• Estonia’s national democratic governance was challenged in 2020 by the exogenous shock of COVID-19. Although some cabinet members downplayed the risk of the virus at first,2 the government reacted rapidly to the pandemic in the spring and declared an “emergency situation” on March 12,3 two weeks after the first positive case in Estonia was reported. A range of measures were introduced, such as closing schools, banning public gatherings, and restricting movement across borders. Saaremaa, the country’s largest island and the initial epicenter of the virus, was isolated.4 Large-scale nationwide testing and contact tracing were initiated. A €2 billion aid program was launched, including labor market support, sickness benefits, and tax incentives.
• The pandemic’s second wave gained ground in late October,5 and although much more devastating in absolute numbers, the second wave was characterized by a lack of action both at the individual and the national level. The government’s response was less restrictive at first and aimed at avoiding total lockdown, although a much stricter approach was recommended by health experts.6
• The implementation of crisis measures was aided by the country’s broad experience with digital society. Existing digital tools and widespread internet access enabled students and workers to continue their education without interruption. A well-functioning digital health system helped manage the acute crisis and avoid major administrative problems. Most public services in Estonia were already available online, and the share of e-government users is high.7 During the pandemic, new initiatives were added, such as online sick-leave applications, virtual healthcare, and digital contact tracing, which helped to alleviate stress on frontline healthcare workers and contain the spread of the virus. 8
• The emergency situation facilitated the concentration of power in the hands of the executive. The national government took the lead in crisis management and was more empowered compared to other actors, such as the parliament or regional and municipal governments. By focusing on implementing restrictions and establishing daily press conferences, the central government employed authority and information as its main instruments of power. On the plus side, the strong central capacity enabled rapid, decisive action that helped contain the spread of the virus. The Estonian public, in turn, showed high levels of approval and compliance with government restrictions in the spring,9 and the majority of both coalition and opposition supporters were satisfied with how the government initially handled the crisis.10
• However, the government pushed through legislative proposals in various policy areas in the midst of the crisis that extended beyond the immediate needs of the pandemic and undermined liberal democratic norms. The most controversial initiatives included changes in migration policy, a pension reform bill, and a government decision to invest in the oil shale industry. Amendments to the Aliens Act, one of the two major legislative acts that regulate immigration in Estonia, were introduced in the framework of the Emergency Act that amended several laws at once. The changes significantly curtailed migrant rights in Estonia, e.g., by revoking visas and residence/work permits of foreign workers from third (non-EU) countries if they become unemployed11 and restricting student mobility from outside the EU.12 The bill received harsh criticism from President Kersti Kaljulaid,13 employers,14 universities,15 and human rights organizations,16 among others. Second, the pension reform bill envisioned making the so-called second pillar of the pension system optional. The bill was eventually signed in October after the Supreme Court rejected President Kaljulaid’s appeal, which cited six constitutional violations and argued that it disproportionately violated people’s fundamental rights by reducing their pensions in the future.17 Lastly, the government’s €125 million investment in a new oil shale processing plant in Eastern Estonia18 appeared to be in stark contrast with the EU’s climate protection strategy, and has also been challenged over EU State aid rules.19
• The Emergency Act increased powers granted to state agencies, most notably the Health Board, potentially enabling the government to avoid political responsibility in future crises.20 At the same time, the cabinet was viewed as interfering in the operation of key public organizations, resulting in several high-level officials resigning over differences of opinion with the government.21 These developments raised concerns over the continuing trend of politicizing public offices in Estonia.22
• Aside from mitigating the health crisis, the government continued in 2020 to iron out problems caused by EKRE, the enfant terrible of the coalition. EKRE’s provocations crossed national borders in November when party leader Mart Helme called the U.S. presidential elections “falsified” and President-elect Joe Biden “corrupt.”23 The statement, which also gained attention abroad,24 was condemned at the highest level in Estonia by President Kaljulaid,25 Prime Minister Ratas,26 and top foreign policy experts,27 calling it endangering to Estonia’s reputation, security, and international relations. This tactical use of foreign policy in the interest of domestic political benefits undermined longtime diplomatic work with the country’s key allies. The scandal culminated with Helme resigning from his post as Minister of Interior, albeit with little remorse.28 Over just one and a half years in office, the cabinet witnessed as many as seven ministers step down amid various scandals, six of them from EKRE.

