Query response on Mali: Information on ethnic and intercommunal conflict and the situation of civilians (Gao, Kayes and Bamako and countrywide) [a-11659-1]

30 July 2021

This response was modified for publication on ecoi.net.

This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to ACCORD within time constraints and in accordance with ACCORD’s methodological standards and the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI).

This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection.

Please read in full all documents referred to.

Non-English language information is summarised in English. Original language quotations are provided for reference.

[passage removed]

Ethnic conflict and discrimination in Mali

Regarding ethnic conflict in Mali the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI), a research center in humanitarian crisis and leadership at Harvard University, in June 2019 provides the following overview:

“In general, the ethnic and cultural dimensions of Malian society are key to understanding the persistent conflict. Indeed, Mali is ethnically eclectic. While figures remain uncertain, it is estimated from reports that the Tuareg account for approximately only 1% of the population. The largest ethnic groups in Mali are the Bambara (approximately one third of the population), the Fulani or Peul (approximately 14%) the Sarakole [or Soninké, remark ACCORD] (approximately 10%) and the Senuto (also approximately 10%). Interviewees[1] discussed a deterioration in terms of how culture in its diverse forms in Mali is appreciated, cultivated, or preserved. In particular, there is a lack of preservation of language, cultural rites, or ways of life, all of which have damaged the social fabric of the country. The tensions between, on the one hand, agro-pastoral, traditionally nomadic communities (such as the Tuaregs), and on the other hand, agriculturally stationary groups, has been exacerbated by the GoM’s [Government of Mali] policies, which have entailed reforms that give priority to agriculture without respecting nomadic traditions. This preferential treatment to those who have established themselves in ‘static’ agricultural communities, and the resulting conflicts, have yet to be sufficiently addressed.” (HHI, June 2019, p. 9)

In its country report on human rights practices covering 2020 the US Department of State (USDOS) notes the following regarding discrimination against Tuareg and the situation of men and boys of Songhai ethnicity:

Societal discrimination continued against black Tuaregs, often referred to as Bellah. Some Tuareg groups deprived black Tuaregs of basic civil liberties due to hereditary slavery-like practices and hereditary servitude relationships. There were continued reports of slave masters kidnapping the children of their Bellah slaves. Slaveholders considered slaves and their children as property and reportedly took slave children to raise them elsewhere without permission from their parents.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 6)

The salt mines of Taoudeni in the North subjected men and boys, primarily of Songhai ethnicity, to a longstanding practice of debt bondage. Employers subjected many black Tuaregs to forced labor and hereditary slavery, particularly in the eastern and northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal (see section 6).“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 7c)

Regarding intercommunal and ethnic violence, the report further notes:

Intercommunal violence led to frequent clashes between members of the Fulani or Peuhl ethnic groups and, separately, members of the Bambara and Dogon communities for their alleged support of armed Islamists linked to al-Qa’ida. According to Human Rights Watch, this tension has given rise to ethnic ‚self-defense groups‘ and driven thousands from their homes, diminished livelihoods, and induced widespread hunger. Such groups representing these communities were reportedly involved in several communal attacks, and retaliatory attacks were common. In the center, violence across community lines escalated. Clashes between the Dogon and Fulani communities were exacerbated by the presence of extremist groups and resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths (see section 1.g, Killings). In another example, over the course of several hours on July 1, unidentified gunmen attacked the Dogon villages of Panga Dougou, Djimdo, Gouari, and Dialakanda, in the circle of Bankass, Mopti region, killing at least 32 civilians and wounding several others, and burning and looting several houses.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 6)

Intercommunal violence and ethnic conflict in the central part of the country continued to cause insecurity and displacement concerns.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1e)

Several international and human rights organizations expressed concern regarding increased intercommunal violence in Mopti Region, mainly between pastoralist Fulani and agriculturalist Dogon ethnic groups.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1g)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) also mentions incidents of communal violence in its annual report covering 2020:

During 2020, at least 400 villagers were killed in numerous incidents of communal violence, mostly in the Mopti region. The violence pitted ethnic Dogon self-defense groups against those of Peuhl, or Fulani, who sometimes had the support of armed Islamist groups. Most of those killed in 2020 were ethnic Dogon. The attacks targeted people in their villages, farms, or markets, and provoked widespread displacement and a hunger crisis.“ (HRW, 13 January 2021)

Concerning the conduct of security forces, the USDOS notes the following:

Most human rights abuses committed by the military appeared to target Fulani, Tuareg, and Arab individuals and were believed to be either in reprisal for attacks attributed to armed groups associated with those ethnicities or as a result of increased counterterrorism operations.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1g)

Ethnic Fulani in the central Mopti and Segou Regions reported abuses by government security forces.“ (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1g)

Please also see the reports by the UN Secretary-General on developments regarding the situation of civilians since September 2020 (UN Security Council, 28 December 2020, pp. 9-10; UN Security Council, 26 March 2021, p. 9; UN Security Council, 1 June 2021, p. 10):

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1281], 28 December 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2048839/S_2020_1281_E.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/299], 26 March 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2048837/S_2021_299_E.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/519], 1 June 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2053490/S_2021_519_E.pdf

 

The conflict tracker available on the website of the International Crisis Group provides further information on the conflict situation in Mali:

·      ICG - International Crisis Group: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Filter: Mali, last six months, undated
https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=26&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2021&to_month=01&to_year=2021

An overview of the conflict in the northern and central parts of the country is found on pages 9 and 10 of the following document:

·      Mills, A. & Islamic Relief Worldwide: Context and Protection Analysis of Central and Northern Mali: Circles of Douentza, Mopti Region and Gourma Rharous, Timbuktu Region, July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ContextAndProtectionAnalysis.pdf

Further background information on Mali can be found in an older report by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) published December 2018:

·      EASO – European Asylum Support Office: Mali Country Focus, December 2018
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1453990/1226_1544600633_easo-coi-report-mali-country-focus-2018.pdf

Situation in Gao region

In its June 2021 report the UN Secretary-General notes the following regarding the situation of civilians in Gao region between 26 March and 1 June 2021:

In Gao Region, civilians also continued to live under the constant threat of violent extremist groups, who are becoming more aggressive about imposing their religious norms, including in the form of targeted kidnappings and killings. The number of internally displaced persons increased in the southern Ansongo Cercle, mostly in Labézanga and Tessit, the risk is that the burden on host communities could stir intercommunity tensions. The ongoing deployment of formed police units from Gao to Ansongo remains of paramount importance to establishing a protective environment. Gold-mining sites in the Gourma area continued to fuel criminal activities, including illegal taxation by armed and violent extremist groups.“ (UN Security Council, 1 June 2021, p. 10)

Regarding the situation in Ménaka region (Ménaka region was formerly part of Gao region, legislation passed in March 2012 stipulated the partition into a separate region, however, the law has not been fully implemented, remark ACCORD) the report further notes:

“While the security situation in Ménaka town remained relatively calm, the remaining cercles are experiencing a precarious security situation that makes civilians more vulnerable. Recurrent clashes between Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara were observed in Anderamboukane Cercle, but also between violent extremist groups and members of the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Daoussak (MSA-D). These resulted in large movements of internally displaced persons from those areas to Ménaka town.” (UN Security Council, 1 June 2021, p. 10)

“It was reported that on 27 April, armed forces of the Niger summarily executed at least 19 civilian men and injured 1, and were responsible for the enforced disappearance of another man during a cross-border military operation in Bana village, Ménaka Region. An investigation was launched by the authorities of the Niger.” (UN Security Council, 1 June 2021, pp. 11-12)

For the period between 28 December 2020 and 26 March 2021 the UN Secretary General reports the following:

In Gao Region, MINUSMA continued to observe, on a daily basis, multiple robberies along the main road, money extortion and terrorist activity. Since 20 December 2020, the deployment of formed police units to Ansongo town and a related change in posture facilitated increased patrolling along parts of the main road, which helped to put a stop to some of the banditry occurring there. Internally displaced persons continued to arrive in Ansongo and Gao towns, mostly after fleeing areas around Djebok and other zones in Ansongo Cercle, due to threats by terrorist armed groups.

