a-5466 (ACC-SOM-5466)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Situation der Asharaf (auch Ashraf, Ashraaf, Asheraf und Sharifians geschrieben)
Der Refugee Council of Australia rechnet in einem Bericht vom Februar 2006 die Ashraf den besonders schutzbedürftigen Gruppen in Somalia zu:
 
“Those in most need of protection are:
· female headed households
· women at risk, including trafficked girls;
· members of minority ethnic groups such as Bantu, Benadiri and Midgan;
· members of the Tumal and Yibro occupational groups of metal-workers,leather-workers, hairdressers, herbalists and others and;
· religious minority groups such as the Ashraf and Shikhal Muslims.” (Refugee Council of Australia, Februar 2006, S. 36)
In einem aktuellen Bericht vom 2. Mai 2007 berichtet Amnesty International (AI) von der Lage somalischer Flüchtlinge beziehungsweise Binnenvertriebener nach der Schließung der Grenze zwischen Somalia und Kenia.  Amnesty International sprach mit einigen Flüchtlingen somalischer Minderheitengruppen, die nicht unter dem Schutz eines Klans stünden. Die meisten von ihnen hätten angegeben, dass sie von verschiedenen bewaffneten Gruppen wie Kämpfern islamistischer Milizen oder Klanmilizen wegen ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu Minderheitengruppen verfolgt worden seien. Unter anderem sei es zu Zwangsrekrutierungen durch bewaffnete Gruppen gekommen. Amnesty International gibt auch die Aussage einer Frau wieder, die der ethnischen Gruppe der Ashraf angehört und aus Somalia geflüchtet ist:
“Amnesty International talked to a number of refugees from the Somali minority groups, who have no clan protection. Most of them asserted that they had been specifically targeted for persecution by the different armed groups such as COSIC [Council of Somali Islamic Courts, Anm. ACCORD] fighters or clan-based armed or militia groups, solely on the basis of being minorities and not members of a clan. According to the refugees, this often resulted in targeted attacks on them and their families resulting in deaths and injuries, the looting of their belongings and property, and their forced conscription into armed groups.(17) Narrating why she fled Somalia to seek refuge in Kenya in December 2006, Safia, a 24-year old mother of two from the Ashraf religious minority, had the following to say regarding systematic attacks on minorities and a pattern of lack of protection for members of different minority groups:
"Before coming to Kenya in December 2006, I lived with my husband in Baidoa town in Somalia and I used to be a vendor of groceries in one of the local markets. We fled Somalia because of persecution related to the fighting around Baidoa between TFG and COSIC forces. There were also other clan-based armed militia operating in Baidoa involved on either side of the fighting. The main clan-based militia was from the Rahenwein, one of the majority clans in Baidoa. When coming from the market after my day’s work, the armed fighters from this clan-based militia would stop us on our way home and loot all we had, leaving us with nothing to take home. They would also come to our homes and beat us up. In one such attack my husband and I were beaten for several hours. We decided to flee Somalia on one particular day in October/November 2006 when fighters from this clan-based militia attacked our home while I was in the market. I reached home only to realize that they had looted property in the house and that my husband and kids had fled the house. I later managed to trace them and we decided to leave Somalia by hiding and walking through the bushes surrounding Baidoa. These attacks happened to other Ashraf families and I believe we were targeted for no reason other than that we were members of this minority."(18) (AI, 2. Mai 2007, Kap. 2)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten im Rahmen einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine weiteren Informationen beziehungsweise Einschätzungen zur aktuellen Lage der Asharaf in Somalia gefunden werden. Ältere Informationen beziehungsweise aktuelle Berichte, die auf Verfolgung in der Vergangenheit Bezug nehmen, entnehmen Sie bitte folgenden Dokumenten:
UNHCR berichtet in einem Artikel vom 25. August 2006 von einem Gruppen-„Resettlement“-Programm, im Zuge dessen Asharaf aus Somalia in die USA umgesiedelt werden. Die Verfolgung des Minderheitenclans der Asharaf, schreibt UNHCR, sei umfangreich dokumentiert. Zu Schikanen sei es nach dem Sturz des Regimes von Siad Barre im Jahr 1991 gekommen und die Asharaf hätten wegen ihrer Clanidentität während des Bürgerkrieges unter schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen gelitten. 1992 hätte die Familie Salat [Angehörige der Asharaf] keine andere Möglichkeit gehabt, als aus Kismayo in Sudöst-Somalia zu flüchten. Weiters berichtet UNHCR auch von Problemen der Familie in einem Flüchtlingslager in Ostkenia, wo diese zwölf Jahre lang gelebt habe. Auch im Exil habe die Familie die Verfolgung und Vorurteile nicht abschütteln können. Die älteste Tochter der Familie erzählt in dem Artikel, dass sie im Lager als Asharaf einen besonders niedrigen Status gehabt hätten:
“Eldest sister Fatuma, 22, explains that they are flying to Seattle as part of the Asharaf group resettlement programme. The persecution of the Asharaf minority clan in Somalia has been widely documented. Their victimization was severely compounded after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, and they continued to suffer gross human rights abuses on account of their clan identity during the civil war.
