USDOL – US Department of Labor

Children in Uzbekistan are subjected to the worst forms of child labor, including in commercial sexual exploitation. (1-3) Uzbekistan has not carried out a national child labor survey to determine the prevalence of child labor in sectors other than cotton production. (3) Table 1 provides key indicators on children’s work and education in Uzbekistan.

Source for primary completion rate: Data from 2019, published by UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2021. (4)
Source for all other data: International Labor Organization's analysis of statistics from Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 3 (MICS 3), 2006. (5)

Based on a review of available information, Table 2 provides an overview of children's work by sector and activity.

‡ Child labor understood as the worst forms of child labor per se under Article 3(a)–(c) of ILO C. 182.

Traffickers exploit Uzbek children in sex trafficking transnationally in the Middle East, Eurasia, and Asia. (1) Children are also vulnerable to internal trafficking for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. (1,12)

ILO monitors reported that prohibitions on child labor were generally upheld during the 2020 cotton harvest. Farmers increased due diligence measures for preventing child labor, including by informing cotton pickers about laws and regulations prohibiting child labor in the harvest and verifying pickers' ages prior to transporting them to fields. (14) However, ILO and civil society harvest monitors also noted an uptick in the number of children, primarily ages 15 to 17, participating in the 2020 cotton harvest compared to harvests in 2018 and 2019. In interviews with ILO and civil society monitors, some pickers reported bringing teenage children to work in the fields to increase household income. (14,15) In such cases, monitors provided pickers with additional information on child labor prohibitions and the hazards cotton picking poses to the health and well-being of children. (14) Monitors also assessed that school closures related to the COVID-19 pandemic and pandemic-related economic stresses within families may have increased children's vulnerability to child labor in the 2020 cotton harvest. (14,15)

Children in Uzbekistan sometimes participate in public works projects, including refurbishing school grounds and facilities. (3,6) Limited evidence suggests that in isolated cases, school officials may compel students to assist in harvesting silk cocoons, sometimes characterizing the work as traditional communal labor (khashar). (6,13) Although there is free public education in Uzbekistan, schools may charge informal fees, which can make education inaccessible to children from low-income families. (3,10, 27)

Uzbekistan has ratified all key international conventions concerning child labor (Table 3).

The government has established laws and regulations related to child labor (Table 4). However, gaps exist in Uzbekistan’s legal framework to adequately protect children from the worst forms of child labor, including the prohibition of commercial sexual exploitation of children.

‡ Age calculated based on available information (27)

During the reporting period, the government adopted a new law on trafficking in persons aiming to enhance access to government services and strengthen protections for victims of human trafficking, including child victims. (12,24) The government also drafted and began Parliamentary review of a comprehensive Labor Code reform package. (28) In addition, in early 2021, parliament adopted a package of amendments to the Criminal Code that included criminal penalties for the use of children ages 16 to 17 in commercial sex. This package of amendments also established criminal penalties in the first instance for forced labor violations involving minors. (29)

Articles 131 and 135 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan criminalize pimping, procuring, involving, or inducing children into prostitution, and criminalize the actions of those who profit from prostitution involving children. (23) In addition, Criminal Code Article 128(1) criminalizes the use of children ages 16 to 18 in prostitution. However, no law criminalizes the users (clients) of prostitution involving children under age 16. (23) Moreover, although Uzbekistan’s laws prohibit the use, procuring, and offering of children for both the production and trafficking of drugs, the legal framework prohibiting these crimes lacks clarity as penalties are only addressed in the Administrative Code, not the Criminal Code. (19,23)

The law does not determine the activities or conditions in which children who have not yet completed their compulsory schooling may engage in light work, although the Labor Code establishes caps on the maximum number of work hours permitted for children ages 15 to 17. (18,27)

The government has established institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of laws and regulations on child labor (Table 5). However, gaps exist within the operations of enforcement agencies that may hinder adequate enforcement of their child labor laws.

