Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Political Situation
1.1 Political Opposition, Protests, and Violence

An October 2021 article by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a nonpartisan and independent organization created by the US Congress that collaborates with governments and civil society to promote peace and mitigate conflict (USIP n.d.), states that economic difficulties, which have led to protests carried out by opposition political parties, along with strained relations between civil and military authorities and an "uptick" in terrorist activities in the country's northwestern region, are "erod[ing]" popular support for the current ruling party in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) [Pakistan Justice Movement (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13)], headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan (USIP 27 Oct. 2021). For additional information on protests organized by the political opposition, see section 3.4 of this Response.

Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicates that protests are "common," noting that they are a "major" driving force of "security unrest" in the country as authorities have "limited" ability to respond to political violence (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.73). The same source adds that while political violence occurs across the country, it is "most prevalent" in Karachi and Balochistan [Baluchistan] (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.159). For further information on the security situation in Pakistan, notably in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Hyderabad, see Response to Information Request PAK200859 of December 2021.

According to sources, Pakistani authorities "crack[ed] down" on [members and supporters of (HRW 13 Jan. 2021)] the political opposition over the course of 2020 (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 279; HRW 13 Jan. 2021). The same sources note that government control over the media, through "increased coercion and censorship" (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 281) or by fostering a "climate of fear" (HRW 13 Jan. 2021), has been accompanied by harassment, attacks, further censorship of journalists, arrests (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 279; HRW 13 Jan. 2021), and prosecutions for "criticizing government officials and policies" (HRW 13 Jan. 2021).

For instance, Amnesty International reports that a joint statement was published in August 2020 by "at least 16" women journalists who stated having been "harassed and threatened with violence by the social media team of the ruling party," especially when their reports were "unfavourable" towards the government (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 281). Similarly, Australia's DFAT reports that while Pakistan has a "vibrant media" landscape with many "independent" news outlets, "the operating environment for journalists reporting on sensitive topics is challenging," as they face "intimidation and violence" to "avoid sensitive topics," and adds that, according to Reporters sans frontières (RSF), women journalists notably face "threats of sexual violence and harassment, including via social media" (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.185, 3.189).

1.2 Enforced Disappearances

According to Australia's DFAT, reliable data and statistics on the prevalence of enforced disappearances are "difficult to obtain" and "vary considerably" from source to source (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 4.9). Amnesty International reports that in 2020, authorities from intelligence agencies used enforced disappearances "to punish dissent" in a more "public and widespread" manner, notably in urban areas (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280). Similarly, in its annual report for May 2020 to May 2021, the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) emphasizes the "consistently high number" of newly reported enforced disappearances during this period, a number of which targeted, among other groups, political activists (UN 4 Aug. 2021, para. 95).

While Amnesty International states that targets of enforced disappearances prior to 2020 included human rights and political activists, students, and journalists "rarely well-known outside their communities" (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280), sources list the following examples of incidents in 2020:

• Matiullah Jan, a [journalist (HRW 13 Jan. 2021) or "vocal critic of the government" (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280)] was abducted in Islamabad in July 2020 and released hours later (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280–281; HRW 13 Jan. 2021), shortly before he was set to appear in court for having criticized the country's judiciary (HRW 13 Jan. 2021).
• In June 2020, Idris Khattak [former Amnesty International consultant and human rights defender (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280–281)], was acknowledged to have been held in custody by security forces since his disappearance in November 2019 (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 280–281; US 30 Mar. 2021, 4).

Australia's DFAT further indicates that the Muttahida Quami [Qaumi] Movement (MQM), a Sindh-based party, indicates that, since 2013, 140 MQM members have been victims of enforced disappearances and 100 have been victims of extra-judicial killings at the hands of government and paramilitary forces (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.163, 3.164).

According to the UN WGEID, enforced disappearances occur with "impunity" and there is a "lack of effective measures" implemented by authorities to prevent them (UN 4 Aug. 2021, para. 95). Similarly, according to Amnesty International, there is "no accountability for the perpetrators" and "no progress towards criminalizing" the use of enforced disappearances was made in 2020, despite the promises of the ruling federal government, "underscoring the culture of impunity" (Amnesty International 7 Apr. 2021, 281).

