16. April 2021

Das US-Außenministerium (US Department of State, USDOS) schreibt in seinem Menschenrechtsbericht vom März 2021, dass die Behörden im Iran private Online-Kommunikation überwachen und Online-Inhalte zensurieren würden. Webseiten würden blockiert, wenn sie der staatlichen Doktrin in Bezug auf den Islam oder dem Regierungsnarrativ zu politischen Themen widersprechen. Regierungsorganisationen, darunter der Basidsch Cyber Council, die Cyber-Polizei und die Cyber-Armee, würden sich mit Cyber-Bedrohungen der nationalen Sicherheit beschäftigen. Diese Organisationen kümmerten sich gezielt um Aktivitäten von Bürger·innen auf offiziell gesperrten Seiten wie Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube und Flickr, und Berichten zufolge schikanierten sie Personen, die die Regierung kritisieren oder sensible Themen aufbringen (USDOS, 30. März 2021, Section 2).

Im Oktober 2020 veröffentlichte Freedom House seinen ausführlichen Bericht Freedom on the Net 2020. Darin wird unter anderem erwähnt, dass Blogger·innen, Online-Journalist·innen, Aktivist·innen und Bürger·innen wegen Online-Inhalten verhaftet und strafrechtlich verfolgt worden seien. So seien zwei Instagram-Influencer in Abwesenheit zu sieben bzw. neun Jahren Haft verurteilt worden (Freedom House, 14. Oktober 2020).

Freedom House erwähnt im Dezember 2019 harsche Strafen für Aktivist·innen und andere, die online Widerspruch äußern. So sei ein Anwalt zu 30 Jahren Haft (reduziert auf 15 Jahre) und 111 Peitschenhieben verurteilt worden, weil er unter anderem einen Telegram-Kanal zur Dokumentation von Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegründet habe (Freedom House, 2. Dezember 2019).

In einem Beitrag von Article 19, einer in London ansässigen Menschenrechtsorganisation mit Fokussierung auf die Verteidigung und Promotion von Informations- und Ausdrucksfreiheit, wird erwähnt, dass der stellvertretende Leiter der iranischen Cyber-Polizei-Einheit FATA (siehe auch Article 19, September 2020, S. 9, S. 40) im Mai 2020 verlautbart habe, dass das Auftreten von Frauen ohne Hidschab in sozialen Medien rechtswidrig sei und nach dem 2009 in Kraft getretenen Gesetz für Computer-Kriminalität (Computer Crimes Law, CCL) geahndet werde. „Moralische Verfehlungen und das Verbreiten von Immoralität“ seien Straftatbestände nach diesem Gesetz und es gebe keinen Unterschied, ob die Straftaten öffentlich oder online verübt würden. Auch werde nicht nach Instagram-Nutzer·innen mit hohen oder niedrigen Follower-Zahlen unterschieden. Der Beitrag erklärt, dass Instagram eine der wenigen ausländischen Plattformen sei, die noch nicht blockiert werde. Im Mai 2018 sei die Regierung gegen „Instagram-Prominente“ vorgegangen und habe Verhaftungen durchgeführt (siehe dazu auch Article 19, Oktober 2018 im Anhang). Es sei unklar, wie das Gesetz in Zukunft bei der Überwachung von Instagram umgesetzt werde. Die Bestimmungen zu moralischem Online-Verhalten im Gesetz seien vage und würden seit 2009 ungleichmäßig umgesetzt (Article 19, 22. Mai 2020).

Amnesty International (AI) berichtet im April 2021, dass die Internetpolizei eine Einheit gegen „Cybergerüchte“ und „Fake News“ auf sozialen Medien im Zusammenhang mit COVID-19 gegründet habe. Zahlreiche Journalist·innen, Nutzer·innen von sozialen Medien und Gesundheitsarbeiter·innen seien festgenommen, verhört oder gewarnt worden. Ein Arzt in der Provinz Kurdistan sei wegen Instagram-Posts angeklagt worden (AI, 7. April 2021). Das USDOS spricht im Zusammenhang mit „Cybergerüchten“ von 3.600 Festnahmen (USDOS, 30. März 2021, Section 2).

