a-6098 (ACC-COD-6098)

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Situation ehemaliger Mitglieder der Präsidentengarde Mobutus (DSP)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche kaum Informationen zur Situation ehemaliger Angehöriger der Division Spéciale Présidentielle Mobutus gefunden werden. Gesucht wurde auf ecoi.net nach den Suchbegriffen "division spéciale présidentielle"/ "special presidential division"/, sowie mittels Google und Allafrica.com nach den folgenden Ausdrücken: Mobutu "division spéciale présidentielle" OR DSP persecution OR prosecution/ Mobutu "special presidential division"/ Mobutu SPD/ Congo SPD, Congo DSP/ repression "Mobutu's guard"/ repression Mobutu guard.
„Apr 1997, Kabila’s rebel forces pushed into Equateur and western Kasai provinces. The rebels insisted there would be no sweeping penalties for past misdeeds in Zaire, and they reinstated many Mobutu officials in areas they have captured. The Ngbandi of the Special Presidential Division (DSP) are afraid that Kabila will not be as lenient with them as with others who served Mobutu throughout his rule.“ (MAR, 10. Jänner 2007)
„An attempted coup d'état took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) during the night of 27-28 March 2004 (Africa Research Bulletin 22 Apr. 2004). […] Agence France Presse (AFP) and the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) of the United Nations both reported that the Congolese authorities had distributed wanted posters and reward offers in April 2004 for information leading to the arrest of Gédéon Gerengba, a.k.a. "Moïse," and Alengbi Mbangui, a.k.a. "Alpha Jephte" (AFP 8 Apr. 2004; IRIN 9 Apr. 2004). Both men were reportedly officers of late Mobutu Sese Seko's elite forces and were thought to be the "leaders of an armed group that attacked government civil and military facilities" on 28 March 2004 (ibid.; see also AFP 8 Apr. 2004). According to IRIN, the amount of the reward was US$5,000 (IRIN 9 Apr. 2004). In June 2004, the government incriminated two other former members of Mobutu Sese Sekou's elite armed forces, the Special Presidential Division (Division spéciale présidentielle, DSP): Colonel Dongo and Lieutenant Bobo Toromina, a.k.a. "Serga" (AFP 23 June 2004). IRIN corroborated that the Congolese authorities had identified the masterminds behind the March coup attempt in June 2004 (IRIN 24 June 2004). However, the same source reported that they numbered 13 in all and, although they were officially identified as being mostly military and former presidential guards under Mobutu Sese Seko, their names were not specified (ibid.). During a 27 August 2004 telephone interview, the president of ASADHO provided the following information on the arrests in relation to the 28 March 2004 failed coup d'état. Of the 88 people originally arrested in relation to the attempted coup, 6 were released. The 82 who remain in custody are members of the military and are being detained at the Kinshasa Penitentiary and Rehabilitation Centre (Centre pénitentiaire et de rééducation de Kinshasa, CPRK), formerly known as Makala Prison. The number of detainees has been implicitly corroborated by the Congolese authorities: [translation] " . . . ten of the assailants appeared at a press conference this Wednesday. . . . Some 72 others are being detained at Kinshasa Central Prison" (AFP 23 June 2004.). This number supposedly reflects [translation] "almost all of the armed forces" implicated in the events of 28 March 2004 (ibid.). IRIN, however, indicated that only 72 people were taken into custody (IRIN 24 June 2004). The government claims that the prisoners are former members of the DSP and the political police affiliated with the late president Mobutu Sese Seko (AFP 23 June 2004). Various sources corroborated the theory that Mobutu supporters were behind the attack (AFP 8 Apr. 2004; Keesing's Record of World Events Mar. 2004; Africa Research Bulletin 22 Apr. 2004; Associated Press 29 Mar. 2004; Mail & Guardian 29 Mar. 2004; IRIN 29 Mar. 2004; Jeune Afrique/L'intelligent 4 Apr. 2004). Only the Congolese newspaper Le Soft offered a contradictory point of view, claiming that the true mastermind behind the coup attempt was President Joseph Kabila (6 May 2004). Jeune Afrique/L'Intelligent also offered the theory that the coup was orchestrated from within the government as a possible explanation for the events of the 28 March 2004, but the publication did not say whether or not this was indeed true (4 Apr. 2004).“ (IRB, 8. September 2004)
Lage und Diskriminierung zurückgekehrter Flüchtlinge
„The law prohibits forced exile, and the government generally did not employ it. However, some supporters of Senator and MLC President Bemba, who left the country under MONUC escort following March 21-23 fighting with pro-Kabila forces which eliminated his militia as a viable military force, claimed that he was effectively in self-imposed exile. He was in principle free to return, but claimed to fear possible prosecution and assassination if he did so.“ (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sek. 2d)