2. Electoral Environment

Freedom House states that major and minor parties contest elections against one another in parliament and provincial assemblies (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B1). The same source further notes that "patronage networks" have "hamper[ed]" competition, and the "freedom" that major parties enjoy based on their alliances with "unelected arms" of the state have allowed for various "legal and extralegal" political maneuverings (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B1). According to Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020, the political party system in Pakistan is "weak, internally undemocratic and personalistic, centered on an individual or dynasty, and sometimes splitting along the lines of personal rivalries for leadership" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13). Similarly, Australia's DFAT reports that while voting trends have historically followed "ethnic, local or feudal" lines rather than "ideological, religious, or sectarian allegiances," local sources indicate that the 2018 general elections aligned more closely with religious and conservative interests, as reflected in electoral political campaigns that "foster[ed] religious intolerance at the community level" (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.55).

Regarding women's participation in political parties and elections, Freedom House indicates that while political parties include women's wings, women's participation in the electorate remains "restrict[ed]" by societal constraints, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B4). Similarly, an article written by several academics, including Ali Cheema, an associate professor of economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), who conducted a survey on the gender gap in voter turnout by province for the 2018 general elections, states that the largest gender gaps are found in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, at approximately 24 percent in the province's cities and 19 percent in the rest of the province (Cheema, et al. 18 July 2019). Across the country, the source notes that the gender gap in voter turnout was 9.1 percent, or that 11 million fewer women voted than men, and that in all provinces the gender gap is greater in urban areas than in other parts of Pakistan's provinces (Cheema, et al. 18 July 2019). The same source adds, based on an original survey of 2,500 randomly selected households in Lahore, the country's second largest city, that the gender gap in electoral participation is a result of "patriarchal norms" and a lack of "political knowledge" and "mobilization," prompted by "[l]ow contact between political parties and women" in metropolitan cities (Cheema, et al. 18 July 2019).

2.1 2018 General Elections

The Brookings Institution, a non-profit public policy organization in Washington, DC (Brookings Institution n.d.), indicates that the 2018 general elections were marked by "institutional" irregularities such as "horse-trading, media threats, [and] judicial meddling" (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 2). According to Australia's DFAT, while the 2018 general elections marked a "spike" in the death toll of political leaders and workers, violence committed against political party members by "groups linked to political parties" had "generally reduced" (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.159). Freedom House reports that observers recorded "efforts" by the military and judicial authorities to "hamper" the participation of the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N party), including "corruption, contempt-of-court, and terrorism charges" against leaders and candidates (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A1).

The BTI 2020 reports that voter turnout was on average 53.3 percent, with the highest rate in Punjab province (59 percent), and the lowest rate in Balochistan (39.6 percent) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 8). According to Freedom House, the PTI secured 32 percent of the vote and 149 seats out of 342, compared with 35 seats in 2013, while the PML-N won 24 percent of the vote and 82 seats compared to 157 seats in the previous cycle, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) received 13 percent of the vote and 54 seats, gaining 12 seats compared to 2013 (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A2). Sources state that the PTI formed a [coalition (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A2)] government with the support of minor parties in the country's National Assembly (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.5; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A2). The Political Handbook of the World 2018–2019 indicates that the following minor parties formed part of the governing coalition:

• Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid[Qaid]]-i-Azam (PML-Q), which won four seats;
• Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), which won four seats;
• Balochistan National Party (BNP) [Baluchistan National Party-Mengal (BNP-M)], which won three seats; and
• Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA), which won two seats (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 20)

Other sources indicate that the coalition government also included the MQM (Dawn 18 June 2020; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A2). According to media sources, in June 2020, the BNP announced its withdrawal from the PTI coalition (Dawn 18 June 2020; The News International 17 June 2020). Dawn, an English-language Pakistani daily newspaper, indicates that the withdrawal of the BNP left the ruling coalition with 180 seats, "whereas the opposition parties have 161 members" in the National Assembly (Dawn 18 June 2020).

