In einer Analyse der International Crisis Group (ICG) vom November 2007 wird die Rolle von Gruppen, die unter dem Banner des Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) oder Badr operierten, näher beleuchtet. Diese Gruppen hätten begonnen, Informationen über Sunniten und frühere Baathisten in der Nachbarschaft zu sammeln und diese Listen an Sicherheitspersonal, das mit SCIRI in Verbindung stehe, weitergegeben. Ein Muster der Schikanierung und der Druckausübung gegen Sunniten habe sich entwickelt, einige Baathisten seien in der Nachbarschaft ermordet worden, und andere seien zur Flucht gezwungen worden:

“At a later stage, some people in the neighbourhood began offering assistance to police, army and security forces. This provided them with acceptance among the wider local community, and they began to establish groups under the banner of SCIRI or Badr that grew as more and more people offered their allegiance, including by going to mosques or attending events at huseiniyas (Shiite places of worship); we don’t know for real their association or how deeply felt it was. These groups started collecting information about Sunnis in the neighbourhood and making inventories; they also gathered information about former Baathists. I found out from friends and neighbours that these lists were passed on to security personnel affiliated with SCIRI. A pattern of harassment and pressure emerged against Sunnis, usually under some pretext, even a silly one like a problem with women or children, and always under the banner of Islam and Shiism. They did this to establish domination and control. A number of Baathists were assassinated in the area, and others were forced to flee.“ (ICG, 15 November 2007, S. 13-14)

Auch in einem Herkunftsländerinformationsbericht von UNHCR vom Oktober 2005 wird erwähnt, dass die Badr-Brigaden beschuldigt werden, eine Reihe von früheren Vertretern der Baath-Partei und Mitglieder des früheren Sicherheitsapparats ermordet zu haben, wobei sie sich Listen zunutze gemacht hätten und von Straflosigkeit profitiert hätten:

“Since the fall of the former regime, the Badr Brigade has been accused of killing numbers of former Ba’ath party officials and members of the former security and intelligence services, making use of hit lists and benefiting from impunity. It has been reported that since the Shiites won the 30 January 2005 elections, increased attacks against former Ba’athists have taken place.” (UNHCR, Oktober 2005, S. 61)

Im Dezember 2005 berichtet die Zeitung Asia Times von einem nicht offiziell bestätigten Dokument, laut dem es Pläne seitens einer schiitischen Miliz gebe, prominente Sunniten zu ermorden. Das Dokument soll eine Liste von sieben prominenten Sunniten enthalten, die „unter Beobachtung“ stünden. Das Dokument sei mit 6. November [vermutlich 2005, Anm. ACCORD] datiert und trage den Briefkopf von SCIRI, deren bewaffneter Flügel die Badr-Organisation ist. Die Zeitung gibt an, sie habe das Schriftstück von einer dem „irakischen Widerstand“ nahe stehenden Person erhalten:

“A Shi'ite militia has drawn up plans to kill prominent Sunni leaders and eliminate a nascent Sunni political party, according to a document obtained by Asia Times Online from a person close to the Iraqi resistance. The document, which has not been officially acknowledged, carries the letterhead of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the political party of which the Badr Organization is the armed wing. The SCIRI is headed by Shi'ite cleric Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a leading contender to become Iraq's next premier. Recently, a secret prison allegedly run by elements in the Iraqi Interior Ministry loyal to the SCIRI was discovered. One of Hakim's main opponents is former prime minister Iyad Allawi, a secular US-backed politician who leads a broad multi-ethnic coalition of Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds.

The document obtained by Asia Times Online, dated November 6, says, "After Eid ul-Fitr [the end of the holy month of Ramadan at the end of November] the people whose names are listed below are under observation. These people belong to movements which are suspected. They are the people because of whom a deviant group has emerged which is destined to destroy the peace of the country and suspend the functions of the government. "These people started their [sabotage] activities soon after the respected [Ibrahim] Jaafari government was established. Their evil and deviant activities were not helped by God nor with any support from the pious family members [of the Prophet Mohammed] , while our leader Syed Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim already opposed this group. This group was established with the name of the Islamic Party [of Iraq - the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood] with broader aims and is also involved in terror activities. They also hold meetings of Muslim scholars. They hold meetings at the residence of Khalid Jamal al-Ubiedi, who is prayer leader of Tabarak mosque in the region of Doura Street 62 and is a challenge."