In 1992, the Salat family had no other option but to flee Kismayo in south-eastern Somalia. "So many people fled with us, so many fell and died along the way," recalls Fatuma. "We were hungry and we saw our fellows die of starvation. Our father was one of those who perished along the roadside."
The sisters and their mother eventually arrived in Dagahaley camp in Dadaab, eastern Kenya, and settled there for 12 long years. But even in exile, they could not shake off the persecution and prejudices they thought they had left behind in Somalia.
"When we arrived in Dagahaley all those years ago, we were relieved to have fled the civil war, but clan rivalries persisted in the camp," says Fatuma. "There, like in Somalia, everyone wants to be a ruler. And as Asharaf we were the lowest of the low."” (UNHCR, 25. August 2005)
Ein Artikel der Los Angeles Times vom 12. September 2006 berichtet ebenfalls von einem amerikanischen Einwanderungsprogramm für Somalier. Die Los Angeles Times schreibt dazu, die meisten Teilnehmer kämen von verfolgten ethnischen Gruppen und Clans, wie den Bantu oder Ashraf, die die ersten gewesen seien, die nach dem Kollaps des Regimes von Mohamed Siad Barre im Jahr 1991 das bisschen Eigentum, das sie gehabt hätten, verloren hätten:
“For most of the students, ranging in age from 4 to 65, it's a steep learning curve. They've spent much of their lives fleeing Somalia's 15-year civil war, scrambling to survive in the bush or toiling in squalid refugee camps. Most come from persecuted ethnic groups and clans, such as the Bantu or Ashraf, that were the first to lose what little property they had after the collapse of Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in 1991. Now those same injustices have made them eligible to escape to the United States.” (Los Angeles Times, 12. September 2006)
Laut dem Bericht des Danish Immigration Service (DIS) zu Minderheitenclans in Somalia vom 1. November 2000 hätten Ashraf-Ältere gegenüber dem DIS festgestellt, dass es mehrere Gründe gebe, weshalb Mitglieder der Ashraf-Gemeinschaft aus Somalia geflohen seien. Bis zu einem gewissen Grad würden die Ashraf in Somalia von den großen somalischen Clans als „Fremde“ gesehen. Die Ashraf behaupteten, aus Arabien zu stammen und würden von den anderen Somalis „Araber“ genannt. Sie würden als schwache, unbewaffnete religiöse Gruppe ohne soziale oder gesetzliche Rechte betrachtet. Nach Aussage der Ashraf-Älteren sei ihre Identität als spezifische ethnische Gruppe seit dem Krieg geschwächt worden, da Ashraf-Frauen entführt, vergewaltigt oder gezwungen worden seien, Mitglieder anderer somalischer Clans zu heiraten. Während die Ashraf-Älteren geschätzt hätten, dass die meisten Ashraf aus Somalia geflohen seien, sei eine unbekannte Zahl in Somalia geblieben - diejenigen, die keine Mittel hätten, das Land zu verlassen. Noch immer würden einige Personen das Land verlassen. Diejenigen, die in Somalia geblieben seien, seien der Gnade der anderen somalischen Clans ausgeliefert. Sie hätten keinen Schutz von einem anderen Clan, da die Ashraf mit keinem der großen somalischen Clans in irgendeiner Weise verwandt oder verbündet seien. Als religiöse Gruppe hätten die Ashraf keine bewaffnete Miliz, wie sie andere Clans hätten. Sie würden sich in keinem Landesteil Somalias als sicher betrachten, das sie kein traditionelles Heimatgebiet hätten, das unter ihrer Kontrolle stehen würde. Sie seien eine städtische Bevölkerungsgruppe ohne ein größeres traditionelles Wohngebiet. Heute seien sie gefährdet, von Mitgliedern der anderen somalischen Clans und Milizen geplündert, vergewaltigt oder sogar getötet zu werden:
“The Ashraf elders stated that there are several reasons why members of the Ashraf community have fled Somalia. To some degree members of the Ashraf are considered as 'strangers' in Somalia by the major Somali clans. The Ashraf claim to originate in Arabia and are called "Arabs" by other Somalis. They are considered to be a weak, unarmed religious group with no social or legal rights.
The Ashraf elders stated that their identity as a specific ethnic group has been weakened since the war, as Ashraf women have been abducted, raped or forced into marriage with members of other Somali clans.
While the Ashraf elders estimated that most Ashraf have left Somalia as refugees, an unknown number still remain in Somalia, the ones that lacked any means with which to leave, and some are still leaving the country. Those who are left behind inside Somalia are living at the mercy of the other Somali clans. They have no protection from any other clan as the Ashraf are not related or allied in any way to any of the major Somali clans. As a religious group the Ashraf do not have an armed militia as many other clans have. They do not consider themselves safe in any part of Somalia, as they do not have a traditional home area of their own that they control. They are an urban population with no larger traditional residential area. Today they are at risk of being looted, raped and even killed by members of other Somali clans and militias.
The Ashraf are a religious clan but they are not supporters of armed Islamic fundamentalist groups such as Al-Ittihad; on the contrary, they fear Al-Ittihad. For this reason the Ashraf prefer not to relocate within Somalia to Puntland, where Al-Ittihad has had some influence in recent years.” (DIS, 1. November 2000, S. 43, 45)
Situation der Rer Hamer (auch Rer Hamar, Reer Hamar, Rer Hamaar oder Rerhamar geschrieben); allgemeine Lage von Minderheitengruppen in Somalia
Laut dem im März 2007 veröffentlichten Jahresbericht des US Department of State (USDOS) zur Menschenrechtslage im Jahr 2006 gehören die Rer Hamer beziehungsweise Rer Hamar den Minderheitenclans in Somalia an. Das USDOS beschreibt die Lage der Minderheitenclans wie folgt:
“There were 31 members of the minority Bantu or Arab ethnic groups in the 275-seat Transitional Federal Parliament and four in the TFG cabinet. The Somaliland parliament and cabinet had no members of minority groups.
NGOs documented patterns of rape of women with impunity, particularly of women displaced from their homes due to civil conflict or who were members of minority clans. Police and militia members raped women, and rape was commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts.
More than 85 percent of the population shared a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomad-influenced culture. In most areas members of groups other than the predominant clan were excluded from effective participation in governing institutions and were subject to discrimination in employment, judicial proceedings, and access to public services.
Minority groups and low-caste clans included the Bantu (the largest minority group), the Benadiri, Rer Hamar, Brawanese, Swahili, Tumal, Yibir, Yaxar, Madhiban, Hawrarsame, Muse Dheryo, and Faqayaqub. The UNIE estimated that minority groups may constitute a higher percentage of the population than previously thought--perhaps as many as two million persons (around 22 percent of the estimated population). In the absence of any census data for the past 30 years any demographic statement can only be an estimate. Intermarriage between minority groups and mainstream clans was restricted. Minority groups had no armed militias and continued to be disproportionately subject to killings, torture, rapes, kidnappings for ransom, and looting of land and property with impunity by faction militias and majority clan members. Many minority communities continued to live in deep poverty and to suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.
It could not be confirmed whether it continued to be the case, as had been reported the previous year, that local clan militias forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without compensation or that in Middle and Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle Bantus were used as forced labor.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Sektion 3, Sektion 5, Sektion 6.c.)
