Access to the internet declined during the coverage period: as of 2019, the overall penetration rate reached 82 percent, according to State Communication Agency (SCA) statistics.1 As of January 2021, the SCA claimed there were approximately 5.5 million internet users out of a population of 6.6 million: 5.28 percent less than in 2019. However, the reliability of the SCA’s data on internet penetration rates has been called into question by some analysts; the agency’s data on the number of internet users comes from service providers.

In 2019, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reported Kyrgyzstan had 4.5 fixed broadband prescriptions per 100 inhabitants.2 Kyrgyzstan’s 2020 active mobile penetration rate, estimated at 112 percent by the SCA,3 was lower than last year’s active mobile penetration rate of 118.8.4 Third-generation (3G) technology for mobile networks is available to much of the country. Fourth-generation (4G) services continued to expand during the coverage period, with one operator, Nur Telecom, claiming in January 2020 that its 4G network reached 97 percent of the population.5 Fifth-generation (5G) technology has yet to be adopted.

Despite being more readily available, mobile internet connections are slower and of lower quality than fixed ones. According to March 2021 data from Ookla’s Speedtest, the average download speed on mobile internet connections was just 20.60 megabits per second (Mbps), compared to 46.88 Mbps on fixed-line connections.6 Kyrgyzstan lags behind neighboring Kazakhstan in terms of average speeds, but compares favorably to other Central Asian countries.

In 2018, the Digital Central Asia and South Asia (CASA)–Kyrgyz Republic project came into effect.7 Funded by the World Bank, the ongoing project aims to provide 60 percent of the population with broadband internet via nearly 400 miles of fiber-optic cables in five years.

Internet connections in rural areas rely on vulnerable infrastructure from the state-owned internet service provider (ISP), KyrgyzTelecom. In March 2019, the Issyk-Kul region was disconnected for 13 hours after a KyrgyzTelecom fiber-optic cable was intentionally damaged.8

In recent years, the average price of an internet connection has decreased, becoming more affordable for much of the population, though fixed broadband prices remain steep. Prices offered by ISPs in Bishkek, the capital, where the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure is well-developed and competition is greater, are lower than in rural areas. Additionally, the quality of connection is better in Bishkek than in rural areas, where the majority of the population lives.9

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a 5 gigabytes (GB) fixed broadband subscription cost 8.2 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2019, while a monthly mobile broadband plan offering 1.5 GB of data cost just 2.8 percent of GNI per capita.10 The monthly price of a 3 Mbps fixed broadband subscription in Bishkek was 513 soms ($6.04) in 2021, which is affordable for much of the population and represents a decrease from the 2020 price.11 The monthly price for the same subscription in the rural Batken region was 614 soms ($7.24).12

The development of mobile networks increasingly provides a viable alternative to fixed-line broadband internet connections. According to 2021 research by the UK-based company Cable, Kyrgyzstan has the second-least expensive mobile data rates in the world, with the price for 1 GB of mobile data averaging $0.15.13

In March 2020, as COVID-19 began to spread in Kyrgyzstan, the government requested that service providers refrain from disconnecting subscribers who could not pay their bills for three months. Reportedly, not all companies heeded this request.14 Many service providers did give their subscribers zero-rated access to official and educational resources during the pandemic.15

The World Bank has observed digital divides in terms of geography, gender, and language (most online content is in Russian) in Kyrgyzstan.16 Ongoing access issues were laid bare by the pandemic. Many schoolchildren could not participate in distance learning programs because they could not reliably access the internet or did not own internet-enabled devices such as smartphones—meaning that they were effectively excluded from the education system.17 In May 2020, the Ministry of Education and Science announced that 30,000 students did not have smartphones and therefore could not communicate with their teachers.18

The government periodically attempts to increase its control over the internet. Using security or economic issues as pretexts, officials or members of Parliament sometimes call for the centralization of the country’s internet infrastructure. Their initiatives seldom gain traction.

To connect to the international internet, ISPs are not required to use government-owned channels, though getting their own channel can be challenging, as it requires permission from the Border Control Service. Kyrgyzstan’s 10 major ISPs operate international internet connections via Kazakhstan and China. In the past, websites blocked in Kazakhstan19 and Russia (Kazakhstan connects to the international internet through Russia) were also blocked in Kyrgyzstan, though these issues have not been reported recently. Chinese filtering does not affect access to web content in Kyrgyzstan.

For a few hours during the October 2020 protests, which led to former president Sooronbay Jeenbekov’s resignation, mobile internet was shut down in the center of Bishkek where clashes between protestors and security forces occurred. All three main mobile operators blamed technical problems and a network overload for the disruptions on October 5 and 6, denying that they had received any orders from the government.20

There are three internet exchange points (IXPs) in Kyrgyzstan: two managed by a telecommunications industry group, the Association of Telecommunications Operators,21 as well as one controlled by the Kyrgyzstani branch of the Internet Society (ISOC).22

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 to reflect the impact that corruption, particularly around the sale of radio frequencies, has had on the diversity of the ICT sector.

