a-4757 (ACC-LBR-4757)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Inwiefern hat sich die Situation in Liberia seit 1996 bzw. 2000 verändert?
Das US Department of State (USDOS) fasst in seinem Länderbereicht vom März 2006 die wichtigsten Veränderungen des letzten Jahres in Liberia folgendermaßen zusammen:
„Liberia is a constitutional republic with a population of approximately 3.5 million. After 14 years of civil war and 2 years of an interim government, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was declared the winner of multiparty presidential elections on November 23, marking a significant milestone in the country's transition to democracy. Domestic and international observers considered the elections generally free and fair. President Johnson-Sirleaf replaced Chairman Charles Gyude Bryant, who led the interim National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) since October 2003. In August 2003 the former government and the country's two rebel groups--Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—-signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the 1999-2003 civil war. Approximately 15 thousand peacekeepers deployed by the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and 1,100 international police (CIVPOL) had primary responsibility for maintaining security, while the Liberian National Police (LNP) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were being retired and retrained. Unlike in the previous year, former rebel combatants no longer retained control of some rural areas. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control over security forces.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006)
Auch UK Home Office geht in seiner Operation Guidance Note zu Liberia vom 2. Dezember 2005 auf die aktuelle Bedeutung der beiden ehemaligen Rebellengruppen LURD und MODEL ein. Trotz Entwaffnung und ihrem offiziellen Bekenntnis zur Zusammenarbeit mit dem NGTL (National Transitional Government of Liberia) gebe es – laut UK Home Office - doch noch einige kleine Gebiete in Liberia, in denen die beiden Gruppen immer noch starken Einfluss hätten. Bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen im Oktober 2005 seien BewerberInnen der ehemaligen Rebellengruppen im ersten Wahlgang ausgeschieden:
„LURD and MODEL and the other main political parties have recognised the NTGL as the state authority and their senior members hold positions within the transitional authority structure. However some factions of LURD and MODEL and factions of combatants associated with the former Taylor regime, are still strong independent influences in some small parts of Liberia. In November 2004, the heads of Liberia's three factions signed an agreement to dissolve their movements' military wings and do away with violence, paving the way for them to stand at the general elections in 2005. The former government of ex-president Charles Taylor, as well as two former rebel groups LURD and MODEL all promised a peaceful future in a ceremony in the capital, Monrovia. These events occurred three days after the UN-led disarmament programme officially ended.
Liberia’s first peacetime presidential elections took place in October 2005, with the successful candidate Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf narrowly defeating rival George Weah in a second round run-off. All ex-rebel force contenders were eliminated in the first round of voting. International election monitors ruled the election to be generally free and fair though there were allegations against of vote-rigging in the second round poll.“ (UK Home Office, 2. Dezember 2005, S. 5, Absatz 3.7.2 – 3.7.4)
Für weitere, detaillierte Informationen zur aktuellen Lage in Liberia sowie ihrer Veränderung in den letzten Jahren möchte ich Sie auf den Jahresbericht des US Department of State (USDOS) vom 8. März 2005 zu Liberia, den Jahresbericht 2005 von Amnesty International (AI) sowie den World Report 2006 von Human Rights Watch (HRW) verweisen. Auch UNHCR geht in seiner „Stellungnahme zur Behandlung von Asylsuchenden aus und Rückkehr nach Liberia“ vom 3. August 2005 auf die Frage der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Liberia sowie Entwaffnungs- und Demoblisierungs­programme für ehemalige Rebellen ein. Die Chronologie des Konflikts in Liberia (Entwicklungen seit 1985) zeichnet der auf IRIN veröffentlichte Artikel „Liberia: A chronology of 25 years of conflict and turmoil“ vom 17. Jänner 2006 nach. (Für genaue Quellenangaben zu den Berichten und Artikeln siehe Quellenverzeichnis)
Würde eine Person, die aus einer Rebellenarmee desertiert ist, nach ihrer Rückkehr von den Rebellen erkannt und für ihre Desertion bestraft? Kann der Staat RückkehrerInnen ausreichend schützen? Gibt es staatlichen Schutz für ehemalige Rebellen vor Verfolgung durch Rebellengruppen?
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten leider keine Informationen dazu gefunden werden, ob eine Person, die aus einer Rebellenarmee desertiert ist, nach ihrer Rückkehr von den Rebellen erkannt und bestraft werden könnte. Auch konkrete Informationen zum staatlichen Schutz ehemaliger Rebellen vor Verfolgung durch Rebellengruppen konnten nicht gefunden werden.
