Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Overview

Sources report that the Front for the Liberation of the Northern Regions (Front de libération des régions du Nord, FLN) is a self-defence group (Researcher 22 June 2016; Associate Researcher 21 June 2016; Anthropologist 20 June 2016) created in 2012 (ibid.; Associate Researcher 21 June 2016). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an anthropologist at the French National Centre of Scientific Research (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, CNRS), whose specialties include the nomadic societies of Mali, said that the FLN was created to reconquer northern Mali, which is occupied by the [translation] “mostly Tuareg armed rebellion” (Anthropologist 20 June 2016). The same source also said that it is an [translation] “antiseparatist and nonreligious” movement (ibid.). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an associate researcher at the Africas in the World (Les Afriques dans le monde) research centre [affiliated with the CNRS and the Bordeaux Institute for Political Studies (l’Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux)], who recently published a doctoral thesis on the connections between Islam and politics in Mali, stated the following:

[translation]

The armed self-defence groups, which includes the … FLN, formed … around two sentiments: great animosity toward the Tuareg separatists …; and the Malian government’s inability to free the northern regions from the grips of the armed Tuareg movements, which were later joined by jihadist movements. (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016)

Sources report that the FLN has nearly 700 combatants (ibid.; RFI 24 Mar. 2016; L’Essor 25 July 2012). According to the Anthropologist, [translation] “[i]t is a patriotic ‘pro-Mali’ movement” … with between 700 and 1,700 combatants” (Anthropologist 22 June 2016). However, the same source also indicated that the numbers of group members should be taken [translation] “with great caution because there is no way to verify their accuracy” (ibid.).

Moreover, some sources report that there are also women among the FLN combatants (ibid.; L’Essor 25 July 2012).

According to some sources, the FLN is generally based in the Gao region, in northeast Mali (AFP 22 July 2012; Associate Researcher 19 June 2016). The Associate Researcher stated that the self-defence group also has bases in Timbuktu and in Mopti (ibid.).

Sources indicate that the FLN is part of the Patriotic Resistance Forces (Forces patriotiques de résistance, FPR) [also called Coordination of Movements and Patriotic and Resistance Front (Coordination des mouvements et front patriotique de résistance, CM-FPR)] (Anthropologist 20 June 2016; Researcher 22 June 2016), a group created in 2012 (ibid.; RFI 24 Mar. 2016). According to sources, the FPR was formed to liberate northern Mali from the armed rebel groups (Anthropologist 20 June 2016; Jamestown Foundation 21 Feb. 2014; Associate Researcher 19 June 2016). Sources note that the CM-FPR supports Mali’s central government in Bamako (ibid.; US 25 June 2015, 2). According to several sources, the CM-FPR is made up of the following militias: the FLN, the Alliance of Communities in the Region of Timbuktu (Alliance des communautés de la région de Tombouctou, ACRT), the Armed Force Against the Occupation (Force armée contre l’occupation, FACO), the Centre for Reflection and Action (Centre de réflexion et d’action, CRA), Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo (International Crisis Group 10 Jan. 2014, 17; AFP 22 July 2012; Jamestown Foundation 21 Feb. 2014).

Furthermore, some sources indicate that the CM-FPR is itself part of the Platform (Plateforme) (Maliactu.net 26 Apr. 2016; Researcher 22 June 2016; International Crisis Group 14 Dec. 2015, 3), which is a group of militias that oppose the rebels in defence of the territory of northern Mali (ibid.; Researcher 22 June 2016).

2. Ties to the Songhai

According to Minority Rights Group International (MRG), based on a 2005 Afrobarometer survey, the Songhai are a minority in Mali, representing 10 percent of the population (MRG N.d.). According to the Associate Researcher,

[translation]

the Songhai are predominant in the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, throughout the Niger River valley, and make up part of the “Azawad” territory [territory in northern Mali], so often claimed by the Tuareg armed groups. (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016)

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a doctor of geography and researcher at the Research and Information Group on Peace and Security (Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, GRIP), an independent research centre located in Brussels (GRIP n.d.), who has published numerous articles on Mali, reported that the FLN was [translation] “primarily made up of Songhai,” but that, according to him, it could not be described as an “ethnic militia” because the Songhai are not the only ethnic group involved in it (Researcher 17 June 2016). According to the Anthropologist, the ties between the FLN and the Songhai are [translation] “not necessarily organic,” but “the Front is sensitive to the [Songhai] reality because [they are] very close culturally speaking” (Anthropologist 20 June 2016).

