20. Jänner 2017

Untergruppierungen des Islamischen Staates (IS) in der Provinz Nangarhar

Borhan Osman, Forscher beim Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), einer unabhängigen, gemeinnützigen Forschungsorganisation mit Hauptsitz in Kabul, die Analysen zu politischen Themen in Afghanistan und der umliegenden Region erstellt, schreibt, dass bewaffnete Gruppen, die sich dem Islamischen Staat (IS) angeschlossen hätten, in fünf Provinzen des Landes versucht hätten, Fuß zu fassen. Allerdings hätten sie nur in Nangarhar damit Erfolg gehabt. Dort habe der Islamische Staat – Provinz Khorasan (ISKP), wie sich der Ableger des IS in Afghanistan und Pakistan nenne, fruchtbaren Nährboden vorgefunden, der geprägt war von „zankenden“ Provinzeliten, traditionellen salafistischen Netzwerken und einer Reihe lokaler ausländischer Kämpfergruppen. Vor allem habe der IS in den südlichen und südöstlichen Distrikten der Provinz einen Pool von kleinen militanten Gruppen vorgefunden, aus dem er rekrutieren konnte. Ein Blick auf die Profile von mehreren Dutzend IS-Mitgliedern in Nangarhar habe ergeben, dass diese aus verschiedenen kleineren afghanischen und ausländischen Gruppierungen stammen würden. Diese Gruppen seien ihrem eigenen Modus Operandi gefolgt und hätten entweder Nangarhar als Operationsbasis genutzt oder sich vorübergehend in der Provinz aufhalten, bevor sie an andere Orte weitergezogen seien. Einige dieser Gruppen hätten ihren Ursprung in den afghanischen Taliban, die nominell dem Kommando der Rahbari-Schura unterstehen würden (auch wenn nicht alle dieser Schura gegenüber wirklich loyal gewesen seien). Daneben gebe es verschiedene pakistanische Gruppierungen und Ableger internationaler Gruppen wie al-Kaida. In den vergangenen Jahren seien in südlichen bzw. südöstlichen Teil der Provinz Nangarhar insgesamt 13 Gruppen aktiv gewesen. Bei den afghanischen Gruppen handelt es sich um Folgende: „Mainstream“-Taliban, Bora Jihadi Front, Hezb-e Islami, salafistische Gruppen, Fedayi Karwan sowie Einheiten der Siahpushan. Bei den ausländischen Gruppen handle es sich um: al-Kaida, Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistani (TTP), Lashkar-e Islam, Jamaat ul-Ahrar, Junud-e Khorasan, Amr bil ma’ruf Wa Nahi An Al-Munkar sowie Ansar ul-Islam. Beim Eintreffen des IS in Nangarhar seien Mitglieder aus fast allen dieser Gruppen, sofern sie zu dem Zeitpunkt noch in Nangarhar aktiv gewesen seien, zum IS übergelaufen. Während die meisten Gruppen (etwa wie die Tora Bora-Front) dem IS nur jeweils wenige Kämpfer zur Verfügung gestellt hätten, hätten sich einige Gruppen, darunter insbesondere Lashkar-e Islam, aber auch salafistische Gruppen und möglichweise Siahpushan, fast vollständig dem IS angeschlossen:

„Armed groups pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) have tried to establish a foothold in five of Afghanistan’s provinces, but only in Nangarhar have they succeeded. There, IS Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghanistan-Pakistan franchise of the Islamic State, landed on fertile ground with a fragmented insurgency, bickering provincial elites, a tradition of Salafi networks and a host of local and foreign militant groups. […]

Most importantly for ISKP, they found in Nangarhar’s southern and south-eastern districts, a pool of small militant groups from which to recruit. A glance at the profiles of several dozen ISKP members in Nangarhar show that it did draw from these various small groups, which are mapped below. This diversity is not seen elsewhere in Afghanistan. These groups, Afghan and foreign, followed their own modus operandi. They either used Nangarhar as their operational base, or temporarily settled there in transit to other places. The groups included some originating from the Afghan Taleban under nominal Rahbari Shura command, although not all were really loyal to it, as well as various Pakistani groups and branches of international organisations, such as al-Qaeda.