In Ménaka Region, a reduction in the number of attacks against civilians was recorded despite the growing tensions noted since the killing of a leader of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in the region by international forces in November. In addition, in Anderamboukane cercle, several population movements resulting from the increased presence of armed terrorist groups, the regular clashes between Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and the operations of international forces at the border with the Niger, have increased the number of refugees and internally displaced persons already present in Ménaka town.“ (UN Security Council, 26 March 2021, p. 9)

Covering the period between September and December 2020 the UN Secretary General reports the following:

“The reporting period was marked by a reduction in the number of attacks against civilians, due to decreased mobility during the rainy season, the increase in MINUSMA operational tempo, and a series of local mediation efforts supported by the Mission. However, attacks along community lines persisted in central Mali, and civilians continue to be affected by clashes between terrorist armed groups and the impact of counter-terrorism operations. […]

In Gao region, MINUSMA recorded only a slight decrease in violence against civilians, despite the efforts of the Malian defence forces to return to their positions in Labézanga, with MINUSMA support. Criminality and incidents of violent intimidation persisted along the Ansongo-Labézanga and the Ansongo-Ménaka routes, highlighting the need for an improved security presence. Abductions of girls and women by presumed radical armed elements were recorded, and violence against civilians continued in the I-n-Tillit commune, in particular against gold miners involved in illegal mining.” (UN Security Council, 28 December 2020, pp. 9-10)

Situation in the regions of Bamako and Kayes

Below you find information on human rights violations and abuses documented by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Bamako and Kayes. Please see the cited reports for more details.

Covering the period between September and December 2020 the UN Secretary General mentions six documented human rights violations and abuses in Kayes. (UN Security Council, 28 December 2020, p. 10). Between December 2020 and March 2021, the UN Secretary General mentions ten cases of human rights violations or human rights abuses in Kayes and 58 cases in Bamako (UN Security Council, 26 March 2021, p. 9). Finally, between March and June 2021 the UN Secretary General reports on 16 human rights violations and abuses in Kayes and 70 in Bamako. (UN Security Council, 1 June 2021, p. 11)

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References: (all links accessed 30 July 2021)

·      EASO – European Asylum Support Office: Mali Country Focus, December 2018
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1453990/1226_1544600633_easo-coi-report-mali-country-focus-2018.pdf

·      HHI - Harvard Humanitarian Initiative: Realities and Myths of the “Triple Nexus”: Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali, June 2019
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SSRN-id3404351_0.pdf

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: World Report 2021 - Mali, 13 January 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2043671.html

·      ICG - International Crisis Group: Tracking Conflict Worldwide, Filter: Mali, last six months, undated
https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=26&date_range=last_6_months&from_month=01&from_year=2021&to_month=01&to_year=2021

·      Mills, A. & Islamic Relief Worldwide: Context and Protection Analysis of Central and Northern Mali: Circles of Douentza, Mopti Region and Gourma Rharous, Timbuktu Region, July 2020
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ContextAndProtectionAnalysis.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1281], 28 December 2020
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2048839/S_2020_1281_E.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/299], 26 March 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2048837/S_2021_299_E.pdf

·      UN Security Council: Situation in Mali; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/519], 1 June 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2053490/S_2021_519_E.pdf

·      USDOS – US Department of State: 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali, 30 March 2021
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2048168.html

 [1] “The paper is based on a desk analysis of relevant literature, as well as over 130 interviews and consultations undertaken with a variety of stakeholders, including government and non-state armed group representatives, civil society members, activists, journalists, humanitarians, analysts, diplomats, entrepreneurs, beneficiaries, displaced people, and students.” (HHI, June 2019, p. xxiii)