Though there are no direct obstacles for ISPs and mobile service providers seeking to enter the market (besides getting licensed, a formality), they must still confront several indirect barriers. One is the high cost of building ICT infrastructure. Existing ISPs are not obligated to share their infrastructure, and there is no cap on the prices they can charge for renting out bandwidth. Another is the obligation to install surveillance equipment on all communications networks, which increases start-up costs (see C5).23

The telecommunications sector is relatively liberalized and competitive compared to other countries in the region; however, the state-owned KyrgyzTelecom remains the largest ISP, which had an estimated fixed broadband market share of about 60 percent in 2009, when the last study was conducted.24 There are nine other major ISPs, some of which have their own international internet channels and all of which are privately owned.

There are four mobile service providers offering mobile broadband: Beeline, Megacom, Nur Telecom (operating under the brand “O!”), and KT Mobile.25 Nur Telecom claims to be the leading operator in terms of market share.26 Megacom was nationalized in 2010 amid political upheaval.

In recent years, a wave of scandals concerning the SCA, telecommunications companies, and the sale of radio frequencies have come to light. In March 2021, the Association of Telecommunications Operators accused Azamat Dyikanbaev, the head of the SCA from June 2020 to May 2021, of impeding the work of smaller telecommunication operators by stopping their licenses or refusing to continue them. The “groundless refusals” led to the termination of 22 licenses, particularly in rural areas, and forced some of the companies to go bankrupt.27 In May 2021, Dyikanbaev, who had recently been appointed Minister of Digital Development, was arrested for extorting a foreign company that was leading a “Safe City” project (see A5).28

Also, in February 2021, Yevgeny Krazhan, the former general director of Beeline operator Sky Mobile LLC, was taken into pretrial detention for allegedly bribing to government officials in exchange for a cheaper license for radio frequencies. According to the Prosecutor General’s office, in 2016 the SCA reissued the radio frequency for a mere 1,000 soms ($11.79), when similar licenses had been sold for 298.8 million soms ($352,372). In December 2020, Azamat Arnaev, the head of the Department of Defense, Law Enforcement, and Emergencies was detained in connection to the illegal sale of radio frequencies.29

In May 2020, SCA director Natalia Chenogubova, two State Committee for National Security (SCNS) officers, a deputy from the television company AlaTV, and other regulatory officials were detained on corruption charges in connection with the allegedly illegal transfer of a radio frequency. In March 2020, Beeline had purchased AlaTV for $1.8 million, securing the company’s 200-megahertz (MHz) frequency, which was designated for television broadcasts. Beeline then repurposed that frequency for 4G services with the SCA’s approval. In the past, such frequencies had been auctioned off by the state for between $10 million and $25 million.30 Upon learning of the deal, lawmakers lamented the loss of state revenue and accused then–prime minister Mukhammedkaliy Abylgaziyev of complicity.31 While denying the charges, Abylgaziyev took a leave of absence in May 2020 and resigned the next month. Beeline also denied any wrongdoing. The head of the Association of Telecommunications Operators claimed the sale of the frequency was legal and questioned lawmakers’ assessments of lost revenue.32

In August 2019, mobile operator KT Mobile (a subsidiary of KyrgyzTelecom operating under the brand “Salam”), started offering services using Megacom’s infrastructure as a virtual operator.33 The company’s debut was preceded by a scandal involving the revelation that its executives (one of whom was former prime minister Abylgaziyev’s nephew) were drawing exorbitant salaries. Subsequently, the executives stepped down.34 As of December 2019, KT Mobile had just 1,200 active subscribers.35

There are no obstacles to providing free and open internet access through Wi-Fi hotspots.36

During the coverage period, the government created a new regulatory body. Historically, regulatory bodies that oversee service providers do not always operate in a free and fair manner.

In May 2021, after the new constitution was enacted (see C1), President Japarov signed the decree “On the Cabinet of Ministers in the Kyrgyz Republic,” which transformed the recently created State Service of the Digital Development into the Ministry of Digital Development and allowed the head of the ministry to serve as vice-prime minister in the new council of ministers.37 This change followed the February 2021 creation of State Service of the Digital Development, which assumed the functions previously performed by the State Committee of Information Technologies and Communication (SCITC)—created in 2016—and its subsidiary, the SCA.38

Azamat Dyikanbaev, the first Minister of Digital Development was arrested for extorting a Chinese company implementing a “Safe City” project just two weeks after his appointment in May 2021.39 Dastan Dogoev, who previously headed the SCITC, was appointed Minister of Digital Development after Dyikanbaev’s arrest.40

The precise mandate for the Ministry of the Digital Development remained unclear at the end of the coverage period. Previously, the SCITC’s responsibilities included developing ICT policy, governing the ICT sector, and facilitating the sector’s development. The committee also issued licenses for ISPs, set standards, and ensured those standards were followed. Committee heads from the private sector tended to push reforms forward, while those from a government background have been more resistant to change. Institutional memory has also been limited, as incoming SCITC heads usually changed all key staff.