There has been a total of 13 groups operating in south and south-western Nangarhar, simultaneously or at some point, in recent years:

Afghan groups:

1. The mainstream Taleban under the leadership council’s (Rahbari Shura or ‘Quetta Shura’) command

2. The Tora Bora Jihadi Front (operating mostly in the three districts dominated by the Khogiani tribe, namely Khogiani, Sherzad and Pachir wa Agam. The Tora Bora Front was officially dismantled and integrated into the mainstream Taleban in October 2015. In 2008-2009 at its peak, the Front was the second largest insurgency network in Nangarhar. Read more about it here

3. Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (mainly active in Chaparhar, Kot and Sherzad districts)

4. Salafi groups, nominally under the chain of command of the mainstream Taleban, but, in practice, operating outside it (present mostly in Chaparhar, Kot and Bati Kot districts)

5. Fedayi Karwan, a semi-autonomous, mysterious Taleban group within the Afghan Taleban (in Khogiani and Sherzad districts)

6. Mysterious units of Siahpushan (plural: black-clad and masked) fighters. It has remained unclear, even to the local population, whether they belonged to the mainstream Taleban, were part of a Salafi network or were independent groups. The Siahpushan have mainly been active in southern districts (Khogiani, Pachir wa Agam and Shirzad) since 2013. They acted, both as the Taleban’s internal disciplinary force, punishing fighters found to be too moderate, and as a group intimidating less supportive communities into backing the insurgency.(4) Read here them in an AAN piece from 2014.

Among the foreign groups, the following have been the most notable:

1. Al-Qaeda (on the move, mostly between Khyber Agency, in Pakistan’s FATA, and Kunar, without a particular area of focus in Nangarhar)

2. The Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistani (TTP) under Mullah Fazlullah, which operated mostly in southern and eastern districts

3. Lashkar-e Islam, a group based in Khyber agency of Pakistan, operating mostly in Nazian and Achin districts. It had, for a long time, enjoyed friendly relationships with the local political elite and some government officials in Nangarhar, before recently allying itself with ISKP.

4. Jamaat ul-Ahrar, a group of Mohmand Agency-based militants that broke away from TTP in summer 2014. It is mostly active in Lalpura, Goshta and Momand Dara districts

5. Junud-e Khorasan, a much smaller TTP splinter group that emerged in early 2014 from the Mohmand Agency-based Taleban, operating mainly in the same districts as Jamaat ul-Ahrar. This group has not been much heard about since early 2015.

6. The Amr bil ma’ruf Wa Nahi An Al-Munkar, a Salafi-oriented group originally led by Haji Namdar from Tirah, in FATA, (assassinated in 2008 by TTP), operating in Nazian and Achin

7. The pro-Pakistani government group, Ansar ul-Islam, founded by a Sufi-oriented Afghan pir, Saif al-Rahman, and later taken over by an Afridi mullah from Tirah Valley from where the group emerged; it spilled over at times into Nazian and Achin – reportedly with the support of the Afghan Taleban. The group was severely undermined by the TTP during a series of clashes in the spring of 2013, an offensive led by then commander of TTP for Orakzai agency, Saeed Khan, who later became the leader of ISKP. […]

Members from almost all of groups listed above, which were still active in Nangarhar, defected to ISKP as it pushed deep into Nangarhar. From the Quetta Shura Taleban, the most remarkable defection has been a former shadow provincial governor, Gul Inam Sirat, who came to ISKP along with several of his commanders. They switched back to the Taleban in April 2016, after almost a year with ISKP. There were also small scale defections from the Tora Bora Jihadi Front. Fearing that groups still loyal to the Front would join ISKP in larger numbers, its leader, Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed, was forced to dismantle his faction under pressure from the Rahbari Shura, in October 2015. It merged fully with the mainstream Taleban. While most groups like Tora Bora contributed only small numbers to ISKP, some joined ISKP wholesale. A case in point is Lashkar-e Islam which has partnered with ISKP, fighting alongside it, in a near merger. Another possible case of collective defection is that of the mysterious Siahpushan ‘units’. Since ISKP has emerged, the siahpushan have totally disappeared from the scene. According to sources which have been part of the local support network for the Afghan Taleban and therefore well aware of insurgency dynamics, the most likely explanation for the siahpushan’s disappearance is their merger with ISKP. Similarly, the Salafi groups operating under the Taleban banner have also disappeared, only to re-emerge under ISKP.” (Osman, 27. September 2016)

