• The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy with a fully functioning governmental system and adequate checks and balances for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
• Nevertheless, in 2019, the country’s political situation was tenuous, with a minority coalition government led by Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and his ANO 2011 party in partnership with the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). The coalition received parliamentary support, including for most of its legislative proposals, from the Communist Party (KSČM).
• A major political crisis emerged in May when the culture minister, Antonín Staněk, resigned; President Miloš Zeman did not accept Staněk’s resignation despite being constitutionally required to do so. PM Babiš subsequently asked the president to dismiss Staněk and appoint the ČSSD nominee, Michal Šmarda. According to most constitutional law experts, including the chairman of the Constitutional Court, the president must comply with the prime minister’s proposal without undue delay.1 Regardless, Zeman delayed the decision to dismiss Staněk for two months and refused to appoint Šmarda,2 arguing that he lacked expertise in the area of culture. ČSSD members, threatening to leave the government, demanded that Babiš take action against the president in front of the Constitutional Court. The political crisis was finally resolved once Šmarda gave up the nomination and the president accepted another ČSSD candidate, Lubomír Zaorálek, in August.3
• There were numerous other changes to the cabinet in 2019. In April, the transport minister resigned and the minister of industry and trade was dismissed. Also in April, the unexpected resignation of the justice minister, Jan Kněžínek, and nomination of the president’s advisor and former minister Marie Benešová as his replacement triggered protests from the opposition parties, which argued that the shakeup was related to the investigation against PM Babiš and could also lead to the dismissal of Prosecutor General Pavel Zeman (no relation to the president).4
• Many saw Benešová, a close friend of President Zeman, as a potential threat to the independence of the judiciary as well as someone who could protect Babiš from prosecution related to his fraud case “Čapí hnízdo” (Stork’s Nest Farm). Her eventual appointment led to the largest protests since the Velvet Revolution of 1989 (see “Civil Society”), bringing together nearly three hundred thousand citizens in June and November demanding the resignations of both Benešová and Babiš.5
• In June, the government faced a motion of no confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.6 The motion, ultimately unsuccessful, was initiated by five opposition parties in reaction to a preliminary report by the European Commission’s audit office stating that Babiš’s Agrofert conglomerate had illegally received more than €19 million in EU subsidies.
• Reacting to repeated violations of the constitution during the year, the Senate approved a draft lawsuit against President Zeman in July. The parliamentary upper house identified eight constitutional breaches of duties by the president, the most important being his attempt to interfere in the courts and his refusal to dismiss the culture minister. If successful, the lawsuit would have resulted in the president’s resignation.7 However, the draft lawsuit was not approved by the Chamber of Deputies, which is required for an action to be brought before the Constitutional Court.8

• Elections in the Czech Republic are free and fair, held by secret ballot on the basis of a universal, equal, and direct right to vote. With the exception of the Senate, all elections are held according to the principle of proportional representation. In 2019, both the European Parliament (EP) elections in May and the Senate by-elections in April were deemed free, fair, and competitive.
• Altogether, 40 parties competed in the EP elections (for a total of 22 seats representing 7 parties). Most successful were candidates of the governing ANO 2011 party (6 seats), closely followed by the opposition Civic Democratic Party (ODS, with 4 seats), the recent newcomer Czech Pirati Party (3 seats), and Coalition for Europe (TOP 09 and STAN, with 3 seats). Ten members of the European Parliament (MEPs) retained their positions from previous elections.9
• The EP elections saw an increase in turnout by more than 10 percentage points from 18.20 percent in 2014 to 28.72 percent in 2019.10 The higher turnout was achieved through greater citizen mobilization and higher campaign visibility in the media rather than any perceived increase in the importance of European issues. Despite the improved participation, Czechia’s turnout for the EP elections was still the second lowest in the European Union (EU) after Slovakia.
• According to Transparency International (TI), Czechia’s political parties were less transparent in their campaign financing in 2019 as compared to previous elections. This could be an indirect result of the public’s relatively low interest in the EP elections, as well as party negligence.11
• The Supreme Administrative Court received 19 complaints following the EP elections, 3 more than during the 2014 EP vote. The complaints pointed out, among other issues, the significant influence of PM Babiš on the media and connections between his ANO 2011 party and the company Agrofert.12 All complaints were rejected or settled by the end of June with no impact on the election results. In justifying its decisions, the Electoral Board of the Supreme Administrative Court reiterated that its role “is not to assess any inconsistencies concerning publicly active persons, but to guard the proper conduct of the electoral process and intervene in justified cases,” but only in those cases “where there is sufficient evidence to show that the election result does not correspond to the real will of the voters.”13
• The lack of mail-in voting in the Czech Republic, one of few such countries in the EU, was heavily criticized during the EP elections and identified as a priority for the new electoral legislation, proposed by the interior ministry in October.14 Experts believe that such an option would increase voter turnout, especially in traditionally less popular elections such as the Senate or EP. Another important proposed change was the limiting of voting to a single day—preferably Friday—and enabling the option of some limited early voting. This proposal was criticized, however, as potentially lowering turnout.15 Additionally, the opposition parties and the civic movement Million Moments for Democracy demanded changes to make the election law fairer for smaller parties, such as altering the formula for the redistribution of mandates and abolishing the higher threshold for coalitions.16
• By-elections to the Senate in Prague’s District 9, following the resignation of Senator Zuzana Baudyšová due to health reasons, took place April 5–6, for the first round, and April 12–13 for the runoff. The by-elections were won by an independent candidate supported by the Starostové a nezávislí (Mayors and Independents) party, and no polling complaints were reported.17

