• In 2020, PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński, who de facto has governed Poland since 2015, formally entered the government in September, overseeing the defense, justice, and interior ministries.3 The governing alliance Zjednoczona Prawica (United Right, ZP)—a coalition of political parties composed of the right-wing Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, PiS), extreme right-wing Solidarna Polska (United Poland, SP), and the moderate right-wing Porozumienie (Agreement)—was challenged by the COVID-19 crisis and internal divisions, yet it maintained a strong grip on power throughout the year.
• In July, the incumbent Andrzej Duda (formally independent, PiS-aligned) narrowly won the presidential election over liberal challenger Rafał Trzaskowski of Koalicja Obywatelska (Civic Coalition, KO) after a polarizing campaign aimed at increasing turnout.4 Two months of intense coalition talks followed Duda’s victory. SP, the party of Justice Minister and Prosecutor General Zbigniew Ziobro, pushed an extreme right-wing agenda and did not back Kaczyński’s pet project, the animal welfare bill, which almost led to the coalition’s collapse.5 The vote on the bill highlighted divisions within the government ranks.6
• Changes implemented in previous years that had weakened Poland’s system of checks and balances remained in place. Throughout the year, President Duda continued signing bills crucial for PiS,7 and swearing in candidates supported by the new PiS-appointed National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) as judges of the Supreme Court, common courts, and administrative courts. He did so in spite of a January resolution by three chambers of the Supreme Court that said judges appointed on recommendations by the politically controlled NCJ should not adjudicate.8
• On October 22, a ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) further restricted the country’s already strict abortion laws, which ignited weeks of mass protests nationwide on a scale unprecedented in Poland since 1989.9 The CT ruling was perceived as directed by Kaczyński in order to prove PiS’s right-wing credentials and crush potential competition from its coalition partner SP as well as the opposition extreme right-wing Konfederacja (Confederation).10 The government withheld publishing the judgment to delay its coming into force.11
• Similar to previous years, the governing coalition targeted vulnerable groups to score political points.12 During the protests, Kaczyński addressed the nation, condemning the demonstrators for committing “a serious crime” and urging nationalist groups to “defend” churches,13 as public opinion divided over some protesters peacefully entering Catholic churches with posters and slogans.
• For most of the year, PiS centralized government power while continuing to limit political space for the opposition. However, the opposition-controlled Senate slowed down the legislative process on key bills, notably, an amendment introducing all-mail voting for the presidential election initially planned for May.14
• Parliament failed to appoint a new Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR) during the year. The five-year term of Adam Bodnar expired on September 9; however, he continued to fulfill the function until the end of the year. The new CHR must be approved by the Sejm (PiS-controlled) and the Senate. PiS did not propose a candidate, and an independent candidate, Zuzanna Rudzińska-Bluszcz, supported by several hundred civil society organizations, was repeatedly rejected by the governing majority.15 In September, a group of PiS MPs petitioned the CT to verify whether a provision allowing the CHR to continue their work until a new CHR may be appointed is constitutional.16
• Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and restrictions for operating businesses in 2020, Poland entered an economic recession for the first time since 1989.17 At the end of the year, the governing majority was weakened by nationwide protests and a dramatic surge in coronavirus cases and related deaths (a disproportionately high number compared to the same period in past years).18
• Cumulatively, these factors contributed to a significant weakening in PiS’s public opinion polling over several weeks.19 This multidimensional backlash against the government provided opportunities for the opposition. One presidential hopeful, former TV host and author Szymon Hołownia’s center-right Polska 2050 party, registered in 2020, became the second opposition force after the center-right KO.20 The opposition Konfederacja flanks PiS on the extreme right.