For his part, the Associate Researcher stated the following with respect to the ties between the FLN and the Songhai:

[translation]

[T]he FLN is most certainly an ethnic militia. However, it would be simplistic to assume that the Songhai populations automatically support the FLN. Nevertheless, it would appear that most of its members are Songhai, as well as Fulani, volunteers. Certainly for the simple reason that the Songhai represent the majority ethnic group throughout northern Mali. … FLN leaders insist that not all of its members are Songhai or from the north. Attracted by the “promise” that they will be integrated into the Malian armed forces after winning back the occupied territories, many young people have apparently come from other parts of the country in order to join the movement. (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016)

3. Treatment of FLN members by the state

According to the researcher, there is no conflict between the state and the FLN, which supports the authorities and cooperates with the state (Researcher 17 June 2016). Similarly, the Associate Researcher stated the following concerning the relationship between the FLN and the state:

[translation]

[O]bservers estimate that [the FLN] had the implicit support of the state because [they have] common enemies. From that perspective, it is hard to understand how members could be victims of abuse by the state. Until proven otherwise, cases of abuse have not yet been publically proven. (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016)

Moreover, the Anthropologist stated that, to his knowledge, “the Front has not faced any repressive measures of any shape or form” (Anthropologist 20 June 2016). However, the same source added the following, without providing more details:

[translation]

[T]he state treats them somewhat unfairly, unjustly [compared with the] accommodations that the state makes for the leaders and combatants of the predominantly Tuareg armed rebellions, who signed the Algiers Accord on 20 June 2015. (ibid.)

The Associate Researcher explained that the Algiers Accord was concluded between the government of Mali and the Tuareg separatist movements to ensure a ceasefire between the two sides (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016).

Moreover, some sources report that top FLN leaders complain that they receive no support from the Malian Armed Forces (Forces armées maliennes, FAMA) (Anthropologist 20 June 2016; L’Essor 25 July 2012), who apparently consider them [translation] “as competition,” according to the FLN leader quoted by the Malian daily L’Essor in 2012 (ibid.). Information on the treatment of FLN members by the FAMA could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Treatment of people of Songhai origin by the state

According to the Associate Researcher,

[translation]

[the Songhai] are not subjected to any persecution, or any particular treatment by the Malian government. There is also no indication that they have faced any type of discrimination, either in northern or southern Mali. (Associate Researcher 19 June 2016)

Similarly, without providing additional details, the researcher said that there is [translation] “no discrimination against the Songhai” by the state (Researcher 17 June 2016). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a lecturer at the Brussels School of International Studies, who specializes in the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger, explained the following regarding the treatment of Songhai by the state:

[translation]

[T]he Songhai are an ethnic group in northern Mali. However, the Malian state is centred politically around the Bambara ethnic group, which is predominant in southern Mali. All northern populations are therefore not as close to the centre of power as the Bambara. However, among the northern populations, the Songhai are fairly loyalist. During the recent Tuareg rebellions that shook the country, they were primarily aligned along state positions. Their youth were trained in pro-government militias. Many of their representatives occupy high-level positions with the government or belong to the “Platform.” … The Songhai do not face any particular discrimination in Mali. (Lecturer 19 June 2016)

According to sources, any potential threats or abuse would come not from the state but from other armed groups (Anthropologist 20 June 2016; Associate Researcher 19 June 2016).