• The civic sector in the Czech Republic is very active and continually expanding. According to the Czech Supreme Audit Office, there were 147,867 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at the end of 2017. However, only 26.5 percent were active. In 2016, the NGO sector employed a total of 104,078 individuals and represented 1.66 percent of Czechia’s GDP.18
• Public trust in NGOs remained relatively low in 2019. In a September survey, only 33 percent of Czechs said that they trusted or somewhat trusted NGOs, whereas 58 percent of citizens did not trust NGOs.19 These numbers have decreased since the 2015 migration crisis, during which NGOs were actively helping or were seen as supportive of migrants and asylum seekers. The current low public trust is a consequence of the long-term negative discourse targeting NGOs from extremist politicians as well as some mainstream figures and President Zeman.
• A wave of demonstrations against the government organized by the group Million chvilek pro demokracii (Million Moments for Democracy) occurred in April through June, with ongoing weekly gatherings in Prague along with events in other cities. The demonstrations peaked on June 23 in the capital city’s Letná Park. According to mobile provider estimates, around 250,000 people protested against the country’s political situation, making this the largest demonstration held in Prague since the Velvet Revolution of November 1989.20 Earlier events held in Staroměstské náměstí (Prague’s Old Town Square) and Václavské náměstí (Wenceslas Square) were attended by 5,000–50,000 protesters.21
• The protests stemmed from the allegations against PM Babiš of fraud involving EU subsidies in the “Čapí hnízdo” (Stork’s Nest Farm) case, as well as conflict-of-interest issues surrounding his nomination of Marie Benešová to fill the sudden departure of justice minister Jan Kněžínek; Benešová, who was seen as a Babiš ally, had already served as minister of justice in 2013–14. The petition demanding Babiš’s resignation organized by Million Moments for Democracy was signed by 430,000 people.22 The demonstrations reignited on November 16, when roughly the same number of protesters gathered again to demand the resignations of Babiš and for opposition parties to cooperate more closely.23
• Back in 2018, the media published information claiming that the Center for Security Policy at Charles University’s Faculty for Social Sciences had provided space for Chinese government propaganda. In 2019, it was revealed that center staff members had been receiving money (through a commercial entity) from the Chinese embassy for the organization of conferences. The center director and a number of staff members resigned in October after the scandal was made public.24
• In December, leaked documents published by Aktualne.cz claimed that Petr Kellner’s company Home Credit, a lending agency doing business in China among other countries, had funded a pro-China campaign and set up a China-friendly research institute.25