• The 2020 presidential elections took place on a significantly tilted playing field that provided the incumbent with undue advantage. The elections were marred by unequal access to campaigning and public-broadcaster bias. On July 12, 2020, the incumbent, President Andrzej Duda (formally independent, PiS-supported), was reelected by a small margin over liberal challenger Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) after a polarizing campaign.21
• Initially, the presidential vote was planned for May 10.22 The governing PiS pushed for all-mail voting after officials ordered a COVID-19 lockdown.23 Importantly, the government refused to declare a state of natural disaster that would have allowed for sweeping restrictions—according to the constitution, no election may take place until 90 days after such an emergency state is revoked.24 In the spring, Duda had a wide lead in the polls.25 At that time, the government was managing the COVID-19 crisis relatively well.26
• In April, the Sejm (lower house of Parliament) passed an amendment introducing all-mail voting.27 Before the amendment’s approval in the Senate (upper house of Parliament), Deputy PM Jacek Sasin ordered the printing of ballots, even though this move lacked a legal basis at the time.28 Indeed, in May, the opposition-controlled Senate rejected the amendment.29 Subsequently, Sasin and Minister of Science and Higher Education Jarosław Gowin, leader of PiS’s coalition partner Agreement, persuaded PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński to postpone the vote until June 28.30 This critical decision was made outside the legal system, an informal political compromise reached by two leaders of the ruling coalition. The election, therefore, legally went ahead on May 10 as called, but no voting took place on that day.31
• The main opposition party, the center-right KO, used this opportunity to replace its candidate; Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska, who had called for a boycott of the all-mail vote and was polling low, bowed out.32 The liberal mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski (KO), entered the race in her place and ran an energetic campaign.33 In total, 11 candidates stood for the presidential election. Other noteworthy contenders included Robert Biedroń (Left), center-right Szymon Hołownia (Polska 2050), right-wing Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, Polish People’s Party, PSL; Kukiz’15), and extreme right-wing candidate Krzysztof Bosak (Konfederacja).
• Some COVID-19 restrictions were eased on May 29, including freedom of assembly, thereby enabling the candidates to campaign. Duda and leading PiS politicians34 used polarizing, incendiary, homophobic rhetoric in the campaign.35 The incumbent relied heavily on public-broadcaster support36 and criticized foreign media for their reporting.37 The OSCE/ODIHR electoral monitoring report highlighted that “candidates were able to campaign freely in a competitive run-off, but hostility, threats against the media, intolerant rhetoric and cases of misuse of state resources detracted from the process. The polarized media environment, and particularly the biased coverage by the public broadcaster, remained a serious concern.”38
• A hybrid model of mail-in and in-person voting was introduced for the postponed election,39 which eventually took place on June 28, 2020, with a high turnout at 64.51 percent.40 After the first round, Duda (43.50 percent) and Trzaskowski (30.46 percent) advanced to a runoff. Hołownia received 13.87 percent; Bosak, 6.78 percent; Kosiniak-Kamysz, 2.36 percent; and Biedroń, 2.22 percent.41
• No televised debate between the contenders took place before the runoff, but both candidates held televised “debates” with their own voters, which was a manifestation of the growing divide and crisis in the public sphere.42 The public broadcaster TVP favored Duda and provided highly biased coverage, especially in the campaign before the runoff, when Duda and Trzaskowski were close in the polls. However, private TV channels were more supportive of the opposition candidate.43
• In addition to polarizing language, diverse incentives were used to increase turnout. PM Morawiecki encouraged the elderly to vote, declaring victory over COVID-19.44 A day ahead of the runoff, the Government Security Center, which typically warns citizens about weather emergencies, sent a text message to all cellphones in Poland reminding that the elderly, pregnant persons, and persons with disabilities may skip the queue at voting stations.45 According to an Ipsos poll, Duda was favored among those over 50.46
• The constitution states that presidential elections must be universal, equal, direct, and held by secret ballot. Yet significant concerns arose about the electoral process’s conformity with the equality and universality requirements. All candidates did not have an equal opportunity to present their candidacy to voters due to the COVID-19 restrictions, while the incumbent Duda met with voters in his capacity as president. Some Poles abroad were denied their right to vote due to various COVID-19 restrictions in the locale where they wanted to cast their vote.47
• In the presidential runoff on July 12, 2020, Duda won 51.03 percent (10,440,648 votes) to Trzaskowski’s 48.97 percent (10,018,263 votes).48 The turnout at 68.18 percent was the second highest after Poland’s transition to democracy in 1989.