The Islamic Party of Iraq, from the central regions of the country, is expected to do well in this week's elections for a new 275-member National Assembly that will serve a four-year term. [1] This would give political representation and legitimacy to the resistance in the legislature, and complicate US designs for Iraq. The document continues: "The information we acquired demands that the office of the Islamic Party established in this region should be shut so that Muslims and Christians can lead a secure life. This is very much in line with Iraqi law section number 618.

"The people under observation are:

1 Al-Shiekh Jamal Khalid al-Ubaidi

2 Abdul Qadir Mehmood al-Khalidi

3 Omar Saleem al-Hizbul Islami (Islamic Party of Iraq)

4 Sohaib Jamal al-Ubaidi (son of Jamal Khalid al-Ubaidi)

5 Abdul Sattar Shakir al-Douri (Muslim Scholars Association)

6 Nadam Qasim Dilshad al-Hizbul Islami al-Kurdi (Islamic Party of Kurdistan)

7 Abdullah Ibrahim Hamadi, former ruler of the region during former regime.” (Asia Times Online, 17. Dezember 2005)

Der Artikel von Asia Times erwähnt auch, dass die Aktivitäten der Badr-Organisation gegen arabische Sunniten mit der gezielten Verfolgung von früheren Luftwaffenoffizieren und –piloten begonnen habe. Die Kontaktpersonen der Zeitung aus dem „irakischen Widerstand“ seien sicher, dass die Badr-Organisation hinter der Ermordung von drei Dutzend Luftwaffenangehörigen stehe und dass sie vom iranischen Geheimdienst Informationen über die Opfer erhalten hätte. Der „irakische Widerstand“ sei jedoch überrascht, wie eine Liste von Offizieren, die in Pakistan ausgebildet worden waren, in die Hände von Badr gelangen konnte:

“According to contacts that Asia Times Online spoke to in Iraq, the activities of the Badr Organization against Arab Sunnis started with the targeting of former Iraqi Air Force officers and pilots. Several of the pilots were assassinated, including some who had flown aircraft to Iran for safekeeping during the first Gulf War in 1991. A number of these Iraqi pilots and officers had been trained in Pakistan during the 1980s.

The contacts said that over three dozen former Iraqi Air Force personnel have been killed. The Iraqi resistance is sure that the Badr Organization is behind most of the killings, having been provided information on some of the targets by Iranian intelligence. However, the Iraqi resistance is surprised how a list of the officers trained in Pakistan was handed over to Badr. The only possible conduit is Pakistan's cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under which it provided the list to the CIA, and it was then passed on to Badr.” (Asia Times, 17. Dezember 2005)

In einem Beitrag der NGO Science and Development Network vom Juni 2006 wird berichtet, dass irakische Attentäter auf über 400 Wissenschaftler, Universitätsangestellte, Ingenieure, Ärzte und Journalisten angesetzt worden seien, deren Namen auf einer Liste aufscheinen würde, die von einer unbekannten Gruppe in Umlauf gebracht worden sei. Das amerikanische Wissenschaftsmagazin Science habe berichtet, dass es eine von irakischen Wissenschaftlern als authentisch eingestufte Kopie der Liste erhalten habe. Schätzungen zufolge seien seit dem Sturz des Saddam-Regimes zwischen 200 und tausend Akademiker ermordet worden. Die Verfasser der Liste seien unbekannt, die irakischen Ermittler würden jedoch Hinweisen nachgehen, wonach iranische Geheimdienstmitarbeiter daran beteiligt sein sollen. Frühere Mitglieder der Baath-Partei seien als Attentäter in die Morde involviert, ebenso seien aber Wissenschaftler, die mit dem früheren Regime in Verbindung gebracht würden, in offenkundigen Racheakten ermordet worden:

“Iraqi assassins are being asked to take aim at hundreds of intellectuals whose names appear on a hit list circulating in the country by an unknown group. The list's existence suggests that the ongoing assassination of Iraqi academics is more organised and systematic than previously thought. Leaflets calling for the murder of 461 named individuals were described in an article published last month by the newspaper Az-Zaman.