• Elections in Estonia are free and fair: electoral laws function well, electoral authorities are impartial, and campaigning is generally conducted with equal opportunity. Internet voting is widespread and highly popular. In the 2019 elections to the Riigikogu—Estonia’s 101-seat, unicameral parliament—a record number (43.8 percent) of all votes were cast online,29 signaling high levels of public trust in the country’s e-voting system.
• No elections were held in Estonia in 2020, but preparations began for the upcoming contests in 2021, the presidential election in August and, in particular, the municipal elections in October. A ban on outdoor political advertising on election day was reversed in 2019 to harmonize campaigning rules for Estonia’s electoral system, wherein an increasing number of people cast their votes during the early voting period when campaigning is still allowed.30
• The president is indirectly elected by the parliament—or, if the two-thirds majority is not achieved in three rounds of voting, by an electoral body consisting of all members of parliament (MPs) and elected representatives of local government councils.31 The administrative-territorial reform completed in 2017, which decreased the number of municipalities from 213 to 79, reduces the proportion of local governments in the electoral body and the leverage of local representatives. The President of Estonia holds a largely ceremonial role, but President Kaljulaid has been active in the legislative process, exercising in several cases her legislative veto power,32 and she is vocal in daily politics, expressing frequent criticism of the government. This indicates that executive power in Estonia is diffused across institutional spheres. Still, because the head of state is not directly elected by popular vote, the presidential election receives a limited amount of public and media attention compared to other national elections.
• Local government council elections take place every four years, and councils are elected directly by their local constituents. Local elections differ from parliamentary elections in that, alongside Estonian citizens, residents in the country from other EU member states and non-EU countries, as well as stateless persons residing in Estonia, have the right to vote. The voting age of 16 years is lower for local elections than the required age of 18 for national elections.33 These rules shape the campaign strategies of political parties, which attempt primarily to attract votes from the country’s large Russian-speaking minority, whose noncitizen members may partake in municipal elections.
• In 2020, the main focus of political debate in advance of the 2021 local elections was the concept of marriage, a topic that has little to do with local issues. A proposed referendum—pushed by the populist, far-right EKRE and agreed upon by the coalition in March 2019—was originally scheduled to take place simultaneously with the 2021 local elections to ask the question of whether marriage should be defined in the constitution as “a lasting union between one man and one woman.”34 Referendums are extremely rare in Estonia, and holding the two votes at the same time would have been challenging since, as explained above, not everyone entitled to vote in local elections would have had the right to vote in the proposed referendum.35 In October, a government crisis broke out over homophobic comments by EKRE leader Mart Helme in an interview to Deutsche Welle. Prime Minister Ratas was desperate to hold his cabinet together, so to resolve the conflict, the referendum was rescheduled to take place in spring 2021.36 This serves EKRE’s interests by allowing the party to fulfill its central electoral promise even earlier than planned. The legislative battle over the referendum began in December when the first reading of the draft favoring the government’s position very narrowly passed in the parliament,37 but the opposition obstructed the bill by proposing thousands of amendments.38 Thus the year ended with uncertainty over the referendum while deeply polarizing Estonian society on the issue and disrupting democratic procedures in the parliament.