In seinem Jahresbericht zu Liberia vom März 2006 berichtet das US Department of State, dass ehemalige Rebellen Zivilisten getötet hätten und dies zu keinerlei Strafverfolgung geführt habe:
„No action was taken against the former MODEL fighter who killed a civilian in March 2004 for refusing to hand over his food. There were no developments in the May 2004 killing of a civilian by former soldiers during a demonstration to demand immediate payment of their resettlement grants.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1a)
Verschiedene Menschenrechtsberichte beinhalten generelle Informationen zum Thema Rechts­staatlichkeit und zeugen vom Fehlen funktionierender staatlicher Strukturen in Liberia:
So beschreibt UNHCR in seinem Global Appeal 2006 die staatlichen Strukturen in Liberia als schwach:
„In spite of peacekeeping efforts law and order remains fragile, as the Government has not yet been able to firmly re-establish its presence and authority throughout the country. The Government has not yet fully assumed its coordination and leadership role countrywide, and there are concerns about the sustainability of the reconstruction effort.“ (UNHCR, 2006, S. 189)
Auch Human Rights Watch (HRW) stellt bezüglich der Rechtsstaatlichkeit Liberias trotz einiger Verbesserungen hinsichtlich des Wiederaufbaus von Polizei, Armee und Rechtssystem nach wie vor schwerwiegende Mängel fest:
„Liberia’s history of armed conflict and human rights abuses reflect profound and deep-rooted weaknesses in institutions which should guarantee the rule of law. In 2003, the U.N. Security Council mandated the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to assist in the restructuring and training of the police, army and judiciary. 2005 saw some progress in the rehabilitation of these institutions. However, serious problems in reform of the Liberian police force, delays in demobilizing the former army, and lack of donor support to rebuild the decimated judicial infrastructure stalled progress in establishing the rule of law.“ (HRW, Jänner 2006)
Das US Department of State (USDOS) berichtet in seinem Jahresbericht vom März 2006 von Ausschreitungen sowie der Herausbildung eines Vigilantensystems als Folgen der schwachen staatlichen Strukturen:
„Lack of confidence in the police and judicial system resulted in mob violence and vigilantism“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1c)
„Public confidence in the police remained low, and vigilante groups formed during the year to protect persons and property.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1d)
Amnesty International (AI) bezeichnet im September 2005 den Aufbau eines nationalen Rechts­systems und die Wieder­errichtung einer juridischen Fakultät als Aufgaben der United Nations Mission in Liberia in Liberia (UNMIL):
„UNMIL’s mandate includes assisting the transitional government to develop, in cooperation with judicial institutions, a strategy for consolidating a national legal framework. The objective is to develop and implement pragmatic solutions for the problems and challenges facing Liberia’s justice system – including re-establishment of the Law School – with the overall aim of restoring the rule of law.“ (AI, 19. September 2005, S. 10)
Weiters gibt AI die Bewertungen des liberianischen Rechtssystems durch die UNMIL und andere Organisationen wider und hebt hierbei besonders den Mangel an professionellem Personal hervor:
„The assessments highlight the lack of sufficiently qualified personnel and a low level of professionalism, resources and incentives for judges, prosecutors, lawyers and others in the judicial system. There has been little oversight of their work in the past, contributing substantially to the lack of capacity in this sector. Few people in Liberia have access to the justice system. Prisons and police detention facilities are overcrowded, and most of the inmates are detained without charge or trial. Hardly any detainees and defendants can afford lawyers, and there are not enough lawyers to provide free legal counsel in such cases.“ (AI, 19. September 2005, S. 10)
Eine Beendung der Straflosigkeit sowie der Aufbau eines funktionierenden Rechtssystems müssten demnach – so AI – eine der Prioritäten der liberianischen Regierung werden:
„A priority for the government, working with the UN, the wider international community and Liberian civil society, must be the development and implementation of a long-term action plan to restore justice and the rule of law and end impunity. Investigation and documentation of crimes at an early stage is essential, however, in order to facilitate eventual prosecutions.“ (AI, 1. Februar 2005)  
Kann es zu Verfolgung durch den Staat auf Grund der Rebellenvergangenheit des AWs kommen?
