Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990
IRAN
* Because of the absence of a United States Mission in Iran,
this report draws heavily on unofficial sources.
Iran is an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei. The formal system of government, based on a
Constitution approved in 1980 by popular referendum and
revised in July 1989, features a parliament and a president
elected from among multiple candidates by universal suffrage.
However, all candidates must meet highly restrictive religious
and political criteria imposed by the Council of Guardians,
and as a result the choice offered to voters is narrow. The
Government, dominated by a political elite composed of Shi 'a
Muslim clerics and of laymen allied with these clerics,
attempts to impose its views on political and socioreligious
orthodoxy. However, there are significant factional
differences on important economic and political issues.
The Government's hold on power is reinforced through arrests,
summary trials and executions, and other forms of intimidation
implemented by an extensive internal security system.
Political arrests are made by the Revolutionary Guards or,
less commonly, by revolutionary committees (komitehs), local
neighborhood groups which once were quasi-official but which
have now been subsumed under the Ministry of Interior. In
practice, these groups retain a certain amount of autonomy,
particularly in the provinces, and the central Government is
not always able fully to control their activities.
The disruptions of the revolution, the destruction from the
Iran-Iraq war, devastating earthquakes in June and November,
and government mismanagement have caused serious economic
deterioration. Inflation is estimated at 50 to 80 percent,
while unemployment is about 40 percent of the work force.
Many industries are operating at less than half of capacity.
Corruption and black market activities are rife. While an
economic Five-Year Plan was approved in January,
implementation of reconstruction programs has been slow.
Iran in 1990 continued to be a major violator of human
rights. Abuses included summary executions of political
opponents; widespread torture; repression of the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly and association; arbitrary detentions;
lack of fair trials; continuing repression of the Baha'i
religious community; denial of citizens' right to change their
government; and severe restrictions on women's and worker
rights.
In January, however, the Government permitted the United
Nations Special Rapporteur for Iran, Reynaldo Galindo-Pohl , to
visit Iran for the first time to prepare a report to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) . Galindo-Pohl paid a second
visit to Tehran in October. The Government also proved
somewhat more responsive to other international inquiries
about the human rights situation. Both Amnesty International
(AI), in its 1990 Report covering 1989, and the Special
Rapporteur cited instances of torture, execution after summary
proceedings, and the holding of political prisoners as among
continuing human rights abuses in Iran. In his November
report, the Special Rapporteur concluded that " the enormous
quantity and variety of allegations and complaints received
from very diverse sources .. .provide a credible factual basis
for the belief that human rights violations occur frec[uently
in the country and that government action to prevent and
remedy such violations has not been sufficient to put an end
to them.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There is no reliable estimate of the number of people killed
for political reasons in 1990. Given the lack of basic
procedural safeguards in political trials, most of the
executions ordered each year in such cases amount to summary
executions. Moreover, the Government often disguises
political charges with accusations of criminal activity, e.g.,
narcotics trafficking. Under a new antidrug law announced in
late 1988, the Government executed hundreds of accused drug
traffickers in both 1989 and 1990. According to several
sources, many of those executed were actually political
detainees.
In its 1990 Report, AI also charged that executions of
political prisoners were common. The Special Rapporteur's
February 1990 report to the UNHRC recounts many cases of
alleged executions of political prisoners. In addition, the
Iranian Government carries out political executions of its
opponents residing abroad.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1990 is unknown. The
situation is complicated by the lack of government information
on many political prisoners. AI reports that many families of
executed political prisoners have not been informed officially
of their relatives' deaths; many others who have been informed
were often not told where the bodies were buried.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Accounts of torture in Iran's prisons continued to be received
in 1990 and included a wide range of inhuman practices
documented by various human rights groups and eyewitnesses.
The Special Rapporteur related several such accounts in his
February 1990 report. Former prisoners told the Special
Rapporteur that lashings and beatings of all kinds are
common. Allegedly, prisoners are flogged on the soles of
their feet until they can no longer walk; some are forced to
do so anyway. In one variant of this torture, guards
reportedly rip the dried medical dressing from the feet of the
injured prisoners.
The Special Rapporteur also said ex-prisoners told him that
they were frequently held in solitary confinement or denied
adequate rations as a way of forcing them to confess.
Suspension from the ceiling is another common method of
torture. Guards have threatened and intimidated family
members of detainees, and relatives or other prisoners have
occasionally been forced to watch torture.
Prisoner protests against poor prison conditions have
reportedly been met with beatings, denial of medical care,
and, in some cases, execution. The Special Rapporteur
reported that a "Prisoner's Organization" exists to redress
mistreatment. However, no information is available on its,
activities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arrests for expression of views critical of or different from
those of the Government are known to occur, but it is not
known how many may have occurred in 1990.
Some persons have been arrested on trumped-up criminal charges
when their actual "offenses" were political. Others were
taken into custody on vague charges such as "corruption on
earth" or "warring with God." The lack of fair trials and
other procedural safeguards encourage such practices.
No judicial determination of the legality of detention exists
in Iranian law. There is reportedly no legal time limit on
incommunicado detention. Suspects are held for questioning at
local Revolutionary Guard offices or in jails.
There have been reports that children often have been taken
into custody with their mothers. The Special Rapporteur
recounted one instance in which a child, arrested with its
mother at the age of 2 months, grew up in prison. Some women
have been imprisoned solely because they have associated with
men who are political suspects.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
There are essentially two different court systems. The civil
courts deal with criminal offenses, and the revolutionary
courts, established in 1979, try "political" offenses.
By international standards, no trial by a revolutionary court
can be called fair or public in the usual sense. If the trial
is staged publicly, it is generally because the prisoner has
already been forced to confess to a crime. Persons tried for
political offenses enjoy virtually no procedural or
substantive safeguards. The Special Rapporteur reports that
trials lasting 5 minutes and less are not uncommon.
The Special Rapporteur noted in his February 1990 report many
examples of the lack of basic procedural guarantees,
mentioning particularly the problem of limited access to a
lawyer. The right to a defense counsel is provided for in the
Iranian Constitution, a provision emphasized to the Special
Rapporteur by the head of the Iranian Bar Association.
Nevertheless, many defendants do not have access to a lawyer,
are unable to call witnesses on their behalf, and are unable
to appeal. One witness with 30 years of judicial experience
told the Special Rapporteur that lawyers are generally not
admitted before the revolutionary courts and are harassed and
intimidated if they insist. Some persons have been imprisoned
beyond the limit of their sentence, and even executed after
the formal expiration of their prison term.
The judicial system is weakened by the fact that revolutionary
courts can consider cases formally under the jurisdiction of
the civil and criminal courts. The review authority of the
Supreme Court is also limited. Assignment of cases to regular
rather than revolutionary courts is haphazard and apparently
occurs mainly when arrests are made by regular police.
Revolutionary courts can also overturn the decisions of the
civilian courts.
For coirjnon criminal offenses, many elements of the
prerevolutionary judicial system survive, and the accused
often have the right to a public trial with benefit of lawyers
of their own choosing, assuming they can afford the fee. Even
this judiciary is not fully independent, however. Many of the
former judges were retired after the revolution, and new
judges were selected. One criterion for new judges is
grounding in Islamic law, and political acceptability is a
requirement for any government position. Favorable verdicts
reportedly can often be "purchased" from the judges serving on
civil and criminal courts and to a lesser degree from judges
of the revolutionary courts. The expert witness cited above
told the Special Rapporteur that even in ordinary penal cases
lawyers must be extremely careful, and mentioned the example
of a colleague who was indicted after requesting an additional
hearing in a case. In general, the witness said, the practice
of interfering with lawyers is becoming worse.
No reliable estimate is available on the number of political
prisoners. According to AI , seven women political prisoners
were released in August.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Government rejects the Western distinction between a
public sphere which the State may control and a sphere of
private life (religion, culture, thought, and private
behavior) which the State may not properly control.
Authorities still enter homes, wiretap telephones, and open
mail, but these activities have been less common over the past
few years than they were before 1982.
Special Revolutionary Guard units and neighborhood komitehs
check on social activities. Women whose clothing does not
completely cover the hair and all of the body except hands and
face, or who wear makeup, are technically subject to arrest.
In the past, men have also been recfuired to dress "modestly,"
eschewing, for example, short-sleeved shirts. Enforcement of
standards of Islamic morality has appeared to vary with the
political climate and the jurisdiction. In May the Head
Office for Combatting Unlawful Acts announced a crackdown on
dress code and moral violations, stipulating that offenders
would be handed over to the revolutionary courts.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution states that "publications and the press may
express ideas freely, except when they are contrary to Islamic
principles, or are detrimental to public rights." In
practice, most publications are controlled by the Government;
independent publishers run the risk not only of press
shutdowns and confiscation of publications and equipment but
of arrest and summary punishment if they are overly critical
of the Government.
All books must be submitted to the Ministry of Islamic
Guidance for review before they can be published. Publishers,
authors, and printers also engage in substantial
self-censorship before submitting books to the Ministry in an
effort to avoid the substantial penalties, including economic
losses, incurred when books are rejected. Iranian authorities
have interpreted broadly their right to censorship on
religious grounds.
Newspapers, which are usually associated with various
government factions, reflect a variety of viewpoints.
Officials and government policies are often subjected to
public criticism, but newspapers are forbidden to criticize
the concept of the Islamic republic, or to promote ethnic
minority rights. Nevertheless, some independent publishers
out of favor with the Government continue to survive, and some
books and peunphlets critical of the Government are published
without reprisal. Foreign books, newspapers, and magazines
may be imported only after they have been reviewed by the
Ministry of Islamic Guidance.
All broadcasting facilities are government owned, and the
content of their broadcasting reflects the political and
socioreligious ideology of the Government.
The severity of restrictions on academic freedom has been
relaxed somewhat in recent years. However, course content is
still monitored, and there is little genuine critical
discussion of issues. Informers are said to be common on
Ceimpus and in the classroom. To achieve tenure, professors
reportedly must cooperate with government authorities over a
period of years. All textbooks proposed for use at the
universities are reviewed by government authorities to
determine their acceptability.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution permits unarmed assemblies and marches
"provided they do not violate the principles of Islam." The
only ones permitted in practice are those sponsored by the
Government, such as Friday prayers and parades and
demonstrations on official occasions.
Early in the year, there were several reports of unofficial
demonstrations against the Government, many of them centering
on the deteriorating economy. In February, following the
cancellation of a soccer match, spontaneous demonstrations
occurred in Tehran during which slogans were shouted against
government leaders and progovernment posters were torn down.
These demonstrations, like most other such disturbances, were
suppressed by government forces.
Article 26 of the Constitution allows the formation of
political parties, groups, and professional associations, as
well as Islamic and some minority religious associations,
provided they do not violate the principles of "freedom,
sovereignty, [and] national unity" or question Islam or the
Islamic Republic. In practice, most independent organizations
have either been banned, co-opted by the Government, or are
moribund.
Former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan told the Special
Rapporteur in a February meeting in Tehran that the Freedom
Movement, with which he is associated, continues to be
harassed by Iranian authorities. For example, according to
Bazargan the Movement's telephones have been tapped, its mail
opened, and members subjected to intimidation. The houses of
most of the leading members of the Movement had been bombed.
While the Freedom Movement participated in the first
parliamentary election after the revolution, it was prevented
from doing so in all subsequent elections. For example,
Bazargan was not approved as a candidate for the presidential
elections in 1989. Constitutional guarantees notwithstanding,
Bazargan said, the legal status of the Freedom Movement
remains in suspense.
In June, 21 members of the Freedom Movement were arrested
after signing an open letter to the Government calling for
greater personal and political freedoms as guaranteed by the
Constitution. Government officials as well as the Iranian
news media accused the Freedom Movement of acting as a "fifth
column" in the service of the revolution's enemies.
The Special Rapporteur also met in February with
representatives of the 4-year old Association for the
Protection of Liberties and Human Rights (APLHR) . This
organization, like the Freedom Movement, has received no
official recognition, although its charter, based on
constitutional principles, was submitted to the Ministry of
Interior for approval. In 1988, APLHR representatives said,
their party offices were occupied by the authorities and their
chairman was arrested. They are denied access to printing
facilities, although it is possible to circulate photocopies
of their newsletter by hand. The Special Rapporteur noted
that similar restrictions were experienced by other
organizations trying to promote human rights and freedoms.
c. Freedom of Religion
In Iran religion is almost inseparable from government. The
President and many other top officials are mullahs (Islamic
clergymen), as are the Speaker of the Parliament and nearly
half the parliamentary deputies.
Approximately 90 percent of Iranians are Shi ' a Muslims. Aside
from slightly over 1 percent who are non-Muslims (Baha'is,
Christians, Zoroastrians , and Jews), the rest are Sunni
Muslims. The Sunnis are mostly Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans,
Baluch, and other ethnic minorities whose political influence
is very limited. The Constitution declares that "the official
religion of Iran is Islam and the sect followed is Ja'fari
Shi 'ism," but it also states that "other Islamic denominations
shall enjoy complete respect."
The small Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian (the pre-Islamic
religion of Iran) populations are concentrated mainly in urban
areas. Their religions are recognized by the Constitution,
and they elect representatives to seats reserved for them in
the Parliament. They are permitted to practice their
religions, to instruct their children, and—although with a
great deal of disruptive interference—to maintain schools.
Citing the example of the Armenian Christians (who number
about 200,000), the Special Rapporteur said in his February
1990 report that religious minorities are freely able to
practice their faith. He said the Armenians operate 7 active
churches in Tehran and 12 in Isfahan, and are able to bury
their dead in their own cemeteries. He also noted that the
Armenians are permitted to publish a weekly newspaper and to
operate a number of cultural associations.
Reports from other sources, however, suggest that while there
is little overt discrimination against Christians,
administrative and other official harassment is commonplace.
In the case of the Chaldean Catholics (numbering about
14,000), the Government has reportedly refused to renew the
church's registration and has, as a result, denied requests to
print Bibles, construct chapels, or engage in registered
charitable activities. The Presbyterian church has allegedly
suffered similar interference from the authorities; while the
Interior Ministry was said to have allowed elections for
church officials, it disrupted the meeting at which they took
place and obstructed the balloting.
The Government in 1990 continued to discriminate against the
Baha'i community, Iran's largest non-Muslim minority (300,000
to 350,000 members). The Baha'i religion, an offshoot of
Islam, is considered a "misguided sect" by the authorities and
is not officially recognized.
In some important respects, the Government mitigated its
repression of individual Baha'is, continuing the trend of the
last several years. According to the National Spiritual
Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States, 14 Baha'is were
arrested in 1990 while 19 were released, leaving only 9
Baha'is in prison for religious reasons. No Baha'is were
reported to have been executed in 1990. A small number of
Baha'is were permitted to leave the country. Some Baha'i
property confiscated by the Government was returned, including
most Baha ' i-owned shops, although the amount represents a
small fraction of the total seized. Most Baha'is are now able
to obtain food ration booklets. Baha'is are now generally
able to bury their dead in Baha'i cemeteries, although this
remains a problem in a number of areas. Baha'i children are
now permitted to attend grade school and high school . In his
February 1990 report, the Special Rapporteur noted that "the
situation of the Baha'is is moving towards quite broad de
facto tolerance."
However, the Government has not officially abandoned its
anti-Baha'i policies. Widespread discrimination against the
community persists. All property of the community, such as
places of worship, remains confiscated. Baha'i marriages are
still not recognized. Baha'is generally cannot attend college
(the Special Rapporteur notes that only four have been
admitted to universities) or be employed on college
faculties. Baha'is are forbidden to participate in social
welfare organizations, and they may not teach their faith.
Some Baha'is continue to be denied public sector (and often
private sector) employment on account of their religion; in a
number of cases ration cards have been denied on the same
grounds. Thousands of Baha'is dismissed from government jobs
in the early 1980 ' s receive no unemployment benefits and have
been required to repay the Government for salaries or pensions
received from the first day of employment. Those unable to do
so face severe prison sentences. While some Baha'i's have
been issued passports, the Special Rapporteur reported that
the vast majority of such requests are denied. The Government
continues to attack the Baha'i community as a front for
political and espionage activities and prohibits the community
from electing leaders or conducting religious activities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Iranians may travel to any part of Iran, although there have
been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas at times of heavy
fighting. Persons may change their place of residence without
obtaining permission.