• Although private financing for the civic sector is growing in Estonia, civil society organizations (CSOs) still largely operate on public funding. And because funding levels have remained unchanged for years, financial viability remains a central concern.39 This situation threatened to deteriorate further in July when the Ministry of Finance, under the leadership of the far-right EKRE, suspended financing for projects promoting equal opportunities and gender equality in the country.40 The affected nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) declared this political malice.41 As a response, Minister of Social Affairs Tanel Kiik (Center) brought back the arrangement of suspended subsidies under his own ministry, and funding for these NGOs resumed.42
• Following a proposal by EKRE, the government decided to grant €141,000 from the state budget to the anti-abortion NGO Elu Marss (March for Life), making it the largest beneficiary of the direct regional investments scheme. The organization had been in existence for just four months, and during that time had organized only one anti-abortion march, which took place in August in the capital Tallinn. Abortion has been legal in Estonia since 1991, but EKRE has politicized the issue over the past several years. During that time, political support, in the form of funding, has also increased to religious organizations.43
• Amid the coronavirus outbreak in spring 2020, the government introduced an array of emergency measures, some of which seemed at odds with civil rights like freedom of movement and assembly. Yet the public showed a high degree of approval and compliance with the measures.44 A series of surveys conducted in May, September, and November indicated that more than 80 percent of the population believed that the restrictions did not breach any human rights.45 A small-scale anti-mask protest took place in November, attracting some 200 participants.46
• Within the country, no major discrimination occurred on national or ethnic grounds as a result of the emergency measures.47 Meanwhile, residents without Estonian citizenship rated the state of their civil rights as lower than those of Estonian citizens, though attitudes did not worsen in 2020 compared to past years.48 However, government restrictions significantly reduced the mobility of foreign workers and students from third countries. The restrictions were followed up with a bill seeking to amend the Aliens Act, the Higher Education Act, and the Study Allowances and Study Loans Act,49 all of which concern working, studying, and residing in Estonia. The new bill extends well beyond the emergency situation and has been regarded as unjustified,50 while also signaling ideological motivations behind the legislative process.
• On March 20, Estonia unexpectedly joined five other Eastern European countries in activating Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which enables—in a time of war or other public emergency—the authority to partly restrict freedoms, including religious freedoms and freedom of expression. Along these lines, Minister of Foreign Affairs Urmas Reinsalu (Isamaa) warned that emergency measures that step outside core civil rights may be required in order to resolve the coronavirus crisis.51 While these threats never materialized, the willingness to derogate from established democratic civil and political rights drew harsh criticism from judicial experts and human rights organizations, not least because no discussion preceded the decision and no explanation followed.52
• A referendum on the legal definition of marriage was scheduled for spring 2021, mobilizing movements on both the conservative and liberal ends of the political spectrum. The NGO Foundation for the Protection of the Family and Tradition (SAPTK) is the key player campaigning to define marriage as between one man and one woman.53 The referendum’s “no” side is led by the Liberal Citizen foundation (SALK), a new civic association set up to counterbalance the conservative view.54 Both movements rely in large part on private donations, but because NGOs have no obligation to reveal the names of their donors, fears surfaced over hidden political financing through civic organizations.55 The liberal-minded SALK has declared that it will keep its funding transparent.56
• In October, a scandal broke out when Mart Helme, the leader of EKRE and the Interior Minister, made aggressively disparaging remarks about the LGBT+ community in an interview on Deutsche Welle’s Russian service.57 The statement caused a backlash on the political58 and societal59 levels, while driving a wedge between coalition partners with differing stances on LGBT+ issues.60 The European Commission started infringement proceedings against Estonia, together with Romania, as the only EU countries where hate speech is not criminalized.61

• In 2020, media ownership remained highly concentrated in Estonia, casting doubts over the sector’s autonomy, editorial independence, and journalistic freedom. Still, freedom of speech is protected, and criticism of the government has a strong presence in the media. The power of this criticism was illustrated when media pressure led to the resignation of Minister of Education and Research Mailis Reps (Center Party) in November as news outlets revealed her use of public resources for personal benefit.62
• During the year, the coalition’s junior partner EKRE carried on with its verbal attacks toward liberal media and, in particular, Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR). In addition to making degrading remarks about its journalists,63 EKRE accused ERR of being propagandistic64 and initiated a bill aimed at ensuring its “political balance.” The proposed bill sparked a strong backlash for its attempt to subject ERR to government control.65
• Coronavirus-related topics were center stage in the news media throughout the year. During the emergency situation, all paper and electronic media outlets provided continuous coverage, and ERR carried daily live transmissions of press conferences held by the government and health authorities.66 In addition, the government set up a crisis-related website,67 and the Emergency Response Center launched a free 24/7 hotline providing timely and detailed information in Estonian, Russian, and English.