In der bereits zitierten Operation Guidance Note vom Dezember 2005 stellt das UK Home Office in einer abschließenden, generellen Bewertung der Situation ehemaliger Rebellen fest, dass diese bei einer Rückkehr nach Liberia im Allgemeinen nicht wirklich gefährdet seien, durch den Staat verfolgt zu werden:  
 „There is no evidence of any state persecution of members, or those associated, with former rebel groups or political opponents and the NGTL are widely reported to generally respect the human rights of its citizens. LURD, MODEL and all parties formerly opposed to the previous Taylor regime have endorsed, co-operated with and (to varying extents) participated in the NTGL. Individual members of these groups involved in criminal activity; either low level localised violence or suspected war criminals, may face prosecution. In light of the current geo-political situation, members of any of the mainstream factions of these groups do not now in general have a real risk of ill treatment amounting to persecution and would therefore not qualify for a grant of asylum. Applications under this category are likely to be clearly unfounded and as such should be certified.“ (UK Home Office, 2. Dezember 2005, S. 5-6, Absatz 3.7.7)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten keine weiteren aktuellen Informationen zu staatlicher Verfolgung in Liberia aufgrund der Rebellenvergangenheit des Aws gefunden werden.
Das US Department of State (USDOS) zeigt in seinem neuesten Bericht vom März 2006 zum Thema Folter und andere grausame, unmenschliche oder degradierende Behandlung oder Bestrafung auf, dass derartige Behandlungsweisen in Liberia per Gesetz zwar verboten seien, es vor August 2003 aber trotzdem immer wieder zu Übergriffen der Polizei auf ehemalige LURD-KämpferInnen gekommen sei:
„however, prior to August 2003, police and security forces frequently tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise humiliated persons, particularly during interrogations of LURD detainees at the Gbatala security training base. According to Amnesty International, 73 percent of women over 18 who registered for the 2003-04 Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) program reported sexual abuse.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1c)
In dem selben Bericht hält das USDOS fest, dass im September 2002 Jugendliche der ethnischen Gruppe der Mandingo verdächtigt worden seien, der LURD anzugehören und durch ehemalige staatliche Sicherheitskräfte entführt worden seien:
„Most of the ethnic Mandingo youths abducted between September 2002 and March 2003 by former government security forces for suspected involvement with the LURD rebel group remained unaccounted for at year's end.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1b)
Kann jemand nach 10 Jahren Auslandsaufenthalt und ohne Familienanknüpfung eine Lebensgrundlage in Liberia finden?
Das US Department of State (USDOS)  bezeichnet die Infrastruktur in Liberia als durch den Krieg schwer beschädigt. Armut, Arbeitslosigkeit und Analphabetismus seien weit verbreitet:
„Poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy were widespread, and the country's infrastructure was severely damaged as a result of the war. The educational system barely functioned, and the country had no public electricity, potable water, sewer system, or postal service.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Einleitung)
An anderer Stelle spricht das USDOS (im Kontext des Themas Kinderarbeit) von extremer Armut:
„The law prohibits the employment of children under the age of 16 during school hours in the wage sector; however, due to extreme poverty and lax enforcement, child labor was a serious and widespread problem.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 6d)
Weiters führt das USDOS den Betrag des liberianischen Mindestlohnes an und stellt fest, dass dieser eine Familie in Liberia nicht ernähren könne:
„The law requires a minimum wage of approximately $0.20 (10 ld) per hour not exceeding 8 hours per day, excluding benefits, for unskilled laborers. The law also requires that agricultural workers be paid $1.20 (60 ld) for an 8-hour day, excluding benefits. Skilled labor has no minimum fixed wage. The highly competitive minimum wage jobs did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Families dependent on minimum wage incomes also engaged in subsistence farming, small scale marketing, and begging.“ (USDOS , 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 6e)
Die Arbeitslosigkeit betrage in Liberia - so das USDOS - geschätzte 80 Prozent:
„Due to the destruction of the economy and the estimated 80 percent unemployment rate, strikes were infrequent.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 6b)
Das Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) bezeichnet Liberia im Februar 2006 als eines der ärmsten Länder der Welt. Binnenvertriebene müssten in Gebiete ohne grund­legende soziale Dienste bzw. ohne Möglichkeiten zur Sicherung des Lebensunterhaltes zurückkehren:
„Years of conflict, compounded by acute mismanagement and poor governance, have devastated Liberia’s infrastructure and economy, leaving it one of the poorest countries in the world. IDPs are returning to areas without basic social services or livelihood opportunities, in some cases causing them to drift back to camps or urban areas. Unknown numbers of unregistered IDPs continue to occupy public buildings in the capital Monrovia in often grim conditions.“ (IDMC, 9. Februar 2006, S. 7)
Das Foreign and Commomwealth Office (FCO) fasst in seinem Länderbericht vom Mai 2005 die Lebensbedingungen in Liberia folgendermaßen zusammen:
„Decades of mismanagement and conflict have made Liberia one of the world's poorest countries. The civil war left thousands of people brutalised and traumatised and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced. It left a generation of Liberians with no education and few skills to use in peace time. The state, its institutions, its security forces, its education and health services all have to be rebuilt from scratch. A Donors Conference was held in February 2004. It committed some US$ 500 million for reconstruction. But disbursement has been slow because of worries over continued corruption and financial mismanagement.“ (FCO, 9.Mai 2005)
Informationen zu den Möglichkeiten für einen allein stehenden Ex-Kombattanten eine Lebensgrundlage in Liberia zu finden, lassen sich auch Berichten zur Umsetzung der von 2003 – 2004 durchgeführten Entwaffnungsprogramme[1] entnehmen, welche die Eingliederung in ein Reintegrations­programm als überlebensnotwendig für ehemalige KämpferInnen beschreiben:
Human Rights Watch (HRW) berichtet in seinem Jahresbericht zur Menschenrechtssituation in Liberia von organisatorischen Problemen bei der Umsetzung von Programmen zur Entwaffnung von Rebellengruppen. Zahlreiche KämpferInnen, die die Waffen niederlegen wollten, hätten keinen Platz mehr in den Reintegrationsprogrammen gefunden, was zu Re-Rekrutierungen ­– diesmal von ivorischer Seite – geführt habe: 
„From 2003-2005, more than 101,000 individuals were disarmed and demobilized. The disarmament exercise was criticized for not having strict admittance criteria and for letting in numerous individuals who were not real combatants, a factor which contributed to the shortfall of funds from international donors to support education or skills training programs. At years end, this shortfall left some 43,000 excombatants outside of the reintegration program. During 2005, the dearth of training and education programs, particularly along the border with neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, contributed to re-recruitment by the Ivorian government and rebel forces, of hundreds of ex-combatants, including children. According to interviews with Liberian fighters, the majority went to fight alongside militias associated with the Ivorian government. In 2005, two periods of intense recruitment occurred: at the beginning of March and September 2005, in anticipation of future attacks on Ivorian rebel-held positions.“ (HRW, Jänner 2006)
Ebenso warnt das Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) vor neuerlichen Rekrutierungen:
„A badly planned disarmament and demobilisation process has produced large groups (twice those planned) of men and young children with available money, but few weapons have been handed in. Lack of funding for the reintegration component of the process, coupled with lack of economic opportunities, increases the chances that these former combatants will return to their previous ways of making a living. Reports of recruitment in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire for Guinea increase the risks for continued instability in the region.“ (IMDC, 9. Februar 2006, S. 52-53)
Auch das US Department of State (USDOS) erwähnt Proteste von ehemaligen KombattantInnen aufgrund des Scheiterns von Entwaffnungs- und Reintegrationsprogrammen:
„During the year demonstrations by former combatants protesting disarmament or the government's failure to complete resettlement grants resulted in civilian injuries and extensive property damage. For example, on May 11, former combatants attacked NGO offices involved in demobilization activities; several persons were injured. The attackers were disgruntled because they had not been paid, and their training had been delayed. During a May 27 graduation from a skills training program, more than one thousand former combatants began rioting and smashing vehicles when they learned they would not receive the tools and training benefits that they had been promised upon graduation; two persons were injured. Police arrested and briefly detained several of the former combatants.“ (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Abschnitt 1c)
In seinem Bericht vom 13. April 2005 spricht HRW von zehntausenden jungen Menschen, die auf Schul- bzw. Ausbildungsplätze warteten:
„During January 2005, some 4,000 ex-combatants enrolled in secondary schools were expelled because the DDRR program had failed to cover their school fees, provoking protests from the students. While their fees were eventually paid, tens of thousands of others are waiting to enter school and job training. Liberians, long fearful of this volatile population, are concerned at what will happen if ex-combatants are left idle. The long wait between disarmament and entrance into a job training or education program also leaves them vulnerable for re-recruitment into another armed conflict.“ (HRW, 13. April 2005, S. 47)