2.2 Role of the Military

The European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), a think-tank based in the Netherlands (EU Oct. 2021, 21), states that military involvement in Pakistani civilian governance "has gone far beyond the traditional realms of national security and foreign policy" since 2013, affecting many aspects of governance, including finance, commerce, interior affairs, and media management (EFSAS 15 May 2020). Similarly, Freedom House indicates that the military is involved in security issues as well as "other policy issues," and "intimidates the media" while engaging in "indiscriminate or extralegal use of force" with "impunity," adding that the military "is considered more powerful than elected politicians" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, overview, Sec. B2). Deutsche Welle (DW), an international media outlet based in Germany, further reports that since Khan became prime minister, active and retired members of the military have been appointed to government portfolios "traditionally" allotted to civilians, such as the role of Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Information, now taken up by a retired general (DW 28 May 2020).

The Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), a Pakistan-based research institution that focuses on democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan, assessed perceptions of pre-election fairness, including as it relates to the military's neutrality vis-à-vis contesting political parties and candidates; this was seen as "highly unfair," the lowest rating out of a four-rating scale (PILDAT May 2018, 2, 5, 10).

Freedom House indicates that observers documented "pressure on" and "interference with" media, under the direction of security forces, in the run-up to the general elections, prompting "muted" coverage of the incumbent PML-N electoral campaign (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A1).

Since the 2018 general elections, the Brookings Institution reports that the PTI government's alliance with the military has prompted a "division of responsibilities" between civilian rule over domestic policy, and military rule over foreign policy and national security (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 7). Similarly, the BTI 2020 reports that since the 2018 elections, the military continues to be perceived as Pakistan's "key arbiter of defense, security and foreign policy" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 8).

2.3 Role of the Judiciary

The BTI 2020 reports that the role of the judiciary has historically been to both "validat[e]" and "resis[t]" the role and influence of the military (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 10). However, Freedom House indicates that the judiciary is "politicized" and "often" follows the military's priorities (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. F1).

For instance, according to the BTI 2020, the 2016 release of a tax directory of parliamentarians and leak of the Panama Papers [1], which showed evidence of a "wide disparity in taxes paid" and the prevalence of "offshore holdings" by "high level" parliamentarians, government officials, and a member of the judiciary, prompted a judicial inquiry, and resulted in the conviction of then-Prime Minister Sharif and his daughter in 2017, as well as accusations of corruption against "[t]housands" of other PML-N members (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 30–31). According to the Brookings Institution, the Supreme Court disqualified the former prime minister from holding office and sentenced him to 10 years imprisonment in the weeks leading up to the 2018 general elections, prompting supporters to declare the ruling "unfair," representing "selective justice," and pointing to the military's involvement in the Supreme Court-appointed joint investigation of the Sharif case (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 4). Similarly, the BTI 2020 reports that in July 2018, an Islamabad High Court justice accused the military intelligence authorities of "interfering" in the judicial process and "pressur[ing]" judges to keep Sharif detained in the lead-up to the 2018 elections (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 10, 31). Freedom House notes corruption cases against politicians of the PML-N and PPP, which are both former governing parties, continued to proceed in 2020, while similar cases against PTI members were scarce (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. F1).

2.4 Other Political and Electoral Actors

According to Freedom House, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) oversees and administers elections, and is made up of current or retired senior judges based on a nomination process that includes consultation between the ruling government and the opposition (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A3). The same source states that candidates have "extensive access to the courts" to settle election disputes (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A3). Freedom House notes that despite its legal framework, the ECP has "prove[n] unable to counteract" the influence of judicial and military authorities over the electoral environment (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A3).

According to the BTI 2020, the anticorruption authority, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), was seen as "selectively [settling] political scores" and taking orders from "other power centers" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 31). A report on events in 2020 by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), an independent human rights body (HRCP n.d.), notes that the NAB launched cases against the opposition, while treating the ruling party "mild[ly]" (HRCP 2021, 132).

3. National Political Parties and Alliances

Sources report that the three major political parties are the PTI, the PML-N, and the PPP (Brookings Institution 20 July 2018; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13).

3.1 PTI

Sources state that the PTI is led by Imran Khan, Pakistan's Prime Minister (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 3,7; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 19). Sources report that the party won the 2018 parliamentary elections (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.5; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 19).

Australia's DFAT reports that the PTI is accused by the PML-N to be the beneficiary of the military's election "manipulati[on]," including the "coerci[on]" of PML-N candidates who subsequently switched parties (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.5). Similarly, the Brookings Institution indicates that Khan's "close ties with the military" have "become apparent" since the July 2018 election (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 1). Dawn, reporting on a May 2018 press conference by PML-N leader and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, cites Sharif as indicating that "some forces" have applied pressure on PML-N candidates to quit and run as independents or to join the PTI (Dawn 10 May 2018).

The Handbook states that the party is considered "centrist" (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 19). The Brookings Institution reports that the PTI and its leader campaigned on a "classic populist" agenda, framing the party as the "non-corrupt alternative" to the PML-N and the PPP (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 1). With a diverse policy platform that includes advocating for social services and "reduc[ing] Pakistan's dependence on the West" in favour of eastern alliances, the same source indicates that the party and its leaders were elected "by a diverse coalition" that cuts across various sets of demographics in Pakistan, allowing them to form provincial governments in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as in Balochistan by way of a coalition (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 1, 7). According to Australia's DFAT, the PTI "has not engaged in political violence" except for minor "altercations" with security forces amid otherwise peaceful demonstrations (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.160). The same source adds that PTI members are "rare[ly]" targets of political violence (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.161, 3.162).

3.2 PML-N

According to sources, the PML-N is led by Muhammad Shehbaz [Shahbaz] Sharif [brother of Nawaz Sharif (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.21)] (Pakistan n.d., 3; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21). The BTI 2020 reports that the PML-N is "exclusive[ly]" headed by Sharif family descendants (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13).

The Handbook indicates that since its emergence in 1993, the group became the dominant PML chapter and formed a majority government in 1997 under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, former Punjab province's chief minister, before a 1999 military coup led to his exile until 2007 (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21). Sources state that the PML-N won the 2013 general elections and Nawaz Sharif became prime minister (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.4; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21), and resigned in 2017 following his disqualification by the Supreme Court (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 2.4). Sources report that PML-N leader Mamnoon Hussain served as president of Pakistan (PTI 15 July 2021; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21), from September 2013 to September 2018 (PTI 15 July 2021).

According to sources, the party ranked second in the 2018 parliamentary elections (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21; IPU n.d.). Freedom House states that throughout 2020, the PML-N was "profoundly disrupted by a barrage of court cases" against party leaders and family members with charges of corruption, breach of media regulations, and involvement in "unauthorized" protests (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B2). Similarly, Reuters reports that police cases were filed against "nearly" 17,000 members of the PML-N in Punjab province in the run up to the 2018 elections, and that "hundreds" had also been detained in the city of Lahore, regarding alleged violations of election rules (Reuters 16 July 2018).

3.3 PPP

According to the Handbook, the PPP is a political party with an "Islamic socialist" platform, established by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967, and whose daughter, Benazir Bhutto, was prime minister from 1988 to 1990, and from 1993 to 1996 (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 23–24). Sources indicate that that the PPP is now headed by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 24; Pakistan n.d., 4) Benazir Bhutto's son (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 24). According to the BTI 2020, the PPP chairmanship is hereditary within the Bhutto family (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13). According to the Diplomat, a current affairs magazine focused on events in the Asia-Pacific region (The Diplomat n.d.), the PPP is currently part of the ruling government in the province of Sindh (The Diplomat 8 Jan. 2021).

Since 2020, Freedom House reports that the party has been targeted by a "barrage" of legal cases against its leaders and family members, including charges of corruption, breach of media regulations, and participation in illegal demonstrations (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B2).

3.4 Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM)

Media sources indicate that the PDM is an alliance of 11 opposition political parties (The Diplomat 8 Jan. 2021; The Indian Express 29 Oct. 2020). Freedom House specifies that the movement was formed in October 2020 to compete in the 2021 Senate elections (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B1). Sources further indicate that the PDM seeks to "oust" (Dawn 19 Jan. 2021) or "topple" (The Diplomat 8 Jan. 2021) the PTI government (Dawn 19 Jan. 2021; The Diplomat 8 Jan. 2021).

According to the Indian Express, an Indian English-language newspaper, the movement's constituent parties, including major parties like the PPP and the PML-N, is also made up of an array of regional parties "representing virtually the country's entire political spectrum," including from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, giving a "national platform" to regional demands for an end to repression and for greater autonomy (The Indian Express 29 Oct. 2020). The Diplomat reports that the PDM elected Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl [Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl] (JUI-F) leader, Maulan Fazlur Rehman [Rahman], as PDM leader; the source notes his record of "pursuing anti-democratic politics," such as promoting blasphemy laws against members of religious minorities, and declaring Khan a "'Jewish agent'" during a political rally against the government in 2019 (The Diplomat 10 Oct. 2020). Dawn also reports that during a rally held in May 2021 by the JUI-F, its leader declared that the party would defend the Taliban's "long struggle" in Afghanistan and that his party would "continue [to] struggle against 'Jewish agents' in Pakistan" (Dawn 22 May 2021).