The US-based magazine Science reports today (30 June) that it has obtained a copy of the list, verified as authentic by several Iraqi scientists. It names scientists, university officials, engineers, doctors and journalists in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. Since the invasion of Iraq in April 2003, the number of attacks on academics has risen steadily. The death toll is difficult to determine, but estimates range from 200 to over 1,000 (See Nearly 200 Iraqi academics killed since 2003).

The authors of the hit list are unknown. Iraqi investigators are looking at claims that Iranian intelligence agents are involved, reports Science. Also unknown are the motives for the killings, but religious and political sectarianism appear to be playing a significant role.

Former members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party are implicated in the killings as assassins, while some scientists associated with the old regime have been murdered in apparent acts of revenge. Meanwhile, Sunni militias are targeting Shiite academics, and vice versa. Money is certainly a motivating factor behind many attacks, as kidnappers often demand a ransom before they commit a murder, reported Nature yesterday (29 June).

Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, an Iraqi microbiologist at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, told Nature that the insurgency has undermined much-needed university construction efforts "beyond belief". More than 2,000 scientists are thought to have fled Iraq. Those staying put are trying to keep the universities open, but the killings — which usually happen on their way to and from work — are unlikely to stop soon.” (Science and Development Network, 30. Juni 2006)

Auch die Wissenschaftsmagazine Science und Nature berichten im Juni 2006 über diese „Todeslisten“:

Science: Targeted for Murder, Iraqi Scientists Named on a Hit List (Autor: Richard Stone), 30. Juni 2006

Nature: Special Report Scientists become targets in Iraq, 29. Juni 2006

 

Die Jamestown Foundation berichtet im Oktober 2006 in ihrer Publikationsreihe Terrorism Focus von einer im September in Umlauf gebrachten „Todesliste“ der verbotenen Baath-Partei. Die Liste enthalte unter anderem die Namen bekannter schiitische Führer in der neuen Regierung und in den Sicherheitsdiensten. Der Beitrag erwähnt, dass gezielte Tötungen eine sehr effiziente Taktik der Aufständischen darstellten und dass auch schiitische Milizen ihre eigenen „Todeslisten“ hätten:

„In early September, the outlawed Baath party distributed a "hit list" of prominent Iraqi political, military and judicial leaders who were targeted for assassination (al-Watan, October 17). It resurfaced publicly this month and has been widely reported in the Iraqi press. The Baath party document was issued by the "Martyr Qusay Unit" (in reference to Saddam Hussein's slain son) of the Dhi Qar Special Operations Command and was addressed to the commanders of Baath party special units. The document stated that the communiqué was approved by the secretary general of the party and acting commander-in-chief of the armed forces, a reference to Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri who remains on the most wanted list.

Many individuals on the list were former exiles and internal opposition leaders that survived years of attempted assassinations by Saddam's regime and became prominent political figures in the new democratic government. First on the list is Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and scion of the prominent al-Hakim family. Al-Hakim has had 12 of his brothers killed at the hands of Saddam. Al-Hakim is also a prime target because he is a strong advocate of federalism and the re-organization of Iraq into three regional, largely ethnic based blocs, a plan which many nationalist Iraqis fear will lead to the break up of the country (Gulf Times, October 28). The list is populated mostly by well-known Shiite leaders in the new government and security services, along with Moqtada al-Sadr and his senior associates.

