst ähnliche Informationen folgendermaßen auf Deutsch zusammen:

·      Der Spiegel: Wie der Kreml Kritikern in Kriegszeiten den Mund verbietet, 7. März 2022 (verfügbar auf Factiva)

„Die wichtigsten Informationen zu den drei Gesetzesänderungen im Überblick:

Was besagen die Gesetzesanpassungen genau?

Es gibt drei neue Straftatbestände:

1. ‚Fake News‘

Das ‚öffentliche Verbreiten absichtlich falscher Informationen über den Einsatz der Streitkräfte der Russischen Föderation‘ wird nun mit hohen Geldstrafen, ‚Besserungsarbeiten‘ oder Freiheitsstrafen bis zu drei Jahren geahndet. Allerdings enthält der neue Paragraf 3 des Artikels 207 des Strafgesetzbuches auch einige vage gefasste Punkte wie den ‚Missbrauch der dienstlichen Stellung‘, die ‚künstliche Schaffung von Belastungsmaterial‘ oder Motive wie ‚politischen oder nationalen Hass‘. Sie erhöhen das Strafmaß auf fünf bis zehn Jahre Haft, bei ‚schwerwiegenden Folgen der Tat‘ sogar auf zehn bis 15 Jahre.

Offensichtlich will der Kreml kritische Berichte über das Vorgehen der russischen Armee im Nachbarland und das Verbreiten von Informationen über getötete, verletzte und in Gefangenschaft geratene russische Soldaten in der Ukraine unterbinden. Präsident Putin und Behörden bezeichnen den Einmarsch in die Ukraine als eine ‚militärische Spezialoperation‘ zur ‚Entmilitarisierung und Entnazifizierung‘ der Ukraine – eine Sprachregelung, die gebetsmühlenartig auch von den Staatskanälen wiederholt wird. Staatsnahe Zeitungen haben diese Bezeichnung übernommen. Die Führung in Moskau behauptet weiterhin, dass Berichte über russische Angriffe auf Wohngebiete von Städten in der Ukraine ‚gefälscht‘ wären, obwohl diese durch zahlreiche Berichte von internationalen Medien vor Ort – auch des SPIEGEL – dokumentiert sind.

2. ‚Diskreditieren‘

Der zweite neue Tatbestand richtet sich gegen ‚öffentliche Handlungen‘, welche den Einsatz der russischen Streitkräfte, die sich zum Schutz von Staatsinteressen, Bürgern, dem Völkerrecht und der Sicherheit engagieren würden, ‚diskreditieren‘ sollten. Die Strafen reichen von Geldbußen bis hin zu fünf Jahren Haft.

3. Aufrufe zu Sanktionen

Wer zu Sanktionen gegen Russland aufruft, gegen russische Bürger oder juristische Personen, kann jetzt mit Geldstrafen oder mit bis zu drei Jahren Haft bestraft werden.

Wer ist betroffen?

Die neuen Gesetze gelten für alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger – und zwar unabhängig davon, ob sie Journalisten sind, für ein akkreditiertes Medium arbeiten oder nur Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken oder Blogs posten. Darauf weisen die Juristen des unabhängigen ‚Zentrums zum Schutz der Rechte von Medien‘ hin. Der Vorsitzende des Duma-Ausschusses zur Informationspolitik, Alexander Chinstejn, von der Kremlpartei Einiges Russland machte darüber hinaus deutlich, dass die Gesetzesänderungen auf ‚alle Bürger, nicht nur die Russlands‘ abzielen. Die größte Zahl der angeblichen Fakes stamme aus der Ukraine, erklärte Chinstejn. Die Urheber solcher ‚Fakes‘ könnten wahrscheinlich nicht bestraft werden, weil ‚sie sich außerhalb der russischen Jurisdiktion befinden‘, sagte er. ‚Aber diese Leute haben Komplizen, Unterstützer, Anhänger, haben diejenigen, die all das hier vorantreiben.‘ Womit der einflussreiche Duma-Abgeordnete wohl auch westliche Journalisten gemeint haben dürfte.“ (Der Spiegel, 7. März 2022)

Der folgende Artikel von HRW enthält ähnliche, allerdings weniger detaillierte Informationen und erwähnt darüber hinaus:

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: Russland kriminalisiert unabhängige Kriegsberichterstattung und Antikriegsproteste, 10. März 2022
https://www.hrw.org/de/news/2022/03/10/russland-kriminalisiert-unabhaengige-kriegsberichterstattung-und-antikriegsproteste

„Mit den Gesetzen unterliegt jede Berichterstattung über den Krieg zwischen Russland und der Ukraine einer strengen Zensur, wobei die russischen Behörden es verbieten, diesen als ‚Krieg‘ oder ‚Invasion‘ zu bezeichnen. Die Gesetze sind jedoch nicht allein auf den aktuellen Krieg in der Ukraine beschränkt, sondern gelten für jeden Einsatz, an dem russische Streitkräfte beteiligt sind, wie zum Beispiel im Rahmen des regionalen Militärbündnisses, der Organisation des Vertrags über kollektive Sicherheit (OVKS). Es besteht auch die Gefahr, dass das Gesetz rückwirkend angewandt werden könnte. Die russischen Behörden haben routinemäßig Menschen des Extremismus oder der Beteiligung an ‚unerwünschten Organisationen‘ angeklagt, und zwar auf Grundlage von Beiträgen in sozialen Medien, die in den Jahren vor dem Verbot dieser Gruppen gepostet wurden. So verurteilte ein Gericht im September 2021 Igor Kaljapin, den Vorsitzenden des Russischen Komitees gegen Folter, wegen der ‚Verbreitung von Material‘ einer ‚unerwünschten‘ ausländischen Organisation. Bei diesem Material handelte es sich um einen Artikel auf der Website des Komitees gegen Folter, in dem berichtet wurde, dass die tschechische humanitäre Organisation ‚Menschen in Not‘ Kaljapin für seine Menschenrechtsarbeit ausgezeichnet hatte. Die Organisation wurde im Jahr 2019, zwei Jahre nachdem Kaljapins Organisation den Artikel veröffentlicht hatte, schließlich auf die Liste ‚unerwünschter‘ Organisationen gesetzt. Doch selbst in diesem Fall kam das Gesetz zur Anwendung, wobei die russischen Strafverfolgungsbehörden und Gerichte die Beiträge als ‚fortgesetzten Verstoß‘ interpretierten. Wenn die Behörden bei den neuen Gesetzen genauso vorgehen, laufen russische Oppositionspolitiker*innen, Aktivist* innen und Journalist* innen Gefahr, strafrechtlich verfolgt zu werden – auch wenn sie in der Vergangenheit öffentlich zur Beendigung des Krieges aufgerufen, protestiert, mutmaßliche Verstöße der russischen Streitkräfte publik gemacht oder Sanktionen gegen Russland gefordert hatten. Wenn sie sich außerhalb Russlands aufhalten, könnten sie von Auslieferungsverfahren betroffen werden.“ (HRW, 10. März 2022)

·      rnd – Redaktionsnetzwerk Deutschland: Straflager droht: Putin unterschreibt weiteres Fake-News-Gesetz, 26. März 2022
https://www.rnd.de/politik/putin-unterschreibt-weiteres-gesetz-gegen-angebliche-fake-news-FNM2OMU4XLPKPPGFO6DFXO5JMM.html

„Russlands Präsident Wladimir Putin hat ein weiteres Gesetz gegen die Verbreitung angeblicher Falschnachrichten in Kraft gesetzt. Geld- oder Haftstrafen drohen demnach nun nicht nur wegen ‚Fake News‘ über die russischen Streitkräfte, sondern auch über die Arbeit russischer Staatsorgane im Ausland, wie Medien in Moskau am Samstag berichteten. Das betrifft etwa die Arbeit von Behörden, Botschaften oder Handelsvertretungen, über deren Arbeit im Ausland aus Sicht des Kreml falsche Informationen verbreitet werden könnten. Der Kreml veröffentlichte das von Putin unterzeichnete Gesetz am späten Freitagabend. Demnach drohen für die ‚öffentliche Verbreitung bewusster falscher Informationen unter dem Deckmantel wahrheitsgetreuer Mitteilungen‘ Strafen zwischen 700.000 Rubel (6300 Euro) und 1,5 Millionen Rubel (13.500 Euro) oder Freiheitsentzug bis zu drei Jahren. Das Gesetz diene jenen, die ‚die Interessen Russlands außerhalb seiner Grenzen schützen‘, hatte der Parlamentsabgeordnete Alexander Chinstein zuvor gesagt. […]

Umstritten sind die Gesetze deshalb, weil die Auslegung über das, was richtig und was falsch ist, nach Meinung von Kritikern der Willkür des Machtapparats überlassen ist. Mit einem separaten Gesetz ist es zudem verboten, die Arbeit russischer Staatsorgane im Ausland in Misskredit zu bringen. Russland hatte seine Gesetze zuletzt im Zuge des Krieges gegen die Ukraine noch einmal verschärft.“ (rnd, 26. März 2022)

Ähnliche Informationen finden sich in folgendem Artikel:

·      orf.at - Putin unterschreibt weiteres „Fake News“-Gesetz, 26. März 2022
https://orf.at/stories/3255852/

·      The Washington Post: Putin’s purge of ‘traitors’ scoops up pensioners, foodies and peaceniks, 26. März 2022
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/26/russia-media-putin-ukraine/

„There was a message to all Russians in the first cases under Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hunt for what he calls ‘scum and traitors.’ That message is that no one is too small to escape notice.

Authorities arrested an Interior Ministry technician for talking privately on the phone. They also nabbed people holding blank placards implying opposition to the war; a woman wearing a hat in Ukraine’s yellow and blue colors, and a Siberian carpenter in Tomsk named Stanislav Karmakskikh who was holding a poster of an 1871 Vasily Vereshchagin artwork called ‘The Apotheosis of War.’ A popular food blogger, Nika Belotserkovskaya, was among the first three to face charges under Russia’s law against ‘fake’ war news after her Instagram feed went from truffles and rosé to posts about Ukrainian refugee children. (She is outside Russia.)

The speed of Russia’s transformation to Soviet-style ‘self-purification’ has been astonishing. When Russia invaded Ukraine last month, state TV went to wall-to-wall propaganda blaming Ukrainian ‘neo-Nazis’ and ‘nationalists.’ Now, shadowy pro-Putin figures are daubing the words ‘traitor to the motherland’ on the doors of peace activists and others. A pile of animal excrement was left outside the door of St. Petersburg activist Daria Kheikinen on Friday, and a severed pig’s head and an antisemitic slogan were left Thursday at the door of Alexei Venediktov, editor in chief of the now-disbanded liberal radio station Echo of Moscow. The station was forced to close earlier this month by state-owned Gazprom, which controlled its board.

Websites with names have sprung up encouraging Russians to denounce ‘traitors,’ ‘enemies,’ ‘cowards’ and ‘fugitives’ who oppose the war.

One of the first three people charged under Russia’s tough wartime censorship law was Marina Novikova, a 63-year-old pensioner with 170 Telegram followers. A day after the invasion, she fixed her gaze on the camera, a lock of red hair flopped over one eye. ‘Those who want to think and can think will be able to get out of darkness,’ said from the closed Russian nuclear city Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7). In what she called a ‘shock psychotherapy’ session, she said Russians ‘all approved the war in Ukraine. This is our silent, total agreement.’ […]

Kirill Martynov, political editor of Novaya Gazeta, was denounced as a traitor and dismissed recently by two universities where he taught two philosophy courses. A parent had heard him tell students that civilians were being killed in Ukraine. Martynov, who later left Russia, fears the purges are just getting started, amid deepening social tensions over the war. ‘Russian authorities and people who support the war need to find someone who is guilty, because when society and the economy is collapsing, you have to find some enemy to take responsibility,’ he said. ‘There will be a kind of hunt for traitors in the next months and we’ll see a lot of criminal prosecutions, because they need some explanation of what is happening in Russia and, if Russia is so great and Putin is such a wise person, why is life in Russia so bad now,’ he added.“ (The Washington Post, 26. März 2022)

·      The Guardian: ‘Our voices are louder if we stay’: Russian anti-war activists refuse to flee, 27. März 2022
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/our-voices-are-louder-if-we-stay-russian-anti-war-activists-refuse-to-flee

„Tens of thousands of Russians have fled the country since it invaded Ukraine, fearing a wave of government repression and a possible closure of Russia’s borders similar to what happened in the Soviet Union. […] The government has already opened nearly a dozen cases into alleged ‘fakes’ about the military, which can carry a sentence of up to 15 years, and has made more than 15,000 arrests of protesters.“ (The Guardian, 27. März 2022)

Lage der politischen Opposition, von Menschenrechtsaktivist·innen, Journalist·innen, Demonstrant·innen, Personen, die sich in sozialen Medien kritisch äußern; Anwendung der neuen Gesetze

Allgemeine Informationen zu Regierungskritiker·innen, zum Register „ausländischer Agent·innen“ in Russland sowie zu den Auswirkungen einer Aufnahme in das Register finden Sie in folgender Reportage von Reuters:

·      Reuters: Putin targets enemies at home as his missiles strike Ukraine. 31. März 2022
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-repression/?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social

Allgemeine Informationen zum Register „ausländischer Agent·innen“ entnehmen Sie bitte auch dem folgenden deutschsprachigen Artikel:

·      DW – Deutsche Welle: Russlands "Gesetz über ausländische Agenten", 4. Februar 2022
https://www.dw.com/de/russlands-gesetz-%C3%BCber-ausl%C3%A4ndische-agenten/a-60659666

Politische Opposition

·      AI – Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22; Zur weltweiten Lage der Menschenrechte; Russland 2021, 29. März 2022
https://www.amnesty.de/informieren/amnesty-report/russland-2021

„Recht auf Versammlungsfreiheit

Von der Opposition organisierte öffentliche Versammlungen wurden meist verboten, teilweise unter dem Vorwand, sie gefährdeten die öffentliche Gesundheit, während Massenveranstaltungen der Regierungspartei zugelassen wurden. Personen, die allein eine Mahnwache abhielten, wurden auf Grundlage des unangemessen restriktiven Versammlungsgesetzes regelmäßig festgenommen und strafrechtlich verfolgt. Kundgebungen zur Unterstützung des Oppositionsführers Alexej Nawalny führten zu willkürlichen Festnahmen in beispiellosem Ausmaß sowie zu massenhaften Verfolgungen in Verfahren wegen Ordnungswidrigkeiten und Strafverfahren aus fadenscheinigen Gründen. In Moskau wurden Berichten zufolge Technologien zur Gesichtserkennung eingesetzt, um friedliche Demonstrierende zu identifizieren und zu bestrafen. Rechtswidriges gewaltsames Vorgehen der Polizei gegen friedliche Demonstrierende, z. B. mit Elektroschockwaffen, wurde nicht geahndet.“ (AI, 29. März 2022)

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2022 - Russia, 28. Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2068627.html

„Opposition politicians and activists are frequently targeted with fabricated criminal cases and other forms of administrative harassment designed to prevent their participation in the political process. Navalny was poisoned with a toxic nerve agent in August 2020 while he was investigating corruption and campaigning in Siberia, with evidence later emerging that the attack was carried out by the Federal Security Service (FSB). He had to be evacuated to Germany to prevent the authorities from interfering with his treatment, and he was arrested upon his return in January 2021 for violating probation, receiving a prison term in February.