Das Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) berichtet am 13. März 2006 von der  Guthrie Gummiplantage, die immer noch von ehemaligen Rebellen kontrolliert werde. Obwohl sich der Artikel hauptsächlich mit der Situation der ansässigen Bevölkerung sowie der ArbeiterInnen auf der Gummiplantage auseinandersetzt, finden sich in dem Bericht auch Hinweise auf die problematische Lage der früheren Rebellen. Die ehemaligen KämpferInnen hätten im Zuge des UN-Entwaffnungs­programms keine Entschädigungen enthalten, seitens der Regierung werde jedoch Reintegrationshilfe versprochen:
„Many of the ex-fighters, living at the site along with family members, say they have not received compensation the UN promised after Liberia’s fighting ended in 2003 - a claim being examined by a joint UN-government task force that includes a representative of the national disarmament and reintegration commission. The UN has repeatedly faced shortfalls in its programme to disarm and rehabilitate ex-fighters. UN officials were not available to comment on whether a lack of funds has contributed to the problem at Guthrie. Liberia’s agriculture minister Christopher Toe, who chairs the joint task force, told reporters earlier this month that the government would provide opportunities to the ex-fighters living at Guthrie and other plantations. ‚We will look into how we can resettle and ensure that employment opportunities are given to any ex-combatants, and to ensure that they get whatever packages that have been given to others in the past.’“ (IRINnews, 13. März 2006)
Ähnlich berichtet die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters in einem am 6. März 2006 auf Yahoo.news publizierten Artikel von rund 150 Ex-KämpferInnen, die ebenfalls nicht in den Genuss der Reintegrationsprogramme für ehemalige KombattantInnen gekommen seien und sich nun gezwungen sähen, ihren Lebensunterhalt durch den illegalen Abbau von Gold in den Schürfgebieten in der Nähe von Fish Town zu verdienen:
„Like scores of other ex-fighters in the far-flung corner of eastern Liberia, Johnson turned to illegal mining to survive after 14 years of on-off war in the West African country ended in 2003. "We have to go to the gold mines to dig. If we do not do that, we will not survive," said Johnson, who wore cut-off black jeans and a ripped T-shirt. A United Nations-sponsored program to reinsert former combatants into society never reached remote River Gee state, which lies some 180 miles east of the capital Monrovia on the border with Ivory Coast.“ (Reuters, 6. März 2006)
„Today, Johnson and other former rebel fighters are divided into gangs who delve for gold near the banks of the Cavalla River, which snakes along the border with Ivory Coast before pouring into the Gulf of Guinea. Lacking identity documents after missing out on the U.N. reintegration plan, Johnson says they have few other opportunities but to scrabble for gold in the humid, malaria-infested jungles. "We will continue to carry on this gold digging until light can come to this place," he said. County administrator Christian Chea estimates there are some 150 ex-fighters around Fish Town who did not benefit from the U.N. disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation program. "They have to survive by getting involved in illegal gold mining activities," he told Reuters. It is a familiar story. In the capital Monrovia, hundreds of former child soldiers shine shoes or push heavy carts stacked with jerrycans of drinking water around the city to eke out a meager living. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa's first elected female leader, knows that finding work for thousands of former fighters is essential to guarantee the stability of her administration, which took office in January. The head of the United Nations' 16,000-strong peacekeeping mission in Liberia, Alan Doss, has said more international funding is required to provide skills training for some 10,000 former combatants.“ (Reuters, 6. März 2006)
„For some ex-combatants, the only alternative to illegal mining was to return to the bush to fight in Ivory Coast's simmering conflict. Human rights agencies say many ex-fighters have crossed the Cavalla River to work as mercenaries.“ (Reuters, 6. März 2006)
IRIN zeigt außerdem am Beispiel der früheren Rebellenhochburg Voinjama, dass auch nach erfolgter Entwaffnung die Infrastruktur in Liberia erst wieder im Aufbau begriffen sei:
„Nevertheless, despite the upswing in safety, schools are not yet functioning and health centres need to be rehabilitated and staffed with trained practitioners. William Jallah, Lofa's development superintendent, told IRIN that not a single school had been re-opened in any of the county's major towns. Similarly, although a few clinics had been renovated and re-opened, Voinjama's Tellewoyan Hospital, the main referral hospital for Lofa, had no assigned doctor and very few nurses and medical assistants, he said.“ (IRIN, Februar 2005, S. 33)
Behandlungsmöglichkeit bei posttraumatischer Belastungsstörung? Kann es bei einer Rückkehr nach Liberia zu retraumatisierenden Erlebnissen kommen?