Small Media, eine in London ansässige Stiftung, die freien Informationsfluss in politisch geschlossenen Gesellschaften fördern will, schreibt im Februar 2019, dass im Oktober 2018 der Chef der Internetpolizei FATA verlautbart habe, dass FATA in den acht Jahren seit seiner Gründung in mehr als 133.000 Rechtsfällen involviert gewesen sei und fast 75.000 Festnahmen durchgeführt habe. Im Dezember 2018 habe ein weiterer Vertreter von FATA gesagt, dass seit 2014 42.000 zivile Freiwillige rekrutiert worden seien, um Bürger·innen online zu überwachen (Small Media, 20. Februar 2019; zu weiteren Details der Aktivitäten von FATA siehe Small Media, 20. Mai 2019).

Die saudi-arabische Tageszeitung Arab News berichtet im Februar 2021, dass der Iran zwei Überwachungsoperationen im Cyberspace durchführe, bei dem mehr als tausend Dissident·innen ausspioniert würden. Es würde Spyware verwendet, um nach der Infizierung von Computern Informationen über Netzwerke, insbesondere im Ausland, zu erhalten. In Folge würden Verhaftungen erfolgen. Es gebe zwei dafür zuständige Stellen, eine bei den Revolutionsgarden (IRGC), die sich auf Dissidenten im Ausland konzentriere, und eine beim Geheimdienstministerium, das sich um Ziele im Inland kümmere (Arab News, 9. Februar 2021; vgl. auch Freedom House, Februar 2021, S. 37).

Für weitere Hintergrundinformationen beachten Sie bitte auch unsere Anfragebeantwortungen vom Juli 2019 und vom Juni 2017:

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zum Iran: Überwachung von Aktivitäten im Ausland (exilpolitische Aktivitäten, Konversion) [a-11025], 5. Juli 2019
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2012531.html

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: Query response on Iran: Capacity and methods of authorities to monitor online activities and religious activities of Iranians living abroad [a-10098], 12. Juni 2017
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1402692.html

Zur Behandlung von regierungskritischen Aktivist·innen, darunter Rückkehrer·innen, sowie die Überwachungsmöglichkeiten von Iraner·innen im Ausland beachten Sie bitte folgende Anfragebeantwortung des kanadischen IRB:

·      IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Iran: Treatment by the authorities of anti-government activists, including those returning from abroad; overseas monitoring capabilities of the government (2019–February 2021) [IRN200457.E], 22. Februar 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2047908.html

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 16. April 2021)

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: Query response on Iran: Capacity and methods of authorities to monitor online activities and religious activities of Iranians living abroad [a-10098], 12. Juni 2017
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/1402692.html

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zum Iran: Überwachung von Aktivitäten im Ausland (exilpolitische Aktivitäten, Konversion) [a-11025], 5. Juli 2019
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2012531.html

·      AI – Amnesty International: Iran 2020, 7. April 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048569.html

·      Arab News: Iran’s dissident surveillance operation exposed, 9. Februar 2021
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1805986/middle-east

·      Article 19: Tightening the Net: The internet in the time of currency crisis, Oktober 2018
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/TTN-6_Eng_10.18.pdf

·      Article 19: Iran: Policing women on social media, 22. Mai 2020
https://www.article19.org/resources/iran-policing-women-on-social-media/

·      Article 19: Tightening the Net 2020: After Blood and Shutdowns, September 2020
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TTN-report-2020.pdf

·      Freedom House: The True Depth of Iran’s Online Repression, 2. Dezember 2019
https://freedomhouse.org/article/true-depth-irans-online-repression

·      Freedom House: Freedom on the Net 2020 - Iran, 14. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2039093.html

·      Freedom House: Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression, Februar 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045035/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf

·      IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: Iran: Treatment by the authorities of anti-government activists, including those returning from abroad; overseas monitoring capabilities of the government (2019–February 2021) [IRN200457.E], 22. Februar 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2047908.html