• One major incident of disinformation occurred, however, when news spread on social media on March 16 that Tallinn would be locked down and the sale of alcohol would be stopped. The government quickly refuted the rumors and labeled them a deliberate distribution of false information.68
• To cope with the negative economic impacts of the pandemic and sharp decreases in advertising revenue, media organizations introduced temporary pay cuts (including at Õhtuleht, Postimees, and Ekspress Grupp), reduced the size of their publications (Postimees), or decreased the frequency of their publishing schedules (Äripäev).69 The financial daily Äripäev never returned to its pre-crisis business model and instead became a weekly with more emphasis on digital content.
• Estonia-based Russian-language media remained relatively weak compared to the powerful media channels of Russia, but the need for timely and accurate information about the domestic coronavirus situation boosted the ratings of local media outlets. Estonia’s only Russian-language TV channel, ETV+, doubled its viewership compared to preceding months, reaching 4.6 percent of the daily share among non-Estonians.70 Mihhail Kõlvart (Center Party), the first Russian-speaking Mayor of Tallinn, is a key opinion leader for this segment of the population. Under his leadership, Tallinn City Government initiated the program “Tallinna uudised” [Tallinn News] on Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal (PBK),71 a popular Russian channel in the Baltics (10.9 percent of the daily share among non-Estonians72 ). This collaboration was criticized, including by President Kaljulaid, for guiding viewers back into the Russian information space and contributing to Russian propaganda.73

• Local self-government is guaranteed by the Estonian constitution, according to which “all local matters are determined and administered by local authorities” (Article 154).74 There are 79 local government units in Estonia, including 15 towns and 64 rural municipalities.75 The numbers were reduced with an administrative-territorial reform, completed in 2017, aimed at increasing the capabilities of municipalities and ensuring more consistent regional development.
• Estonia is a small, centralized country with vertical dispersion of authority, thus management of the COVID-19 crisis was concentrated in the hands of the central government. This allowed a rapid, decisive, and uniform response to the outbreak nationwide, with the exception of the most affected regions.76 Yet local governments witnessed shrinking revenue bases amid the pandemic, and new expenses related to social benefits and personal protective equipment (PPE). To alleviate the damages and stimulate business, €130 million was allocated to local governments from the state’s supplementary crisis budget. Still, several municipalities were forced to make cuts and cancel planned investments due to the fiscal gap.77
• In the spring, Saaremaa, Estonia’s largest island, became the country’s initial coronavirus epicenter. The island constitutes only 2.5 percent of the population, but in March and April, it had the majority of the country’s hospitalized patients.78 An estimated half of the island’s population contracted the virus. The Saaremaa outbreak is associated with a volleyball match, held in early March, that hosted a club from Milan, Italy. Criticism over allowing the match to take place led to the resignation of the island’s mayor.79 To mitigate the spread of the virus, Saaremaa was closed off from the rest of the country, causing mild protests among islanders who were not able to get to the mainland for work.80 These movement restrictions were lifted on May 18.
• In the fall, infection rates surged primarily in Tallinn and the Russian-speaking part of the country, Ida-Virumaa. In December, Ida-Virumaa was practically locked down amid unprecedented case numbers.81 Schools were closed across the nation, causing dissatisfaction with universal rather than targeted measures given the pandemic had demonstrated great regional variation.82
• In 2020, political parties began active preparations for the local government council elections to be held on October 17, 2021. In Tallinn, Mayor Kõlvart, favored by the Russian-speaking population, made efforts to gain visibility. Under the pretense of addressing COVID-19, his municipal government launched a Russian-language news program in March on PBK, a popular Russian TV channel in the Baltics. Although originally planned to last for two months only, the program was brought back in August and has since focused on local city news instead of the pandemic.83 In the fall, the city government introduced coronavirus measures that were stricter than elsewhere in the country, which some health experts considered disproportionate.84

• Estonia’s judicial framework remained strong in 2020, and the country ranked among the top three EU member states for speed and efficiency of the judicial system. Estonia also received high marks for the availability of IT tools, especially during the pandemic; the court databases and e-File system facilitated judicial processes and enabled the exchange of information between different parties.85
• On the flip side, it was pointed out that the statistics on efficiency do not consider criminal law proceedings, which tend to be slow in Estonia. In addition, workload is unevenly distributed between courts, leading to varying levels of efficiency.86 Trust in the independence of the judicial system is not very high on average (57 percent among the general public and 39 percent among companies).87 Concerns over favoritism within the justice system have also been raised, e.g., in relation to instances of promoting judicial employees based on loyalty rather than merit.88
• Throughout the pandemic and the emergency situation, courts continued their regular operations. People were asked to submit appeals electronically or in written form, and hearings were either postponed or held digitally.89 The postponement of hearings primarily concerned criminal cases, which require the physical presence of prisoners at court. But the use of digital tools meant that the overall efficiency of the courts did not suffer significantly during the pandemic.90
• During the emergency situation, visits to prison inmates were banned, and prison guards switched to five-day shifts and remained on-site during their time off.91 Prisoners were largely confined to cells, and out-of-cell activities, including joint activities and walks, were halted. Inmates were given access to additional reading material, crossword puzzles, and TV channels, but they were prevented from taking fresh-air breaks and their options for calling relatives were reduced, measures that were regarded as unjustified by the Chancellor of Justice.92 Restrictions were lifted when the emergency situation ended on May 18. Longer visits to prisons were again banned starting from October, but short-term visits were still allowed. In the spring, no coronavirus cases were detected among inmates, but two of Estonia’s largest prisons experienced large virus outbreaks in the fall.93

• In 2020, Estonia was still recovering from the devastating blow of high-profile corruption in the banking sector that surfaced in 2018–19. Money laundering of over €200 billion in illicit funds of mostly Russian origin is alleged to have taken place between 2007 and 2015 in the Tallinn branch of the Danish-owned Danske Bank, and also linked to Swedish banks Swedbank and SEB. Investigations are still ongoing in Estonia and elsewhere. Danske Bank has since been ordered to close its branches in the Baltics, and over 10 predicate offenses are being processed.94 The head office of Swedbank received a fine of approximately €360 million for failing to combat money laundering in its Baltic operations.95 SEB was fined €1 million for deficiencies in its money-laundering prevention activities in Estonia.96
• In June, Finance Minister Martin Helme (EKRE) hired Louis Freeh, a U.S. lawyer and former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director, to represent Estonia in international money-laundering hearings.97 But a nontransparent deal using taxpayer funds to pay the lawyer’s €3-million fee was met with great controversy. Freeh is claimed to have been involved in a money-laundering case with links to the Kremlin, channeling money through the very same Tallinn branch of Danske Bank that is at the center of the investigation.98 Government members had been warned by several state agencies about the agreement presenting a conflict of interest, including by the Estonian Embassy in Washington that conducted background checks and issued a critical memo on Freeh.99
• The government launched a number of measures to relieve the economic impact of COVID-19, but suspicions surged that the distribution of financial aid was politically influenced. In September, the government agreed to give a loan on overly favorable terms to the Porto Franco real estate development in the Tallinn port area, led by an entrepreneur whose father donated €60,000 to the incumbent Center Party around the same time.100 The prime minister’s party has denied links between the donation and the support loan,101 which was also criticized for not being of strategic importance102 and for creating an unfair competitive advantage.103 In the agricultural sector, emergency aid was given to companies that have strong political ties. Many of the recipients had little to do with rural affairs or did not actively operate at all, and several had previously been involved in subsidy fraud. Almost all council members of the foundation that issued the loans belong to one of the three governing parties.104 The National Audit Office found that the terms for allocating close to a billion euros of extraordinary loans during the pandemic were vague.105
• In a highly controversial move, the coalition parties submitted a bill in May to abolish the Political Parties Financing Surveillance Committee (ERJK) and transfer its responsibilities to the National Audit Office. The ERJK is an independent body that monitors the legality of political party financing in Estonia. The coalition’s initiative failed after the parliamentary opposition blocked the bill, which would have been a worrying move toward reducing control and sanctions for illicit funding and, in particular, would have helped the ruling Center Party escape responsibility for prior offenses.106

Author: Dr. Liisa Talving, PhD, is a Research Fellow in Comparative Politics at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her areas of research include electoral studies, voting behavior, and public opinion.