a-6391-2 (ACC-ETH-6392)
Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Informationen zu oben genannten Fragen finden Sie auch im Länderbericht des britischen Innenministeriums:
Sicherheitskräfte
Im Bericht Countries at the Crossroads, veröffentlicht im September 2007 von Freedom House (FH), wird von der systematischen Beseitigung von potenziell unloyalen Soldaten durch die Regierung berichtet. Umfragen 2005 hätten ergeben, dass die Öffentlichkeit an der Rechtschaffenheit der Sicherheitskräfte zweifle, vor allem nach den gefälschten Wahlen 2005 und wegen der Behandlung bestimmter Gruppierungen mit dem Ziel, Unruhen zu unterbinden. Die Sicherheitskräfte würden für Misshandlungen selten zur Rechenschaft gezogen:
“The military has generally remained loyal to civilian authority. However, in August 2006 a dissident Oromo general defected to Eritrea with 100 of his troops and pledged his support for the armed wing of the OLF. This moved the government to begin a systematic purge of soldiers it viewed as potentially disloyal. Additionally, in a series of surveys taken in 2005, the public expressed concerns about the “public integrity of the armed forces.” This concern stems not only from events surrounding the flawed elections of 2005 but also from the way various groups, such as the Anuak, Somalis, and Oromo, have been treated by military forces called in to put down popular unrest. Accountability for abuses perpetrated by the security forces is rare. An example is the commission of inquiry on the 2005 post-election violence: although in the end the commission officially exonerated the security forces of using “excessive force,” it soon emerged that an earlier commission vote had found that excessive force was indeed applied.” (FH, 25. September 2008)
Im Jahresbericht zur Menschenrechtslage des US Department of State (USDOS), erschienen im März 2008, heißt es, die föderale Polizeikommission unterstehe dem Bundesministerium und in weiterer Folge dem Parlament, es gebe aber auch Milizen der lokalen Regierungen, die unabhängig von Polizei und Militär als lokale Sicherheitskräfte operieren würden. Korruption und Straflosigkeit seien weiterhin ernsthafte Probleme geblieben, und die föderale Polizei habe zugegeben, dass es vielen ihrer Mitglieder und auch der regionalen Polizei an Professionalität mangle. Die Regierung habe ihre Bemühungen fortgesetzt, Polizei und Armee im Hinblick auf Menschenrechte weiterzubilden:
„Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
The Federal Police Commission reports to the Ministry of Federal Affairs, which in turn is subordinate to the parliament. Local government militias also operated as local security forces largely independent of the police and the military. Corruption remained a problem, particularly among traffic policemen who solicited bribes. Impunity also remained a serious problem. The government rarely publicly disclosed the results of investigations into such types of abuses. The federal police acknowledged that many of its members as well as regional police lacked professionalism.
The government continued its efforts to train police and army recruits in human rights. During the year the government continued to seek assistance from the ICRC, JFA-PFE, and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to improve and professionalize its human rights training and curriculum by including more material on the constitution and international human rights treaties and conventions.” (USDOS. 11. März 2008, Sec. 1d)
[Textpassage entfernt]
Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch Sicherheitskräfte werden insbesondere durch die Organisation Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO) dokumentiert, beispielsweise in den aktuellesten regulären Berichten der Organisation:
Korruption bei Behörden
Zur Korruption bei Behörden schreibt Freedom House (FH) im Juli 2008, die Regierung habe zwar einige Schritte zur Bekämpfung der Korruption unternommen, ihr seien jedoch auch selbst korrupte Praktiken vorgeworfen worden. Transparency International habe Äthiopien auf Rang 138 von 180 bewerteten Ländern im Corruption Perceptions Index platziert.
„Ethiopia was ranked 138 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index. The government has taken a number of steps to limit corruption, but it has also been accused of participating in corrupt practices. In 2007, former prime minister Tamrat Layne and former defense minister Seye Abreha were convicted on corruption charges.” (FH, 2. Juli 2008)
Der Menschenrechtsbericht des US Department of State (USDOS) vom März 2008 enthält folgende Angaben zu Korruption der Regierung: Per Gesetz würde Korruption von Beamten strafrechtlich verfolgt, die Regierung habe diese Gesetze jedoch nicht effektiv umgesetzt, und laut World Bank sei Korruption ein großes Problem. Es seien keine hohen Regierungsbeamten, jedoch zahlreiche niedrige Beamte wegen Korruption verhaftet worden.
„Government Corruption and Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement these laws effectively. The World Bank's worldwide governance indicators reflected that corruption was a serious problem.
The Ministry of Justice has primary responsibility for combating corruption. A combination of social pressure, cultural norms, and legal restrictions limited corruption. However, government officials appeared to manipulate the privatization process, as state and party-owned businesses received preferential access to land leases and credit. The government's decision to grant MIDROC, the country's largest foreign investor, an exclusive license to import cement was perceived as favoritism toward a government ally.