• Several mass demonstrations occurred in 2020, despite COVID-19 restrictions on freedom of assembly. The protests drew diverse groups who channeled their various grievances against the government, including over the dismantling of rule of law standards, the economic downturn, the handling of the pandemic, and the scapegoating of LGBT+ people.49
• The year was marked by intense anti-LGBT+ rhetoric, especially during the presidential campaign. According to OSCE/ODIHR, “The incumbent’s campaign and coverage by the public broadcaster were marked by homophobic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric.”50 In June, President Duda stated that “LGBT ideology” is worse than communism.51 PiS MP Przemysław Czarnek, who later became Science and Higher Education Minister, suggested on TVP that LGBT+ people are “not equal to normal people.”52
• In August, Polish society was polarized over the arrest of Margot, a queer activist who faced criminal charges for attacking a driver and van emblazoned with slogans defamatory of LGBT+ people;53 48 people were detained during a spontaneous protest against her arrest and, more broadly, the ongoing smear campaign against non-heterosexual people.54 The detentions raised concerns of international human rights monitoring bodies55 and the international community.56 The activist was released on court order after three weeks of arrest, and her case was pending at year’s end.57
• In 2020, Polish courts overruled discriminatory local-government orders such as the “Regional Charters of Family Rights” and “Anti-LGBT ideology” resolutions.58 Since 2019, on roughly a third of Poland’s territory, local authorities have endorsed some form of such declaratory, non-legally binding, but symbolically important acts.59 In July, the European Commission (EC) refused to grant funding to some local governments that introduced such resolutions.60 In August, the Ministry of Justice compensated them with grants.61
• In July, Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro submitted a motion to withdraw Poland from The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (aka, the Istanbul Convention). 62Later that month, PM Morawiecki filed a motion to the CT to examine the compatibility of the convention, ratified in 2015, with the Polish constitution.63
• In August, Ziobro called for banning “LGBT ideology” from schools and universities.64 In October, Science and Higher Education Minister Czarnek warned that universities may not receive state research funding as a result of enabling students to participate in protests over the CT’s controversial abortion law ruling.65 The minister and many members of the ruling party argued that freedom of speech is apparently restricted at Polish universities for scholars with a radically conservative outlook. Subsequently, he proposed controversial legislation aimed at “protecting free speech at universities.”66
• Despite COVID-19 restrictions to freedom of assembly, various social groups, including entrepreneurs67 and farmers,68 protested government policies during the year. After the CT’s ruling of October 22 that further tightened Poland’s abortion law, two weeks of protests ensued nationwide.69 On October 29, according to the police, 400,000 people participated in antigovernment protests in 410 locations.70 The next day, 100,000 marched in Warsaw, the biggest single antigovernment protest since 1989.71
• No substantial legal changes were introduced in 2020 regarding nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The government announced plans for a law obliging NGOs to report foreign financing, but no draft act was presented for review by year’s end.72

• In May, the state-owned radio broadcaster Channel Three annulled the results of its song chart after a track that criticized PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński reached number one. The broadcaster’s director accused the speaker hosting the chart of vote tampering, and in response multiple journalists offered their resignations.73
• During the presidential campaign, Andrzej Duda accused the daily Fakt, owned by the Swiss-German media conglomerate Ringier Axel Springer, of participating in a “German attack during the election.”74 His words came after Fakt published an article criticizing Duda’s decision to pardon a pedophile. The president also alluded that “Germans want to pick the next Polish president.”75 Kaczyński alleged that Duda’s victory was achieved “despite an extremely tough campaign, one in which all the rules were often broken. The assault on us was coordinated by a powerful media front, also inspired from the outside.”76 In the months following the elections, several journalists, including from Gazeta Wyborcza and Fakt, had their press passes revoked by Duda’s administration.77
• Following Duda’s reelection, the ruling camp repeatedly announced that it was preparing a new package of media legislation that would be aimed at “deconcentrating” and “repolonizing” the media sector.78 In line with these plans, on December 7, the state-owned gasoline retailer PKN Orlen announced a takeover of Polska Press from the German Verlagsgruppe Passau. Polska Press owns 20 of the 24 largest Polish regional newspapers as well as more than 150 local weeklies, and it reaches more than 17 million users online.79 In November, PKN Orlen also purchased Ruch, Poland’s second largest press distributor and second largest newsstand chain.80
• The ruling camp also uses its economic power to influence the media sector through selective funding. In January, online media outlet OKO.press revealed that the largest online news portal in Poland, WP.pl, was receiving funding from the Ministry of Justice in return for positive coverage. The website’s editor-in-chief was demoted as a result of the scandal.81 The funding came from the ministry’s Justice Fund, which was created to support crime victims but has also sponsored homophobic articles in the progovernment weekly Do Rzeczy.82
• Most media outlets suffered during the COVID-19 crisis due to cuts in advertising, which amounted to 30–40 percent of advertising revenue. Conversely, state-owned companies increased their public relations budgets in the early months of the pandemic—in the case of PKN Orlen, by as much as 100 percent—to bolster the financing of progovernment newspapers and magazines.83
• The ruling camp resorted to litigation to silence criticism of the government. In 2020, Gazeta Wyborcza was battling 55 strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) brought by the government, PiS MPs, state-owned companies, and institutions connected to the ruling majority. The newspaper was granted financial support from the EU’s Media Freedom Rapid Response mechanism.84
• There were multiple physical assaults on media professionals during the year. In June and August, two journalists were harmed during progovernment and far-right rallies.85 In October, at least three journalists were assaulted by far-right aggressors after PiS chairman Kaczyński pleaded with “all individuals who care for Poland” to stand against the women’s rights protesters, which resulted in large groups of radical nationalists organizing militias on the streets of Polish cities.86
• In November, multiple journalists were beaten by the police while covering the far-right Independence March, and one was struck in the head by a police rubber bullet.87 Also in November, a photojournalist was detained by the police for photographing an officer during a protest despite presenting her press ID.88

• The estimated total loss in local government income tax revenue due to COVID-19 was in the range of PLN 5.3–6.9 billion, amounting to 2.5–3 percent of total revenue.89 According to municipalities’ own data, 90 cities were on track to lose financial liquidity before the end of 2020.90 Meanwhile, new corporate tax regulations aimed at boosting investment would result in a decrease of local government resources by another PLN 2.7 billion per year. The Union of Rural Municipalities of the Republic of Poland pointed out that, according to assumptions in the new law on corporate tax cuts, these losses may be balanced by an influx in other tax revenues that would, however, flow to the central budget. As such, the bill introduces a net revenue transfer away from the local and into central government coffers.91
• The education sector, which accounts for over half of all municipal spending in Poland and in some cities reaches 80 percent of their budget,92 was burdened with a six-percent raise in teacher salaries93 as well as additional costs in preparing schools to comply with the country’s COVID-19 sanitary regime.