“In response to an information request on the subject of the treatment of rejected asylum seekers in the DRC the UNHCR stated on 19 April 2006, that after the press coverage following the BBC programme their officials in Kinshasa had contacted various organisations and institutions in an attempt to gather more information. This included organisations such as the Congolese Immigration Authorities (DGM), the National Committee for Refugees (CNR), IOM, MONUC, and national human rights NGOS. In addition, it sent staff to the airport on days of arrival of flights from Europe. The following were its findings:
1. According to the DGM and CNR, the usual procedure for any person returning through Kinshasa airport in case they do not hold proper documentation, including current DRC passports, and/or when they have been absent for a long time, is to be interrogated by immigration officials at the airport. In the best case scenario, they are freed within one to three hours. In the worst case, they are sent to a detention facility in the centre of town, and released after further verification. 2. The Congolese human rights NGO ‘Voix des Sans Voix’ informed the office that rejected asylum-seekers are received upon arrival at the airport by agents of DGM, who question them about why they left and applied for asylum. The NGO have an office at the airport and are closely monitoring the situation. They mentioned that there were many failed asylum seekers who are sent back by western European countries, but they are not aware of any of these persons detained and/or tortured upon return. They reported that some of the failed asylum seekers had to pay some money to the police (5 to 10 US$). 3. IOM Kinshasa advised the office that they have no information of returnees who were mistreated and/or tortured upon return. 4. According to MONUC’s human rights section, which is also monitoring the prisons in the DRC, they did not receive concrete indications that individual failed asylum-seekers were arrested upon their return. 5. According to ASADOH (Association Africaine de Defense des Droits de l’Homme), no cases of detention, abuse or torture of failed asylum-seekers were known to their office. 6. As reported above, UNHCR staff were at times present at the airport, but they have not witnessed arrests made at the airport. However, it has to be kept in mind that arrivals at the airport are difficult to monitor, and UNHCR does not have a regular presence at the airport. The UNHCR Kinshasa office has only details on the forced return of three persons, of whom two were from African countries and one from Sweden. The latter person was, upon arrival, interrogated for some three hours and then released without further problems. 7. In general, the situation in the prisons and detention centres in DRC are extremely dire, and detainees have to rely on relatives to bring them food. 8. With the limited information available to UNHCR, it does not have evidence that there is systematic abuse, including detention and mistreatment, of failed asylum seekers returned to the DRC through Kinshasa airport. It wishes to highlight, however, that it advises against the forced return to Kinshasa of persons of Banyamulenge ethnic origin. [Response to Information Request Subject: DRC – Treatment of rejected asylum seekers. Letter dated 19 April 2006]” (UKHO, 8. Februar 2008, S. 353)
„Citing a 9 December 2004 letter from the British ambassador to the RDC, an April 2005 report from the United Kingdom's Immigration and Nationality Directorate indicated that there was no evidence that failed asylum seekers who were returned from European countries faced "persecution" by Congolese authorities (UK Apr. 2005, para. 6.267).
However, referring to a document published on 1 January 2005 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)-a document that the Research Directorate was unable to locate-the same British report stated that the UNHCR's position was that all Congolese citizens with real or perceived political associations were likely to run the risk of being subjected to ill treatment if forced to return to their own country after failing to acquire asylum abroad (ibid., para. 6.268). The British report further indicated, citing the same UNHCR document, that such people, upon arriving at Ndjili Airport in Kinshasa, risked being subjected to abuse, intimidation, extortion and arbitrary detention by security forces (ibid., para. 6.270).
Furthermore, recent sources indicate that failed Congolese asylum seekers run a serious risk of facing ill treatment, as well as extortion and imprisonment (BBC 24 June 2005; The Guardian 10 Apr. 2005; see also AP 23 June 2005). Citing the testimony of a Congolese human rights activist, sources reported that, at the Ndjili Airport, Congolese citizens deported from European countries are handed over by European escorts to the Congolese authorities who, after interrogating them, detain them in isolation before transferring them to the Makala Central Prison (The Guardian 10 Apr. 2005; IRR 2 Dec. 2004).
