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Dokument #2037998
Freedom House (Autor)
| Democracy Percentage | 2.38 / 100 |
| Democracy Score | 1.14 / 7 |
By Robert Denis
Authoritarianism remained firmly entrenched in Azerbaijan in 2019. A series of reforms were highly touted by the government, and generated guarded optimism among the opposition, but so far these have done nothing to address the country’s fundamental institutional problems. Nevertheless, some small but noteworthy gains occurred in the political and civic realms, namely, the increased participation of activists from outside the traditional opposition parties.
Over the course of the year, President Ilham Aliyev decreed a series of administrative changes and shuffled top appointments, which the government portrayed as a reform program. In January, several state agencies were dissolved, others were created, and some authorities and responsibilities were redistributed. In October, several prominent appointees who had held their positions since the 1990s were removed from office, such as the former head of the presidential administration Ramiz Mehdiyev, former prime minister Novruz Mammadov, and senior presidential adviser Ali Hasanov. These high-profile moves were accompanied by a reshuffling of less significant executive appointments. There were also changes to the functioning of the judiciary: increasing the country’s number of judges, dividing administrative-economic courts into two separate organs, and requiring the audio recording of all hearings, among other modifications. Experts characterized these administrative reforms as technical in nature, possibly leading to increased efficiency in the operations of the government. None of these changes, however, address Azerbaijan’s fundamental problems—the dominance of the executive branch, rampant corruption, repressive conditions inhibiting civil society, and the lack of any government accountability to the population.
Despite the release of a large number of political prisoners in 2019, the government has continued to arrest and prosecute opposition activists and independent journalists. The year began with a major groundswell of support for imprisoned journalist and blogger Mehman Huseynov. When new charges were unexpectedly brought against Huseynov just two months before his scheduled release, the biggest demonstration Baku had seen in years was held on January 19 and the government quickly backed down, dropping the charges and releasing the journalist as scheduled on March 2. Two weeks later, President Aliyev issued a traditional, but unusually large, prisoner pardon that freed over 400 people, including 51 political prisoners of various stripes—opposition politicians, youth activists, Shia religious activists, journalists, and a former minister. Despite cautious hope within civil society and the international community that the pardon might be a sign of a shift in policy, many political prisoners have yet to be released and new arrests have followed. The annual pardons are a reminder that the fate of political prisoners is at the discretion of the executive as exemplified by youth activist Bayram Mammadov, arrested on March 30, two weeks after he was released under Aliyev’s pardon, and sentenced to another 30 days in detention on trumped-up charges. Despite the mass pardon, the number of political prisoners in Azerbaijan actually grew in 2019 according to human rights activists.
Azerbaijan is currently negotiating a new partnership agreement with the European Union (EU). Talks began in 2017, and diplomats from both the Azerbaijani and EU sides expressed optimism during 2019 that a deal would soon be concluded. Experts have suggested that the administrative reforms and the prisoner pardon may have been calculated to strengthen Azerbaijan’s position at the negotiating table by demonstrating improvements in the country’s business environment and human rights situation. In a speech in November, however, President Aliyev explicitly rejected the idea of European integration, painting the EU as a region in economic crisis with anti-Islamic attitudes.
The year did witness some incremental successes as Azerbaijan’s civic sector mobilized over specific issues despite the government’s repressive tactics. While the rally in support of Mehman Huseynov in January was allowed by authorities, the government employed drastic measures to prevent or limit other demonstrations throughout 2019. Two demonstrations in support of women’s rights in March and October were broken up, sometimes violently, by police, street sweepers, and onlookers suspected of working for the police. In October, when the opposition coalition National Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF) held a demonstration in the center of Baku, police blocked several metro entrances, internet service was cut throughout much of the city, and excessive force was used to detain at least 60 people.
Municipal elections were held on December 23, with independent observers reporting widespread violations. Several major opposition parties decided not to participate, due partly to the lack of any real authority in the municipal councils and partly to the repressive electoral environment excluding any possibility of free and fair elections. The opposition complained of obstruction in its attempts to organize, and the leader of the Republican Alternative Party (ReAL), former political prisoner Ilgar Mammadov, lost an appeal to wipe his record of the criminal conviction that bars him from running for public office. Notably however, as the election approached, youth activists organized a campaign to register themselves as candidates to encourage public participation in the electoral process. Many of them were allowed to register, and one, Vafa Naghi, was actually elected, becoming the first feminist activist to serve in municipal government in Azerbaijan.
In 2020, the February snap parliamentary elections, the ongoing generational shift within the government, and the public’s increasing political engagement may result in a certain amount of volatility. Additionally, the long-awaited partnership agreement between Azerbaijan and the EU may finally be signed even as President Aliyev’s rhetoric becomes more anti-European.
| Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 1.00 / 7.00 |
| Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
| Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
| Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 1.00 / 7.00 |
| Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 1.50 / 7.00 |
| Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 1.00 / 7.00 |
| Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 1.00 / 7.00 |
Author: Robert Denis is an editor, translator, and contributor at Baku Research Institute.
The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.
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