In ihrem World Health Atlas 2005 gibt die World Health Organization (WHO) Auskunft über Betreuung und Behandlung psychiatrischer Krankheiten. In Liberia gebe es diesbezüglich kaum Möglichkeiten:  
„A mental health policy is absent. A national mental health programme is absent. Mental health is not a part of primary health care system. Actual treatment of severe mental disorders is not available at the primary level. Regular training of primary care professionals is not carried out in the field of mental health. There are no community care facilities for patients with mental disorders. A few facilities offer layman counselling and shelter, but these services do not cater to the needs of the severely mentally ill. There is only one psychiatrist and one psychiatric nurse in the country. No mental health services are currently available in the country as the psychiatric hospital was destroyed during the war. Under the emergency programme, a 25-bedded public hospital is reopening in Monrovia in Fall 2004 along with limited outpatient functions. These will constitute the only clinical mental health services in the country. Mental health is integrated in pre-graduate training of nurses and doctors, but due to the war and the lack of clinical services, the training is sporadic and mainly theoretical. Special training programmes for mental health are not present. The emergency programme plans restarting of in-service training and has restarted training of medical students.“ (WHO, 2005, S. 285-286)
Für detailliertere Informationen zur Versorgung psychischer Krankheiten möchte ich Sie direkt auf die Ausführungen zu Liberia im Mental Health Atlas 2005 der WHO verweisen (genaue Quellenangabe: siehe Quellenverzeichnis).
Das Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) weist auf die allgemeine Schwäche des Gesundheitssystems in Liberia hin:
„Fourteen years of conflict have contributed to the deterioration of health care services in Liberia. In the last two years there has been a gradual expansion in humanitarian emergency health actions to accessible areas of the country. However, the health care delivery system is still in the emergency phase and is heavily reliant on additional external resources in order to increase primary health care coverage and build human and institutional capacity.
The health care system in Liberia is highly dependent on support from Agencies and NGOs, which currently implement more than 90% of health service delivery. Access to basic and secondary health care services is still a major problem as more than 75% of the population has no access to referral care services such as essential and emergency obstetric care. This situation has resulted in some of the highest infant (157/1,000 live births) and maternal (580/100,000 live births) mortality rates in the world. Childhood malnutrition is high with 39% of children under five stunted, 86% of children 6 – 23 months anaemic and 53% deficient in vitamin A.“ (IDMC, 9. Februar 2006, S. 62)
Auch das UK Home Office macht in der Operation Guidance Note auf einen Mangel an spezialisierter medizinischer Betreuung aufmerksam:
„The medical infrastructure in Liberia has yet to recover from the period of civil conflict, and is highly reliant on foreign aid and charities for assistance. There is a lack of both resources and staff, and specialist care is not readily available.“ (UK Home Office, 2. Dezember 2005, S. 8, Absatz 4.4.2)
Die Gesundheits-Infrastruktur in Liberia bezeichnet Amnesty International (AI) als eine der schlechtesten der Welt. In seinem – auf die Situation vergewaltigter Frauen und Mädchen bezogenen Bericht – stellt auch AI fest, dass es keine den Bedürfnissen dieser Zielgruppe entsprechenden Einrichtungen gebe:
 „The provision of health facilities in Liberia, including hospitals and primary health centres, is among the worst in the world. According to estimates by the UN, the World Bank and the NTGL, less than 10 per cent of the Liberian population has access to "any kind of health care", and these mainly in urban and safe areas.(58) A debilitated infrastructure, lack of funds, deterioration of support systems, and progressive undermining of the public sector workforce have all contributed to this parlous state. Health facilities with appropriate services to meet the needs of women and girls affected by sexual violence remain inaccessible to many. The situation is further aggravated by women’s lack of money for transport, medical treatment and drugs.“ (AI, 14. Dezember 2004)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten keine Informationen zu eventuell retraumatisierenden Erlebnissen bei einer Rückkehr eines früheren Kämpfers nach Liberia gefunden werden.
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Die Antwort stellt keine abschließende Meinung zur Glaubwürdigkeit eines bestimmten Asylansuchens dar.

[1] In einem Pressegespräch vom 1. September 2004 weist die United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) darauf hin, dass die Entwaffnung ehemaliger Rebellen bis Oktober 2004 abgeschlossen sein sollte. Nach diesem Zeitpunkt sei der Besitz einer Waffe als Straftatbestand zu bewerten und werde gerichtlich verfolgt (UNMIL, 1. September 2004). Die Aufnahmekriterien ins Liberia Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDRR) beschreibt das United Nations Development Proramme (UNDP) in seinem Tätigkeitsbericht des DDRR (Dezember 2003 bis August 2004) (UNDP, ohne Datum).