Males of draft age are not issued exit visas except for
approved courses of study, and Iranians who are suspect
politically, such as some retired military officers and
high-level public officials under the former regime, are not
able to leave the country. Persons who have not repaid loans
obtained from development banks under the old government also
are denied exit visas. Reportedly some Iranians, particularly
those whose skills are in short supply and who were educated
at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit visas.
In his February 1990 report, the Special Rapporteur recounted
several instances in which passports were denied, sometimes
for apparent political reasons, and on other occasions with no
reason given. As noted in Section 2.c., most Baha'is are
denied passports.
Iranian Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to travel,
even to Israel, but they are normally denied the multiple-exit
visas given to most Iranians and must make a fresh application
(with a fresh fee) for each planned trip. Permission is not
normally granted for all members of a Jewish family to travel
outside Iran at the same time.
Iranians are generally able to return to Iran after long
periods abroad without reprisal. Since the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, the Government has encouraged the many
thousands of skilled Iranians living abroad to return to help
rebuild the country. Of those who have gone back in recent
years, a number have been able to pursue, through the Iranian
judicial system, the return of their properties. However,
many exiles complain that formal legal guarantees of their
safety have not yet been provided, and, as a result, many
remain reluctant to return.
There are some categories of persons who may be in danger if
they return to Iran. Some of those with close ties to the
former regime, draft evaders, and those who departed the
country illegally face possible arrest upon their return.
Members or sympathizers with the People's Mojahedin
Organization of Iran, an opposition group, are subject to
imprisonment and torture or even execution should they return.
Nevertheless, immediate relatives of persons wanted by the
Government are often able to live in Iran, travel outside, and
return without undue difficulty.
Iranian passports have always been stamped "not valid for
emigration," but the Government does not make a clear
distinction between legal residence in another country and
emigration. According to the regulations, Iranians with a
legal residence outside Iran may be issued passports and
advance exit visas by the Iranian embassy, consulate, or
interests section in their country of residence. Iranians who
have acquired U.S. citizenship are considered Iranian (in
effect dual nationals) unless they have formally renounced
their Iranian citizenship in accordance with Iranian law.
There have been many instances in which Iranian authorities
have confiscated the U.S. passports of dual nationals. There
are no known instances of the denial of Iranian citizenship to
Iranians who left Iran, or to those who have remained there.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Iran is ruled by a group of religious leaders (mullahs) and
their lay associates who share a belief in the legitimacy of a
theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation
of Shi ' a Islam. Citizens are not free to question or to
change this form of government.
The revolutionary Government has held elections at fairly
regular intervals for president. Parliament deputies, members
of the Assembly of Experts (responsible for choosing the
Revolutionary Leader's successor), and members of local
government councils. Elections for the Assembly of Experts
and parliamentary by-elections were contested in October.
Voting is by universal suffrage of everyone age 15 and older
and is by secret ballot. All candidates must be approved by
the Council of Guardians, however, and only those meeting the
Council's vaguely described political and religious criteria
may run. In practice, only supporters of the theocratic state
are accepted.
The Ministry of Interior announced in December 1988 that
political parties would be allowed to form, provided they met
the Government's religious and political criteria. Since then
only a few have been licensed.
The independence of the Parliament is provided for in the
Constitution and exists to a large degree in practice. While
Parliament deputies are typically allied with various powerful
political and religious officials, they may speak and vote
independently and may shift from one faction to another.
Vigorous parliamentary debates—normally covered extensively
in the press—cover a wide variety of issues. Harsh criticism
of government officials is often heard in these debates, and,
in some cases, laws proposed by the executive branch have been
voted down.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed
of 12 members: 6 clerics unilaterally appointed by the
Leader, and 6 lay members well grounded in Islamic law who are
nominated by the head of the Judicial Council, subject to the
Parliament's approval. The Council of Guardians must certify
all bills passed by the Parliament as being in accordance with
Islamic law and the Constitution. If bills fail to be
certified, they are sent back to the Parliament for revision.
They cannot become law until passed by the Parliament and
certified by the Council.
The Council has rejected various important bills and portions
of bills passed by the Parliament, including legislation on
land reform, foreign trade, private enterprise, the press
code, and reform of the civil code.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
Iranian organizations that attempt to speak out on human
rights, such as the Freedom Movement and the Association for
the Protection of Liberties and Human Rights, face severe
harassment by the Government (see Section 2.b.). In the past,
the Government generally has been uncooperative with foreign
human rights groups, whether government sponsored or
independent, regarding their activities as interference in the
country's internal affairs. Foreign diplomats stationed in
Tehran who attempt to develop information about human rights
abuses face strong interference from Iranian authorities.
However, in January the Government, for the first time,
permitted the U.N. Special Rapporteur to visit the country and
interview both opponents and supporters of the Government,
including high-ranking Government officials such as the
President and the head of the judiciary. Nevertheless, his
access to victims of abuse was limited, and some of those who
testified faced reprisals. A second visit by the Special
Rapporteur took place in October. Again, the Government
denied him access to some of those imprisoned persons he
wished to interview. Government-imposed controls during the
Special Rapporteur's visits prevented him from being able to
investigate fully all reports of human rights abuses.
In his February 1990 report, the Special Rapporteur said that,
during his visit in January, the Government responded
favorably in principle to several of his suggestions. These
included regular visits by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to prisons throughout the country to examine
conditions and to look into the situation of political
prisoners; the possibility of the U.N. Center for Human Rights
in Geneva providing technical assistance to Iran; development
of a program to identify inconsistencies between Islamic law
and international law to help bring the Iranian system more in
line with accepted international standards of human rights;
and consideration of humanitarian requests submitted by the
Special Rapporteur.
To date, the Government has been in touch with the ICRC and
has reached agreement in principle to facilitate prison visits
by ICRC officials. The Foreign Ministry is also working on a
paper comparing international law and Islamic law.
In addition to its acceptance of the Special Rapporteur's
mission, the Government has also indicated its willingness in
principle to receive an official visit from Middle East Watch,
a New York-based human rights monitoring group, in January
1991.
In its 1990 Report, AI said that it pressed the Government to
respond to charges of mass execution of political opponents in
1988-89. The Government responded that a small number had
been executed for taking part in armed incursions by the
People's Mojahedin into Iran, and that the Government had the
right to punish those who took up arms against it. AI said
that the Government failed to reply to repeated requests for
details of any charges brought against political prisoners.
In response to AI ' s appeal for an end to mass executions of
accused drug dealers, the Government said it believes the
death penalty is an appropriate response to such a serious
crime, but did not respond to AI ' s concerns about the summary
trials of many of those executed.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Women have faced heightened discrimination since the
revolution. Ultraconservative dress, entirely hiding the hair
and all of the body except the face and hands, is a
requirement for all women, regardless of their religion,
national origin, or citizenship. In the past, women have been
harassed, detained, or physically attacked if they appeared in
public in clothing that official or self-appointed guardians
of public morality deemed insufficiently modest. While
enforcement of these rules has varied considerably since the
cease—fire with Iraq in 1988, and particularly since
Ayatollah Khomeini's death last year, in 1990 a crackdown on
dress code and morals violations was announced (see Section
l.f .).
Although violence against women is known to occur in Iran,
little is known about its extent. Abuse within the family is
considered a private matter in this conservative society and
is seldom discussed publicly. There are no official
statistics on the subject. In his February 1990 report, the
Special Representative related several accounts of the torture
and execution of women detainees, some of whom were allegedly
raped before execution.
Under legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to
divorce their husbands, and regulations promulgated in 1984
substantially broadened to 12 the number of grounds for which
a woman may seek divorce. A husband may obtain a divorce
without having to state a reason or go to court.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha ' i minorities
suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination
in a number of areas, particularly with respect to employment,
education, and public accommodations. Muslims who have
converted to Christianity are similarly discriminated
against. For example, one requirement of university admission
is passing a test on Islamic theology, which has the effect of
excluding most religious minorities from higher education.