Authorities continued to engage in disproportionate and arbitrary blocking of online content during the coverage period, largely reflecting official concerns about extremism. The government and judiciary’s broad application of anti-extremism laws has impacted various websites hosting user-generated content. While popular social media platforms are freely accessible, the authorities are examining methods for censoring individual pages on these platforms.

As of May 2021, 77 websites, most of which offer MP3 and audio downloads, were blocked by a court decision, allegedly for hosting extremist content.41

In July 2020, Change.org, a website that hosts online petitions, was inaccessible for internet users of most ISPs including MegaCom, Beeline, Aknet, and Homeline, after a petition calling for the impeachment of former president Jeenbekov was posted.42 Though the website was blocked in July, the Oktyabrsky District Court did not officially order the blocking until September 2020, citing extremist content. In December 2020, the Media Policy Institute, representing the office of Change.org, filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, which overturned the decision in March 2021.43

In 2019, authorities blocked more than 100 websites and 300 accounts on social media platforms for extremism or promoting drug use, according to the Prosecutor General’s office.44 A list of blocked websites maintained by the private ISP Megaline, however, includes some websites that do not seem to fit into the categories outlined by authorities, like video and audio hosting sites or the University of Pennsylvania’s online library.45

A series of court decisions in 2017 led to the blocking of several websites, including the music and podcast streaming platform SoundCloud, for hosting “extremist” content. The action against SoundCloud specified that all SoundCloud files—regardless of their authorship—could no longer be distributed or stored.46 A request for information submitted by the online news website Kloop revealed that the blocking request came from the prosecutor general’s office. The courts have ordered blocks on several subdomains of Blogger, LiveJournal, and WordPress; some ISPs that do not utilize deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies were forced to block all subdomains that share the blogs’ internet protocol (IP) addresses.47

Courts have also ordered the blocking of URLs that link to specific content on Facebook, the Russian social media platform Odnoklassniki (OK), Twitter, and YouTube.48 However, these orders were not carried out due to the technical challenges associated with blocking individual pages on social media platforms by URL.

Also in 2017, courts ordered the blocking of the Internet Archive and JustPaste.it in their entirety under an anti-extremism law. The Internet Archive, which offers access to billions of deleted webpages, was apparently blocked for allowing local users to bypass restrictions on extremist content normally inaccessible in the country. Some users speculated that the decision was related to a deleted article available on the site that criticized the award of a government contract to a Czech company.49 JustPaste.it is a widely used text publishing tool that inadvertently became popular with extremist movements as a means to spread propaganda.50 The website was still blocked as of May 2021, while the Internet Archive had been unblocked.

The government does not often force outlets to remove content, though it pressured social media users to remove content during the coverage period. The law does not oblige publishers or hosts to remove any content except for material that relates to extremism or terrorism. Journalists who work online have occasionally removed political content under threat of violence from unknown actors (see C7).

Law enforcement agencies have taken actions against citizens who joked about or critiqued former president Jeenbekov on social media, summoning them to their offices, or calling or visiting them with threats to initiate criminal cases and demands that they remove any offensive posts and apologize (see C7). In July 2020, comedian Nazgul Alymkulova posted a video where the president’s head was superimposed onto a famous rapper. She was interrogated and the video was removed from her page, which she alleged was due to someone hacking into her account.51

In July 2020, a migrant whose mother had recently died posted a video online criticizing the president. She later posted a video calling the president “Khan from God” and apologized for her initial post. Similarly, that same month, Eldiyar Zholdoshev posted a video criticizing the president’s response to the pandemic, later removing it after the Bishkek Main Directorate of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs summoned him to make a public apology, which he refused to do (see C3).52

Prior to the blocking of Change.org (see B1) in July 2020, users who posted the petition demanding the resignation of the president on social media also received visits from the police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, demanding that they remove the content in question.53

In April 2020, a doctor was allegedly pressured by his employer to remove a Twitter post criticizing the quality of the personal protective equipment (PPE) issued to him amid the COVID-19 pandemic.54 He subsequently deleted his entire Twitter account, but not before being forced to post an apology. Other social media users who complained online about PPE or the response to COVID-19 pandemic in the country were reportedly visited by agents from the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) and warned “not to aggravate the situation.” In some cases, these users subsequently published public apologies that the SCNS insists were not forced.55

From July to December 2020, the government did not issue any content removal requests to Facebook,56 Google,57 or Twitter.58

Court orders are often used to block websites and remove content in Kyrgyzstan. The courts justify blocking sites, such as the Internet Archive and SoundCloud, under Article 315 of the criminal code, which prohibits extremist materials. These are expansively defined under the Law on Countering Extremist Activity as anything that stokes “ideological, political, racial, national, or religious hatred or enmity.”59 The Prosecutor General’s office can also issue blocking and content removal requests to courts. The reasons for blocks are indicated in the court materials, which are only shared with the parties involved, not the public. Thus, in most cases, civil society cannot ascertain why a website was blocked and if the decision was proportional. Furthermore, the appeals process for challenging blocking orders is only open to the owner of the web resource being blocked or their official representative.