In 2020, the feedback mechanism hotline operated by the Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan (FTUU) received 180 complaints related to the cotton harvest. (40) Of these 180 complaints, 30 concerned recruitment for the cotton harvest, 102 concerned late payment of wages for cotton picking, 34 concerned poor working conditions in the harvest, 5 concerned issues with labor contracts for pickers, and 9 concerned financial collections at workplaces to pay for cotton pickers. All 180 complaints were referred to the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations (MOELR) for investigation; of these, 118 labor law violations were identified and remedied through corrective action. (40)

Labor Law Enforcement

In 2020, labor law enforcement agencies in Uzbekistan took actions to combat child labor. (Table 6). However, gaps exist within the operations of MOELR that may hinder adequate labor law enforcement, including human resource allocation.

The number of labor inspectors is likely insufficient for the size of Uzbekistan’s workforce, which includes more than 17.8 million workers. According to the ILO’s technical advice of a ratio approaching 1 inspector for every 20,000 workers in transitioning economies, Uzbekistan would employ about 890 inspectors. (44,45) In 2020, labor inspectors, farmers, and cotton cluster operators attended a series of training seminars on fair recruitment laws and practices. (37,42) A total of 80 labor inspectors also received routine recertification training, which every inspector is required to complete at least once every 3 years. Although funding for the Labor Inspectorate decreased in 2020 compared to 2019, the government noted that 2019 funding levels had included one-time appropriations for purchasing new equipment, which were not included in the 2020 budget. (12) The government also noted that, in addition to labor inspectors employed by MOELR, the FTUU employs 33 labor monitors, who can refer potential violations to the Labor Inspectorate for investigation and imposition of penalties as appropriate. (12)

During the reporting period, the government enhanced penalties for violations of labor laws. Maximum fines for forced labor violations in the first offense increased significantly, from $60–70 in 2019 to nearly $2,000 in 2020. (35) MOELR identified two child labor cases, one in Bukhara and the other in Samarkand. Both cases were referred through social media and involved children working on refurbishing school facilities and grounds. (12) Labor inspectors assessed and collected penalties totaling $2,200 (22,300,000 UZS) for these two violations. (12) MOELR also identified 105 total forced labor cases in 2020, 46 of which were related to mobilization of workers for the annual cotton harvest and 59 of which were related to unfair recruitment into other work. (14,40) During the cotton harvest, 42 offenders, including district hokims (local leaders), heads of institutions, directors, and farmers were penalized under Administrative Code Article 51 for forced labor violations. (14) Five hokims from districts in Namangan, Tashkent, and Khoresm regions were formally reprimanded by the Cabinet of Ministers for forced labor offenses in their districts and officially warned that they would be dismissed without further notice for any subsequent forced labor offenses. (14,42) MOELR referred six forced labor cases to the courts for criminal action, although the current status of these cases is unknown. (12,46)

Labor inspectors are empowered to conduct self-initiated unannounced inspections in public-sector enterprises and, with permission from the Business Ombudsman, are authorized to conduct limited inspections at private-sector businesses. However, reports indicate that in practice, inspectors may be reticent to enter private businesses or homes and typically only do so in response to complaints. (3,10-12,35,47,48) In addition, a temporary moratorium on planned inspections at state enterprises was put in place for part of the reporting period due to the pandemic. However, inspectors still carried out monitoring visits to state enterprises during the cotton harvest season to enforce prohibitions on forced and child labor. (35) The legislature established working groups comprising senators, Legislative Chamber deputies, journalists, and bloggers that conducted labor monitoring visits at farms, cotton clusters (vertically-integrated cotton production enterprises), neighborhood associations (mahallas), private enterprises, and public organizations. MOELR also established six working groups comprising labor inspectors that conducted rapid-response investigations of forced labor complaints during the harvest. (40) All of these working groups visited, in total, 95 cotton clusters, 3,221 farms, 1,572 neighborhood associations, and 796 private and public enterprises and organizations. (40) The Labor Inspectorate further reported that it reviewed 26,788 complaints in 2020 across all sectors, conducted 5,154 total inspections for compliance with laws governing working conditions, and identified 6,314 violations requiring remediation. (12)

The government increased cooperation with independent civil society monitors to detect and respond to suspected labor violations in the cotton harvest. Civil society monitors participated in regular information exchanges with MOELR and received special badges from the government that granted them unimpeded access to visit cotton fields and other entities involved in the harvest, despite pandemic-related internal travel restrictions. (14,35) Independent observers reported that labor inspectors consistently investigated potential labor violations referred to them by civil society activists, and investigated reports of potential violations were publicized in the press and on social media. (10,15,49) Labor inspectors responded to 790 forced labor complaints between January and October 2020, of which 461 were received through MOELR's feedback hotline, 113 through social networks (including Telegram messenger), 201 in writing, and 15 through MOELR's website. (10,12,35,37,40) Civil society activists reportedly submitted 26 complaints, 6 of which resulted in imposition of fines for official complicity in forced labor. (10)

Criminal Law Enforcement

In 2020, criminal law enforcement agencies in Uzbekistan took actions to combat child labor (Table 7). However, gaps exist within the operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) that may hinder adequate criminal law enforcement, including investigation planning.