Applicants for public sector employment are similarly screened
for adherence to standards of Islamic orthodoxy, with much the
same effect. There have also been reports that religious
minorities have suffered discrimination in the legal system,
such as receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits,
and of suffering heavier punishments than those imposed on
Muslims. Although Sunnis have encountered religious
discrimination on the local level, the Government has made
efforts to reduce Shi ' a-Sunni antagonism.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There are no real labor unions. A national organization known
as the "House of Labor," founded in 1982 as the labor branch
of the now defunct Islamic Republican Party, is the only
authorized national labor organization. It works closely with
the Islamic societies and "Islamic labor councils" set up in
most Iranian factories. The House of Labor is headed by
Hossein Kamali, the Minister of Labor; as such, it is largely
a conduit of government influence and control, not a trade
union founded by workers to represent their interests.
The officially sanctioned Islamic labor councils also are
instruments of government control and not bodies created and
controlled by workers to advance their own interests, although
they have frequently been able to block layoffs or the firing
of workers.
There is also a system of "guild unions," which operates on a
regional basis. These guild unions issue vocational licenses,
fund financial cooperatives to assist members, and help
workers to find jobs. The guild vinions operate with the
cooperation of the Government.
No information is available on the right of workers in Iran to
strike. No strikes are known to have taken place in 1990, and
it is unlikely that the Government would tolerate any strike
deemed to be at odds with its economic and labor policies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
In practice, the right of workers to organize independently
and bargain collectively is extremely limited. It is not
known whether labor legislation and practice in the export
processing zones differ in any significant respect from the
law and practice in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Section 273 of the Iranian Penal Code provides that any person
who does not have definite means of subsistence and who,
through laziness or negligence, does not look for work may be
obliged by the Government to take suitable employment. This
provision has been frequently criticized by the Committee of
Experts (COE) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) as
contravening ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. In its 1990
report, the COE noted an indication by the Government in its
latest report to the Committee that provision 273 had been
abolished and replaced, for a trial period, by a new provision
approved by the Parliciment. The Government, according to the
COE, stated that the new provision was not incompatible with
Convention 29, and promised to provide a copy after the
provision was translated. The COE noted that the Government
had indicated in its 1977 report that similar regulations
concerning unemployed persons and vagrants had been repealed,
but had not yet complied with the Committee's request for a
copy of the repealing legislation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Iranian labor law, which exempts agriculture, domestic
service, family businesses, and, to some extent, other small
businesses, forbids employment of minors under 12 years and
places special restrictions on the employment of minors under
18. In addition, women and minors may not be used for hard
labor or, in general, for night work. The extent to which
these regulations are enforced is not known.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The labor law establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum
(except for overtime at premium rates), with 1 day of rest
(normally Friday) per week as well as at least 12 days per
year of leave with pay and a number of paid public holidays.
There are also legal provisions with respect to minimum wages
and health and safety in workplaces. Further information on
these laws and the amount and adequacy of the minimum wage is
not available.
Given the large segments of the economy exempted from the
labor law, the State's still unresolved administrative
disorganization resulting from the revolution, the effects of
the war with Iraq, and the general lack of effective labor
unions, it is unclear to what extent the provisions of Iran's
labor law affect most of the labor force.
The ILO has long been concerned with official discrimination
in employment against members of the Baha ' i religion. In its
1990 report, the ILO's COE cited somewhat conflicting reports
indicating that the Government was moving toward ending
discrimination in employment against Baha' is, and asked the
Government to provide clarification of the current situation
and the Government's intentions.
When the COE report was discussed in the ILO Conference
Committee on the Application of Standards in June, the
Government delegate from Iran outlined and provided
documentation on various legislative reforms and steps that
the Government claims it is taking to bring about compliance
with Convention 111 barring discrimination in employment,
which has been the primary focus of complaints against Iran at
the ILO for its treatment of Baha ' is (see also Section 5).