• The ruling camp’s strategy for tackling the pandemic largely bypassed local authorities, who were not consulted about the majority of legislative and regulatory tools adopted by Parliament and the government in response to the crisis.94 This approach was criticized for violating the subsidiarity principle.95
• In July, however, the government announced that it had prepared a fund worth PLN 12 billion to help local authorities cope with the social and economic consequences of the pandemic. Half of the money was automatically assigned to municipalities based primarily on population size. The remaining PLN 6 billion would be available to local governments through a competitive grant procedure.96
• Experts criticized this proposal due to the arbitrariness of the grant criteria, lack of proper mechanisms for legal or administrative recourse, and the fact that grant committees were to be composed solely of central government administrators. They pointed out that similar mechanisms have been used to determine distributions from the Local Roads Fund, and studies have shown that localities governed by PiS politicians have a much higher rate of success in obtaining those grants.97 In the aftermath of the presidential election, Janusz Kowalski, deputy minister of state assets, remarked that it was “time to reform the local government and to tear down the big city fiefdoms of Platforma Obywatelska” (Civic Platform, PO), Poland’s largest opposition party.98

• On February 14, a new act on the judiciary—the so-called muzzle law—entered into force, broadening the notion of disciplinary offenses and making the disciplinary system for judges harsher.99 The act was adopted despite strong domestic, EU, and international criticism, and galvanized an unprecedented “Thousand Robes March” in Warsaw in January. Polish judges, prosecutors, attorneys-at-law, and legal advisors marched alongside colleagues from 22 EU countries and thousands of citizens to protest attacks on judicial independence.100
• The EC had already considered the former model of disciplinary responsibility for judges in Poland incompatible with EU law. In 2019, the Commission referred a case to the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) against the Polish government.101 In April 2020, the CJEU asked for interim measures in the case, ordering a suspension of disciplinary proceedings against judges until the final ruling is announced.102
• Also in April, the EC launched another EU law infringement procedure regarding the muzzle law specifically. The Commission argues that the provision of the act prevent courts in Poland from directly applying EU law protecting judicial independence and asking the CJEU for preliminary rulings on such matters.103
• Poland’s justice system further moved from integrity to duality as institutions established or taken over by the government continued to assert their power. In April, the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) ruled on the motion of the Prime Minister and the Marshal of the Sejm104 and found that the January 23 resolution of the Supreme Court (SC) on judicial appointments was not legally binding.105 In that resolution, the three “old” chambers of the SC, following criteria established by the CJEU, argued that the added Disciplinary Chamber in the SC is not an independent court under EU law.106 Further, the SC ruled that the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ), reestablished by the government in 2018, is not independent. Consequently, new SC judges selected by the NCJ and sworn in by the President of the Republic should not adjudicate. Despite the CT’s ruling, the SC continued to apply the resolution; and the new NCJ continued to propose candidates as judges to the SC and common courts.107
• The CT, presided over by Julia Przyłębska, an ally to PiS chairman Kaczyński, continued to rule on politically and socially sensitive issues. On October 22, the CT found a provision decriminalizing abortion in cases of fetal malformation unconstitutional.108 This decision sparked nationwide protest (see “Civil Society”).
• In May, Małgorzata Manowska become the new First President of the Supreme Court,109 replacing Małgorzata Gersdorf, who held office until the end of her six-year constitutional term.110 According to the abovementioned SC resolution, Manowska, appointed to the SC on recommendation by the new NCJ, does not have power to adjudicate. However, she has been adjudicating and acting as the First President of the SC nonetheless.
• The model of disciplinary responsibility for judges, modified in 2018–20, was actively used during the year. In January, the Disciplinary Chamber of the SC suspended without pay Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn, known for challenging the government by applying CJEU rulings.111 The UN Special Rapporteur on Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the European Association of Judges condemned the decision.112 In October, the Disciplinary Chamber lifted the immunity of Judge Beata Morawiec, president of the THEMIS association of judges and a prominent critic of the judiciary changes implemented since 2015, in a crimial case brought against her.113
• The Article 7(1) TEU political dialogue procedure, launched by the EC in 2017 against the Polish government for rule of law violations, continued in 2020.114 In September, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a report and resolution urging the EC and the Council to broaden the scope of the procedure to also address the state of democracy and human rights in Poland.115
• Courts in other EU member states, including Germany116 and the Netherlands,117 questioned safeguards to judicial independence in Poland in the context of judicial cooperation within the EU and the European Arrest Warrant procedure, citing the muzzle law as one of the reasons.118 Since 2018, courts in several EU member states (including Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, and Slovakia) halted the execution of European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) requested by courts in Poland, citing changes in the judiciary and their impact on judicial independence and fair trial guarantees.119 In September, the Amsterdam Regional Court posed preliminary reference questions regarding an EAW to Poland to the CJEU and, making precedent in the EU, paused all extraditions from the Netherlands to Poland until the CJEU’s ruling.120
• The majority of Poles did not agree with plans by the Polish and Hungarian governments to veto the EU budget and pandemic recovery package; the two governments wanted to avoid linking the provision of EU funds to rule of law issues.121 After much back and forth, they approved the package in December, but both governments announced that they will challenge the rule of law conditionality mechanism at the CJEU.

• As part of the special law adopted in March to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the government introduced a rule exonerating public officials from responsibility for abusing their administrative power or for causing a financial loss in business transactions.122 A number of procurement decisions undertaken by the government for personal protective equipment (PPE) raised serious doubts concerning mismanagement of public funds. The Ministry of Health purchased masks and visors from health minister Łukasz Szumowski’s ski instructor, who had no previous experience selling medical equipment, and paid him more than three times the other offers sent to the ministry. Media reports revealed that the Central Anticorruption Bureau ran multiple inquiries about purchases of equipment during the pandemic.123
• Besides masks, the Ministry of Health bought 1,200 ventilators for PLN 200 million from a company owned by an arms dealer, who also had no prior experience selling medical equipment. While the price was significantly above the market value, the ministry justified the higher cost by saying the contractor was the only one to guarantee expedited procurement of the equipment. However, the company never delivered the large majority of the ventilators, and the ministry is still owed PLN 70 million.124
• Further press investigations found that while Łukasz Szumowski, who also served as deputy minister of science in 2016–18, had virtually no savings, the value of Szumowski Investments, a company founded by his brother, had grown over the last four years from PLN 40,000 to over PLN 40 million. Several years ago, Szumowski transferred his shares in Szumowski Investments, amounting to 30 percent of the total value of the company, to his wife. In 2017, as deputy minister, he was in charge of directly supervising the National Center for Research and Development for almost two months. Over that period alone, the center offered grants worth over PLN 50 million to a company partly owned by Szumowski Investments.125
• Meanwhile, the state-owned copper giant KGHM purchased 1,300,000 masks from China at the direct order of PM Mateusz Morawiecki. The price paid by KGHM was four times the equipment’s market value, and the masks’ certificates were forged.126 Further investigation showed that the transaction was coordinated by Polish secret service and its associates and served to funnel additional funding from the state-owned company to the service’s operating budget. 127
• In August, the ruling majority MPs proposed a new amendment to the special law on combatting COVID-19 that would further expand the special leniency regime by exonerating anyone from any legal responsibility for breaking existing laws as long as it was necessary to counteract the pandemic. After receiving a positive recommendation from the parliamentary Public Finance Committee, the proposal was taken off the Sejm agenda at the last minute when the ruling camp temporarily lost its majority due to a conflict between the coalition parties in September.128
• In January, government-controlled media claimed that during his career as a doctor, the President of the opposition-controlled Senate, Tomasz Grodzki, had accepted bribes for preferential medical treatment. No evidence of corruption was produced beyond the accusations of anonymous former patients.129 In turn, Grodzki revealed that he was contacted by two of his former patients who were blackmailed with the purpose of offering damaging testimony against him. Another former patient claimed that he was approached by an unidentified man and offered PLN 5,000 to accuse Grodzki of demanding a bribe for performing surgery.130 While politicians from the ruling camp pushed for Grodzki’s dismissal, no follow-up actions were taken by the prosecutor’s office concerning the accusations.

Author: Anna Wójcik is a co-founder of the rule of law monitoring initiative The Wiktor Osiatyński Archive and the website ruleoflaw.pl. She covers the rule of law crisis for OKO.press.

Miłosz Wiatrowski is a PhD candidate in contemporary Polish history at Yale University and editor of Wyborcza in English.