However, according to a Human Rights Watch report, four Arabs and one Songhai were missing at the time the report was published in March 2014 (Human Rights Watch 20 Mar. 2014). Family members and neighbours told Human Rights Watch that they were arrested in February 2013 by Malian soldiers in Timbuktu (ibid.). Additional information on these disappearances could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to interviews conducted by the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), whose mission is to “improve protection for civilians caught in conflicts around the world” (CIVIC N.d.),

incidents of civilian harm attributed to the FAMA are primarily targeted abuses against Tuareg and Arab communities, with Songhai and Bellah also affected. (ibid. 2015, 34)

That same source notes the following statements, which were collected during an interview in March 2015 in the Timbuktu region:

We [Songhai] are also victims of security forces because of the existence of young Songhai men within armed groups. Until peace is found …, there will always be abuse. (ibid., 43)

The following appears in the joint report of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), published in March 2015:

Based on comparative statistics from the [OCHCR] Human Rights Division, there were 150 cases of arbitrary arrest undertaken by FAMA between 1 November and 31 May 2014, including 78 Tuareg, 31 Arabs, 16 Songhai and 1 French individual. (UN 20 Mar. 2015, para. 38)

Additional information on the treatment of the Songhai by Malian authorities could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 22 July 2012. “Mali : formation de groupes d’autodéfense pour ‘libérer’ le Nord.” [Accessed 14 June 2016]

Anthropologist, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), France. 22 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Anthropologist, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), France. 20 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Associate Researcher, Les Afriques dans le monde (LAM), Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux. 21 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Associate Researcher, Les Afriques dans le monde (LAM), Institut d’études politiques de Bordeaux. 19 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). 2015. Heather Sonner and Kyle Dietrich. Fending for Ourselves: The Civilian Impact of Mali’s Three-Year Conflict. [Accessed 14 June 2016]

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). N.d. “Who We Are.” [Accessed 5 July 2016]

L’Essor. 25 July 2012. “Camps de volontaires de Mopti : Ce sont les armes qui manquent le plus.” [Accessed 28 June 2016]

Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP). N.d. “À propos du Grip.” [Accessed 29 June 2016]

Human Rights Watch. 20 March 2014. “Mali: Letter to President Keita on Ending Impunity for Grave Human Rights Abuses.” [Accessed 24 June 2016]

International Crisis Group. 14 December 2015. Mali: la paix venue d’en bas? [Accessed 14 June 2016]

International Crisis Group. 10 January 2014. Mali : réformer ou rechuter. [Accessed 10 June 2016]

Jamestown Foundation. 21 February 2014. Andrew McGregor. “Mali’s Ganda Iso Militia Splits Over Support for Tuareg Rebel Group.” Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 12, No. 4. [Accessed 10 June 2016]

Lecturer, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent. 19 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Maliactu.net. 26 April 2016. Abdoulaye Guindo. “Mali : Groupes d’autodéfense du Nord : qui sont-ils et que veulent-ils?” (Factiva)

Minority Rights Group International (MRG). N.d. “Mali. Peoples.” World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. [Accessed 14 June 2016]

Radio France internationale (RFI). 24 March 2016. Arnaud Jouve. “Forces et groupes armés au Mali : Qui est qui?” [Accessed 14 June 2016]

Researcher, Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP). 22 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Researcher, Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP). 17 June 2016. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

United Nations (UN). 20 March 2015. United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OCHCR) and United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali du 1er novembre 2013 au 31 mai 2014. [Accessed 10 June 2016]

United States (US). 25 June 2015. Department of State. “Mali.” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014. [Accessed 10 June 2016]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Aberfoyle International Security; Association malienne des droits de l’homme; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Civilians in Conflict; Commission nationale des droits de l’homme; journalist, RFI; Professor of anthropology, Université du Québec à Montréal; Professor of history, Columbia University.

Internet sites, including: Amnesty International; BBC; ecoi.net; Factiva; Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’homme; Freedom House; Human Rights Quarterly; Institute for War and Peace Reporting; IRIN; Jane’s Intelligence Review; Jane’s Terrorism Watch Report; United Nations – Refworld; United States – Congressional Research Services, Department of State.