Sources report that the PDM has held rallies against the central government (The Indian Express 29 Oct. 2020) or against the Prime Minister (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. B1). According to Dawn, the PDM held a rally in January 2021 in front of the ECP headquarters demanding that investigations into foreign funding of the PTI from India and Israel be expedited (Dawn 19 Jan. 2021). According to the Indian Express, the PDM has also held "massive" political rallies in Gujranwala, Karachi, and in Quetta in October 2020, and continues to "isolat[e]" the prime minister and challenge "the credibility of his powerful military backers" (The Indian Express 29 Oct. 2020).

4. Regional Political Parties
4.1 Awami National Party (ANP)

According to the Handbook, the ANP is headed by Asfandyar Wali Khan (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 25). Australia's DFAT indicates that the ANP is a Pashtun nationalist secular political party headquartered in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, with its main support in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan; from 2008 to 2013, the ANP governed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's provincial government, and at the federal level was a junior coalition ally with the ruling party, the PPP (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.170). The Handbook specifies that the party was established in 1986 by the following four "left-of-center" groups whose respective support bases were drawn from different provinces:

• National Democratic Party (NDP);
• Pakistan National Party (PNP) dissidents led by Latif Afridi;
• Elements of the [Pakistani] Awami Tehreek [Tehrik] (PAT);
• Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 25).

Australia's DFAT indicates that the ANP opposes the Taliban and its members have been targeted by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban] (TTP) [2] for the party's secularism, support for the military and its counter-insurgency activities, and advocacy for improving Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relations; the party claims to have lost 1,000 members due to terrorism attacks, including a local Provincial Assembly candidate for the 2018 general elections, when a suicide bomb attack at a rally claimed the lives of "at least" 20 people and wounded 69 in July 2018 (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.171, 3.172).

Sources report that the party won one seat in the 2018 parliamentary elections (Dawn 18 June 2020; Pakistan [30 Oct. 2018]; IPU n.d.).

4.2 MQM

Australia's DFAT reports that the MQM is a secular political party based in Karachi (Sindh), with other support bases in Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts in the province of Sindh, that promotes the rights of Mohajirs or Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants from India and their descendants, which "often brings it into conflict" with the PPP and other Sindh-based parties advocating for Pashtun rights (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.163). The Handbook reports that the MQM was originally conceived as a national movement in support of Mohajirs and became the "third largest" party in the National Assembly in the 1998 election, and has since allied itself, at various points, with both the PML-N and the PPP (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 24).

Sources indicate that the party is led by Altaf Hussain, who is based in London (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.167, 3.168; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 24, 25). According to Australia's DFAT, Hussain's "[a]nti-Pakistan rhetoric" has led to a splinter in the party, with one faction loyal to Hussain and the other faction called MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P), which has been officially recognized by the government and led by Khalid Maqbool Siddiqui and other party officials within Pakistan since February 2018 (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.167, 3.168).

Australia's DFAT adds that MQM members have been "periodically" attacked by militant groups due to their secularism, although the attacks "have been much less frequent in recent years"; anti-MQM sentiment is based on allegations of the MQM's ties with Indian intelligence, and the "level of anti-MQM rhetoric, discrimination and violence reflects popular perceptions of the Pakistan-India bilateral relationship" (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.166).

Sources report that the party secured 7 seats in the National Assembly during the 2018 general elections (Dawn 18 June 2020; Pakistan [30 Oct. 2018]; IPU n.d.). According to Australia's DFAT, due in part to "leadership and faction conflicts," the party won 21 out of 167 seats in the July 2018 Sindh Provincial Assembly compared to 50 seats during the previous elections, a sign of their "diminish[ing]" influence (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.163).

4.3 BNP

Dawn reports that the BNP is headed by Sardar Akhtar Mengal and that the BNP was a part of the PTI-led ruling coalition until it left the alliance in June 2020 "for not paying heed to the key issues of Balochistan including missing persons," and joined the opposition after being courted by the PPP (Dawn 18 June 2020).