·      Small Media: Iran’s Cyber Police — ‘Society-Based Policing’ and the Rise of Peer Surveillance, 20. Februar 2019
https://smallmedia.org.uk/news/irans-cyber-police-society-based-policing-and-the

·      Small Media: FATAwatch//01 — Iranian Cyber Police Monitoring, 20. Mai 2019
https://smallmedia.org.uk/news/fatawatch01-iranian-cyber-police-monitoring

·      USDOS – US Department of State: 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iran, 30. März 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048099.html

Anhang: Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

·      AI – Amnesty International: Iran 2020, 7. April 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048569.html

„The authorities took measures to stop independent reporting on COVID-19 and silence criticism about their handling of the pandemic. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance ordered media and journalists to use only official sources and statistics in their reporting. Cyber police established a special task force to tackle ‘cyber rumours’ and ‘fake news’ related to COVID-19 on social media; and scores of journalists, social media users, health care workers and others were arrested, summoned for questioning or given warnings. In April, Rahim Yousefpour, a doctor from Saqqez, Kurdistan province, was charged with ‘spreading propaganda against the system’ and ‘disturbing public opinion’ for his Instagram posts about COVID-19.” (AI, 7. April 2021)

·      Arab News: Iran’s dissident surveillance operation exposed, 9. Februar 2021
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1805986/middle-east

„Iran is running two surveillance operations in cyberspace, using various methods to spy on more than 1,000 dissidents, according to a leading cybersecurity company. People in Iran, the UK, the US and 10 other countries have been tracked by Iranian hackers, Check Point said. It added that two groups are involved in disseminating spyware among dissidents that is then used to monitor them and to steal call recordings and other media. One of the groups, Domestic Kitten, uses various methods to trick people into downloading malicious software to their phones. […] Check Point said Tehran has achieved at least 600 successful infections using these methods. The other group involved in the hacking scandal, Infy, is known to have been operating as early as 2007, and has targeted peoples’ computers by sending emails with attractive content and an attachment containing spyware.

[…] Amin Sabeti, executive director at the Washington-based Digital Impact Lab, told Arab News that once Iranian operatives break into dissidents’ devices, their priority is finding out who these people are speaking to in Iran. ‘They want to find the network of people, especially those outside the country, and figure out what they’re talking about and who they’re talking to — then they arrest them,’ he said. […] What Tehran’s cyber agencies excel at is what Sabeti called the ‘social engineering’ side of hacking. ‘In terms of the technology they aren’t that sophisticated, but in implementation they’re excellent,’ he said. ‘They understand their target perfectly — they study them and figure out what they want, and compromise them from there.’ The Intelligence Ministry and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Sabeti said, each run their own distinct cyber entities with different targets. The IRGC focuses on foreign dissidents, while the ministry focuses on Iranians at home.” (Arab News, 9. Februar 2021)

·      Article 19: Tightening the Net: The internet in the time of currency crisis, Oktober 2018
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/TTN-6_Eng_10.18.pdf

„MAY 18 / PERSECUTION Tehran’s Cyber Police (FATA) arrest a series of high profile Iranian Instagram users (Maedeh Hojabri; Elnar Ghasemi; Shadab Shakib; and Kami Yousefi).

[…] 03 JUL 18 / PERSECUTION Iran’s Prosecutor General declares Instagram is a hotbed of illicit activities by “Instagram celebrities” and fraudesters, and that the judiciary will filter it.

16 JUL 18 / PLATFORMS Hormozgan’s local police chief announces they have arrested 46 fashion workers, including eight models, who run their activities on Instagram pages.” (Article 19, Oktober 2018)

·      Article 19: Iran: Policing women on social media, 22. Mai 2020
https://www.article19.org/resources/iran-policing-women-on-social-media/

„Iran’s cyber police force, known as FATA, announced on 13 May 2020 that women, including both public and private figures, are in breach of Iran’s laws when they appear without a hijab (Islamic veil) on social media. ‘In relation to the removal of hijab in cyberspace, it is a violation because it falls under deviant behaviour,’ Colonel Ramin Pashaei, FATA’s deputy chief, explained. He also clarified that crimes on the Internet are charged according to the Computer Crimes Law (CCL), which was ratified in 2009. He outlined that ‘moral offences or promoting immorality’ are part of these offences, and there is no difference between crimes committed in public and those committed online. Colonel Pashaei also clarified that the law would not discriminate against Instagram users with a high or low follower count, and all would be considered criminally responsible. This clarification is significant given all online morality arrests have targeted high profile Instagram users officials have termed as ‘Instagram celebrities.’ How this law will be implemented in the monitoring of instagram accounts, including private vs public accounts, remains unclear.