In 2020, law enforcement investigated 12 criminal cases involving 13 suspects under suspicion of procuring children for commercial sexual exploitation. Because of these investigations, 13 children were recognized as victims of crimes related to human trafficking and referred to rehabilitation centers for services. (12) Eight cases involving 10 suspects were referred for prosecution under Criminal Code Article 135, trafficking in persons. One case culminated in an acquittal for two defendants and the other seven cases resulted in conviction of eight perpetrators. (12) Of these, four perpetrators were sentenced to prison terms, three were sentenced to restriction of liberty, and one received a suspended sentence. (12) In one of these cases, investigators and prosecutors cooperated with lawyers from Istiqbolli Avlod, a local anti-trafficking NGO, to gather evidence and present it in court. The perpetrator was sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment. (50) Sources reported that this case was the first human trafficking conviction in which Istiqbolli Avlod's lawyers were able to participate directly in court proceedings. (50)

Limited reports suggest that MOIA investigations into potential cases involving the worst forms of child labor may not be thorough enough to detect violations or gather sufficient evidence to move forward with prosecution. (35,50) The Prosecutor General's Office began a review of human trafficking cases that were closed due to lack of evidence to determine whether any should be reinitiated. However, information on how many of these cases involved child victims was not available. (10,50) In addition, the new law on combating human trafficking adopted during the reporting period established procedures to improve the referral mechanism by which authorities refer child victims of trafficking to social services. (10,24)

Although criminal liability for repeat forced labor offenses was introduced in early 2020 under Criminal Code Article 148(2), monitoring reports on the 2020 cotton harvest noted enforcement challenges that may have hampered the government's ability to initiate criminal prosecutions for forced labor offenses. (14,23) Officials can only be held criminally liable under Art. 148(2) for complicity in forced labor if they commit repeated offenses within the same 12-month period. In addition, criminal enforcement agencies faced difficulties collecting sufficient evidence to prosecute complicit officials. (14) The ILO reported on two instances in which issues related to witness testimony and admissibility of documentary evidence limited government efforts to pursue prosecution of forced labor cases. (14)

During the reporting period, 184 MOIA staff members received training on Uzbekistan's new law on trafficking in persons. (12) Judges from the Supreme Court and from the Higher School of Judges received training from UNODC on interpreting and applying Criminal Code Article 135, which defines and establishes penalties for human trafficking crimes, including those involving children. (51) Investigators, judges, and prosecutors also received training from the ILO on child labor and forced labor. In addition, the NGO Istiqbolli Avlod continued to work with criminal enforcement agencies to provide human trafficking training to investigators. (10)

The government has established mechanisms to coordinate its efforts to address child labor (Table 8). However, gaps exist that hinder the effective coordination of efforts to address child labor, including coordination with civil society organizations.

During the reporting period, the National Sub-Commission on Combating Forced Labor drafted an Action Plan based on international recommendations to eliminate the worst forms of child labor; the National Rapporteur formally approved this Action Plan in November 2020. (54) The National Sub-Commission on Combating Trafficking in Persons prepared addenda to Uzbekistan's draft National Referral Mechanism (NRM) regarding trauma-informed and child-friendly approaches to addressing human trafficking crimes. However, these addenda cannot be adopted or implemented until the full draft NRM package is adopted. (35) International organizations reported that the Sub-Commission's lack of a designated secretariat hampered communication with external stakeholders, which delayed action on activities to counter human trafficking. (35)