There were no arrests of high-level government officials, although numerous low-level officials were arrested for corruption during the year.
The law provides for public access to government information, but access was largely restricted in practice.
The government publishes its laws and regulations in the national gazette prior to their taking effect. The Ministry of Information managed contacts between the government, the press, and the public; however, the government routinely refused to respond to queries from the private press (see section 2.a.).” (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sec. 3)
Im Bericht Countries at the Crossroads von Freedom House (FH) 2007 gibt es ein Kapitel “Anticorruption and Transparency”, das folgende Informationen enthält: Im Vergleich zu anderen afrikanischen Ländern sei die öffentliche Korruption in Äthiopien „nicht überwältigend“ („not overwhelming“), nehme aber in den letzten Jahren zu. Erhebungen von Transparency International zufolge nehme die Bevölkerung Korruption als weit verbreitet wahr, vor allem in Steuerbehörden, in der Wirtschaft, in politischen Parteien, Polizei und Justiz. Es sei üblich, Bestechungsgelder anzubieten, um Probleme mit den Behörden zu vermeiden.
Die Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) habe 2001 die Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC) gegründet, die sich später für die Bekämpfung der Korruption auf höchster Ebene eingesetzt habe.
Äthiopien habe zwar einen Ombudsmann, er sei jedoch nicht eindeutig politisch unabhängig:
“By the standards of some countries in Africa, public corruption in Ethiopia is not overwhelming. However, it has been on the rise in recent years. There is evidence of some institutional corruption, with the public citing graft by certain government officials, as well as petty corruption, in which individuals report having to pay bribes to receive services.
Transparency International’s 2005 Global Corruption Barometer found that Ethiopian respondents perceived corruption to be widespread. The most corrupt public institutions were said to be taxation agencies (3.8 out of 5, with 5 representing the most corrupt). Business and private sector groups, also with a score of 3.8, are viewed as part of the problem. The Ethiopian public was similarly concerned about corruption involving political parties (3.6), the police (3.7), and the judiciary (3.7). Respondents felt that the least corrupt institutions were civil society organizations and religious bodies, which scored 2.5 and 2.4, respectively. Ethiopia has a high incidence of bribery. In the same Transparency International report, thirty percent of respondents said they had paid a bribe in the past year, while about half said they were asked for a bribe. Offering bribes to avoid problems with authorities is common, with nearly half of respondents saying they did so.
Ethiopia’s corruption is in part influenced by the difficulties of operating a federal system with a public bureaucracy that is low in human capacity. Officials are underpaid and often unaccountable. Common forms of corruption include bribes to receive certain permits and contracts or to get a public official to act more favorably in the issuing of a license. There is additional evidence that the public is concerned about the number of companies that, because of their political connections, enjoy above-average access to information, contracts, and finance. Lawmakers regularly consult with business allies while formulating the state budget, though the state has made progress in disseminating budget information to the public.
The government is ostensibly pursuing economic liberalization, but the World Bank found that ongoing state control of the economy has held back the private sector. Some industries have been privatized, but the state still owns the major utilities and dominates the financial sector. Moreover, high-level party officials have undue privileges as business entrepreneurs.
In 2001, the EPRDF unveiled the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC). It is widely held in Ethiopia that the commission was created principally to pursue powerful figures who had fallen out of favor with the regime. However, the FEACC has recently been active in fighting high-level corruption. For example, 12 senior officials of the Development Bank of Ethiopia were arrested in May 2006 and charged with violations of bank policy and illegal overseas transfers. In a separate reform move, the Federal Inland Revenue Authority (FIRA) in 2006 installed a new tax administration system to help improve the efficiency of revenue collection. The FEACC also established a mechanism for whistle-blowers to confidentially report cases of corruption and pledged to protect them from retribution; although the testimony of whistle-blowers has indeed been utilized in corruption cases, the politicization of corruption cases may limit their effectiveness. In addition, the lack of media freedom clearly inhibits the press’ ability to freely conduct investigative journalism or widely air accusations of corruption in an unbiased fashion.
A January 2007 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report stated that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in November 2006 had sacked the long-serving federal auditor general, Lema Argaw, for allegedly interfering in politics. According to the EIU, in July 2006 Argaw had reported that some federal money allocated to regional governments had not been properly accounted for. The government declared that in doing this, he had overstepped his authority, since regional funds were not part of his purview. The EIU report suggests that the prime minister did not have the authority to fire Argaw, citing a constitutional provision that gives such power to parliament.
Ethiopia has an ombudsman, but it is not clear that he is free from political pressure. Human Rights Watch claims that he was appointed without adequate debate or discussion. The government’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) includes measures to improve reporting by federal institutions, make this information available to the public, and improve accountability and transparency at the local government level. Generally, although access to state information has increased, Ethiopia still lacks systematic legislation governing such access. There is no freedom of information law; the draft press law includes a section regarding access to state information, but leaves ambiguous the constraints that the state may place on citizen requests.” (FH, 25. September 2007)
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
Quellen:
