Overview: Throughout 2018, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS-Yemen, Hizballah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), and other Iran-backed terrorist groups, continued to exploit the political and security vacuum created by the ongoing conflict between the Yemeni government under the leadership of President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, backed by a Saudi-led coalition, and the Iran-backed Houthi forces. Additionally, IRGC-QF has exploited the conflict to expand its influence in Yemen. UN and other reporting has highlighted the growing connection between the IRGC-QF and the Houthis, including the provision of lethal aid used by the Houthis to target civilian sites in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In Yemen, Houthi attacks enabled by U.S.-designated Iranian entities or proxies targeted military and civilian sites, primarily associated with Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) and Saudi-led coalition members. Media reports suggest that other FTOs, such as Hizballah, may also be supporting the Houthis. The Saudi-led coalition continued its air campaign to restore the legitimacy of the ROYG, which it started in March 2015.  The ROYG, in partnership with the Saudi-led coalition, controlled the majority of Yemeni territory at the end of 2018, including the population centers of Aden, Al Ghaydah, Mukalla, and Ta’izz. Houthi forces controlled the capital of Sana’a and surrounding northwest highlands, and largely controlled the port city of Hudaydah, among other areas. AQAP retained a significant area of influence inside Yemen, though the terrorist group suffered setbacks caused by counterterrorism pressure.

The ROYG cooperated closely with the U.S. government on counterterrorism efforts. However, because of the instability and violence in Yemen, and because of its own degraded capabilities, the ROYG cannot effectively enforce counterterrorism measures.  A large security vacuum persists, which gives AQAP and ISIS-Yemen more room to operate.  Counterterrorism gains in 2018 continued to remove key leaders and complicate AQAP’s freedom of movement, but AQAP and ISIS-Yemen continued to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the country, including in government-held territory. UAE-backed Yemeni forces continued to play a significant role in counterterrorism efforts.

ISIS-Yemen remained considerably smaller in size and influence compared with AQAP, but it remained operationally active and continued to claim attacks against AQAP, Yemeni security forces, and the Houthis.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: AQAP and ISIS-Yemen terrorists carried out hundreds of attacks throughout Yemen in 2018. Methods included suicide bombers, VBIEDs, ambushes, armed clashes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. The following list details a small fraction of the incidents that occurred:

• On February 24, suspected ISIS terrorists and car suicide bombers targeted the headquarters of a Yemeni counterterrorism unit in Aden, killing at least 14 people and wounding more than 40 others.
• On June 14, AQAP conducted a complex attack targeting UAE-backed forces in al-Wada’a district in Abyan governorate.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Yemen made no significant changes to its counterterrorism legal framework or to its law enforcement and border security procedures in 2018. Yemen does not have comprehensive counterterrorism legislation and no progress was made owing to the state of unrest and because most of Yemen’s government remained in exile until November, at which point the Prime Minister directed most of the country’s ministers to move to the ROYG’s temporary capital of Aden. Owing to a lack of resources and organization, police forces throughout the country struggle to exert authority.

Draft counterterrorism legislation has been pending in the parliament since 2008.  Before the political instability in the capital, the draft was under review by the three parliamentary subcommittees responsible for counterterrorism law issues (Legal and Constitutional Affairs; Security and Defense; and Codification of Sharia Law).  The law would facilitate the detention of suspects and include mandatory sentencing for several terrorism-related crimes. There have been no clear moves to implement legal structures compliant with UNSCR 2178, relating to countering foreign terrorists. There are limited commercial flights operating out of airports in Yemen, and the government did not have the capacity or resources to implement UNSCR 2309 mandates on aviation security.

Before March 2015, the National Security Agency and President’s Office drafted a National Counterterrorism Strategy. A ministerial committee reviewed the draft but was unable to finalize its task because of developments in the country. Thus, Yemen’s National Counterterrorism Strategy had not been officially adopted or implemented by the end of 2018.

Yemen employs the U.S.-provided PISCES in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Despite the conflict, Yemen has been able to maintain traveler screening at a limited number of points of entry.

In past years, the Yemeni government’s coast guard played a critical role in interdicting weapons and other illegal materials destined for Yemen-based terrorist groups, although the nation’s maritime borders remained extremely porous because of a lack of capacity. The central southern coast remains highly vulnerable to maritime smuggling of fighters, weapons, materials, and goods used to support AQAP and ISIS-Yemen. During 2018, the United States planned multiple training courses for more than 140 land border and coast guard personnel. These courses, funded by the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, provided hands-on training in Saudi Arabia and Seychelles to conduct illicit weapons interdiction operations at sea and in port, focusing on conventional weapons, explosives, ammunition, man-portable air-defense systems (known as MANPADS, or MPADS), ballistic missile components, and WMD materials. U.S. partners provided training and technical assistance in several counterterrorism-related areas, although the conflict hampered in-country efforts in 2018.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: There were no significant changes in 2018. Yemen is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). Owing to a lack of judicial capacity and territorial control, the Yemeni government is unable to fully implement UNSCRs related to terrorist financing. Since 2010, FATF has identified Yemen as a risk to the international financial system because of its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies.

Countering Violent Extremism: There were no significant changes in 2018.

International and Regional Cooperation: The ROYG continued to cooperate with and be advised by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United States, and other donor countries as it concentrated on working toward a peaceful solution to the conflict. Despite the challenges, the ROYG remained a dependable international partner as it worked to reestablish the rule of law within the territory it holds. Yemen, with the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, participates in the Yemen Security Working Group, which includes high-level military and diplomatic representatives from its three member states, and develops several cooperative capacity-building initiatives for Yemeni military and security forces. For example, in April 2018, Yemen Coast Guard members participated in a four-week training held in the Republic of Seychelles and delivered by the UNODC Maritime Crime Program. Yemen also belongs to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League.