• Journalists and the media enjoy freedom of the press in the Czech Republic. In recent years, however, developments related to media ownership and concentration have raised alarms about the sector’s overall independence.
• Numerous media outlets are owned by Czech oligarchs, with PM Babiš (owner of the media group MAFRA) having significant power over two of the country’s largest newspapers, Mladá fronta DNES and Lidové noviny. In 2019, both dailies operated under a trust to ostensibly prevent abuse of influence. MAFRA holds a 25 percent share of the country’s print media readership.26
• This trend of concentration will likely continue, since the PPF group (owned by the wealthiest Czech entrepreneur, Petr Kellner) announced in October the acquisition of the largest Czech commercial broadcaster, TV NOVA,27 which holds a stable 35 percent audience share and 62 percent share of the TV ad market.28
• Drawing upon TI research, the Černošice municipality29 ruled twice, in January and August, that PM Babiš was still in a position to influence the media outlets he owns and was, therefore, involved in conflicts of interest.30 The municipality issued Babiš a fine of CZK 200,000 (€8,000). On appeal, the Authority of the Central Bohemia Region (governed by a representative of Babiš’s political party, ANO 2011) overruled the administrative decisions in September.31
• As in previous years, the Czech public broadcaster, Česká televize (ČT), was criticized for alleged bias in its news coverage by the party leaders of Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) and the Communist Party (KSČM). Other strong critics of ČT were President Zeman, mostly through the spokesman Jiří Ovčáček, and the owner of TV Barrandov, Jaromír Soukup. Soukup regularly denounced ČT and its board over various topics on his show Kauzy Jaromíra Soukupa. In reaction, ČT filed a lawsuit arguing that Soukup was spreading false information that could harm the public broadcaster. The Prague court ruled32 in favor of ČT in April and directed TV Barrandov to apologize.33 Similarly, in August, the chairman of SPD, Tomio Okamura, was ordered by the first instance court to apologize to the independent platform HlidaciPes.org for claiming it was a scam website.34
• Still, none of these criticisms ultimately damaged ČT’s reputation. According to an April poll, 74 percent of viewers trusted the public broadcaster.35 The Chamber of Deputies approved ČT’s annual reports for 2016–17 in October after extremely long and heated discussions. Had the chamber not accepted the two subsequent reports, it could have dismissed and elected new members of the Czech Television Council.36

• The Czech Republic has a two-tiered system of self-governance. There are more than 6,200 municipalities of various sizes at the local level, and the country is also divided into 14 regions represented by regional governments. Citizens elect local and regional assemblies, which further elect local and regional councils, mayors, and regional governors.37
• There were no regional or local elections in Czechia in 2019. Regional governments elected in 2016 were stable, similar to most of the ruling coalitions in bigger cities elected in 2018. Local and regional governments maintained sound financial health during the year, and since 2012, they have managed surplus budgets and lowered their debt.38
• According to a September opinion poll by the Public Opinion Research Center, mayors and municipal assemblies were the most-trusted political representatives in the country. Altogether, 66 percent of citizens said they trusted mayors, and 64 percent trusted local assemblies. Regional governments were rated as more trustworthy than the central government or both houses of Parliament.39
• In 2019, the Chamber of Deputies debated a proposal that would expand the competencies of the Supreme Audit Office to monitor revenues of regional and local self-administrations, part of a broader proposal to give the office oversight of all government finances. The proposal was pending at year’s end and would require a constitutional amendment to be implemented.40
• A major dispute arose during the year between the Prague municipal government and its counterpart in Beijing, China, over a partnership treaty that had been signed under a previous government. The newly elected Mayor of Prague, Zdeněk Hřib (Piráti), had urged for a revision to the article of the treaty recognizing the “One China” policy. Hřib argued that such an article should not be part of an apolitical treaty between two cities. This move was strongly criticized by Chinese political representatives, especially the Chinese Embassy in Prague, which called for a reaction from the central government. Although many Czech politicians disapproved of Hřib’s action, seeing it as a possible threat to Czech-Chinese relations, the foreign affairs minister stated that it was not in the government’s competence to interfere in local policies. As there was no willingness to compromise on such a sensitive issue for China, the partnership treaty was revoked by Beijing in October.41