According to the sources, the BNP secured four seats in the 2018 parliamentary elections (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 26; IPU n.d.), by winning three seats directly and receiving one additional seat reserved for female representatives (IPU n.d.).

5. Religious Parties

According to the BTI 2020, Islamic political parties' support bases are "mostly" in urban centres and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 13).

5.1 Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan [Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan] (TLP)

According to Al Jazeera, the TLP is a "banned far-right" group headed by Saad Rizvi, who was arrested in 2020 following his involvement in protests against a French publication's feature of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (Al Jazeera 23 Oct. 2021). The Brookings Institution reports that the party's platform is "fundamentalist," based on "the strict implementation of Pakistan's harsh blasphemy law (under which blasphemy is punishable by death)" (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 3). Sources report that the party ran in the 2018 general elections (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 3; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021a, Sec. A2), securing "a couple" of seats in provincial assemblies, including in Karachi, while winning none in the national parliament (Brookings Institution Feb. 2019, 3).

5.2 JUI-F

The Handbook reports that the JUI-F advocates for adherence to a "constitutional government guided by Sunni Islamic principles" (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21). The same source indicates that the party is led by Fazlur Rehman, who supported Afghanistan's Taliban (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 21). Sources note that the party, along with five other Islamic parties, had unified under the moniker Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal [Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal] (MMA), and won the 2002 general elections (Dawn 21 Dec. 2021; Political Handbook of the World 2019, 22), but that the alliance is now "defunct" (Dawn 21 Dec. 2021). According to the Handbook, the JUI-F won 12 seats in the 2018 general elections (Political Handbook of the World 2019, 22).

5.3 Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)

According to the BTI 2020, the JI is a "pro-Islam" political party that has questioned the legitimacy of Western parliamentary democracy (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 6). Dawn reports that the party is the political "rival" of JUI-F in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawn 21 Dec. 2021).

6. Kashmir Secessionist Parties

Information on Kashmir secessionist parties was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to sources, the Kashmir region in Pakistan is constituted by two territories, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021b, overview; Sharma, et al. 2019, xvii). Sources further indicate that Kashmir nationalist or secessionist parties are "marginalized or barred" from politics (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021b, Sec. B1) or that secessionist parties are "barred" from elections, while parties "advocating for autonomy are tolerated" (Sharma, et al. 2019, xvii). Freedom House notes that the role of separatist or nationalist parties in the 2020 Gilgit-Baltistan elections was negligible (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021b, Sec. B1).

According to Freedom House, the PTI secured 10 of the 24 directly elected seats in the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly in the November 2020 election, forming government when a few independents joined the party, and prompting the election of the PTI's Khalid Khurshid Khan as chief minister (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021b, Key Developments in 2020, Sec. A2). The same source notes that the PML-N and the PPP "complained of election rigging," refusing to accept results, while "eventually" taking their seats (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021b, Sec. A2). In an article published by Al Jazeera, a Kashmir-based political analyst stated that the electoral environment in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is dominated by Pakistani national parties, including the PML-N, the PPP, and the PTI, while a journalist who reports on Kashmir politics noted that "pro-freedom parties" are "'very marginalised'" and "'mostly urban-based'" with "'many'" members residing overseas (Al Jazeera 4 Mar. 2019).

7. Political Parties' Ability to Track Someone

The information in the following paragraph was provided by a representative of the European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS) in an interview with the Research Directorate:

Political parties and their members who wish to operate in Pakistan are expected to have, at the very least, a "cordial" relationship with the military establishment. The military's structures are "very efficien[t]" in tracking someone across the country, and leaders or members of political parties in any region may leverage the resources of other parties with which they are allied, or those of the police, military, or local government to track someone. This is done most frequently in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, as well as in Kashmir territories, but "less" common in Punjab because it is "more urbanized and aligned with the ruling government." For instance, an EFSAS contact who was publicly critical of the Kashmir government and who fled abroad for political asylum several years ago, had returned to Pakistan since his family faced "harass[ment]" and his brother was subjected to "tortur[e]" in his absence due his political activism, and since December 2021, the contact's whereabouts have been unknown (EFSAS 8 Dec. 2021). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] According to the Guardian, the Panama Papers are files leaked from a Panama-based law firm that show how the rich, including political leaders from various countries, "can exploit secretive offshore tax regimes" (The Guardian 5 Apr. 2016).

