Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992
LIBYA
* Because the United States has no Embassy in Libya and because the regime strictly limits
access to information, it is difficult to comment authoritatively on conditions in Libya.
The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship ruled by
Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadiiafi, aided by extragovernmental Revolutionary Committees
operating at his behest. The governing principles of the society are expressed
in Col. Qadhafi's "Green Book" rather than in a constitution. He has created a political
system borrowing from pan-Islamic and pan-Arab sources and purporting to establish
a "third way" superior to both capitalism and communism. In the past, he
has used assassination and intimidation as ways to control his enemies abroad; at
home he continues to use a variety of summary judicial proceedings to suppress all
popular resistance. Ethnic minorities, such as Berbers, are tightly controlled.
Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of several elite military
units, including Col. Qadhafi's personal bodyguards. The local Revolutionary
Committees and People's Committees also have security functions, designed to monitor
as well as protect the populace. The result is multilayered, pervasive surveillance
and control of individual activities.
Despite continued marginal efforts at privatization, the Libyan economy remains
essentially state controlled. It is based almost exclusively on the country's rich oil
resources, Libya's principal source of foreign exchange earnings. Libya has used its
oil income to finance internal development (new schools, hospitals, roads), but much
has been wasted. The Government also continued to spend vast sums on military
and weapons procurement. Foreign exchange controls remained tight in 1992.
There was no significant change in the human rights situation in 1992, and these
rights remained tightly restricted. Legal freedoms and rights are generally lacking.
There are no effective rights to peaceful association or assembly, to freedom of
speech, including expression of views opposing those of the Government in any form,
to formation of trade unions, or to strike. The same is true of personal rights such
as the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty, to a public and speedy
trial, to legal counsel, to be secure in one's home or person, or even to hold property.
While some of these rights are guaranteed in principle by the Libyan Government,
they do not exist in practice. Althou^ Col. Qadhafi announced his support in 1988
for policies and reforms aimed at remedying past abuses of human rights, there has
been no evidence of significant change.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
There were reports by opposition groups that political killings took place in 1992, but it was not possible to verify
these reports. There were reliable reports that 5 to 10 alleged leaders of Islamic
groups and other political detainees arrested in 1989-90 were executed in 1991.
A lai^e number of offenses, including political offenses, are punishable by death
under Libyan law. For example, Law No. 71 of 1972 provides for the death penalty
for anyone involved with any group activity based on any ideology opposed to the
principles of the revolution. Despite his publicly stated intentions. Col. Qadhafi has
not acted to abolish the death penalty for this offense. La fact, in the September
1991 Consolidation of Liberty Law No. 20, Article 4 stipulates that the death penalty
may be imposed on "those whose behavior constitute a threat or cause depravity
to society."
b. Disappearance.
There were no reports of disappearance in 1992 (but see Section 1. c).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Libya is a State Party to the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, prisoners are
reportedly tortured during interrogations or for discipline. Reporting in 1991 and
1992 indicates that some of the thousands of black African workers who were detained
and then expelled may have been tortured while in detention. One related
death was reported in 1991, and at least 16 workers were reported to have "disappeared"
wlule under detention. Some black African workers are reportedly still
held in detention camps (see also Section 6.e.). Many prisoners are held incommunicado,
which makes confirmation of torture difficult.
Means of torture reportedly include: chaining to a wall for hours, clubbing, electric
shock, corkscrews in the back, lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing
the joints to heal without medical care, suffocation using plastic bags, deprivation
of food and water, and beatings on the soles of the feet.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Under Libyan law, detainees may be held
incommunicado for unlimited periods. Many political prisoners are held in unofficial
detention centers, controlled by members of the Revolutionary Committees, where
prolonged periods of incommunicado detention are common. Many allegedly are held
without charge or trial, apparently as an example to other would-be opponents of
the regime. Tnere continuea to be reliable reports that between 400 ana 500 political
detainees were still being held at the end of the year, most of whom were arrested
within the past 3 years. While undergoing interrogation, sometimes for periods
of several months, prisoners are given no access to legal representation. Although
Col. Qadhafi has claimed to be opposed to secret arrests, there is still no
evidence he has issued explicit orders to stop the practice. Foreigners have also been
subject to aAitrary arrest and torture. There have been credible reports that some
foreign workers in Libya have been forced into military training and military service
on behalf of Libya or coerced into subversive activities against their own countries.