Legislation enacted in June 2021 banned individuals associated with extremist organizations from running for election. The Central Election Commission subsequently disqualified a number of candidates who were accused of extremism or association with undesirable organizations. Other opposition activists were sentenced to prison or fled the country due to charges they said were politically motivated. Among other new restrictions, Russian citizens who hold a second citizenship or a foreign residence permit, and people who have been found guilty of one of 400 criminal and administrative offenses, were unable to run for office as of 2021. In June, Golos reported that around nine million Russians, or nearly one in 10 adults, had effectively been denied the right to run for any public office.“ (Freedom House, 28. Februar 2022)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russland: Repression eskaliert, 13. Jänner 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2066555.html

„Im Januar 2021 kehrte Alexej Nawalny in sein Land zurück, nachdem er im August 2020 fast den Folgen eines Giftanschlags erlegen und in Deutschland behandelt worden war. In Russland angekommen wurde er vor Gericht gestellt, verurteilt und inhaftiert. Etwa zur gleichen Zeit veröffentlichte sein Team Videos von Korruptionsermittlungen, die Präsident Wladimir Putin belasteten. Dies löste eine Reihe massiver, aber weitgehend friedlicher landesweiter Proteste im Januar, Februar und April aus. Die Polizei reagierte mit Gewalt und nahm Tausende von Demonstrierenden fest, was mehrere Strafverfahren nach sich zog und viele von Nawalnys Anhänger*innen und Helfer*innen zur Flucht aus dem Land zwang.

Unter dem Deckmantel des Coronavirus erließen die Behörden ein generelles Verbot von öffentlichen Versammlungen und verfolgten vermeintliche Organisator*innen und Teilnehmer*innen strafrechtlich wegen der Nichteinhaltung dieses Verbots. Gleichzeitig hielten die Behörden weiterhin massive regierungsfreundliche oder staatlich geförderte Veranstaltungen ab – ein klares Zeichen ihrer Doppelmoral. […]

Die Behörden missbrauchen auch die überzogenen russischen Gesetze zur Terrorismus- und Extremismusbekämpfung, um gegen Oppositionelle, Andersdenkende und religiöse Minderheiten vorzugehen. Drei Organisationen, die mit Nawalny in Verbindung stehen, wurden als ‚extremistisch‘ eingestuft und verboten, obwohl es keine glaubwürdigen Beweise dafür gibt, dass sie an Gewalttaten beteiligt waren, diese geplant oder dazu aufgerufen haben. Mehrere Mitarbeiter*innen Nawalnys wurden festgenommen.” (HRW, 13. Jänner 2022)

·      AI – Amnesty International: Russia: Opposition leader Aleksei Navalny sentenced to 9 years in prison in cynical deprivation of his human rights, 22. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2069975.html

„Responding to the news that Russian opposition leader and prisoner of conscience Aleksei Navalny has been sentenced to 9 years in prison for his overt criticism of Vladimir Putin and peaceful political activism, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Marie Struthers, said: […]

On 22 March, the Lefortovo District Court of Moscow delivered its verdict at a hearing held in penal colony IK-2 in Pokrov, Vladimir Region, where Aleksei Navalny is serving his previous, arbitrary 2.5-year sentence. The court found him guilty of ‘fraud on an especially large scale’ and ‘contempt of court’. The politician has been accused of siphoning off approximately US$ 25,000 from donations to organizations he founded.

Amnesty International analyzed his case and concluded that this prosecution was politically motivated and based on the arbitrary application of law which wrongfully criminalized Aleksei Navalny.

Aleksei Navalny faces further reprisals from the Russian state. In September 2021 the authorities opened a new criminal case against him and his associates under the trumped-up charge of creating an ‘extremist association.’ The Anti-Corruption Foundation and the Citizens’ Rights Protection Foundation, both founded by Navalny, were arbitrarily officially labelled ‘extremist’ and banned in June 2021.“ (AI, 22. März 2022)

·      The Guardian: How Putin’s regime stifled anti-war protests in Russia, 10. März 2022
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/10/vladimir-putin-regime-anti-war-protests-russia-russian

„The political opposition has been decimated in the last few years and is unable to coordinate an anti-war effort. Following the January 2021 protests in support of Alexey Navalny, his organisations were declared extremist and functionally eliminated. Other opposition political parties with national reach, such as Yabloko, are exceedingly unlikely to chance severe penalties for organising illegal protests, or expose their followers to repression.

For individual activists, the landscape is also bleak. Many oppositionists are in self-imposed exile, and lack both the social media reach and the moral authority to call for protest. Those in Russia are rapidly repressed, such as human rights activist Marina Litvinovich, who was arrested on the day of the invasion, a few hours after she posted about protesting. The repressive landscape is changing rapidly, with new consequences for speaking out introduced seemingly on a daily basis, and many potential protesters have already begun leaving the country.“ (The Guardian, 10. März 2022)

·      WPS Russian Media Monitoring: The police drew up protocols against the former mayor of Yekaterinburg Yevgeny Roizman for discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 30. März 2022 (verfügbar auf Factiva)

„Police officers filed two protocols against the former mayor of Yekaterinburg, Yevgeny Roizman[1], under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (‘Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’). Roizman's lawyer Yulia Fedotova told reporters about this on Tuesday. ‘Two protocols under article 20.3.3, ‘Defamation’ for a post on Twitter and a video,’ she said. According to Roizman, he is currently exploring defense options. In addition, another protocol was drawn up against Mr. Roizman under Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses. According to Fedotova, they were not acquainted with the materials of this case, she learned about another protocol from monitoring the court's website, the case is scheduled for consideration for April 7.” (WPS Russian Media Monitoring, 30. März 2022)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russia: Arrests, Harassment of Ukraine War Dissidents; Raids, Detentions, Prosecution of Anti-War Activists, Independent Journalists, 24. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2070461.html

„On March 17, Kazan police raided the homes of at least nine activists in connection with a criminal investigation into ‘inciting mass riots,’ and seized some of their personal devices. The investigation was reportedly triggered by a message from an anonymous user in a Telegram chat. Among them are three members of the opposition political party, Yabloko, which publicly spoke out against the war. Police detained three of the activists as suspects in the mass riot case. On March 19, a court ordered one of them, Andrey Boyarshinov, to be placed under house arrest and amended charges against him to ‘justification of terrorism.’ The two others were released without charge. […]

Also on March 18, police raided 10 homes in Pskov, including the head of the local Yabloko branch, Lev Shlosberg, and two other party members, and their parents. The authorities also searched Yabloko’s local headquarters for the second time in recent weeks. The searches were carried out in connection with a case involving alleged libel against the governor of Pskov region. On March 12, the Pskov governor had recorded a video, referring to some of these activists as those who ‘hate our motherland.’

On March 7, assailants physically attacked Roman Taganov, an activist with the opposition movement Mayak (The Lighthouse), as he was coming home with his son, in the southern city of Maykop. They broke his nose and injured his neck, his wife said. The assailants, he later learned, were plain-clothes police officers. They detained Taganov, who was then fined for ‘discrediting the Russian army’ in an anti-war post on Instagram and sentenced to 10 days detention for ‘disobeying the police.’ On March 17, authorities charged Taganov with ‘violence against a police officer’ and placed him under house arrest.“ (HRW, 24. März 2022)

·      Das Erste: Video: Russische Politiker gegen den Krieg, 30. März 2022
https://www.daserste.de/information/politik-weltgeschehen/morgenmagazin/politik/nikolai-brobinsky-100.html

In einem Video im Morgenmagazin (MOMA) des Ersten deutschen Fernsehens berichtet der Moskauer Lokalpolitiker Nikolai Bobrinsky, der einen offenen Brief an Präsident Putin mit der Forderung einer Beendigung des Kriegs gegen die Ukraine unterzeichnet habe, dass von den lokalen Abgeordneten, die den Brief unterzeichnet hätten, inzwischen eine Person wegen der Teilnahme an Protesten festgenommen worden sei. Er selbst sei zwei Mal von der Polizei aufgesucht worden, das sei aber im Rahmen sogenannter „prophylaktischer Maßnahmen“ gewesen. Er sei Anfang März 2022 in Urlaub gefahren und sei jetzt etwas länger im Urlaub „steckengeblieben“. Er befinde sich derzeit nicht in Moskau, und es gebe eine Reihe von Gründen dafür, unter anderem den, dass er als Reservist von der Wehrpflicht betroffen sein könnte. (Das Erste, 30. März 2022)