[…] The CCL provisions on online morality have remained vague and unevenly implemented since their introduction in 2009. The majority of women who are arrested in Iran for online self-expression have been on Instagram. Instagram remains one of the most popularly used social media platforms in Iran, and one of the few foreign platforms to remain unblocked. With millions of Iranian users, the platform has been host to countless public and privately shared images of women without their hijab. In May 2018 authorities cracked down on high profile Iranian ‘Instagram celebrities’ for ‘sinful acts’. The May 2018 arrests coincided with increased demands by hardline authorities to block Instagram. This pressure is being vocalized by hardline politicians and factions on Iran’s judiciary and the Ministry of ICT to block the platform. Many believe the debate will intensify with the start of the new conservative majority Iranian parliament.” (Article 19, 22. Mai 2020)

·      Freedom House: The True Depth of Iran’s Online Repression, 2. Dezember 2019
https://freedomhouse.org/article/true-depth-irans-online-repression

„As authorities increase surveillance capabilities, they have continued to hand down harsh punishments to activists and others who express dissent online. In June, for example, lawyer Amirsalar Davoudi received a 30-year prison sentence, along with 111 lashes, for actions including the establishment of a Telegram channel to document human rights violations. Though the prison term will be reduced to 15 years under Iran’s penal code, the sentence is still an egregious breach of international human rights norms.” (Freedom House, 2. Dezember 2019)

·      Freedom House: Freedom on the Net 2020 - Iran, 14. Oktober 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2039093.html

As in past years, bloggers, online journalists, activists, and citizens were arrested and prosecuted for content posted online. The government continued to block websites and ban content deemed as critical of the state.

[…] Key Developments, June 1, 2019 - May 31, 2020

A near total internet shutdown was implemented across the country in November 2019 for around seven days, following nationwide protests sparked by the sudden announcement of fuel price increases (see A3).

As the spread of COVID-19 in the country intensified, a number of journalists and citizen journalists were arrested for criticizing the government’s response to the crisis (see C3).

Iran continued to impose strict penalties for publication of legitimate online content, including handing out a 7-year and a 9-year in absentia prison sentence to two Instagram influencers for content posted to their social media accounts (see C3).

Data from 42 million Iranian Telegram accounts was leaked online. Reportedly, some of the data was related to unofficial Telegram apps that have potential ties to the government (see C5).” (Freedom House, 14. Oktober 2020)

·      Freedom House: Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression, Februar 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045035/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf

„Iranian authorities also run highly sophisticated spyware campaigns. According to a paper on the topic from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), “offensive cyber operations have become a core tool of Iranian statecraft,” and attacks on civil society “often foreshadow” attacks on other, harder targets.267 Iranians abroad receive complex spear-phishing attempts, with one example imitating an email from US Citizenship and Immigration Services, and another setting up a fake event for human rights activists in Spain in order to trick them into downloading malicious software.268 An Iranian exile journalist told researcher Marcus Michaelsen, ‘There is no day when I open my email and I don’t have a phishing email.’” (Freedom House, Februar 2021, S. 37)

·      Small Media: Iran’s Cyber Police — ‘Society-Based Policing’ and the Rise of Peer Surveillance, 20. Februar 2019
https://smallmedia.org.uk/news/irans-cyber-police-society-based-policing-and-the

2018–19 // FATA Today

Eight years on, FATA is an established force in the Iranian security landscape. Since the death of Sattar Beheshti, it has generally managed to avoid significant levels of international scrutiny. Yet despite managing to avoid the spotlight, FATA continues to exert a powerful effect on the country’s online media ecology.

On October 10 2018, FATA Chief Seyyed Kamal Hadiyanfar announced that in the last eight years, FATA has been involved in more than 133,000 legal cases, making nearly 75,000 arrests. While cases such as that of Sattar Beheshti’s, and of a young Iranian woman detained in July 2018 on the basis of her dance videos received widespread attention, there has been next-to-no media scrutiny of this huge number of arrests.

[…] FATA’s lack of transparency has meant that very little information is available about what happens to Iranian internet users arrested by FATA, the level of legal assistance available to them, and any requirements for sharing their data with the organisation. This lack of transparency also means that today we have little information about how investigations are carried out by FATA. In light of Iran’s established policy of discouraging the use of encrypted services, one can assume that a level of technical surveillance is involved in the security forces’ (including FATA’s) monitoring and investigation of Iranians’ online activities. However, the security services aren’t wholly reliant on technical surveillance; recent comments by FATA’s Deputy of Social Affairs Colonel Ramin Pashayi on 19 December confirmed the integration of widespread peer surveillance into online law enforcement. In his interview, Pashayi boasts about the recruitment of 42,000 civilian volunteers since March 2014. In this alarming Interview, Pashayi stated that FATA’s approach to policing was one of ‘society-based policing’, with the aspiration of creating a culture of ‘every citizen a police officer’. In practice, this amounts to create an environment for participatory, peer-led surveillance of online communities. According to Pashayi, volunteers can sign up to work with FATA through their website. He added that at present, volunteers take part in a range of activities including monitoring online spaces, content production and content promotion. FATA’s large-scale volunteering drive shouldn’t be taken to imply that it’s strapped for cash — the body still enjoys substantial financial support from central government. FATA’s share of the national budget for the current Iranian year (2018/19) is 100bn IRR (2.38bn USD), with a rise to 110bn IRR (2.6bn USD) projected in the latest draft of the proposed budget for 2019/20.” (Small Media, 20. Februar 2019)

·      USDOS – US Department of State: 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iran, 30. März 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048099.html

„As the outbreak of COVID-19 escalated, the head of the Cyber Police (known as FATA), Commander Vahid Majid, announced the establishment of a working group for ‘combatting online rumors’ relating to the spread of the virus. In April a military spokesman said authorities had arrested 3,600 individuals for spreading COVID-19 ‘rumors’ online, with no clear guidance on what authorities considered a ‘rumor’.” (USDOS, 30. März 2021, Section 2)

„Internet Freedom

The Ministries of Culture and of Information and Communications Technology are the main regulatory bodies for content and internet systems and maintain monopoly control over internet traffic flowing in and out of the country. The Office of the Supreme Leader also includes the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, charged with regulating content and systems. The government collected personally identifiable information in connection with citizens’ peaceful expression of political, religious, or ideological opinion or beliefs.

[…] Authorities blocked access to independent news sites and a number of social media and communication platforms deemed critical of the state, and continued to monitor private online communications and censor online content. Individuals and groups practiced self-censorship online.

[…] Authorities restricted access to tens of thousands of websites, particularly those of international news and information services, the political opposition, ethnic and religious minority groups, and human rights organizations. They continued to block online messaging tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, although the government operated Twitter accounts under the names of Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Rouhani, Foreign Minister Zarif, and other government-associated officials and entities, including after shutting down most of the country’s internet access during the November demonstrations. According to Freedom House, websites are blocked if they contradict state doctrine regarding Islam, as well as government narratives on domestic or international politics. News stories that cover friction among political institutions are also frequently censored.

[…] Government organizations, including the Basij Cyber Council, the Cyber Police, and the Cyber Army, which observers presumed to be controlled by the IRGC, monitored, identified, and countered alleged cyberthreats to national security. These organizations especially targeted citizens’ activities on officially banned social networking websites such as Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr, and they reportedly harassed persons who criticized the government or raised sensitive social problems.” (USDOS, 30. März 2021, Section 2)