In August 2021, after the coverage period, president Japarov signed the Law on Protection from False Information, which poses threats to free expression and user privacy.60 In August 2020, former President Jeenbekov vetoed the Law on Information Manipulation, the predecessor to the new law. In May 2021, parliament established a reconciliation group to develop a new draft, 61 which became the Law on Protection from False Information. Though parliament initially failed to pass the new bill in June 2021, it passed in a second vote in July 2021 after the president hosted a number of lawmakers at his residence.62 The law enables individual or companies to file a complaint about false or defamatory information, which websites or social media platforms must remove within 24 hours. If the content is not removed, the individual or company who filed the complaint can then request the suspension of the website or the social media account that posted the information.63 The Cabinet of Ministers is tasked with establishing a procedure for these complaints, which is not outlined in the law.64

To facilitate this mandate, the law would de-anonymize website administrators and social media account holders (see C4)65 and require that service providers retain provide user’s real names to the government’s “single registry system” (see C6).66

In January 2020, political party Uluu Kyrgyzstan and local NGO Kyrgyz El announced the collection of 25,000 signatures in support of a bill regulating online content to protect children from harmful information.67 The draft was formally registered in Parliament in May 2020 but did not advance during the coverage period.68 The bill would subject putatively harmful online content containing obscene language, denying “family values,” and more, to “state control and examination,” to ensure that it is safe for children to consume. A comparison by FackCheck.kg found that, in many places, the bill is identical to comparable legislation already in effect in Russia.69 An earlier version of the bill was introduced in February 2019 and drew criticism from Adilet, which warned it could be used to violate freedom of expression.70

The Ministry of Justice’s official site, which hosts the official list of banned extremist and terrorist materials,71 contains outdated information and does not offer a full picture of website blocking. Compounding this lack of transparency, only a few ISPs, such as Megaline, publish lists of blocked sites and display a descriptive page when these sites are reached.

While ISPs are not directly liable for the content on their networks, they can lose their licenses if they fail to carry out a court order to block content.

Self-censorship exists online to a certain degree, primarily as a result of government restrictions on inciting hatred. All posts on online forums are strictly moderated to limit hateful content, and online journalists, bloggers, and everyday users generally try to avoid issues concerning ethnic relations. Other laws may increase self-censorship, such as those governing defamation. Amendments to the code of violations penalizing the dissemination of false information amid the COVID-19 pandemic (see C2) and the increase in forced content removals (see B2) could have chilling effects and increase self-censorship.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because of the activity of troll networks linked to former customs official Raimbek Matraimov around the October 2020 elections.

Online platforms, such as forums and social networks, have been used to manipulate public opinion. Trolls hired by various actors influence online discussions by expressing favorable or unfavorable views on politicians and political issues. According to Oxford University researchers, political and private actors in Kyrgyzstan use fake Facebook accounts to promote narratives favorable to the accounts’ backers.72 Research by FactCheck.kg from July 2018 exposed a small-scale network of fake Facebook accounts supporting President Jeenbekov and another group supporting his rival, former president Atambayev.73

In October 2020, the non-profit news outlet openDemocracy revealed that they had stopped collaborating with investigative journalist Elnura Alkanova because of her links to Matraimov, which included her decision to run for parliament as part of Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, Matraimoiv’s party, and her role in running a troll network. The openDemocracy report demonstrated that she had led a network of trolls to create fake accounts; tarnish a joint investigation by Azattyk (an affiliate of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; RFE/RL), the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), and the investigative journalism site Kloop (see C3); and praise Matraimov. Previously, openDemocracy had nominated her for a $125,000 award, which she won.74

In the wake of the October 2020 election, the same network of Matramaiov-linked trolls, who had initially supported Sooronbay Jeenbekov’s candidacy for president and the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party, began promoting Sadyr Japarov’s candidacy for president.75 An additional investigation by Kloop revealed that the same team continued to support Matraimov and president Japarov,76 with monthly salaries for individuals ranging from $100 to $3,000, depending on the activities they performed.77

In December 2020, Facebook reportedly removed a number of Facebook and Instagram accounts, groups, and pages that engaged in political activities in violation of their policy on coordinated inauthentic behavior. In one case, Facebook linked a network, which focused primarily on the 2020 parliamentary election and the 2021 snap presidential election, to a company called Media Center.78

Various online media outlets, some of which are owned by politicians or powerful business interests, are also used as tools of political influence. The television channel “September,” affiliated with opposition leader Omurbek Tekebaev, came under pressure during Atambayev’s presidential term and ceased broadcasting in August 2017, becoming an online-only outlet.79 The television channel “April,” affiliated with Atambayev himself, came under pressure after Atambayev moved into the opposition. In August 2019, the government raided the offices of April—ostensibly in connection with a corruption probe into Atambayev—restricting journalists’ access to the studio and forcing them to broadcast exclusively over the internet.80

News outlets, including those that publish online, are sometimes given editorial guidance by their owners. According to the US State Department, in Kyrgyzstan, “some news outlets instructed their reporters not to report critically on certain politicians or government officials.”81 These instructions are at times the result of government pressure.

There are no regulations imposed by the government that negatively impact users’ or online media outlets’ ability to publish content online. Media outlets are not required to register with the government. However, according to the 2018 Media Sustainability Index by the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX), “government pressure skews the advertising market,” which was not especially large to begin with.82 A 2019 report from Central European University (CEU) noted that media outlets are seldom able to generate the appropriate cash flow to assure their independence. The CEU report singled out just four outlets that were financially vaible: Kloop.kg, financed mostly through grants and income generated from paid trainings for journalists; Kaktus.kg, with income from grants and advertisements; and 24.kg and Super.kg, both of which have an advertisement-based business model.83

Recent research has demonstrated that the internet, and in particular social media platforms and messaging applications, have become an important source of alternative information for users.84 The main participants in online communities tend to encompass the wealthier, urban segments of the population who can afford consistent internet access (see A2). However, in October 2020 president Sadyr Japarov, a former convicted kidnapper,85 used social media to appeal to the Kyrgyz-speaking rural audience and project an image of himself as a national patriot and savior of the nation.86 Massive troll farms (B5) also provide a biased perspective on social media (see B5).

Digital activism remains limited in Kyrgyzstan, despite the availability of online mobilization tools. The government does not place any restrictions on these tools or their use.

In April 2021, several hundred activists gathered in front of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bishkek. The crowd was protesting the police’s inability to apprehend the individuals who kidnapped Aizada Kanatbekov earlier in the month; she was found murdered by suffocation two days after the protest. Even though the kidnapping was recorded on Bishkek’s “Safe City” cameras and the police received several calls from the woman, law enforcement took no action, ostensibly because kidnapping for marriage—ala kachuu in Kyrgyz—was considered a national tradition. News of the murder spread across social media and led to a spontaneous rally the next day demanding that the police and Ministry of Internal Affairs be held accountable, that the practice of ala kachuu be prosecuted, and that authorities take steps to better protect women’s rights.87 Two days after the protests, the heads of the city and regional police department were fired and several police officers were punished.88

In November 2020, hundreds of people gathered at a rally in Bishkek to protest the proposed constitution, which they decried as a move towards authoritarianism.89 The rally was organized and led by the youth movement Bashtan Bashta, which continued the rallies under the slogan “For legitimacy!” every Sunday for several months leading up to a constitutional referendum (see C1).90

During the October 2020 protests over vote rigging in the parliamentary elections, the government restricted access to the internet (see A3).

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because measures in the new constitution threaten freedom of expression and further diminish the independence of the judiciary.

The constitutional reforms initiated by President Japarov posed new threats to freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary.

On April 10, 2021, voters approved the referendum for a new constitution, which concentrated power in the hands of the president. A joint opinion from the Venice Commission and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) highlighted issues with the process of drafting the constitution, including the limited opportunity for public consultation and the general “lack of respect for the principles of rule of law and legality.”91

The constitution, adopted in May 2021, includes vague definitions that could negatively impact freedom of speech. For example, Article 10 on mass media mentions that activities that contradict the “moral and ethical values and public consciousness of the people of the Kyrgyz Republic” may be restricted by law to protect the younger generation; this could lead to increased censorship of media outlets and individuals.92

Additionally, the law gives the president power to strip immunity of members of Parliament and appoint judges. The Venice Commission and OSCE’s report stresses that Article 70 of the constitution gives the president the authority to appoint judges “all the way down to the local level.”93 Corruption among judges, who are generally underpaid, is already widespread, hindering the fairness of decisions in freedom of expression cases and other litigation. In March 2018, a group of activists, lawyers, and human rights defenders began to compile a list of judges they believed to be corrupt or biased, working with people who claimed to have been victimized by biased rulings and judicial corruption.94

Article 32 of the constitution guarantees the right to freedom of thought, expression, speech, and the press.95 Article 29 protects privacy, including private communications shared by phone or electronic methods, and forbids the collection or dissemination of confidential information without the subject’s consent.96

The government’s initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic only exempted journalists working for state-run outlets from strict quarantine measures.97

There are several vaguely defined laws used to penalize legitimate online activities.

In January 2021, the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposed amendments to Criminal and Criminal Procedural Codes that would classify the incitement of “political enmity” as well as “national, ethnic, or racial enmity” as “extremist.” According to Human Rights Watch, the amendment could provide opportunities for the prosecution of government critics and substantially restrict rights for freedom of expression.98 The amendment passed the first reading in Parliament in April 2021, but after surge of criticism, it was excluded during the second reading in May.99

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parliament amended the code of violations in April 2020 to introduce fines for disseminating false information “aimed at violating the rule of law, or actions that violate public order and peace of individuals” during a state of emergency or when martial law has been declared.100

In October 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor general’s office must obtain the approval of the president before filing lawsuits in defense of their “honor and dignity.” The ruling further required that such defamation lawsuits must only seek nonpecuniary damages.101 The ruling followed a series of defamation lawsuits filed by the prosecutor general’s office in 2017 against media outlet Zanoza for libeling then-president Atambayev in articles that compared him to well-known authoritarian rulers and implied that he was corrupt.102 The suits resulted in a fine of 12 million soms ($141,500) against Zanoza and the court-ordered removal of the allegedly defamatory articles.103