·      Mediazona: Московской муниципальной депутатке Штейн наклеили на дверь стикер с Z и надписью «Не продавай Родину» [Der Moskauer kommunalen Abgeordneten Schtein wurde ein Aufkleber mit einem Z und der Aufschrift „Verrate die Heimat nicht“ an die Tür geklebt], 31. März 2022
https://zona.media/news/2022/03/31/shtein

Mediazona berichtet am 31. März 2022, dass auf die Tür der Moskauer kommunalen Abgeordneten (und Pussy Riot-Aktivistin, Anm. ACCORD) Ljusja Schtein ein Aufkleber mit ihrem Bild sowie den Aufschriften „Kollaborateur“ und „Verrate die Heimat nicht“ geklebt worden sei. Zudem sei auf dem Aufkleber auch das Symbol Z zu erkennen. An den Seiten des Aufklebers werde auf die Paragraphen 207.3 und 280 des russischen Strafgesetzbuches (öffentliche Verbreitung von Falschnachrichten über die russische Armee und Diskreditierung der russischen Armee) hingewiesen. Laut Mediazona seien nach Beginn des Kriegs in der Ukraine auf Türen von Aktivist·innen, Politiker·innen und gesellschaftlicher Akteure, die sich gegen den Krieg ausgesprochen hätten, der Buchstaben Z sowie Aufschriften bezüglich des Verrates der Heimat aufgetaucht, darunter auch Aktivist·innen und Journalist·innen aus Moskau, Petersburg und Kaliningrad.

Der Artikel enthält auch ein Bild des Twitter-Accounts von Ljusja Schtein mit einem Tweet, der den Aufkleber auf der Tür zeigt:

„Московской муниципальной депутатке Люсе Штейн наклеили на дверь стикер с надписью ‚Коллаборант‘. Об этом она написала в твиттере.

На стикере изображена фотография Штейн, поверх которой написано ‚Коллаборант‘ и ‚Не продавай Родину‘. На портрете также изображена белая буква Z. Сбоку указаны статьи 207.3 и 280.3 УК (публичное распространение фейков о российской армии и ‚дискредитация‘ россиейской армии).

После начала войны в Украине на дверях активистов, политиков и общественных деятелей, не поддерживающих войну стали появляться буквы Z и надписи о ‚продаже Родины‘. Среди них активисты и журналисты из Москвы, Петербурга и Калининграда.“ (Mediazona, 31. März 2022)

Informationen zu möglichen Bedeutungen und der Verwendung des Buchstabens Z im Zusammenhang mit der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine finden Sie in folgendem Artikel:

·      Meduza: Z’ How Russia transformed a letter of the Latin alphabet into the official (and ominous) symbol of its invasion of Ukraine, 16. März 2022
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/16/z

Menschenrechtsorganisationen, Aktivist·innen

·      AI – Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22; Zur weltweiten Lage der Menschenrechte; Russland 2021, 29. März 2022
https://www.amnesty.de/informieren/amnesty-report/russland-2021

„Recht auf Vereinigungsfreiheit

Aufgrund einer erneuten Verschärfung der Gesetze zu ‚ausländischen Agenten‘ und ‚unerwünschten Organisationen‘ waren zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen 2021 in noch stärkerem Maße Repressalien und Einschränkungen ausgesetzt. Die Neuregelung beinhaltet jetzt auch ein Verbot, mit ‚unerwünschten ausländischen Organisation‘ im Ausland zusammenzuarbeiten. Zudem wurden die Sanktionen für Ordnungswidrigkeiten und Straftaten verschärft. […] Die Behörden setzten 2021 acht weitere NGOs auf die Liste der ‚ausländischen Agenten‘, darunter die Allianz der Ärzte, eine unabhängige Gewerkschaft des Gesundheitspersonals. […] Gegen Organisationen, die auf der Liste ‚ausländischer Agenten‘ standen, verhängten die Behörden weiterhin hohe Geldstrafen.“ (AI, 29. März 2022)

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2022 - Russia, 28. Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2068627.html

„The government has relentlessly persecuted NGOs, particularly those that work on human rights and governance issues. Civic activists are frequently arrested on politically motivated charges.

Authorities impede and block NGO work by requiring groups that receive foreign support and are deemed to engage in broadly defined ‘political activity’ to register as ‘foreign agents.’ This designation, which is interpreted by much of the Russian public as denoting a foreign spying operation, entails onerous registration requirements, obliges groups to tag their materials with a ‘foreign agent’ label, and generally makes it extremely difficult for them to pursue their objectives. Under amendments adopted in late 2020, authorities can designate individuals and informal organizations as foreign agents. Those who fail to comply with the law risk fines or prison time.

In June 2021, the president signed laws that made it easier to open criminal cases for alleged affiliation with ‘undesirable’ organizations and banned individuals affiliated with ‘extremist’ organizations from seeking public office. As of December 2021, the Ministry of Justice had listed 86 NGOs and public associations, 36 media outlets, and 75 individuals as foreign agents. Separately, a total of 48 organizations had been deemed ‘undesirable.’ That month, Russia’s Supreme Court ordered the closure of Memorial International, one of Russia’s most well-respected human rights organizations, on the grounds that it had repeatedly failed to meet the requirements of the foreign agents legislation.” (Freedom House, 28. Februar 2022)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russland: Repression eskaliert, 13. Jänner 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2066555.html

„2021 setzten die russischen Behörden diese Strategie fort und nutzten verschiedenste Instrumente, um Menschenrechtsverteidiger*innen zu schikanieren, einzuschüchtern und in ihrer Arbeit zu behindern. Darunter fallen die Ausweisung mehrerer prominenter Menschenrechtsaktivist*innen, aber auch Fälle, in denen diese ins Exil gezwungen wurden.

Im Dezember entschieden Gerichte, Memorial aufzulösen, eine der ältesten und bedeutendsten Menschenrechtsorganisationen Russlands, angestoßen durch eine Liquidierungsklage der Staatsanwaltschaft gegen die International Memorial Society und das Memorial Human Rights Center ein. Zuvor musste der bekannte Menschenrechtsanwalt Iwan Pawlow die Schließung seiner Menschenrechtsorganisation Team 29 bekannt geben und das Land verlassen, nachdem die Behörden versucht hatten, ihn aus der Anwaltschaft auszuschließen, seine Tätigkeit eingeschränkt und ihn und vier seiner Kolleg*innen als ausländische Agent*innen eingestuft hatten. Zwei weitere Menschenrechtsanwältinnen, Vanessa Kogan und Valentina Chupik, beide ausländische Staatsangehörige und Leiterinnen von Menschenrechtsorganisationen, die sich mit internationalen Menschenrechtsprozessen beziehungsweise dem Rechtsbeistand von Migrant*innen befassen, wurden aus zweifelhaften Gründen des Landes verwiesen. Im Dezember sperrten die Behörden die Website der Menschenrechtsgruppe OVD-INFO, die Anfang des Jahres als ‚ausländischer Agent‘ eingestuft wurde.“ (HRW, 13. Jänner 2022)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russia: Arrests, Harassment of Ukraine War Dissidents; Raids, Detentions, Prosecution of Anti-War Activists, Independent Journalists, 24. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2070461.html

„Crackdown on Human Rights Defenders

In March, unidentified assailants repeatedly harassed the Movement for Human Rights, one of the oldest rights organizations in Russia, which the authorities formally shut down in 2019 and its founder and leader, Lev Ponomarev whom authorities designated ‘foreign agent mass media.’ In February, Ponomarev had initiated a petition, calling on the Russian military to withdraw from Ukraine, which gathered more than 1.2 million signatures.

On March 3, a woman attacked Ponomarev on the street throwing coins at him and then insulting and calling him a foreign agent. Journalists with the pro-Kremlin television channel NTV, known for such provocations, filmed the entire incident.