[2] For information on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban] (TTP), see Response to Information Request PAK106391 of January 2020.

References

Al Jazeera. 23 October 2021. "More Clashes as Banned TLP Continues Protest in Pakistan." [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

Al Jazeera. 4 March 2019. Asad Hashim. "In Pakistan-Administered Kashmir, a Shrinking Pro-Freedom Space." [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022]

Amnesty International. 7 April 2021. "Pakistan." Amnesty International Report 2020/21: The State of the World's Human Rights. (POL 10/3202/2021) [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021]

Australia. 20 February 2019. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). DFAT Country Information Report: Pakistan. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2020. "Pakistan Country Report." Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) 2020. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

Brookings Institution. February 2019. Madiha Afzal. An Inflection Point for Pakistan's Democracy. [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021]

Brookings Institution. 20 July 2018. Madiha Afzal. "A Volatile Election Season in Pakistan." Order from Chaos. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

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Cheema, Ali, et al. 18 July 2019. "Pakistan's Participation Puzzle: A Look at the Voting Gender Gap." The Olive Branch. United States Institute of Peace (USIP). [Accessed 24 Dec. 2021]

Dawn. 21 December 2021. Zulfiqar Ali. "JUI-F's Surprise Win Likely to Reshape KP's Political Landscape." [Accessed 22 Dec. 2021]

Dawn. 22 May 2021. "Fazl Says Workers Ready to Fight Along Palestinians." [Accessed 24 Dec. 2021]

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Dawn. 18 June 2020. Amir Wasim. "Setback for PTI as BNP-M Quits Ruling Alliance." [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]

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Deutsche Welle (DW). 28 May 2020. S. Khan. "Why Are Pakistan's Generals Taking Up Top Civilian Posts?" [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

The Diplomat. 8 January 2021. Umair Jamal. "It's Game Over for Pakistan's Opposition Alliance." [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]

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Human Rights Watch (HRW). 13 January 2021. "Pakistan." World Report 2021: Events of 2020. [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021]

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The News International. 17 June 2020. "BNP-M Announces Leaving PTI-Led Coalition Govt." [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021]

Pakistan. [30 October 2018]. Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). Party Position in National Assembly of Pakistan. [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021]

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Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019. 2019. "Pakistan." Edited by Tom Lansford. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press. [Accessed 15 Nov. 2021]

Press Trust of India (PTI). 15 July 2021. "Former Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain Passes Away." [Accessed 15 Dec. 2021]

Reuters. 16 July 2018. Mubasher Bukhari. "Police Open Criminal Cases Against 17,000 Members of Pakistan's Outgoing Ruling Party." [Accessed 24 Dec. 2021]

Sharma, Surinder Kumar, Yaqoob ul Hassan, and Ashok Behuria. 2019. Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities. New Delhi: Pentagon Press LLP. [Accessed 21 Dec. 2021]

United Nations (UN). 4 August 2021. Human Rights Council. Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. (A/GRC/48/57) [Accessed 7 Dec. 2021]

United States (US). 30 March 2021. Department of State. "Pakistan." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020. [Accessed 10 Nov. 2021]

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 27 October 2021. Uzair Younus. "Pakistan's Shifting Political and Economic Winds." [Accessed 18 Nov. 2021]

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Atlantic Council; fellow at a foreign policy institution and think tank based in the US whose research focuses on politics, policy, and extremism in Pakistan; independent scholar and fellow at a university in the UK whose research focuses on military and political affairs, including military-civil relations, in South Asia; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; Transparency International Pakistan; visiting professor at a university in Pakistan whose research focuses on civil society, political parties and structures, and military-civil relations in Pakistan; United States Institute for Peace.

Internet sites, including: Asia News Network; Asian News International; Asylum Research Centre; BBC; ecoi.net; The Express Tribune; The Guardian; International Crisis Group; The New Indian Express; Norway – Landinfo; Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés; Pak Institute for Peace Studies; Pakistan Today; The Times of India; Transparency International Pakistan; UK – Home Office; UN – Refworld, UNHCR; US – CIA World Factbook; Voice of America; The Washington Post.