In April 2018, following criticism from journalists, parliamentarian Dastan Bekeshev withdrew legislative amendments to the civil code first introduced in 2017, which would have mandated fines of 20,000 soms ($236) or more for online content deemed to discredit a citizen’s “honor,” “dignity,” or “business reputation.”104 In 2011, the parliament decriminalized libel, aligning the law with the 2010 constitution.105 Defamation is only a criminal offense in cases of insult against judges and other participants in legal proceedings or desecration of the state, state symbols, and state institutions.106

The criminal code, which entered force in January 2019, outlaws inciting ethnic, national, racial, religious, or interregional hostility (Article 313, previously Article 299-1) and provides for prison terms of five to ten years for violators.107 The code also punishes the possession of “extremist materials” with the intent to distribute (Article 315, previously Article 299-2) with up to five years in prison.108 Previously, possession of “extremist materials” was illegal regardless of intent. Critics have long argued that these provisions are vulnerable to abuse. In some cases, the government has sought to apply these antiextremism laws to restrict nonviolent political speech.

Several laws also impose disproportionate restrictions on freedom of expression. Notably, the Law on Countering Extremist Activities, last amended in 2016,109 criminalizes public expressions of approval of and justification for extremism or terrorism, raising concerns about possible restrictions on legitimate expression online. The law also defines the scope of extremist materials that Article 315 (previously, Article 299-2) of the criminal code prohibits.110

Under a 2014 amendment to the criminal code, those found guilty of disseminating “knowingly false messages about the commission of crimes” faced steep fines and prison sentences of up to three years.111 In the 2019 criminal code, the maximum sentence under this provision, Article 344, was increased to five years.112 Even though, according to case law, this provision does not apply to mass media, the SCNS has nevertheless used it to harass online media outlets (see C3).113

Users continued to face civil or criminal penalties for protected online expression during the coverage period.

In April 2021, doctoral candidate Gulzat Aalieva was detained for a Facebook post that allegedly incited “interreligious enmity.” Aalieva practices Tengrism, a Turko-Mongolic religion, and the authorities claimed she criticized Islam in her posts.114 On April 23, she was released under house arrest but was prohibited from using Facebook and leaving the city for two months.115

In February 2021, the Bishkek city court upheld a decision of the lower court to sentence Kamran Shenvari, an Afghan refugee who had lived in Kyrgyzstan for 15 years, to 5 years imprisonment for violating Article 313 of the criminal code in a Facebook comment, which allegedly incited national hatred. His lawyer and media experts have argued that the account—which posted in Russian, a language Shenvari does not write—does not belong to him, although it uses his name and picture.116 In May 2021, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence from imprisonment to a fine of 300,000 soms ($3,538).117

In March 2021, the public prosecutor withdrew charges against popular blogger Elmir Sydymanov, alias Sydman, who had been arrested in February 2020 for inciting national hatred under Article 313 of the criminal code. In a video on his Instagram page, he had stated that he disliked people from the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, which he called underdeveloped. Experts from the Media Policy Institute did not consider his words to rise to the level of inciting national hatred,118 but he was nevertheless detained for ten days before being released under house arrest.119 State prosecutors were seeking a six-year prison term in his case. The prosecutor withdrew the video due a lack of corpus delicti, after experts stated the video did not actually constitute “inciting national hatred.”120

In February 2021, SCNS officers searched the house of the blogger Yuliya Barabina and two staffers working for Abdil Segizbayev, a presidential candidate. Barabina had criticized the political establishment on her Facebook page, pravdorub.kg. The SCNS seized personal belongings, digital media, and money, and then interrogated Barabina and the two staff members. The court ordered the search based on complaints about posts and comments published on her page that had allegedly incited national and religious hatred and violence. Following this incident, Barabina fled the country.121

In August 2020, the Kyrgyz authorities extradited Uzbek blogger Bobomurod Abdullayev, who has regularly criticized the Uzbek government to Uzbekistan, even though activists warned he could be tortured.122 After arriving in Uzbekistan, Abdullayev was eventually released at the end of the month.123 During his detention in Kyrgyzstan, Abdullayev alleged he was tortured by the authorities (see C7).124

In July 2020, law enforcement officials detained several people who criticized former president Jeenbekov online and attempted to force them to delete their comments (see B2). First, the SCNS questioned comedian Nazgul Alymkulova after she posted a video with the president’s head superimposed on a famous rapper’s body. 125 Police also detained Argen Baktybek, the administrator of the Facebook group “Memestan,” because they claimed he facilitated “the dissemination of information that demeans the authorities.”126 The SCNS later questioned Eldiyar Zholdosev after he published a video criticizing former president Jeenbekov’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.127

In April and March 2020, the SCNS detained dozens around the country for knowingly spreading false information online about COVID-19.128 In some cases, users were arrested under Article 334 of the criminal code, although local civil society organizations raised doubts about the legal applicability of this provision to COVID-19-related mis- and disinformation.129 However, the NGO Adilet observed that, “as a rule, citizens are warned of criminal liability for disseminating false information” without authorities specifying which article of the criminal code they had violated.130

In March 2020, the SCNS opened a case under Article 344 of the criminal code against internet news agency The Asia Times, which published information about two people who had died of COVID-19—information the SCSNS asserted was untrue.131 In 2015, the Supreme Court had ruled that Article 344 did not apply to mass media.132 How the SNCS can pursue legal action was unclear.