Two sources reported that the Dutch immigration minister had decided to temporarily halt the deportation of failed asylum seekers to the RDC; this followed the publication of reports indicating that the Congolese authorities had obtained confidential information on people deported from the Netherlands (BBC 24 June 2005; AP 23 June 2005). The fact that the Congolese authorities were aware of confidential information gathered by the Dutch government put failed asylum seekers at risk of ill treatment (ibid.; BBC 24 June 2005).“ (IRB, 12. August 2005)
Vorgehen der Regierung Kabilas gegen exilpolitische Oppositionelle
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche kaum aktuelle Informationen zum Vorgehen der Regierung J. Kabilas gegen exilpolitische Oppositionelle gefunden werden. Gesucht wurde auf ecoi.net und Allafrica.com, sowie mittels Google nach den folgenden Begriffen: Kabila opposition exile/ Kabila exilpolitisch/ Kabila persecution opposition exile 2007 OR 2008/ Congo "oppositional political activities in exile"/ Congo opposition OR political "activities in exile"/ Congo "activités politiques" exil/ Congo "activités politiques exils"/ Congo "opposition en exil"/ Congo "opposition en exil" retourner persécution/ repression Kabila exiles/ Kabila "against exiles"  
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Im Folgenden finden sich zusätzlich Informationen zu derzeitigen Repressionen gegen Opoositionspolitiker im Land, sowie ältere Berichte über ein mögliches Vorgehen der Regierung gegen exilpolitische Oppositionelle nach ihrer Rückkehr in die DR Kongo: 
„A law on the status and rights of the political opposition, which was adopted in late 2007, recognizes opposition parties represented in parliament as well as those outside it and guarantees their right to participate in political activities without fear of retribution.“ (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sek. 3)
„Opposition politicians alleged that approximately 400 suspected supporters or sympathizers of Bemba were held without trial in jails and prisons in Kinshasa following the fighting in March.“ (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sek. 1e)
„Amnesty International reported in October that the Directorate of General Intelligence and Police Special Services (DRGS) allegedly engaged in intimidation of opposition politicians and parliamentarians. For example, on March 25, DRGS officers searched the house of an opposition National Assembly deputy, Pitchou Bolenge Yoma, without a warrant. A DRGS officer subsequently threatened Bolenge after he complained to authorities. There were no reports that authorities had taken action against the DRGS officers as of year's end.“ (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Sek. 2b)
„Amnesty International believes that the accusations against all these men [an evangelical church leader, his two co-defendants and a Supreme Court lawyer, Anmerkung ACCORD] were politically motivated. The unlawful and arbitrary conduct of the state authorities in these cases represents a deterioration in respect for human rights in the DRC amid an already tense political atmosphere in advance of elections set for 30 July. The organisation is concerned that state security services - notably those reportedly accountable only to DRC President Joseph Kabila and his special security advisor, including the services spéciaux (Special Services) police - appear to be acting in an increasingly repressive manner towards perceived political opponents and critics.“ (AI, 6, Juli 2006)
"Specific information on the treatment of former diplomats (under Mobutu's regime) who return to Kinshasa could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.
However, referring to [translation] "former dignitaries" of the Mobutu regime, a report on a fact-finding mission to Kinshasa from 16 June to 15 August 2002 by the Centre de documentation des instances d'asile (CEDOCA), which falls under the Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides of Belgium, stated that Joseph Kabila's regime opened a new era for Mobutists (Belgium Oct. 2002). The report explained that after the Sun City Accord was signed [in April 2002], a large number of Mobutu sympathizers returned to the country (ibid.). The Belgian report concluded that [translation] "unless they are suspected to be linked to rebel groups, those who were loyal to Mobutu are not persecuted anymore. There is no risk of persecution for being affiliated to the MPR [Mouvement populaire de la revolution], Mobutu's political party." (ibid.).
According to Le Potentiel, many exiled high officials have returned to the country (1 Nov. 2002). The same Congolese newspaper added that "Mobutists" are now present everywhere, including in government positions (Le Potentiel 28 Mar. 2003).
Referring to "people who were linked to former President Mobutu and the MPR," a November 2002 report stated that "persecution may result from either having held a very senior visible position in the party, the government or the security forces, or from overt opposition to the current government." (ACCORD/UNHCR 28 Nov. 2002)." (IRB, 3. April 2003)
„Die Tätigkeit der Force novatrice militaire aquise au changement (FONOMAC) in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist nach den hier vorliegenden Informationen personell und inhaltlich eng verbunden mit der Exiltätigkeit anderer Oppositionsgruppen, namentlich der Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) unter Etienne Tshisekedi. Schon allein daher ist es möglich, dass ihre Arbeit von den Behörden der DR Kongo überwacht wird. Gesicherte Erkenntnisse über das Ausmaß der geheimdienstlichen Tätigkeit der kongolesischen Behörden in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland liegen amnesty international allerdings nicht vor. […] Insgesamt werden Anhänger der politischen Opposition gegen die Staatsführung unter Präsident Joseph Kabila immer wieder Opfer politischer Verfolgung. In jüngerer Zeit ist es zu einem alarmierenden Anstieg an willkürlichen Verhaftungen und Inhaftierungen gekommen. Obwohl Präsident Joseph Kabila im Mai 2001 offiziell das von seinem Vater, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, verhängte Betätigungsverbot für politische Parteien aufgehoben hat, werden die Aktivitäten der Opposition immer wieder stark eingeschränkt.“ (AI, 27. Mai 2002)