Exile is not a form of punishment practiced in Libya; to the contrary. Col. Qadhafi
seeks to pressure Libyans working or studying abroad to return to Libya. The regime
does, however, arbitrarily expel noncitizens (see Section 6.e.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Most civilians are tried in regular courts, but their
cases may be referred to less formal "people's courts," or to military or revolutionary
courts, depending on the arbitrary decision of the security forces. Security forces
have the power to judge persons guilty without trial, particularly "traitors to the
people." Some trials are held in private or in the absence of the accused.
A 1981 law prohibits the private practice of law and makes all attorneys employees
of the Secretariat of Justice. Libya claims it "guarantees prisoners all necessary
means of defense and safeguards of justice adequate to the principles contained in
the [Universal] Declaration of Human Rights" and provides lor legal assistance "as
soon as possible with respect to the exigencies of interrogation." Nevertheless, there
continue to be numerous reports that these rights are denied.
Alleged political offenses have at times been tried before ad hoc revolutionary
courts rather than by civilian courts, with opportunities to engage defense counsel
severely restricted. A number of these trials have been held in secret. Despite the
regime s 1988 announcement of their abolition, "extraordinary" courts are still in operation
and have been publicly discussed in the case of Islamic fundamentalists. Of
the 400 to 500 known political prisoners currently held in Libyan prisons, most were
never formally charged or tried. At least one has remained in prison since 1984 despite
having been tried and acquitted in 1985.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Government does not respect the right to privacy. The legal requirement that judicial
warrants be obtained before entering a private home is often disregarded. Local
and international telephone calls are routinely monitered. An extensive government
informer network is encouraged by both security agencies and Revolutionary Committees.
Libyan exiles report that mere family ties to suspected regime opponents
can result in harassment or even persecution and detention by the authorities. Property
can be seized and burned if it belongs to "enemies of the people" or those who
"cooperate" with foreign powers.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Some difference of opinion is tolerated in People's
Committee meetings and at the General People's Congress, but in general freedom
of speech is severely limited. This is especially true with regard to criticism
of Col. Qadhafi or his regime. In the summer, the Libyan media carried reports critical
of Qadhaii, but these appear to have been orchestrated by the regime as part
of its propaganda campaign to deflect international pressure on Libya to respond effectively
to United Nations I'esolutions 731 and 748 regarding its role in the bombings
of Pan American flight 103 and Union de Transports Aerens flight 772.
Political speech is repressed through legislation banning all political activities not
sanctioned by the Government, including the nonviolent expression of conscientiously
held beliefs. The legislation, which makes the dissemination of "hostile information"
a crime, is so all-encompassing that almost any form of expression may be
deemed Illegal. Fear of being informed upon by elements of the Revolutionary Committees
ana an underlying climate of mistrust at all levels of society further inhibit
freedom of speech.
Libyan media are owned and controlled by the State. There is a state-run daily
newspaper, with a circulation of 40,000. Several smaller newspapers are run by the
Revolutionaiy Committees. JANA, the official news agency, is the designated conduit
for politically acceptable opinions. Publishing opinions contrary to government
policy is not permitted. Newsweek, Time, the Herald Tribune, and Express Jeune
Afrique are available, but censorship is applied at times. There are strict controls
of foreign publications at the Tripoli airport. Foreign broadcasts can be received.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Public assembly is repressed
unless it is government controlled and supportive of regime positions. The right of
association is limited and granted only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According
to Law No. 71 of 1972, party activities constituting "treason" are punishable
by death. Offending activities include "any grouping, organization, or formation, of
whatever kind or number, which is based on a political concept opposed in its aims
to the principles of the * * * Revolution." Organizations such as independent trade
unions and professional associations are viewed as unnecessaiy, since Col. Qadhafl
has vowed not to "accept intermediaries between the revolution and its working
forces."
c. Freedom of Religion
Libya is overwhelmingly Muslim. In an apparent effort
to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned the once-powerful
Sanusiyya Islamic religious sect. In its place. Col. Qadhafl established the Islamic
Call Society (ICS), which became the outlet for state-sanctioned religion, as well as
a tool for exporting the Libyan revolution abroad. In mid-1992, the Government announced
the disbandment of the ICS; however, there is no evidence it has actually
been disbanded.