In December 2019, former customs official Raimbek Matraimov (see B5) filed a defamation suit against media outlets 24.kg, Kloop, and Radio Azattyk, as well as Radio Azattyk reporter Ali Toktakunov. Kloop, the OCCRP, and Radio Azattyk had published an investigation alleging that Matraimov was involved in laundering $700 million, which 24.kg republished. Matriamov sought 15 million soms ($176,900) in damages from 24.kg, 12.5 million soms ($147,400) from Kloop, 22 million soms ($259,400) from Radio Azattyk, and 10 million soms ($117,900) from Toktakunov. The defendants’ bank accounts were frozen when he lodged his suit.133 Under pressure from civil society, Matraimovs’ lawyers later asked the court to unfreeze the defendants’ bank accounts while leaving the original suit intact.134 The punitive damages sought by the proceedings attracted controversy on their own, leading the OSCE representative on freedom of the media135 and the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee136 to publicly express concern. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused both the OSCE and the US of meddling in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic sphere.137 In January 2020, 24.kg published an article stating that it could not prove that Matraimov was linked to the alleged money laundering scheme, after which Matraimovs’ lawyers dropped the suit against the outlet.138

New measures that came into effect after the coverage period place restrictions on anonymity. The Law On Protection from False Information, which the president signed in August 2021 (see B3), requires all website owners and social media account holders to publicly identify themselves by their names and email addresses. Public Wi-Fi hotspots are also required to record users’ names.139

In 2014, the government issued a new regulation requiring service providers to sell new SIM cards only after they have been registered, making it more difficult for individuals to use mobile devices anonymously. Previously, SIM cards had to be registered within a year of purchase.140

In June 2018, the SCITC submitted a bill that would register the serial numbers of mobile devices used in public discussion.141 The bill did not advance.

State surveillance of internet activities often infringes on users’ right to privacy. The state’s surveillance apparatus is modeled after Russia’s System for Operational Investigative Activities (SORM). Every ISP and mobile service provider is obliged to install SORM-compliant equipment on their ICT infrastructure to allow the authorities unfettered access to internet traffic and subscribers’ information (see C6). If a provider does not comply, its license can be cancelled.

These requirements could enable mass surveillance without judicial oversight, and there has been evidence of abuse since they were implemented. For example, in 2016, telephone conversations between leaders of the opposition group the People’s Parliament were leaked online—conversations in which they were apparently plotting a coup; the individuals involved were subsequently arrested.142 Also in 2016, telephone conversations between other opposition figures discussing potential political upheaval were leaked. Those involved were accused of attempting to forcibly seize power.143

In September 2021, after the coverage period, the Ministry of Interior admitted to wiretapping a number of individuals in January and February 2021, allegedly for their roles in the October 2020 protests. However, the list of individuals also includes people who were not involved in the protests.144

In April 2020, authorities launched a contact-tracing app for people who tested positive for the coronavirus, though the app was removed from mobile stores after President Jeenbekov resigned in October 2020. The app, called STOP COVID-19 KG, was not mandatory for individuals to download, but Eurasianet reported that “many are being pressured into loading it on their phones.”145 In April 2020, a video appeared on YouTube showing an unidentified person accessing personal data collected by the app, raising serious privacy concerns.146 In August 2020, the government mandated that individuals traveling in cars or by land install the app on mobile phones.147

In early 2019, the SCITC began its “Safe City” project by installing video cameras on roads in Bishkek.148 The tender for this first phase was won by the Russian company Vega, which also supplies equipment to the Russian military and intelligence services. A Chinese company has also reportedly supplied facial recognition technology that can be utilized together with the existing video cameras.149 The data from Safe City cameras is not safe and secure. In December 2019, photos from these cameras that might have shown the former head of State Registry Service and his deputy spread across the internet.150 Two operators of the “Safe City” information system were fired.

In August 2020, the second phase of the “Safe City” project, implemented by Chinese company Shenzhen Sunwin Intelligent Co. Ltd, began, with the goal of setting up an additional 306 cameras in the capital and more rural regions.151 However, the contract expired in June 2021 and implementation at the time was far from complete. Additionally, several criminal cases related to the contract with Shenshen Sunwin, including the arrest of the former minister of digital development, were ongoing at the end of the coverage period (see A4 and A5).152

The parliament passed a personal data law in 2008 that provided for the establishment of an authority for personal data protection. In practice, however, the law has not been effectively implemented; the personal data protection authority has not yet been established. In 2017, new amendments to the 2008 law were passed to more effectively protect personal data.153

By law, service providers are required to aid the government in monitoring users’ communications. In 2014, the government adopted a resolution requiring ISPs and mobile service providers to make their infrastructure compliant with the latest iteration of SORM (see C5).154 The resolution further requires providers to store subscribers’ metadata for up to three years and to allow authorities direct, real-time access to their communications networks without notification and oversight, even from prosecutors. In addition, ISPs must purchase and update equipment at their own expense to ensure compliance with SORM.