• The judicial system, including the prosecution and the police, work independently and provide the necessary protection of rights in the Czech Republic. In 2019, as in previous years, the justice system’s main weakness continued to be the lengthy duration of court proceedings. The Constitutional Court plays a strong role in providing protection of human rights as well as ensuring the constitutional conformity of laws approved by Parliament.
• During the year, Parliament debated proposals for constitutional amendments on a range of issues, including to better facilitate national referendums,42 to regulate the replacement of deputies who become members of government,43 to increase the time limit for the Senate to discuss laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies to 60 days,44 and an amendment to increase the competencies of the Supreme Audit Office.45 None of these proposals had passed by year’s end; in fact, the country’s last constitutional amendment was ratified in 2013.
• In January, Constitutional Court judge Vojtěch Šimíček and President of the Supreme Administrative Court Josef Baxa claimed that President Zeman had tried at times to put pressure on the courts either directly or through his chancellor, Vratislav Mynář.46 Yet, in May, the public prosecutor confirmed a police decision not to start criminal proceedings against Mynář, arguing that his actions did not constitute a criminal violation.47
• In September, the municipal prosecutor’s office in Prague halted the investigation into PM Babiš in the “Stork’s Nest Farm” case, which had gone on for almost four years. Babiš had been accused of using a procedural loophole to benefit from EU subsidies earmarked for small and medium sized companies. Contrary to the findings of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), the prosecutor’s office declared that the company owned by Babiš had fulfilled the conditions of an SME and was entitled to receive support from the EU budget.48 President Zeman announced he was prepared to use his constitutional right to stop the prosecution if the decision of the municipal prosecutor’s office was reversed by the prosecutor general. Babiš himself declared that he would not accept such help.49 In the end, the prosecutor general reopened the case in December.
• The Ministry of Justice proposed an amendment to the Public Prosecutor’s Office Act that drew criticism from prosecutors, opposition parties, and civil society alike. Although the justice minister declared that the amendment’s aim was to prevent the prosecutor general from being dismissed without reason, Prosecutor General Pavel Zeman feared the amendment would have enabled a quick change of both the prosecutor general and high-level public prosecutors.50 The amendment had not been passed by year’s end.

• Corruption is a long-standing problem in the Czech Republic. And, similar to previous governments, the minority coalition, led by PM Babiš’s ANO 2011 party, has proclaimed the fight against corruption to be its priority.51 In a positive development, the country’s most prominent corruption case, that of former health minister David Rath (ČSSD), was finally closed in 2019. Also, the institutional anticorruption framework was updated with a number of important pieces of legislation.
• In September, Parliament approved the so-called Nomination Act that regulates how the management and control bodies of state-owned companies are selected, with the aim of eliminating purely political nominations. The act introduced obligatory open and transparent selection procedures and created a governmental committee for nominations that should ensure proper and independent assessments of candidates.52 Another positive change was the amendment to the Act on Register of Contracts that eliminated exemptions to the obligation to publish contracts for companies with majority state ownership listed on the Czech or European stock exchanges.53
• On the other hand, the amendment to the Law on Public Administration approved in January 2019 will allow for personnel changes in state offices in the case of new political leadership. It also puts less emphasis on filling vacancies with candidates from state administration.54
• The justice ministry introduced two important anticorruption legislative amendments on the docket in February. The Act on the Protection of Whistle-blowers and the Act on Lobbying, which would increase the transparency of legislative processes. In both cases, the legislative procedure was put on hold until the adoption of a corresponding EU directive on the protection of whistle-blowers, but the government nevertheless declared its intention to transpose the EU directive onto both draft acts and to introduce them into Czech law as quickly as possible.55
• The most prominent corruption case in the Czech Republic, dating from 2012, was finally closed in June when the Supreme Court sentenced former health minister David Rath (ČSSD) to seven years in prison for manipulating the procurement process.56 Meanwhile, a new high-profile corruption case emerged in April when police performed several searches including at the home of Peter Rafaj, head of the Office for the Protection of Competition, and found CSK 2 million in cash. The police accused Rafaj of trying to influence a contract to operate an electronic toll-collection system.57
• The Czech Republic dropped six places in Transparency International’s 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, falling to 44th place (out of 180 countries).58 According to the report, Czechia’s trend of state capture continued without interruptions.59

Author: Vladimír Bartovic is the director of EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in Prague and Associate Researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He also sits on the Board of DEMAS–Association for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights.

Note

The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.