On March 16, four masked men and apparently the same woman went to the organization’s door, seemingly trying to enter. Before leaving they glued ‘get out traitor’ and ‘enemy foreign agent’ stickers to the nameplate and the walls.

On March 21, unidentified assailants painted ‘V’ and ‘Z’ – widely recognized symbols of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine – on Ponomarev’s office door.

On March 23, four unidentified men interrupted an event in the group’s office, spraying pepper spray and screaming insults. Staff recognized one of the men as a person who had followed Ponomarev when he submitted the anti-war petition to government.

On March 11, authorities blocked the website of the Movement for Human Rights.

On February 28, Russia’s Supreme Court rejected the appeal to pause the implementation of the decision to liquidate another prominent human rights organization, International Memorial. On March 22, the court upheld the ruling to shut down Memorial for allegedly violating the draconian ‘foreign agent’ legislation.

On March 4, police raided the offices of Memorial and its partner organization, Civic Assistance Committee, in connection with an ‘extremism’ case opened against one of Memorial’s members. Police prevented lawyers and employees of the organizations from entering their offices for 12 hours. When the search was complete, Memorial staff found the letters ‘Z’ and ‘V’ and ‘Memorial is finished’ written on their office walls.

On March 14, unidentified assailants splashed a liquid reeking of gasoline and urine, on the entrance door of Memorial’s Moscow office. A witness said the stench made it ‘very hard to be inside the building.’

For years, the authorities have been harassing Memorial in retaliation for its human rights work, labeling the group a ‘foreign agent’ and imposing hefty fines.

On March 15, a Moscow court fined Svetlana Gannushkina, the head of Civic Assistance, for participation in an anti-war protest on February 27 during which she ‘was walking in the crowd which was chanting slogans.’ Police also briefly detained Gannushkina on March 3 after public CCTV cameras identified her and notified the police as she was leaving a metro station.“ (HRW, 24. März 2022)

·      The Guardian: ‘Our voices are louder if we stay’: Russian anti-war activists refuse to flee, 27. März 2022
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/27/our-voices-are-louder-if-we-stay-russian-anti-war-activists-refuse-to-flee

„Despite reaching one of the darkest moments in more than 40 years as a dissident and human rights activist, Oleg Orlov [of the human rights group Memorial] says that he has no plans to flee Russia. […] He has been arrested three times for holding pickets since late February, when Russian troops launched an assault on Ukraine. And he doesn’t rule out a prison term in his future.“ (The Guardian, 27. März 2022)

Tom Parfitt, Korrespondent der Times, postet am 28. März den folgenden Tweet inklusive Bild:

·      Parfitt, Tom: Tweet, 28. März 2022
https://twitter.com/parfitt_tom/status/1508518638533455874

„Russia human rights legend Oleg Orlov of Memorial, a scrupulous observer of abuses in the North Caucasus and an opponent of the assault on Ukraine, is the latest person to have his door daubed with pro-war symbol ‘Z’ - and a sign reading ‘Collaborator’. […]

“ (Parfitt, 28. März 2022)

Diese Informationen finden sich auch auf Russisch in einem Tweet des Menschenrechtszentrums Memorial vom 28. März 2022, der unter folgendem Link verfügbar ist:

·      Menschenrechtszentrum Memorial: Tweet, 28. März 2022
https://twitter.com/hrc_memorial/status/1508504631126761475

Lage von Journalist:innen

Ein Dossier zur russischen Medienlandschaft sowie ein Dossier zu zensierten Medien in Russland finden Sie unter folgenden Links:

·      Dekoder: Alles Propaganda? Russlands Medienlandschaft, ohne Datum
https://www.dekoder.org/de/dossier/medienlandschaft-propaganda-pressefreiheit

·      Dekoder: Zensierte Medien – Journalisten in Gefahr, ohne Datum
https://www.dekoder.org/de/dossier/medien-zensur-russland

·      AI – Amnesty International: Amnesty International Report 2021/22; Zur weltweiten Lage der Menschenrechte; Russland 2021, 29. März 2022
https://www.amnesty.de/informieren/amnesty-report/russland-2021

„Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung

Die Behörden griffen auch 2021 auf die Gesetze über ‚ausländische Agenten‘ und ‚unerwünschte ausländische Organisationen‘ zurück, um das Recht auf freie Meinungsäußerung einzuschränken und unabhängige Medien, Journalist_innen und Aktivist_innen zum Schweigen zu bringen. Es wurden Geldstrafen verhängt, wenn entsprechende Veröffentlichungen nicht deutlich mit dem vorgeschriebenen Hinweis ‚ausländischer Agent‘ gekennzeichnet waren. Die Behörden erklärten 14 Medien und 70 Personen zu ‚ausländischen Agenten‘. […] Im September 2021 veröffentlichte der Inlandsgeheimdienst FSB eine umfangreiche Liste mit Themen, die nicht als geheim klassifiziert waren, die jedoch eine Einstufung als ‚ausländischer Agent‘ nach sich zogen, sollte sich eine Person damit beschäftigen. Die Liste der Themen reichte von Verbrechen in der Armee bis hin zu Verzögerungen bei Raumfahrtprogrammen. Die seit drei Jahrzehnten aktive Menschenrechtsorganisation Soldatenmütter von St. Petersburg kündigte daraufhin an, ihre Tätigkeit zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen in der Armee einzustellen.“ (AI, 29. März 2022)

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2022 - Russia, 28. Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2068627.html

„Although the constitution provides for freedom of speech, vague laws on extremism grant the authorities great discretion to crack down on any speech, organization, or activity that lacks official support. The government controls, directly or through state-owned companies and friendly business magnates, all of the national television networks and many radio and print outlets, as well as most of the media advertising market. A handful of independent outlets still operate, most of them online and some headquartered abroad. The few still based in the country struggle to maintain their independence from state interests. Television remains the most popular source of news, but its influence is declining, particularly among young people who rely more on social media.

Laws on extremism, foreign agents, and undesirable organizations have been used to harass media outlets, curtailing their access to funding and forcing many to cease operations in Russia. In late 2020, legislators expanded the foreign agents law to apply to individuals and informal organizations. Authorities cracked down on journalists who reported on protest events in 2021, for example by arresting editors at the student-led newspaper Doxa. Also during the year, a number of prominent independent media outlets were declared foreign agents, including Meduza, VTimes, Dozhd, OVD-Info, Mediazona, and iStories. Roskomnadzor, the federal media and telecommunications agency, required several media outlets to delete reports by the investigative news outlet Proekt, which was declared an undesirable organization in July.” (Freedom House, 28. Februar 2022)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russland: Repression eskaliert, 13. Jänner 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2066555.html

„Die Behörden griffen die wenigen verbliebenen unabhängigen Medien und Journalist*innen an und leiteten unter anderem Strafverfahren gegen Journalist*innen auf Grundlage zweifelhafter Anschuldigungen ein, so dass einige Medien geschlossen wurden oder einzelne Personen das Land verlassen mussten. Die Zahl der Organisationen und Einzelpersonen, die als ‚ausländische Agenten – ausländische Medien‘ eingestuft werden, hat sich seit Dezember 2020 fast verachtfacht. Die Zahl der Organisationen, die als ‚unerwünscht‘ auf der schwarzen Liste stehen, steigt weiter an, ebenso wie die Zahl der Strafverfahren gegen russische Aktivist*innen wegen angeblicher Beteiligung an solchen Organisationen. Andrej Piwowarow, der ehemalige Kopf der Oppositionsbewegung ‚Open Russia‘, befindet sich auf Grundlage dieser Vorwürfe – lediglich wegen eines Posts in den sozialen Medien – weiterhin in Untersuchungshaft. Sein Prozess begann im vergangenen November.“ (HRW, 13. Jänner 2022)

·      Der Spiegel: Wie der Kreml Kritikern in Kriegszeiten den Mund verbietet, 7. März 2022 (verfügbar auf Factiva)

„Jede kritische Äußerung über den Krieg – auch Posts oder Tweets in den sozialen Medien– kann harte Strafen für Russinnen und Russen sowie für Ausländer, die im Land leben, zur Folge haben. […] Dadurch, dass die neuen Gesetze schwammig formuliert sind – zum Beispiel ist nicht klar, was den Aufruf zu Sanktionen genau umfasst – haben die Sicherheitsbehörden viel Spielraum, um gegen Kritiker vorzugehen. […] Der ohnehin unter Druck stehende unabhängige kritische Journalismus ist in Russland damit am Ende.“ (Der Spiegel, 7. März 2022)

·      Meduza: The war at home - Russia is de facto under martial law, human rights experts warn, 25. März 2022
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/26/the-war-at-home

„Rights and freedoms in Russia have been restricted to the point that the country is de facto under martial law. This is the conclusion of a new report authored by prominent human rights experts Pavel Chikov, head of the rights group Agora, and Damir Gainutdinov, head of the Net Freedoms Project. Indeed, against the backdrop of Moscow’s month-long invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have moved to impose serious restrictions on basic constitutional rights and freedoms at home. As Chikov and Gainutdinov write, these restrictions have primarily affected freedoms of assembly, speech, and movement, as well as private property rights. Meduza summarizes the report’s main findings here. […]

Freedom of Speech

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was immediately followed by new restrictions on freedom of speech. On February 26, Roskomnadzor (the federal communications and censorship watchdog) began issuing notices to media outlets, demanding that their editors retract reports about the war. A few days later, the censorship agency began blocking online publications en masse. In total, at least 811 websites have been blocked. On top of targeting the press, the Russian authorities began cracking down on social networks. In addition to blocking Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, Russia declared Meta (Facebook and Instagram’s parent company) an ‘extremist organization.’ Whether Google and its services will be able to continue operating in Russia remains an open question.“ (Meduza, 25. März 2022)

·      AI – Amnesty International: Russian Federation: End censorship on voices against the war [EUR 46/5345/2022], 14. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069461/EUR4653452022ENGLISH.pdf

„The growing censorship has had a heavy toll on independent media outlets and social media across Russia. Access to more than two dozen Russian and international media websites has been blocked in Russia shortly after 24 February, following the authorities’ mandates to call the war a ‘special operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine’ and to only use information about the Russian invasion of Ukraine ‘received only from official Russian sources’. The list of the blocked media includes BBC Russian Service, Deutsche Welle, Radio Liberty and its regional projects, Meduza, Mediazona and others. Russian regional media outlets like TV Station TV-2 in Tomsk, Znak.com in the Urals, Pskovskaya Gubernia from Pskov and “7x7” from Syktyvkar have also been blocked. Online access to the popular radio station Echo Moskvy was blocked on 1 March, after it was taken off air and then liquidated. Some other independent media outlets, like TV Rain and Znak.com, also announced that they had to suspend their work due to censorship and restrictions. Other media, like Novaya Gazeta, chose to continue their work but had to delete materials covering the armed conflict in Ukraine as a precaution against possible penalties[2], while others like The Bell decided to explicitly state that they would stop covering the situation.

The risks and challenges faced by journalists and other media workers have risen significantly after the introduction of new legislation that effectively imposed war-time censorship on 4 March. The closure of independent media outlets, coupled with new legislation prohibiting the dissemination of ‘fake news’ and ‘discreditation’ of the Russian Armed Forces have led to a mass exodus of Russian and foreign journalists from Russia. According to ‘Agentstvo’ online media, as of 7 March, at least 150 journalists had to leave Russia since the start of the invasion of Ukraine for fear of reprisals.“ (AI, 14. März 2022, S. 4)

Ähnliche Informationen finden sich auch in folgendem Artikel:

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russia: Kremlin Targets Critics Amid Ukraine War; Baseless Verdict Adds 9 Years to Alexei Navalny’s Prison Sentence, 23. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2069994.html

Lage von Demonstrant·innen und Personen, die sich in sozialen Medien regierungskritisch äußern

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2022 - Russia, 28. Februar 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2068627.html

„The government restricts freedom of assembly. Overwhelming police responses, the excessive use of force, routine arrests, and harsh fines and prison sentences have discouraged unsanctioned protests, while pro-Kremlin groups are able to demonstrate freely. Despite the risks, thousands of people have turned out for a series of antigovernment demonstrations in recent years.

It is extremely difficult for groups opposing the Kremlin to obtain permission to hold a protest or rally. At the regional level, extensive location-based restrictions prohibit assemblies in as much as 70 percent of public space. While some of these restrictions have been invalidated over the years, authorities can ban rallies on vaguely defined ‘public interest’ grounds. Since 2014, nine major legislative amendments have been introduced to curtail freedom of assembly. Some protesters have resorted to single-person pickets to circumvent limits on mass gatherings, but authorities have used a variety of laws and tactics to crack down on the practice in recent years.

The government has invoked public health concerns to tighten restrictions on assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic, but the rules are selectively applied to target critics of the regime.

In early 2021, mass demonstrations in response to the arrest and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny were met with excessive force by state security personnel. At least 11,500 people were detained, more than 130 criminal investigations were opened, and multiple protesters and journalists were injured, with many reporting beatings and other abuse in custody. Some of those convicted over the subsequent months received multiyear prison sentences. Facial-recognition technology installed in Moscow and several other cities was reportedly used to identify and arrest participants in the protests.“ (Freedom House, 28. Februar 2022)

·      Meduza: The war at home - Russia is de facto under martial law, human rights experts warn, 25. März 2022
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/03/26/the-war-at-home

„Rights and freedoms in Russia have been restricted to the point that the country is de facto under martial law. This is the conclusion of a new report authored by prominent human rights experts Pavel Chikov, head of the rights group Agora, and Damir Gainutdinov, head of the Net Freedoms Project. […] Meduza summarizes the report’s main findings here.

Freedom of Assembly

The Russian authorities haven’t authorized a single anti-war demonstration - or a single public gathering in support of the so-called ‘special military operation’ - since the Kremlin began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24. Applications to hold public gatherings have been rejected under the pretext of ‘pandemic restrictions.’ At unauthorized anti-war rallies, protesters have been detained en masse. Russian law enforcement have already carried out more than 15,000 arrests at anti-war protests across the country, and there have been dozens of reports of police officers beating demonstrators.” (Meduza, 25. März 2022)

·      The Washington Post: Putin’s purge of ‘traitors’ scoops up pensioners, foodies and peaceniks, 26. März 2022
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/26/russia-media-putin-ukraine/

„Despite the risk of fines and jail time, others keep protesting. More than 15,000 people have been arrested since the war started.“ (The Washington Post, 26. März 2022)

Eine englische, laufend aktualisierte Chronik zu Protesten in Russland gegen den Krieg in der Ukraine, zu Verhaftungen sowie Verurteilungen finden Sie unter folgendem Link:

·      OVD-Info: Russian Protests against the War with Ukraine. A Chronicle of Events, ohne Datum
https://ovd.news/news/2022/03/02/russian-protests-against-war-ukraine-chronicle-events

·      AI – Amnesty International: Russian Federation: End censorship on voices against the war [EUR 46/5345/2022], 14. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069461/EUR4653452022ENGLISH.pdf

„Anti-war protests have been ongoing in Russia since the start of the invasion on 24 February. […] The majority of those arrested during the anti-war protests face charges under Article 20.2 (5) of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences, Article 20.2 (2) (‘Organization of a public event without submitting a notification’), Article 20.2(8) (‘Repeated violation of the rules of participation in a public assembly’) and Article 19.3 (‘Disobedience to the lawful order of a police officer’). The Russian Net Freedoms Project had already reported since the protests of 6 March at least 144 cases brought under the newly introduced Article 20.3.3 (‘Public actions aimed at discreditation of the Russian armed forces’) across Russia and in the occupied Crimea. As of 7 March, at least seven people were issued with fines ranging from RUB 30,000 to RUB 60,000 (US$ 224 to US$ 447) for having called others to join an anti-war action by staging a single picket with an anti-war slogan or by writing ‘No to war’ on the snow. […]

Like with many other public assemblies, there have been reports from several cities of the police arbitrarily arresting by-standers or passers-by. […] Media workers covering the protests have also been detained. […] The police has also arrested and otherwise targeted children who have been part of peaceful street rallies, with at least 113 children arrested during protests since 24 February according to OVD-Info. […] The police also targeted older people during peaceful protests. […] Anti-war demonstrations to protest against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been routinely dispersed, often with the use of unnecessary and excessive force. […] There have also been reports of torture or other ill-treatment of people held in some police stations. […] Reports from several cities where protesters were detained indicate multiple other violations of their rights while in police custody, including detention in cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions, unlawful fingerprinting and photographing for a police database, confiscation of mobile phones and others.“ (AI, 14. März 2022, S. 2-3)

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Russia: Brutal Arrests and Torture, Ill-Treatment of Anti-War Protesters; Thousands Arrested on March 6; Protesters Abused in Detention, 9. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2069274.html

„Russian authorities have arbitrarily arrested thousands of peaceful protesters at anti-war rallies across Russia, in line with their increasingly brutal crackdown on those who disagree with Russia’s military offensive in Ukraine. The police used excessive force against protesters while detaining them and, in several instances, inflicted abuse amounting to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment, on those in custody. […]

Numerous videos filmed in various cities show the police using excessive force as they arrest people. A video from Moscow shows five police officers detaining a man, while one of them kicks him. In Saint Petersburg police officers are seen pushing a man to the ground and punching him. A police officer in Moscow hit a protester with his baton while the officer and fellow officers had the protester restrained and were carrying him.

In Saint Petersburg, between four and six police officers were filmed beating a man, pinned to the ground, with batons and then appear to administer electric shocks to him. The man is shouting that he is not a protester and was simply passing by. The use of an electroshock weapon on a person clearly in police custody violates the prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.

Detainees reported sustaining cuts, bruises, and electric burns. One protester allegedly suffered a concussion and another had an open laceration on his head, allegedly inflicted during his arrest. Some detainees were hospitalized. […]

Detainees also reported degrading and inhuman treatment, including torture, at police stations. Police in Moscow detained Marina Morozova, 22, for allegedly participating in the anti-war protests and took her to the Bratayevo police station. She was able to discretely make an audio recording inside the station. In the audio, which she later shared with the independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta, three police officers can be heard questioning her. One unidentified policeman was especially aggressive, insulting Morozova, punching her in the head, and threatening to shoot her and smash the chair into her head.

Aleksandra Kaluzhskikh, 26, also managed to discretely record audio while she was being questioning at Bratayevo. She shared this with OVD-Info. It appears that the same unidentified police officer who interrogated Morozova, slapped Kaluzhskikh, hit her in the face with a water bottle, grabbed her by the hair, threatened to give her electric shocks, and smashed her phone. ‘Do you think I will be punished somehow? Putin told us to kill you [all]. Putin is on our side,’ says the unidentified officer in the audio. ‘You are enemies of the state. You are enemies of the nation. We will get a bonus for this.’ Four other women reported to Novaya Gazeta that police officers at Bratayevo held them down while pouring water on their faces, which one of the women said made her feel like she was drowning. The description given by the women suggests the police subjected them to treatment commonly known as waterboarding, which constitutes torture. The women also said the police grabbed them by the hair, slapped them in the face, threatened them with sexual assault, and kicked them in the stomach. Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta and a 2021 Nobel Peace Prize winner, filed a complaint with the Internal Affairs Ministry, calling for investigations into these incidents at the Bratayevo police station.

OVD-Info also reported that officers at police stations across the country routinely threatened detainees with violence. Even though they were detained for alleged administrative offenses, detainees were forced to have their photo and fingerprints taken and surrender their telephones, contrary to Russian law.” (HRW, 9. März 2022)

·      The Times: 'Surprisingly, I'm Quite Optimistic.' Navalny's Chief of Staff on What War In Ukraine Means For Russia, 30. März 2022
https://time.com/6162889/navalny-ukraine-russia-leonid-volkov/

„Alexei Navalny, the de-facto leader of the Russian opposition, has been languishing in a Russian prison since February 2021. He was jailed after surviving an assassination attempt, by poisoning, from the Russian security forces while he was campaigning against President Vladimir Putin. With Navalny in jail, one of the most prominent voices of his banned political movement—the Anti-Corruption Foundation—is Leonid Volkov, who serves as Navalny’s chief of staff. He spoke with TIME over the phone from self-imposed exile in Lithuania about what the war in Ukraine means for the opposition movement in Russia, ahead of a scheduled appearance at the 14th annual Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy on April 6. […]

Navalny, and your team, have been calling for Russians to protest in their town squares. Can you talk about whether those protests were as widespread as you wanted them to be? And if not, why?

There is a thing that many people in the West don’t understand: the risks that ordinary protesters face in Russia. Now, if you go to protest, you will very likely be detained, highly likely arrested, expelled from university or fired from your job. You are risking a prison term, like real prison, for three or five years. It has changed over the last six years dramatically. Two years ago, the largest risk for a protester was to get arrested for 10 days. Now it’s 15 years. Ten years ago, the largest risk for a protester was to get fined 500 rubles [approx. $6]. Still, over 15,000 people were detained during anti-war rallies in the first couple of weeks, which means that hundreds of thousands of people attended. There were arrests in over 130 Russian cities. And very importantly, every protester in a country like Russia represents maybe a thousand people who are sympathetic but can’t afford to risk going to prison for five years; can’t afford to get fired from their job. So we know that many people are supporting us, but for very natural reasons, because they live in a totalitarian regime, they can’t turn out and participate. For many years, it was completely safe at least to share information about the situation on social media. Now you will risk lengthy imprisonment for this as well.“ (The Times, 30. März 2022)

·      AI – Amnesty International: Russia: Authorities launch witch-hunt to catch anyone sharing anti-war views, 30. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2070558.html

„Just a month on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, at least 60 criminal cases have been initiated over peaceful protests against the war or public criticism of the Russian authorities, according to Agora, a Russian human rights group. They are being investigated under 14 separate articles of the Criminal Code.

At least 46 people have faced criminal charges, including nine who were taken into custody and three who were confined under house arrest. They have been charged with a myriad of ‘crimes’, including insulting government officials, libel, inciting extremist activities, inciting mass riots, hatred and fraud, and the desecration of burial sites, according to Agora. […]

At least 10 of these cases saw critics being investigated under a new law, for ‘discrediting’ Russia’s armed forces. Under the new Russian law this is punishable by up to 10 years in prison - or 15 years if the comments caused ‘grave consequences’. […]

On 16 March, Veronika Belotserkovskaya, a gastronomy blogger with 850,000 Instagram followers, became the first individual charged under the new law. She was charged with sharing ‘knowingly false information about the use of the Russian Armed Forces to destroy cities and the civilian population of Ukraine, including children.’

Sergey Klokov, a technician at the Moscow City Police Department, was the first person taken into custody under this law after being arrested on 18 March. According to his lawyer, he was charged with spreading ‘fake news’ during phone calls with residents of Crimea and Moscow region.

More cases followed. On 22 March, Aleksandr Nevzorov, a prominent journalist who gained popularity during perestroika (a state-approved series of political reforms in the 1980s), was charged with sharing ‘false information’ about Russia’s strikes against a maternity hospital in Mariupol, after criticizing the shelling in an Instagram post on 9 March.

On 25 March, Izabella Yevloyeva, a journalist from Russia’s Republic of Ingushetia, was charged after sharing a post on social media that described the Russian armed forces’ pro-war ‘Z’ symbol as being ‘synonymous with aggression, death, pain and shameless manipulation’.

Anti-war opinions are also prosecuted using other repressive articles of Criminal Code. On 18 March, Andrey Boyarshinov, a civil society activist from Kazan, was charged with two incidences of ‘justifying terrorism’ and placed under house arrest for two months over anti-war messages he shared in a Telegram channel.

On 24 March, Irina Bystrova, an art teacher from Petrozavodsk, was charged with sharing ‘fake news’ and ‘justifying terrorism’ in relation to posts she shared on VKontakte, a Russian social media site. “ (AI, 30. März 2022)

·      Universität Bremen - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa: Russian Analytical Digest Nr. 280, 21. März 2022
https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD280.pdf

„VK is a popular Russian social network that has more than 100 million visitors per month. It was created in 2006 by Russian software developer Pavel Durov, who later gained fame as the architect of Telegram. In 2014 Durov was forced to leave Russia due to his refusal to disclose users’ personal data at the request of Russian intelligence (the FSB). […] Following Durov’s dismissal, VK became closely connected to the Russian government. In 2021 Vladimir Kirienko, an official linked to the Presidential Administration, was appointed CEO of VK. Simultaneously, Alisher Usmanov, who held the controlling stake in VK, sold it to Sogaz. The latter is owned by Yury Kovalchuk, a businessman closely allied with Vladimir Putin. VK thus became a social network that—unlike Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter—easily and instantly cooperates with the government and is controlled by pro- Putin parties. What are its core peculiarities? […]

If foreign social networks are guided by their policies and international law, VK relies on Russian law. And Russian law changes rapidly, especially in the context of war. On March 4, the Russian authorities hastily passed a law that imposes serious criminal penalties on media, public figures, and private individuals alike for spreading ‘fakes’ about the Russian armed forces. The definition of fakes and the application of the law is still quite vague, but it has become clear that publicly using such common terminology as ‘war’ or ‘intervention’ to describe Russia’s actions in Ukraine amounts to a violation thereof. According to a letter from the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) received by multiple media and public actors, only official Russian sources can be cited and only the term ‘special military operation’ can be used to describe Russia’s actions. Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter faced the same demands from Russian regulatory bodies and were de facto instructed to censor all content that referred to a ‘war’ in Ukraine instead of a ‘special military operation.’ Facebook not only refused to do so, but also banned Russian state media pages from advertising on the site. Following hundreds of thousands of Euro of fines issued by the Russian government, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were ultimately blocked in the country. VK, unlike its Western counterparts, instantly implemented the demands of Roskomnadzor and rapidly deleted any content violating the new Russian law about fakes. It blocked the pages of a range of media - such as the BBC, Radio Free Europe, and Deutsche Welle - for not complying with the new law. The same procedure has been applied to many other pages and private VK users that post content at odds with the new law. Moreover, VK has blocked a range of groups opposing war, the biggest of which is called ‘No War.’ The site reported on March 9 that by order of the public prosecutor’s office, the group’s page is no longer available to Russian users. […]

VK is notorious for disclosing users’ personal data at the request of Russian law enforcement. As the founder of VK, Pavel Durov, stated, this was the main stumbling block that forced him to leave Russia in 2014. Since the ousting of Durov and the installation of pro-Kremlin management, VK has disclosed hundreds of users’ personal data to the government. Many of them are allies of Alexey Navalny. Since the adoption of the law ‘on spreading fakes about the Russian armed forces,’ VK has been transferring the data of any users who post comments that are not in line with the current legislation (i.e., calling it a war, invasion or attack instead of a special military operation) to the law enforcement and intelligence bodies daily. Russian courts have already handed down hundreds of fines, ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 rubles (~250–800 Euro). People across Russia - in Siberia, in southern Russia, and in the North - have been accused of posting or reposting ‘fakes’ about the war in Ukraine on VK. At the same time, Facebook, despite its spotty reputation when it comes to the protection of users’ personal data, refused to localize the data of its Russian users in Russia, as the authorities had demanded, fearing that doing so would make the data more vulnerable to the interested state bodies.“ (Universität Bremen - Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, 21. März 2022, S. 20-21)

·      The Times: Anti-war dissidents in Russia forced to recant in apology videos, 30. März 2022 (verfügbar auf Factiva)

„Russians who oppose the war are being made to publicly recant their beliefs, in a sign that the country is returning to a form of totalitarianism not seen since the Soviet Union.

A Muscovite who posted a video of himself on social media saying ‘glory to Ukraine’ was forced to apologise and release a second video in which he declared his support for the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine, RIA Novosti, the state news agency, reported. ‘I said statements used by Ukrainian nationalists,’ he said. ‘I am not a nationalist and do not recommend these statements to the people of the Russian Federation. If I offended anyone I am sorry. I support the special operation of Russian forces in Ukraine.’ The man, who was not named, was arrested by police in Alushta, Crimea, which Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014.

A Ukrainian man living in Krasnogorsk, on the outskirts of Moscow, was also forced to apologise for ‘speaking badly about Russian soldiers’ in a video he had posted on Instagram. In his recantation video, published by RIA Novosti, he explained that he had been drunk when he made the original video. […]

A woman in Vladikavkaz, southern Russia, has been told she faces up to three years in prison for defacing a banner about the ‘special operation’, local news reported. The woman, 37, poured paint over the sign, which supported the Russian armed forces.” (The Times, 30. März 2022)

Reaktionen auf Menschen, die Russland verlassen

·      Jamestown Foundation: Putin Opens a Second Front: The Battle Against ‘Traitors’ Inside Russia, 24. März 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2070158.html

„Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, conceived as a ‘blitzkrieg,’ has gone on already for a month, inflicting colossal damage to Ukraine and making life in Russia substantially worse. Nevertheless, pro-government sociological centers claim that the popular approval for Vladimir Putin continues to grow, affirming that as of March 13, it was at 77.2 percent (Ren.tv, March 18). They are echoed by several independent sociologists, who confirm that nearly three-quarters of Russians support the war against Ukraine. Over the past weeks, this percentage has grown even further (Hvylya.net, March 16). At the same time, other sociologists note that ‘the chauvinistic euphoria of 2014 is unlikely to be duplicated.’ Still, some warn that the people fear to say what they think and therefore, the value of today’s sociological data is not very high (Еuronews, March 13).

However, regardless of the population’s mood, there is a significant split within the Russian elite. Russian officials and propagandists are starting to quit and go abroad. One of the first to leave Russia was the deputy general director of Aeroflot, Andrey Panov (Deutsche Welle—Russian service, March 12). Following the protest of Marina Ovsyannikova, editor at the Russian state-controlled Channel One, who appeared on air with an anti-war placard, propagandists began to abandon Russia’s federal TV channels (BBC—Russian service, Оbozrevatel.com, March 15).

In response to these trends, the deputy chairman of the ruling United Russia party, Sultan Khamzaev, proposed a scheme to prevent celebrities and oligarchs from returning to Russia after fleeing the country since the war began (Versia.ru, March 7). Speaking on March 16 at a meeting on socio-economic support for the regions, Putin referred to those who follow a Western lifestyle as ‘national traitors.’ In his words, they represent a ‘fifth column’ on which the West can count to ‘dismember Russia.’ The president expressed hope that ‘the Russian people can always discern true patriots from scum and traitors’ and ‘the natural and necessary purging of society’ will strengthen the country (Kremlin.ru, March 16).

On the one hand, such statements reveal Putin’s deep uncertainty that the elite will unquestioningly support his military adventure. On the other, many are inclined to think that such declarations signal the start of a new round of repression against all segments of the population. Novaya Gazeta journalist Kirill Martynov is confident that ‘the country should expect a hunt for dissidents even more ambitious than in recent years’ (YouTube, March 17).

Apart from the common arrests at anti-war rallies, the Kremlin appears to be preparing for an even tougher wave of repression. According to the few independent news outlets in Russia, artists opposing the war will be put on a ‘blacklist.’ They will be forbidden to give concerts and appear on television (Novaya Gazeta, March 18). The site of the so-called ‘Committee for the Defense of National Interests,’ created in 2020 and infamous for compiling lists of ‘enemies and traitors,’ published the personal data of 600 Russians who have left the country since the beginning of the war (Inagenty.ru, March 17).“ (Jamestown Foundation, 24. März 2022)

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