The much-criticized August 2021 Law on the Protection from False Information (see B3) would mandate that all ISPs and mobile service providers submit users’ real names to the government’s “single registry system.”155

ICT users, including online journalists, faced physical and digital attacks in the run-up to the October 2020 parliamentary election.

In October 2020, coverage of the parliamentary elections and subsequent protests led to an increase of attacks against journalists. In Osh, an unknown assailant attacked Khamidullo Uzakov, a video journalist who worked for the online media outlet Kloop, attempting to steal Uzakov’s camera and temporarily taking his mobile phone. In Talas, an unknown woman demanded that a Radio Azattyk journalist stop filming at a polling station and punched the camera. In both cases, the police did not intervene when the attacks occurred.156

During the clashes that followed the election, including the storming of the parliament on October 5 and 6, Internews recorded 20 attacks against journalists.157 In one case, security forces in Bishkek shot at Aibol Kozhomuratov, a correspondent with RFE/RL affiliate Current Time.158 In another case, Ruslan Kharizov, a reporter with news site 24.kg, had his phone taken by a police officer, who deleted the most recent recording on the device. A group of protestors also blocked Kharizov, Kloop crews, and other media personnel from entering the Dostuk hotel, where Parliament was convening an emergency session. Kloop’s team was also attacked while recording protests in front of the government house in Bishkek. Later, Eldos Kazybekov, an online journalist from broadcaster Vesti.kg, dodged a stone thrown at him by a police officer, who threw the object upon finding out that Kazybekov was a journalist.159

During the protests, news outlets also were targeted with harassment and intimidation. Kaktus.media, 24.kg, Radio Azattyk, and the Russian government-funded Sputnik Kyrgyzstan all reported receiving threats online and subsequently increased security around their offices. Additionally, protestors raided the office of Sputnik and demanded that they cover a rally in support of president Japarov.160

In August 2020, Bobomurod Abdullayev alleged the SCNS tortured him before extraditing him to Uzbekistan (see C3).161

In January 2020, Bolot Temirov, the editor-in-chief of FactCheck.kg, was attacked near his office and was violently beaten by three assailants, who took away Temirov’s phone. The assault happened just after Temirov had published a story about the lavish lifestyle of the Matraimov family (see C3).162 Five days later, police arrested four suspects.163 The investigation into Raimbek Matraimov overall generated a wave of pressure in Kyrgyzstan; 12 journalists who reported on the investigation (not all of whom live in Kyrgyzstan) faced some form of targeted harassment, including defamatory social media posts and threatening phone calls. Several RFE/RL editors were warned “that their close relatives in Kyrgyzstan should change their addresses.”164

Online hate speech toward feminists as well as LGBT+ people in Kyrgyzstan is commonplace.165

During the coverage period, the practice of politically motivated cyberattacks continued.

Ahead of the October parliamentary elections, journalists and activists also had their social media accounts hacked. In one case, an unknown attacker changed journalist Makhinur Niyazova’s Twitter password and deleted some of her posts, though she was eventually able to recover the account.166 Activists also complained of attempts of unauthorized access to their Facebook accounts.167

In September 2020, before the parliamentary elections, the Instagram page OMKS_Kg ("One Million Kyrgyz Stories”) was hacked after the page published a video critical of Matraimov and the Mekenim Kyrgyzstan party. One of the founders of OKMS noted that only one page had been hacked successfully, though there was an attempt to hack his Telegram account.168

In July 2020, journalist Raushan Aitkulova had her Facebook account hacked after she sent a letter to the prosecutor general’s office demanding the prosecution of former president Jeenbekov’s cabinet for their mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic. In the same month, activists Urmat Dzhanybaev, Nazul Tyumenbaeva, and Syimyk Zhapykeyev also experienced hacking attempts and had content mysteriously removed from their social media accounts.169

In July 2020, the Facebook group “Black list,” which provided its more than 90,000 followers opportunities to share problems in their cities and issues with the quality of government-provided services, was hacked after it’s administrator died.170

In December 2019, after the publication of the investigation into the alleged criminal activities of Matriamov and his family, almost all popular independent news media that had reported on the investigation were disabled by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. The incident affected Economist.kg, Kaktus.media, Kloop, Knews.kg FactCheck.kg, Politklinika Sokol.media, Today.kg, and VB.kg. Additionally, MediaLaw.kg, a website affiliated with FactCheck.kg, was hacked by actors traced to China.171 The authorities declined to investigate this incident.172

In November and December 2019, a wave of Telegram hacks affected some NGOs and human rights defenders. The hackers attempted to break into Telegram accounts by intercepting two-factor authentication codes.173