Members of some minority religions (e.g. Christianity) may conduct services, but
Islamic groups at variance with the state-sanctioned version are banned. Services
in Christian churches are attended by the foreign community. There is a resident
Catholic bishop operating two churches with a small number of priests. Nuns reportedly
are permitted to wear religious habits.
In 1990 Col Qadhafi stepped up a campaign against Islamic fundamentalists. Likening
fundamentalists to the Mafia, he denounced them as threats to the Government
and to Arab existence. As a result of this campaini, many fundamentalists
left Libya in 1990. In 1992 there were renewed reports of increased arrests of fundamentalists,
harassment of bearded males, and an increase in surveillance of
mosques. A majority of the political detainees in Libya are reported to be associated
with Islamic groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
With the exception of security areas, movement is not usually restricted
for Libyan citizens. Traditionally, exit permits have been required for travel abroad,
and currency controls have also served to restrict travel. Women must have their
husband's permission for them or their children to travel abroad.
In September Libya tightened border restrictions and began enforcing currenQr restrictions
that had not previously been enforced at the Tunisian border, possibly in
response to Tunisia's implementation of U.N. sanctions against Libya. In 1991 Libya
and Egypt agreed to allow the unrestricted flow of each other's nationals across
their mutual border. Thousands of Libyans reportedly go back and forth regularly.
These borders remained open in 1992 despite increased tensions which at times resulted
in some ti^tening of restrictions on border crossings. The Revolutionary
Committees maintain surveillance of some Libyans while abroad. The right of return
of Libyan nationals is theoretically fully protected even for opponents of Col.
Qadhafi. However, this "right" may be more nearly an obligation; the regime often
calls for students, many of whom are under government subsidy, and others working
abroad to return on little or no notice ana without regard to the impact on their
studies or work. Libyans who study abroad are interrogated on their return home.
A number of Libyans have refused to return.
Some exiled Libyan opposition leaders reported in August that the Libyan Government
had renewed contacts with them encouraging their return. All refused to
do so.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
The people of Libya have no right to change their government. Major government
decisions are controlled by Col. Qadhafi, a few key associates, or by committees acting
in his name. He appoints military officers and official functionaries down to junior
levels. Power flows through a small circle of trusted associates. Corruption and
favoritism (based on tribal origin) in the administration are major problems, adversely
affecting the efficiency of government.
Political parties and tribal or local groupings are prohibited. Participation in elections
is mandatory, and all candidates are cleared by the Revolutionary Committees.
Candidates may not be "merchants, contractors, tribal advocates, election brokers,
officials of the former (pre-1969) government, or people who have been attacked by
the power of the revolution."
Popular participation in government is theoretically provided by the grassroots
People's Committees which send representatives annuafly to the national General
People's Congress (GPC). In practice, the GPC is a rubberstamp assembly, approving
all recommendations made by Col. Qadhafi.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations ofHuman Rights
No independent human rights organizations are permitted to function in Libya.
The Libyan Arab Human Rights Committee, a government organization, was created
in May 1989, reportedly to implement reforms announced in 1988. However,
there are no reports of any activities by the Committee.
Libyan oflicials last met with Amnesty International (AI) representatives during
a June 1988 visit. Since then, the Government has repeatedly refused to reply substantively
to Ars appeals on behalf of political detainees in Libya. However, in 1991
the Government expressed willingness to discuss AI's concerns with AI r^resentatives.
Preparations for an AI visit were under way in 1992, but by yearns end no
visit had occurred.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
Discrimination based on tribal status is frequently alleged, particularly against
Berbers in the interior and Tuaregs in the south. Col. Qadhafi s complaints about
the continued power of tribal and other groups have not prevented him from utilizing
these groups for political action when he sponsors proregime demonstrations. In
past years, he sought unsuccessiullv to assure that Berbers married only non-Ber-
Ders, presumably in an effort to erode their tribal identity.