Although there were no reports of reprisals against individuals for monitoring labor conditions during the 2020 autumn harvest season, a group of activists reported that they were arrested by police while monitoring labor conditions in one region's cotton fields during the spring weeding season; one activist reported that he was beaten after being detained. The activists were subsequently placed under police supervision for 14 days of self-quarantine, allegedly for potential COVID-19 exposure from a police officer. (55) In 2020, the government continued to engage in dialogue with civil society stakeholders on child and forced labor issues. (14,56) In March, the Ministry of Justice registered a local independent human rights NGO, the first to receive official status since 2003. (57) However, there were also continued reports that many human rights NGOs, including those working on forced and child labor issues, were repeatedly denied official registration, sometimes for failing to meet requirements that had not been publicly specified. (15,58,59)

The government has established policies related to child labor (Table 9). However, policy gaps exist that hinder efforts to address child labor, including implementation of privatization policies in the cotton sector.

† Policy was approved during the reporting period.

In 2020, President Mirziyoyev formally abolished the practice of imposing state quotas for cotton production. (65-67) Under this quota system in previous harvests, local and regional officials were held responsible for mobilizing adequate labor to harvest a centrally determined amount of cotton, which observers reported was a root cause of forced labor and increased the risk of child labor. (68,69)

However, independent monitors reported that in some parts of the country, local governments established and carried out regional cotton harvest plans that reproduced quotas on a local level. (14,67) Reports also continued during the 2020 harvest that some cotton "clusters" (vertically-integrated private business partnerships along the cotton value chain from farm to finished products) may reproduce quota pressures through contractual practices. (14,67,70) The government grants clusters exclusive territorial concessions to operate in individual districts, making the cluster the only potential buyer for cotton farmers in that district. (70-72) Although new regulations adopted in 2020 allow farmers to form independent cooperatives, they may only do so in districts without an existing, operational cluster. (36) Allegations persisted in 2020 that some clusters engage in coercive business practices against farmers, including failing to pay for delivered crops or purchasing cotton at a lower price than initially promised. However, such issues appear to be localized to specific districts and clusters. (73,74) Some clusters maintain close ties to local administrators, and there were reports that in the 2020 growing season, some farmers were asked to sign contracts in the presence of local hokimiyats (local government administrations), which then kept the contracts on behalf of the cluster. (14) In some cases, contracts included production targets for farmers that were recommended by the hokimiyat and included land confiscation penalties if farmers failed to deliver the contracted amount of cotton. These practices mimicked the pressures on farmers and officials that historically created high risks for labor exploitation under the national quota system. (14,70) Government of Uzbekistan officials acknowledged that the abolishment of production quotas has been implemented unevenly at the local level, including in the context of cluster contracts. (35)

Some clusters are investing in mechanical harvesting equipment and methods, which reduce the need for manual labor during the harvest. Clusters have also taken a varied approach to recruiting seasonal laborers, with some clusters investing in implementation of fair recruitment practices. (14,15,43,72) ILO and civil society monitors found that in some districts, the adoption of these practices resulted in a significant decrease in labor exploitation. Monitors confirmed that, for the first time since monitoring began, a few of the country's cotton-producing districts had zero cases of forced labor in the 2020 harvest. (14,15)

In 2020, the government funded and participated in programs that include the goal of eliminating or preventing child labor (Table 10). However, gaps exist in these social programs, including the adequacy of programs to address the full scope of the problem.

† Program is funded by the Government of Uzbekistan.

In 2020, the government amended birth registration procedures to ensure all children are registered, including those born to undocumented parents. Citizenship eligibility was also extended to nearly 50,000 residents of Uzbekistan who had been rendered stateless by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. (46) The Ministry of Finance also worked with UNICEF to draft a new regulatory framework for social protection benefits, which is currently under review by other government bodies. (12) In addition, the government significantly increased funding for social services for human trafficking victims, including child victims. These expenditures included funding for anti-trafficking NGOs, shelters for trafficking victims, and legal assistance for trafficking victims. (52)

Although there are programs to address child labor in the cotton sector, research did not find evidence of programs designed to address child labor in other sectors, such as public works and street work.

Based on the reporting above, suggested actions are identified that would advance the elimination of child labor in Uzbekistan (Table 11).

1. U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report- 2020: Uzbekistan. Washington, DC, June 2020.
   https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/uzbekistan/
2. Government of Uzbekistan. Information on investigations by the Investigative Department and its territorial divisions into crimes related to sexual exploitation of minors for the period 2017–2018 and the first 8 months of 2019. 2019. Source on file.
3. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting. January 13, 2020.
4. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, both sexes (%). Accessed March 3, 2021. For more information, please see “Children’s Work and Education Statistics: Sources and Definitions” in the Reference Materials section of this report. http://data.uis.unesco.org/
5. ILO. Analysis of Child Economic Activity and School Attendance Statistics from National Household or Child Labor Surveys. Original data from Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 3, 2006. Analysis received March 2021. Please see “Children’s Work and Education Statistics: Sources and Definitions” in the Reference Materials section of this report.
6. Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights. There is no work we haven't done: Forced labor of public sector employees in Uzbekistan. February 2019. http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Uzbekistan.Forced-Labor-in-Public-Sector-Report.English.1.2019.pdf
7. International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations. Information on the compliance of the Republic of Uzbekistan from 2017 through 2019 with Convention No. 138 of the International Labour Organization “Minimum Age Convention” 1973 (adopted in Geneva on 26 June 1973 at the 58th session of the ILC-ILO) and Convention No. 182 of the International Labour Organization “Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention” 1999 (adopted in Geneva on 17 June 1999 at the 87th session of the ILC-ILO). August 30, 2018. Source on file.
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14. ILO. 2020 third-party monitoring of child labour and forced labour during the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan. January 2021. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---ilo-washington/documents/projectdocumentation/wcms_767756.pdf
15. Uzbek Forum for Human Rights. Key findings from the 2020 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan. January 28, 2021.
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16. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Law No. ZRU-239 to amend the Labour Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Law on Child's Rights Guarantees, UZB-2009-L-85547. Enacted: 2009.
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17. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Law No. ZRU-139 On the Guarantees of the Rights of the Child, UZB-2008-L-85548. Enacted: 2008.
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21. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Decree on Adoption of the List of Occupations with Unfavorable Working Conditions to which it is forbidden to Employ Persons under Eighteen Years of Age. Enacted: 2009. Source on file.
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26. Government of Uzbekistan. Law on civil organizations in the Republic of Uzbekistan. Enacted: 1991.
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27. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Education. Enacted: 2020.
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28. Kun.uz Revised Labor Code project published. September 19, 2020.
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29. Government of Uzbekistan. Law no. 673 on introduction of changes and additions to the Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes of the Republic of Uzbekistan and to the Administrative Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Enacted: February 13, 2021. https://lex.uz/docs/5286350?ONDATE=13.02.2021 00
30. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Presidential Decree on additional measures to further the establishment of systems combating trafficking in persons and forced labor. Enacted: July 30, 2019.
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35. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, January 8, 2021.
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39. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, February 14, 2020.
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41. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Cabinet of Ministers Decree no. 1066 on measures for the fulfilment of activities of the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Enacted: December 31, 2018.
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46. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, February 11, 2021.
47. Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Experience of Uzbekistan in eradicating forced labor. December 10, 2019. Source on file.
48. Government of Uzbekistan. Decree No. 5490, On measures to further the establishment of a system for protecting the rights and legal interests of business entities. Enacted: July 2018. https://lex.uz/ru/docs/3839752
49. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent official. E-mail communication to USDOL official. October 2, 2020.
50. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, December 30, 2020.
51. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, November 6, 2020(b).
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54. U.S. Embassy- Tashkent. Reporting, November 6, 2020(a).
55. Uzbek Forum for Human Rights. Human rights activists isolated for 14 days after monitoring cotton fields. June 12, 2020.
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59. Uzbek Forum for Human Rights. The time for words has passed. Uzbekistan should simplify the rules for registration of NGOs and legitimize civil society voices. April 7, 2021.
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60. ILO and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Memorandum of Understanding. 2014.
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62. Government of Uzbekistan. Action Plan on Improving the position of Uzbekistan in the next report of the US Department of Labour on "Worst forms of child labor" and the implementation of recommendations on the removal of Uzbek cotton and silk cocoons from the "List of goods produced using child labour or forced labour." Approved: November 10, 2020. Source on file.
63. Kun.uz. The Labor Ministry sets wage rates for manual cotton harvesting. September 5, 2020.
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69. Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights. Why the practice of "forced voluntary" cotton harvesting in Uzbekistan continues. November 19, 2019.
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