Das UK Home Office gibt in seiner „Operational Guidance Note“ vom 4. April 2007 folgende Informationen zu den Benadiri (Rer Hamar) und Bravanese:
“Treatment. Somalis with no clan affiliation are the most vulnerable to serious human rights violations, including predatory acts by criminal and militias, as well as economic, political, cultural and social discrimination. These groups comprise an estimated two million people, or about one third of the Somali population and include the Benadiri (Rer Hamar) and Bravanese.32
The Benadiri are an urban people of East African Swahili origin. They all lost property during the war and the majority of Benadiri fled to Kenya. Those that remain live mainly in the coastal cities of Mogadishu, Merka and Brava. The situation of the Benadiri remaining in Somalia is difficult, as they cannot rebuild their businesses in the presence of clan militias. As of 2003, 90% of the Rer Hamar population in Mogadishu had left the city as a consequence of civil war and lack of security. The majority of Rer Hamar who are still in Mogadishu are older people who live in Mogadishu’s traditional Rer Hamar district; Hamar Weyn which is controlled by militias of the Habr Gedir sub-clan, Suleiman. Most homes belonging to the Benadiri and Bravanese in Mogadishu had been taken over by members of clan militias, although sometimes the clan occupants allowed them to reside in one room.33
Information provided by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in January 2007 about the fluid country situation following the ousting of the UIC indicates that the risk to personal safety for the vast majority of Somalis, whether affiliated to majority or minority clans, is the same and that individuals are not targeted simply on the basis of their ethnicity. This view of the current situation should not however detract from previously held information which indicates that clan alignment and the associated support networks remain the cornerstone of Somali society. While for the vast majority of Somalis clan status may not in itself risk mistreatment, the Benadiri or Bravanese are not only outside the clan system but also are some of the few non-clan groups who cannot rely on a patron clan’s support. As such they continue to be isolated and given their ‘lowest of the low’ status are vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion wherever they reside. 35
Sufficiency of protection. Minority groups such as the Benadiri (Rer Hamar) and Bravanese based in southern or central Somalia are culturally and ethnically distinct from Somali clan families and are not able to secure protection from any major clan family or related sub-clan.36 Though the Benadiri orginate mainly from southern or central Somalia, a few who have been resident in more secure parts of the country such as Somaliland are able to avail themselves of the protection of a patron clan (see A (Somalia) [2004] UKIAT 00080).” (UK Home Office, 4. April 2007, Kap. 3.9.)
Abschließend liefert das UK Home Office folgende Einschätzung:
“Conclusion. The Benadiri (Rer Hamar) and Bravanese are part of the underclass in Somali society and are subject to political and economic exclusion due mainly to them being culturally and ethnically unconnected to any major clan group. They are usually unable to secure protection from any clan group and are therefore in a vulnerable position wherever they reside in southern and central Somalia. Though the Benadiri orginate mainly from southern or central Somalia, a few who have been resident in more secure parts of the country such as Somaliland would not face a real risk of persecution or treatment in breach of the ECHR (see A (Somalia) [2004] UKIAT 00080 above). However, individual applicants who have demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that they are of Benadiri (Rer Hamar) or Bravanese origins from southern or central Somalia are likely to encounter ill treatment amounting to persecution. The grant of asylum in such cases is therefore likely to be appropriate.” (UK Home Office, 4. April 2007, Abs. 3.9.9.)
Das UK Home Office hält in seinem jüngsten Länderbericht vom 8. Mai 2007 unter Bezugnahme auf mehrere Quellen in einem Kapitel zur allgemeinen Sicherheitslage von Angehörigen von Minderheitengruppen fest:
“As noted in the JFFMR March 2004, the delegation asked a number of UN and NGO sources whether the security and human rights situation of the minority groups and minor clans in southern and central Somalia had undergone any significant change since the situation described in the JFFMR of December 2000:
“The response from all sources consulted was that no change for the better had taken place, either with regard to their security or human rights situation.” [7c] (p36)
The International Crisis Group (ICG) in a report dated 26 January 2007 stated
“The Courts’ defeat signals the return of clan-based politics to southern Somalia. Whereas the Courts drew their support predominantly from the Hawiye clan, the TFG is widely perceived as dominated by Darod clan interests. TFG leaders reinforced this perception by pursuing policies that further alienated the Hawiye, notably an appeal for foreign troops and the government’s relocation to Jowhar and then Baidoa, instead of Mogadishu. Hawiye alienation and TFG inadequacies left a vacuum into which the Courts expanded between June and December 2006, bringing a degree of peace and security unknown to the south for more than fifteen years. Mogadishu was reunited, weapons removed from the streets and the port and airport reopened. By December [2006], the Courts had expanded from their Mogadishu base to control most of the territory between the Kenyan border and the autonomous region of Puntland in the north east, while the TFG was confined to Baidoa, protected by its Ethiopian backers. Communities seemed prepared to tolerate a strict interpretation of Sharia law in return for peace and security.
“Politically, Somalia has now been returned roughly to where it was when the TFG was formed in October 2004. The government is weak, unpopular and faction ridden, and the power vacuum in southern Somalia is rapidly being filled by the same faction leaders and warlords the Courts overthrew less than a year ago. Many Mogadishu residents resent the Courts’ defeat, feel threatened by the TFG and are dismayed by the presence of Ethiopian troops in the capital. Mogadishu is awash with weapons, and there have already been hit-and-run attacks on TFG and Ethiopian troops. The potential for serious violence is just below the surface.
“Ethiopia’s military victory has dismantled only the most visible part of the Courts: the regional administrative authority in south central Somalia (including Mogadishu), which served essentially as a political platform for Hawiye clan interests. Other elements, including the militant Shabaab leadership, remain largely intact and have dispersed throughout the country, threatening to wage a long war. A U.S. air strike on 8 January 2007 apparently wounded Aden Hashi ‘Ayro, a prominent Shabaab commander, and killed some of his guards but failed to destroy any top targets. A second U.S. airstrike was launched on 23 January [2007], but information on the targets and impact was not immediately available. The grassroots network of mosques, schools and private enterprises that has underpinned the spread of Salafist teachings and their extremist variants remains in place and continues to expand thanks to generous contributions from Islamic charities and the private sector.” [24a] (Section I. OVERVIEW)
The ICG report reflected the rapidly developing situation, and these factors that may have an indirect effect on the security of minority groups. (ICG 26 January 2007) [24a]” (UK Home Office, 8. Mai 2007, Abs. 20.12-20.14; siehe dazu auch ICG – International Crisis Group, 26. Jänner 2007)
In einer älteren Studie von United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) zu Minderheiten in Somalia vom 1. August 2002 heißt es in Bezug auf Minderheitengruppen in Somalia, darunter den Rerhamar:
“One of the things that were deliberately downplayed was the existence of minority groups. Although the population of minority groups living in Somalia has not as yet been established, estimates indicate that they constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.
The Rerhamar and Baravnese are believed to be descendents of Arab immigrant settlers from Yemen and Far East countries. They settled in coastal towns of southern Somalia some ten centuries ago. Most of them are traders.
With the exception of the Bantu, Rerhamar, Bravanese, Bajuni and Eyle who have distinct "non-Somali" physical appearance, all other minorities have physical appearances similar to that of the dominant clans, as well as having ethnic and cultural similarities. What distinguish the assimilated minorities are their distinct economic livelihoods.
Economic dominance is one of the most serious socio-economic problems facing the minority communities. Since independence, the major clans at the expense of minority groups have dominated social and political affairs of Somalia. This trend has continued more than ten years after the collapse of the Somali state.” (OCHA, A study on minorities in Somalia, 1. August 2002)
Das United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) bemerkt in seinem “Mogadishu Fact Sheet” vom 11. Dezember 2006 zur Lage von Binnenvertriebenen (IDPs), die oft Minderheitengruppen oder machtlosen Clans angehören:
“IDPs are often from minority or weak/powerless clans, and thus have limited clan protection. They are particularly vulnerable to violence but have had little recourse to either customary law (xeer), or religious law (sharia). Despite their vulnerability, IDPs/urban poor are unlikely to return to their place of origin due to insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities.” (OCHA, 11. Dezember 2006, S. 2)
Am 6. Dezember 2006 berichtete OCHA im „Protection Fact Sheet“:
“Women and girls, especially within IDP and minority communities, continue to suffer sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). While minority groups, according to some estimates, constitute up to one-third of the Somali population, their lack of clan protection leaves them vulnerable to a range of human rights abuses and harassment; often, they find themselves facing discrimination when trying to access limited social services.” (OCHA, 6. Dezember 2006)
Freedom House (FH) schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht vom September 2006:
“Although more than 80 percent of Somalis share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-influenced culture, discrimination is widespread. Clans exclude one another from participation in social and political life. Minority clans are harassed, intimidated, and abused by armed gunmen.” (FH, September 2006, Kap. „Political Rights and Civil Liberties“)
Weitere Informationen zu Minderheitengruppen in Somalia entnehmen Sie bitte der Anfragebeantwortung des Immigration and Refugee Board Canada (IRB) vom 9. August 2004 und dem Kapitel 4.2.7. „Rer Hamar and Bandhabow“ des vom Danish Immigration Service (DIS) im März 2004 veröffentlichten Berichtes über eine Erkundungsreise zu Somalia.
Situation der Minderheiten in Qoryoley (auch Qoryooley, Qoroley, Yoroley, Qoriooley geschrieben)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnte im Rahmen einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zur Lage von Minderheiten in Qoryoley gefunden werden.
 
Das US Department of State (USDOS) erwähnt in seinem Länderbericht für 2006, dass unter anderem in der Region Lower Shabelle, in der Qoryoley gelegen ist, Angehörige der Gruppe der Bantu [ebenfalls eine Minderheitengruppe, Anm. ACCORD; siehe dazu ebenfalls USDOS, 6. März 2007] unbestätigten Berichten zufolge als Zwangsarbeiter eingesetzt wurden:
“It could not be confirmed whether it continued to be the case, as had been reported the previous year, that local clan militias forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without compensation or that in Middle and Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle Bantus were used as forced labor.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Sektion 6.c.)
Rekrutierung und Verfolgung von Minderheiten in Qoryoley durch Islamisten
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten keine Informationen darüber gefunden werden, ob Minderheiten in Qoryoley durch Islamisten rekrutiert oder von diesen verfolgt werden.
 
Laut einem Artikel von Agence France Presse (AFP) vom 25. Oktober 2006 betreiben Islamisten in Qoryoley ein „Jihad-Rekrutierungs-Zentrum“ („jihad recruitment center):
“Somali Islamists have begun recruiting thousands of young fighters to fight a jihad against Ethiopia, officials said last Wednesday, amid fears of all-out war across the lawless Horn of Africa nation.
A day after claiming to have captured an Ethiopian military officer in fierce weekend battles with a militia allied to Somalia's weak government, the Islamists said that at least 3,000 people had enlisted for combat in the holy war.
Many of the new recruits have signed up in the last two days, since the supreme leader of the powerful Islamist movement announced the start of a threatened jihad against Ethiopian troops alleged in Somalia, officials said.
"We have at least 3,000 young fighters who have now registered to fight the enemy of Allah," a senior official with the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SICS) official said in Mogadishu.
The newcomers, including women, will join what the Islamists claim are tens of thousands of battle-hardened gunmen who seized Mogadishu in June from warlords and now control most of southern and central Somalia.
"We have trained them to fight and that is religious obligation," said Sheikh Abdinur Farah, a senior Islamist commander who runs a jihad recruitment center in Qoryoley, about 120 kilometers (75 miles) south of Mogadishu.
Several recruits from Qoryoley Wednesday said that they had been inspired to join the jihad by Aweys' speech in which he vowed that the graves of Ethiopian troops would "be littered everywhere in Somalia." (AFP, 25. Oktober 2006)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten jedoch keine Informationen darüber gefunden werden, ob Islamisten in Qoryoley gezielt Mitglieder von Minderheitengruppen rekrutieren beziehungsweise Zwangsrekrutierungen durchführen.
 
Laut einem auf Arabic News.com veröffentlichten Artikel vom 30. Dezember 2006 zeigt sich UNHCR über Berichte besorgt, wonach Zivilisten, einschließlich Kinder, zwangsweise für Kämpfe rekrutiert würden, macht jedoch keine Angaben darüber, wer für die Zwangsrekrutierungen verantwortlich ist:
“Inside Somalia, thousands of people fleeing the conflict are reported to be in a desperate situation. UNHCR staff in Puntland, in the north-east, report some 3,000 IDPs who fled the fighting further south. The agency has also received reports of several thousand IDPs in the Bay, Hirann, Mudug, Juba, and Shabelle regions and is particularly concerned about reports of civilians, including children, being forcibly recruited to join the fighting.” (Arabic News. com, 30. Dezember 2006)
Diskriminierung der Rer Hamer aus dem Süden Somalias in Puntland und Somaliland
Das UK Home Office berichtet in seiner „Operational Guidance Note“ vom 4. April 2007 von einer beschränkten Relokationsmöglichkeit von Rer Hamar in Somaliland und Puntland:
“Internal relocation. As the Benadiri (Rer Hamar) and Bravanese are vulnerable to discrimination and exclusion by major clan and sub-clan groups throughout southern and central Somalia , internal relocation within these regions is not a reasonable option. The possibility of internal relocation to Somaliland or Puntland is restricted; in these areas the authorities have made it clear that they would only admit to the territory they control those who are of the same clan or who were previously resident in that particular area.37” (UK Home Office, 4. April 2007, Abs. 3.9.7)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten im Rahmen einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine weiteren Informationen zur Lage der Rer Hamer in Puntland gefunden werden.
 
Zur Lage von Binnenvertriebenen in Somaliland, die Minderheitengruppen aus Süd- und Zentralsomalia angehören, finden sich folgende Informationen vom Juni 2006, die in einem Bericht des Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) vom Oktober 2006 veröffentlicht wurden:
·       „IDPs from Digil, Mirigle, Bantu and minorities suffer social discrimination in Somaliland negatively affecting their standards of living and access to services
·       Minority groups: Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir, Ogadenis, Rahanweyn and Gaboye), represent one third of the Somali population and have been forcibly displaced from valuable agricultural lands
·       Most of the IDPs who fled to the north come from minority groups such as Rahaywen sub clan, Bantu, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf
·       Southern IDPs in the north are considered as ‘criminals’
·       IDPs from minority groups lack protection political representation, and are denied basic rights including access to humanitarian assistance  
·       Minorities are subject to human rights abuses, attacks, discrimination, exploitation, displacement and land dispossession by militias and bandits” (IDMC, 2. Oktober 2006, S. 108)
Das United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) hält in einem älteren Bericht vom 1. August 2002 zur Lage von Binnenvertriebenen in Somalia fest, dass die Binnenvertriebenen (IDPs) im Norden des Landes hauptsächlich Sub-Clans aus dem Süden, einschließlich der Ashraf, und der Minderheitengruppe der Bantu angehörten. Diese Binnenvertriebenen hätten keinen Zugang zu Macht, Entscheidungsfindung und einkommensschaffenden Projekten und stünden nicht unter dem Schutz der dominanten Sub-Clans des Nordens. Zusätzlich seien geschlechtsspezifische Diskriminierung und Gewalt, inbesondere die Vergewaltigung junger Mädchen und Frauen, weit verbreitet:
“IDPs in the north are mostly agriculturalists that belong to sub clans from the south including Rahanweyn, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf and the minority group, Bantu. These IDPs lack access to power and decision making, income generating opportunities and do not enjoy protection provided by the dominant sub clans of the north. Additionally, gender based discrimination and violence, particularly rape of young girls and women is widespread. Women are often attacked when they go out to collect firewood or a earn living for their families. Women are vulnerable to male attacks both from within their clan as well as from other clans.” (OCHA, Internally displaced persons: Combined report on Somalia, 1. August 2002, Introduction)
Weiters haben wir die „UNHCR Empfehlung zu Rückkehrmöglichkeiten somalischer Staatsangehöriger nach Somalia“ vom November 2005 und die „UNHCR position on the return of the rejected asylum seekers to Somalia“ vom Jänner 2004 beigelegt (siehe Qellenverzeichnis).
 
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
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