In 1991 and 1992 Col. Qadhafl expelled thousands of black African workers from
Libya under circumstances that appeared discriminatory (see Section 6.e.).
Tne conservative cultural attitudes of Libya's Islamic society serve to restrict the
rights of certain groups, most notably women. Col. Qadhafl has led efforts to change
the status of women and expand their access to educational and employment opportunities.
With some exceptions, women currently receive basic military training and
are subject to the military draft. However, the husband's permission is still necessary
for women or children to travel abroad. Female circumcision is reportedly
still practiced among tribal groups in remote areas of the south. No information is
available on the extent to which violence against women is a problem in Libya.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Workers do not have the right to form or join unions
of their own choosing. The official trade union organization, the General Federation
of Producers' Trade Unions, which was created in 1972, is under government control
and administered through the People's Committee system. Every Libyan worker is
required to join a trade union (expatriates are not allowed to join). Although unions
are assured the right to "safeguard their interests," there is no right to strike, and
no strikes by Libyan workers nave been reported for years. In a June speech, Col.
Qadhafl stated that workers have the right to strike but added that strikes do not
occur in Libya because the workers are in control and can change authority any
time they wish. Despite this statement, no law authorizes workers to strike.
With government funding, the official trade union organization plays an activist
role in uie International (Jonfederation of Arab Trade Unions, the Arab Maghreb
Trade Union Federation (USTMA), and the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and exploits international trade union contacts to engage in propaganda efforts
on behall of the (jovemment.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Although the Libyan Labor
Code provides for collective agreements, with the stipulation that the validity of
these agreements must be subject to government approval, there is no collective bargaining
in Libya.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The International Labor Organization's
(ILO) Committee of Experts, in its 1992 Report, repeated its earlier observation
that "persons expressing certain political views or views ideologically opposed
to the established political, social or economic system may be punished with penalties
of imprisonment * * * involving * * * an obligation to perform labor." It also
noted that public employees in Libya can be imprisoned and sentenced to compulsory
labor * * * as a punishment for breaches of labor discipline or for participation
in strikes even in services whose interruption would not endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of the whole or part of the population." The Libyan Government
has repeatedly told the ILO's Conference Committee on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations that there have been changes in legislation
which abolish these provisions, but no corroborating evidence has been submitted
to the ILO.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The minimum age for emplojnment
of children is 18.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Libya maintains a woric force of around
1,120,000 workers (plus an additional 1.75 million foreign workers) in a population
of 4.3 million. There is a legally mandated minimum wage, which is adequate to
afford a woricer emd his family a decent standard of living. The legal maximum
workweek is 48 hours. Libyan labor law defines the rights and duties of workers,
including matters of compensation, pension rights, minimum rest periods, and worsting
hours. A corps of labor inspectors, based in the seven municipalities of the country,
are assigned to inspect workplaces for compliance with legal standards including
occupational health and safety. Certain industries, such as the petroleum sector,
try to maintain standards originally set by foreign companies.
Libyan labor law does not accord equality of treatment to the approximately 1.75
million foreign workers in Libya, who do much of the blue-coUar and technical work.
Foreign woreers may stay in the country only for the duration of the contracts
under which they are employed. Foreign workers are subject to arbitrary pressures,
such as changes in work rules and contracts, with little option but to accept or to
depart the country, oft«n without full compensation for work already performed.
Conditions of employment are subject to negotiation between the worker and the
employer. Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no protection.
In the spring of 1990, Col. Qadhafi suddenly began expelling thousands of black
African workers, claiming they were in Libya illegally. Chadians, Nigerians,
Nigeriens, Malians, and Ghanaians were rounded up at their homes or work sites,
detained for varying amounts of time, and returned destitute to their countries, usually
with no warning to their governments. Press reports in several of these countries
have carried unsubstantiated accounts of arbitrary detention and mistreatment
of these workers by Libyan authorities prior to their expulsion, as well as the disappearance
of at least 16 woricers and the kUling, probably extrajudicially, of one
Malian laborer. There were reports that the expulsions continued in 1992 and that
many woikers continue to be detained under dimcult conditions.
