Several sources state that the Red Commando or Red Command (Comando Vermelho) drug gang operates mostly in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns (favelas) (The Boston Globe 26 Nov. 1999; DPA 25 June 1999; Japan Economic Newswire 14 Mar. 1995; OGD 1997; SEJUP 5 May 1994). Two sources state that the Red Commando had expanded its drug trafficking operations to neighbouring Sao Paulo (Jornal da Tarde 25 June 1999; SEJUP 17 Mar. 1994). The Jornal da Tarde report adds that drug gangs connected to the Red Commando had also expanded its activities in the states of Pernambuco and Paraiba, as well as in Vale do Sao Francisco, Bahia State. The only other reference to Red Commando activities in Bahia State was found in a 27 August 1999 Jornal do Brasil report which stated that some tribes' reservations in that state, as well as Pernambuco State, had been invaded by the Red Commando. The situation, according to the tribesmen, who had gone to the Senate in Brasilia to raise their concerns, was most serious in Cabrobro, Pernambuco (ibid.).

Jornal da Tarde offers the following on the organizational structure and drug trafficking activities of the Red Command:

These organizations are reportedly already reaching the status of "mafia," directly employing around 10,000 people in Rio, 35 percent of them children and teenagers. An organization chart shows a defined hierarchy, with "bosses," "coordinators," lawyers, leaders, general managers, security, "white managers" who control the traffic in cocaine, "black managers" who control the sale of marijuana, drug pushers, and lookouts.

The report indicates that in Rio there are now 606 fortified houses for drug trafficking, 500 leaders, 500 managers, 5,000 security men, and at least 300 lawyers who work for the dealers. Also created was the person of "man of trust": a shantytown leader who substitutes for the trafficker when the latter is in jail. The man of trust has a monthly salary of R30,000. The "general manager" of each house earns R12,000 per month and generally has some idea of how to keep books.

Rising Socially

The traffic's "security man" gets R3,000 a month. They are people from the community itself and have the job of "repelling invasions by rivals," "preventing the police from seizing a large quantity of drugs and guns," and "ensuring the escape of leaders." The traffic is allegedly paying R50 per day to each child or teenager who works as a "lookout," with the task of "warning of anything unusual" that happens in the community. The "bosses" of the drug traffic in Rio, according to the report, are persons above any suspicion: businessmen and "mega-businessmen" with front businesses in Brazil and abroad (25 June 1999).

In its 1995-1996 Annual Report, the World Geopolitics of Drugs stated the following on the Red Commando:

Since the beginning of 1995, the [Brazilian] papers have been mentioning a so-called "Rio cartel" co-ordinating major traffickers linked to the criminal organization known as Comando Vermelho (Red Commando), which was created in the late 1970s and has been held to be the main trafficking organization in Rio de Janeiro. Although the organization is shrouded in mystery like its rival, Comando Terceiro (Third Commando), the persistence of violent disputes over control of territory, which sometimes involve favela gang leaders supposedly linked to Comando Vermelho, shows that it is certainly an exaggeration to speak of a "cartel". Some observers even allege that Comando Vermelho, whose original leaders are dead or in jail, is today essentially a solidarity network among inmates. But fuelling the myth allows the criminals who are still at large both to increase their standing and to get respect from the police (1997).

Information regarding the Red Commando in 1994 was found in several 1994 issues of the Brazilian Service for Justice and Peace (Serviço Brasileiro de Justiça e Paz, SEJUP). For example, on 9 January 1994, 12 people were killed in the Acari slum in the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro following a violent confrontation between the rival gangs of the Red Commando and Third Commando (13 Jan. 1994). The confrontation erupted as the Red Commando was attempting to regain some drug-selling locations controlled by the Third Commando (ibid.). According to the report, the Third Commando was much smaller than the Red Commando and was formed by dissidents of the latter. In March 1994, SEJUP reported that Cardinal Dom Lorscheider, archbishop of Fortaleza, Ceara State, had been taken hostage by Red Commando prisoners when he visited the Paulo Sarasate Penal Institute (17 Mar. 1994). The prisoners were given a vehicle and left with the cardinal and the other hostages who were all released the next day in the interior of the state (ibid.). Citing a Folha de Sao Paulo report, SEJUP stated that the Red Commando and the Third Commando were essentially heavily armed teen armies involved in the drug trade (5 May 1994). These youth usually got involved in the drug gangs between the ages of 7 and 12, and were killed before they reached 20 years of age (ibid.).

The Japan Economic Newswire reported in March 1995 that eight people had been killed during a turf war between the Red Commando and a smaller gang in Vila do Joao, another Rio shantytown (14 Mar. 1995). The Red Commando gang, coined in the report as "the strongest and most daring among the many gangs which swarm Rio's 'favelas'," had failed to capture territory from rival traffickers following the shoot-out (ibid.).

Although not identifying the Red Commando gang specifically, in September 1999 a state deputy and former head of the Civil Police stated that "'the drug traffic in Rio has become a great retail business. The big chiefs are either in prison or dead'." (O Estado de Sao Paulo 29 Sept. 1999) Similarly, a Civil Police official stated that most drugs entering Rio arrive by land carried by 'mules' and was cited as saying that "people from all social classes [traffic the drugs]. They carry drugs in cars, in small planes that use clandestine runways in the country's interior, or even on interstate buses" (ibid.). The same report also states that only 20 per cent of the cocaine passing through the State of Rio remains in that state and that the rest heads for the United States and Europe.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA). 25 June 1999. "Rio's Most Powerful Drug Gang Employs More Than 10,000 People." (NEXIS)

Japan Economic Newswire. 14 March 1995. "Fight Between Rio Drug Gangs Leaves 8 Dead." (NEXIS)

Jornal do Brasil [Rio de Janeiro, in Portuguese]. 25 August 1999. "Drug Traffickers Organization Said to Invade Indian Reservations." (BBC Summary 27 Aug. 1999/NEXIS)

Jornal da Tarde [Sao Paulo, in Portuguese]. 25 June 1999. "Rio Drug Mafia Operating in Sao Paulo." (FBIS-LAT-1999-0629 25 June 1999/WNC)

O Estado de Sao Paulo [in Portuguese]. 29 September 1999. "Rio Drug Trafficking Moves R25 Million Monthly" (FBIS-LAT-1999-0930 29 Sept. 1999/WNC)

Serviço Brasileiro de Justiça e Paz (SEJUP). 5 May 1994. No. 127. "Shanty Towns Give Rise to Adolescent Crime Armies." http://www.oneworld.org/sejup/127.htm [Accessed on 30 Nov. 1999]

_____. 17 March 1994. No. 121. "Cardinal Lorscheider Taken Hostage." http://www.oneworld.org/sejup/121.htm [Accessed on 30 Nov. 1999]

_____. 13 January 1994. No. 112. "Terror and Narcotraffic in Rio Favelas." http://www.oneworld.org/sejup/112.htm [Accessed on 30 Nov. 1999]

The World Geopolitics of Drugs. 1997. 1995-1996 Annual Report. http://www.ogd.org/rapport/gb/RP00_TABLE.html [Accessed 30 Nov. 1999]