• In 2020, the democratic quality of Kyrgyzstan’s national governance deteriorated severely as both the executive and legislative branches of power were seized without an electoral mandate by Sadyr Japarov. Though much of the year was dominated by the impact of COVID-19, the parliamentary elections on October 4 would mark a dramatic turning point in the nation’s governance. Amid disputes over the elections, most notably accusations of vote buying by members of parliament (MPs), the electoral results were met with fierce public protests and subsequently annulled by the Central Election Commission. Nevertheless, the parties accused of fraud and abuse of administrative resources during the elections maintained a majority in the parliament by arbitrarily extending their own mandates.
• Although already under scrutiny for controversial draft laws limiting freedom of speech and association, the legislature’s bigger challenge came as a result of the annulled elections.16 The move by the Supreme Council—Kyrgyzstan’s 120-seat, unicameral parliament—to prolong its term indefinitely until constitutional changes were made was roundly viewed as illegal and illegitimate.17 Supporters of Sadyr Japarov,18 freed on October 5 along with many others from the prison where he was serving an 11.5-year sentence for kidnapping, were able to coerce the Supreme Council to appoint him prime minister, which prompted the resignation of President Sooronbay Jeenbekov. Though next in line for the presidency, the speaker of the parliament stepped aside, allowing Japarov to become “acting president.”19 This quick undoing of two elected institutions of government, over less than two weeks’ time, was widely thought to be the result of blackmail, coercion from Japarov’s supporters protesting in the streets, and, perhaps, the participation of organized crime.20
• While the Supreme Council was doubtlessly strong-armed by newly emerging political forces, it was also a culprit in some of the irregular post-electoral processes. Electing a speaker who refused the role of acting president, approving a bill to suspend electoral legislation, and postponing elections were just some of the ways this parliament, with its unclear electoral mandate, had in short order perverted the country’s governing institutions.21
• Early presidential elections, announced after Jeenbekov stepped down, were set for January 10, 2021. The start of the presidential campaign was marred by further complaints of abuse of administrative resources. For instance, school teachers were forced to collect signatures for Japarov, while the president used his newly acquired office to conduct meetings in the country’s regions that were perceived as electoral campaigning.22
• The tumultuous political events that ensued after October 5 were driven not only by intimidation and threats but also by a variety of extralegal means, and the parliament became the conduit by which the much-criticized unconstitutional decisions were moved forward. One of the first calls was to postpone the upcoming parliamentary elections, which was then tied to a subsequent decision to hold a referendum on changes to the constitution. As noted by the Venice Commission, while it is not uncommon to see a parliament serve longer during a transition period, any postponement of elections should be limited in time and narrow in purpose.23 An initial plan to hold a full-fledged referendum coinciding with the presidential elections on January 10 was abandoned, even as attempts to amend the political system continued. Yet, on December 9, in the first reading of the bill, the Supreme Council approved the draft law to hold a referendum in a move that broke many procedural norms.24
• The process of organizing the constitutional reform itself lacked inclusivity and proper deliberation.25 This was due not only to the hastiness of the process but also the composition of the constitutional assembly, which lacked representation of the country’s major political forces. Furthermore, the process was conducted by a parliament that had extended its term without a clear legal basis. The first draft of the new constitution, available for review at year’s end, raised serious concerns of backsliding on democratic norms established in the 2010 version. Those norms would be further undermined by the concentration of power in the hands of the president. Additionally, an Eldik Kurultai (People’s Assembly) was proposed that, according to its proponents, is intended to be a representative body but in fact could be manipulated and abused by a sitting president.26

• Elections to both the Supreme Council and local councils were scheduled for 2020. However, the spring local council elections were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.27 Parliamentary elections, on the other hand, went ahead as planned on October 4 but were marred by allegations of vote buying and abuse of administrative resources, leading to public protests against the results. The Central Election Commission subsequently annulled the results without a clear legal basis.
• In spite of the disputed electoral results and subsequent chain of events, the Central Election Commission (CEC) was actually technically well prepared for the polls. The CEC had improved its website (www.shailoo.gov.kg), which added new features intended to make voters more informed about their choices. This included information about the candidates’ proposed platforms, party programs, campaign funding, and more. Prior legislative amendments had improved conditions, making elections fairer for voter lists and gender quotas, in the case of member withdrawals from the parliament. Although a law was signed in the summer lowering the electoral threshold from 9 to 7 percent, this bar to participation remained an issue for the opposition prior to the elections.28
• Beyond the CEC’s technical improvements, some electoral process issues remained, such as concerns about candidate registration as well as the pending issue of biometric registration and access to voting for hundreds of thousands of citizens.29 Despite the resultant protests and ensuing political upheaval, the electoral process per se was not determined to be significantly worse than in the 2015 parliamentary elections by international election observers. The OSCE observation mission’s final report did not find massive irregularities.30 Nationwide protests were sparked when it was declared that four parties associated with the ruling regime (Birimdik, Mekenim Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Butun Kyrgyzstan) had passed the 7 percent threshold.31 Vote buying and the use of administrative resources were widely believed to be the reasons for the electoral victories of these pro-regime parties.
• The post-electoral process was marred by extralegal decision-making, including, most notably, the CEC’s decision to annul the results of the parliamentary elections.32 Though the political expedience of this move was obvious, it did not reflect norms that typically guide the commission’s electoral decisions.33
• Following the protests and extension of the parliamentary mandate without a clear legal basis, MPs pushed forward a bill to change the country’s electoral laws, lowering the electoral threshold from 7 to 3 percent and reducing the registration fee for candidates from 5 million to 1 million soms (about $12,000).34 However, in light of the proposed constitutional amendments, the impact of these electoral changes may prove minimal.

• In 2020, Kyrgyz civil society expressed itself through a variety of activities but also faced serious challenges in retaining ground. The presence and influence of illiberal, reactionary groups grew dramatically during the post-parliamentary election crisis, as did their ability to marginalize pro-democracy groups.
• The year saw the continuation of anticorruption protests begun in 2019, which were triggered by investigative reporting from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Kloop, and OCCRP into smuggling schemes allegedly organized by the former deputy chair of Kyrgyzstan’s customs service, Raiymbek Matraimov.35 Other notable protests included the Reaktsiya (Reaction) movement, whose activists along with other civic groups protested the parliament’s hasty adoption of the law “On manipulation of information,” which opponents argued hampered freedom of speech.36
• The year was also marked by the brutal suppression of the annual women’s demonstration on March 8. The peaceful rally, organized by local women’s groups, was attacked by unidentified traditionalists, while organizers of the event were taken into custody.37 This type of official response raised concerns that authorities had turned a blind eye to the attack, which led to another massive rally on March 10 against the police conduct.38 This was not the first time the women’s movement in Kyrgyzstan had faced obstacles from nonstate actors, but the 2020 event was unprecedented due to the suspected complicity of state authorities. After a series of judicial hearings on November 11, the Supreme Court ruled against the lower courts’ decisions that police actions to disrupt the women’s march were legal.39 Despite calls to investigate, those who disrupted the march, including the police, received no punishment.
• Legislative initiatives aimed at diminishing civic space, notably the draft law “On manipulation of information,” envision stricter control over internet users and led to one of the largest rallies of the year.40 Another draft law was initiated early in the year that envisioned additional reporting requirements for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Opponents argued that it would create “additional confusing and bureaucratic obstacles” for NGOs, while proponents suggested it would make civil society more accountable and trusted by the wider soсiety.41
• One important development in 2020 was the civic sector’s response to the country’s institutional weaknesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the state government unable to either formulate clear policies to slow the spread of the virus or provide needed public services, a number of civic groups and volunteers began to provide help and assistance in place of—or, in some cases, alongside—state authorities.42 Groups converted hotels and restaurants into medical centers, organized volunteers to deliver oxygen to patients, distributed food and medicine to those in need during the lockdown, and produced personal protective equipment (PPE) for medical personnel. The aftermath of the October protests also spurred civic engagement by citizens who organized people’s squads to prevent possible looting and public disturbances.43
• The government’s attitude towards civil society was mixed. On the one hand, there were examples of beneficial partnerships, for instance, between civic groups and state medical institutions in response to the pandemic. On the other hand, the government’s lack of recognition and unhealthy competition with civil society was evident, examples including the state’s refusal to accept data collection solutions for needed supplies or the failure to include civil society actors in commissions overseeing spending on COVID-19 measures.44

• The state of independent media in Kyrgyzstan remained fairly stable in 2020, with few changes to the legal framework as compared to previous years. However, restrictions during the spring lockdowns affected journalists who were denied access to decision makers in Bishkek and other localities.45 This severely limited the ability of journalists to address fake or misleading news and rumors by providing firsthand accounts and verified information.
• At times, freedom of speech was abridged during the spring lockdowns, even online. In one case, a doctor who had posted a complaint about the lack of PPE and other medical supplies was forced to apologize publicly on video for allegedly disseminating “false information.”46
• Journalists also risked their own personal safety during the year. In January, the editor of factcheck.kg was attacked by unknown individuals presumably in relation to his professional activities.47 There were also incidents of violence against journalists during the parliamentary elections,48 as well as threats and violence during the protests after the elections.49
• The year also included a libel suit filed by Raiymbek Matraimov against Radio Azattyk, Kloop, 24.kg, and journalist Ali Toktakunov, who in 2019 had published a bombshell investigation into Matraimov’s corrupt dealings while serving as deputy chair of the State Customs Service.50
• Blogger Elmira Sydymanova, accused of inciting inter-regional hatred, faced a prison sentence of up to six years.51 Charges against blogger Avtandi Jorobekov on another case of inciting hatred were dropped.52 These cases showed the increasing vulnerability of social media users to extreme charges for their own posts or even comments made on posts. Additionally, the harassment of bloggers and journalists through summonses to appear before law enforcement agencies for their posts and publications has become a frequent practice in Kyrgyzstan.
• The draft law “On manipulation of information” was one of the greatest legislative threats to freedom of speech in 2020.53 Despite public criticism, it was quickly reviewed by the parliament and, only in the final stages, returned to the legislature by President Jeenbekov. The bill would have greatly increased the government’s power, enabling authorities to crack down even more severely on online dissent.
• One unique feature of 2020 was the unprecedented rise of troll farms in Kyrgyzstan. Such ventures were notably utilized in Matraimov’s standoff with media outlets accusing him of corruption, as well as during the parliamentary election campaign. Some argue that this increased phenomenon played a role in Sadyr Japarov’s dramatic rise to power.54

• Although 2020 was once again deemed the year for developing the country’s regions, as announced by the president, there were no notable policy initiatives in this regard. In general, national elites maintain control over local decision-making, while local governments struggle to put together sufficient funding to address local issues.
• Local council elections, planned for the spring, were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Among these were elections to 25 village councils and 5 city councils scheduled to take place on April 12.55
• During the pandemic lockdown, there were issues related to the function of local governments in a number of localities throughout the country. In many places, local officers were vested with special authority to make decisions, and the alignment of their activities with the functions of local government was not always up to par.56
• With the political upheaval surrounding the parliamentary elections and subsequent nationwide protests, appointed and elected municipal officials became targets for blame. Protestors and opposition figures criticized these officials for their alleged collaboration with the previous regime and for the replacement of new leaders. In some cases, the replacement procedures failed to follow the letter of the law, as in the case of the resigned Bishkek mayor whose replacement was selected in a legally dubious process and subject to political pressure.57
• In the fall, Kyrgyz Jarany, a joint concept initiative with the OSCE aimed at “supporting social cohesion within the multi-ethnic society of Kyrgyzstan,” was developed by the State Agency for Local Governance and Interethnic Relations and was approved by the acting president.58 This ended a two-year gap in the program designed to address interethnic relations between local communities.
• In October, the capital city Bishkek joined the Open Government Partnership.59 Kyrgyzstan had joined the OGP at the national level in 2017, while Bishkek became the first municipality in the country to join this initiative.