Secular leaders are not spared. Ayad Allawi, who has survived several assassination attempts by Saddam's men, is also on the list. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Regional Government leader Massoud Barzani, who put up fierce resistance to Saddam's regime, are also singled out. Neither does the Baath party list discount their fellow Sunni Arab compatriots who are part of the unity government. Shammar tribal leader Ghazi al-Yawr and Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi are also included.

Assassination of opposition leaders was a common tactic of Saddam's reign and has become a ubiquitous practice within the insurgency. Hundreds of lesser known community leaders, such as teachers, doctors, professors and other intellectuals, have quietly been targeted and killed by insurgents. Targeted assassination has become an extremely effective insurgent tactic. Assassinations undermine the fledgling government by depriving it of its nascent leadership, stifling the new government before it establishes itself and makes its institutions more secure. It hinders the unity government's efforts to bring people together and persuade them to cooperate in the building of the new Iraq. Citizens cannot feel free to cooperate and participate in a new government if they believe doing so will surely lead to their death. The assassination list undermines ongoing negotiations with Sunni tribal elements and resistance forces that are on the fence about whether to join the new government.

The order called for not only the assassination of the listed individuals, but also their "first, second and third degree relatives." The instruction to kill "first, second and third degree relatives" is a trademark Saddam tactic. It was a common practice of Saddam during his reign to destroy both his enemy and anyone on his enemy's side that could exact revenge for their killing. The decision for Iraqis who are considering taking on a leadership role within society not only becomes about whether they personally want to take the risk, but also whether they are willing to put their entire family at risk. Likewise, Shiite militias have also come up with their own hit lists. The cult of assassination has taken hold in Iraq and is an integral tool not only of the Sunni Arab insurgency, but also of renegade Shiite groups.“ (Jamestown Foundation, 31. Oktober 2006)

In einem Artikel der Washington Post vom Juni 2007 wird erwähnt, dass die Mitarbeiter des 2004 gegründeten offiziellen irakischen nationalen Nachrichtendienstes INIS entdeckt hätten, dass der Iran über eine Liste (hit list) mit Namen und Adressen von Offizieren des alten Regimes verfügte. Der Chef von INIS, General Mohammed Shahwani, sei selbst eine der Personen gewesen, auf die der Iran ein Attentat geplant hätte. Bis zum Berichtszeitpunkt seien bereits 140 Mitarbeiter des INIS getötet worden:

“The official Iraqi National Intelligence Service, or INIS, was established in February 2004 as a nonsectarian force that would recruit its officers and agents from all of Iraq's religious communities. Its chief, Gen. Mohammed Shahwani, is a Sunni from Mosul(Washington Post, 14. Juni 2007). [...] The rival spy agency, called the Ministry of Security, was created last year under the direction of Sheerwan al-Waeli. He is a former colonel in the Iraqi army who served in Nasiriyah under the old regime. He is said to have received training in Iran and to be maintaining regular liaison with Iranian and Syrian intelligence officers in Baghdad. His service, like Shahwani's organization, has about 5,000 officers. [...] Shahwani's operatives discovered in 2004 that the Iranians had a hit list, drawn from an old Defense Ministry payroll document that identified the names and home addresses of senior officers who served under the former regime. Shahwani himself was among those targeted for assassination by the Iranians. To date, about 140 officers in the INIS have been killed.”

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine aktuelleren Informationen zu Todeslisten gefunden werden.

 

Quellen:(Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 9. Oktober 2009)

 

Asia Times Online: Sunnis on hit list (Autor: Syed Saleem Shahzad), 17. Dezember 2005

ICG – International Crisis Group: Shiite politics in Iraq: the role of the Supreme Council, 15. November 2007

Jamestown Foundation: Baath Party Distributes Hit List for Targeted Assassinations, Terrorism Focus Volume 3, Issue 42, 31. Oktober 2006

Science and Development Network: Hit list names hundreds of Iraqi scientists, 30. Juni 2006

UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Country of Origin Information Iraq, Oktober 2005

Washington Post: A Sectarian Spy Duel In Baghdad (Autor: David Ignatius), 14. Juni 2007