• The judicial system remained intact in 2020 despite deliberations on constitutional reforms and related changes to the status of the judiciary. The overall performance of Kyrgyzstan’s justice system was no better than in prior years; in fact, notable decisions were made favoring political expedience during key moments during the turbulent year.
• There were several important judicial decisions that show the extent to which the judiciary is driven by political considerations rather than by the rule of law. In October, the Supreme Court found acting president Japarov, head of security services Kamchybek Tashiev, and newly elected speaker of parliament Talant Mamytov not guilty on previous charges of attempted violent seizure of power.60 And questions remained concerning the uneven approach to other politicians previously charged on political grounds. As in the past, the Supreme Court reconsidered cases that had been pursued under the previous regime, ultimately canceling the decisions of lower courts against former prime minister Sapar Isakov, who had been charged with corruption under former president Jeenbekov.61
• On October 24, the administrative court annulled the Central Election Commission’s decision about new parliamentary elections, and the ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court on October 30. On December 2, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber ruled that the parliament’s decision to postpone parliamentary elections was constitutional.62
• In a rare case where the Supreme Court took the side of civic activists, the court ruled on November 11 that the decision of police to detain organizers of the March 8 rally was unlawful, reversing the rulings of lower courts.63 Otherwise, as in previous years, the courts did little to guarantee justice for those not aligned with the ruling regime. Indeed, in 2020, a number of gender-based violence cases were not addressed in the courts.64
• In the aftermath of the October 5 political upheaval, the Supreme Court hastily annulled the lower courts’ decisions regarding acting president Japarov, Kamchybek Tashiev, and Talant Mamytov.65 Even though it was believed that charges against Japarov, made in 2013, were politically motivated, this was another case where the justice system was seen as serving those who came to power by force.
• Prison conditions were more widely discussed in Kyrgyzstan in 2020, particularly on two issues. First, the detainment of political prisoners who were not given bail in order to stand trial was a prominent issue. Second, on ascending to power after being released from prison, Japarov promised to release inmates serving sentences for minor crimes, and while acting president, he pardoned 230 prisoners.66
• The newly proposed constitutional reforms would dramatically alter Kyrgyzstan’s separation of powers. If approved, the amendments would allow the president to appoint all judges, making an already subservient judicial institution even more dependent, and thereby diminishing any hope for institutional checks and balances.67

• Kyrgyzstan entered 2020 amid a series of public protests triggered by the 2019 investigative reporting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Kloop, and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) into corrupt schemes allegedly organized by Raiymbek Matraimov, former deputy chair of the State Customs Service.68 However, there was little reaction from the government regarding these findings.
• At the Security Council’s January meeting, former president Jeenbekov noted that there were successes in fighting corruption, though he also reprimanded heads of law enforcement agencies for a lack of sufficient action in this area.69 This rhetorical attitude on the issue of corruption marks the overall policy stance of his presidency, including during 2020.
• Some token attempts to address corruption were undertaken during the year. The secretariat of the Security Council drafted a strategy for fighting corruption,70 including increased examination of income declarations and expenditures by civil servants. Yet, the draft strategy had not been adopted by year’s end.
• After the radical change of power in October, acting president Japarov announced that his key policy priority would be fighting corruption. In a speech to his newly established cabinet, Japarov argued that the current constitution is a major impediment to fighting corruption, and changing the constitution would make it easier to tackle the prevalence of bribery.71 However, this statement was accompanied by the common knowledge of his dealings with the aforementioned Raiymbek Matraimov, a major symbol of corruption in Kyrgyzstan. Although having been caught and detained by law enforcement, Matraimov was released the same day under condition that he would repay damages to the state in the amount of 2 billion soms ($25 million). Japarov announced that he had personally proposed the release, stating that it would otherwise be difficult to retrieve any of Matraimov’s financial assets.72
• Actions against Matraimov were accompanied with declarations by the state’s Anti-Corruption Service about the corrupt schemes and details revealed in their investigation of the Customs Service.73 But so far, there have been no systematic efforts to address the issue of corruption within the service.
• Despite the turbulent year, political upheaval, and continued attention paid to the bombshell Matraimov investigation, anticorruption efforts were handled similarly to previous governments. The state’s anticorruption work was mostly aimed at demonstrating progress by charging select high officials without addressing the root causes of the issue. For example, former prime minister Mukhammedkalyi Abylgaziev was summoned for questioning for his alleged involvement in a licensing scandal regarding the improper sale of radio frequencies.74

Author: Medet Tiulegenov, assistant professor at the Department of International and Comparative Politics of American University of Central Asia