Wie der US-Denkfabrik Jamestown Foundation (JF) im Dezember 2016 bemerkt, habe der IS in der Vergangenheit eine Reihe von Rückschlägen in Afghanistan erlebt, sei dann jedoch zu neuer Stärke gelangt, indem er Allianzen mit lokalen radikalislamischen Gruppen wie Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al Alami, Lashkar-e Islam (LeI) oder auch unzufriedenen Taliban-Fraktionen wie Jundallah und Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA) eingegangen sei, welche seit vielen Jahren in der Region aktiv gewesen seien. Auch habe er Berichten zufolge Kämpfer von der Islamischen Bewegung Usbekistans (IMU) rekrutiert:

„Since its formation nearly two years ago, Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan, known as IS Khorasan, has struggled to maintain a foothold in an ever-competitive jihadist landscape. Its disregard for local sensitivities and a number of setbacks on the battlefield had relegated it to a violent distraction in Afghanistan. In the last few months, however, IS Khorasan has claimed several deadly sectarian strikes that have inflicted mass casualties and signaled a possible resurgence of the group in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the epicenter of its imaginary Khorasan region.

IS Khorasan gained its new strength through forging alliances with local sectarian pro-al-Qaeda or Taliban militant groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al Alami (LeJ-A), Lashkar-e Islam (LeI), or disgruntled Taliban factions like Jundallah and Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA), which have been active in the region for many years. It has also reportedly recruited operatives from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).“ (JF, 15. Dezember 2016)

Aktivitäten des IS im Distrikt Deh Bala der Provinz Nangarhar (Beginn der Aktivitäten; Welche Untergruppierung des IS ist dort aktiv?)

In einem Artikel vom Juli 2016 nennt Borhan Osman Deh Bala als einen der Distrikte, die im Mai oder Juni 2015 vom IS erobert worden seien bzw. in denen der IS den Taliban die Kontrolle streitig gemacht habe. Deh Bala sei einer von vier Distrikten in der Provinz Nangarhar, in denen der IS (zum Berichtszeitpunkt Juli 2016) nach wie vor die Kontrolle innehabe. (Osman, 27. Juli 2016)

 

In einem im Jänner 2016 verfassten und im Oktober 2016 aktualisierten Artikel berichtet die afghanische Nachrichtenagentur Tolo News unter Berufung auf den Provinzrat von Nangarhar, dass der IS unter anderem in Deh Bala präsent und aktiv sei:

„Nangarhar provincial council confirms the presence and activity of Daesh in Achin, Deh Bala, Chaparhar, Bati Kot and Kot districts of Nangarhar and said if the terrorist group is not stopped, Nangarhar province could fall to them.” (Tolo News, 8. Jänner 2016)

Der in den US ansässige Think Tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) schreibt im August 2016, dass laut Behördenangaben die afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte in Deh Bala nicht in der Lage seien, Gebiete außerhalb des Distriktzentrums zu kontrollieren und gegen IS-Kämpfer zu verteidigen:

„ISIS Wilayat Khorasan is contesting a district center in Nangarhar and continues to stage attacks in Kabul from the province. Officials claimed on July 19 that Afghan security forces are unable to hold terrain outside the government compound in Deh Bala district center against ISIS militants.” (ISW, 28. August 2016)

IS-Kommandant namens Qari Shamshit Shinwari

Es konnten keine Informationen zu dieser Teilfrage gefunden werden. Es wurde daher ein Experte kontaktiert. Sollte eine Antwort einlangen, leiten wir sie Ihnen umgehend weiter.

 

Es konnten indes folgende Informationen zu einem Stamm namens Shinwari in der Provinz Nangarhar gefunden werden, der im Distrikt Achin und anderen Gebieten mit starker IS-Präsenz lebe und sich Berichten zufolge gegen den IS erhoben habe. Im Oktober 2015 habe der IS mehrere Shinwari-Stammesführer hingerichtet:

„In addition, locals like the Shinwari tribe, who inhabit Achin and other areas with a strong Islamic State presence, reportedly rose up against the self-proclaimed caliphate. At first, clashes between the harsh Islamic State rules and tribal traditions led the Shinwaris to take up arms. But what really ignited the uprising was the Islamic State’s gruesome execution of Shinwari tribal elders in October 2015 by forcing them to sit on bombs that were subsequently detonated, as elders and a commander of the uprising explained.” (FP, 5. April 2016)

 

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 20. Jänner 2017)

·      FP - Foreign Police: On the Trail of the Islamic State in Afghanistan (Autor: Franz Marty), 5. April 2016
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/afghanistan-islamic-state-taliban/

·      ISW - Institute for the Study of War: Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment, 28. August 2016
http://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/afghanistan-partial-threat-assessment-august-28-2016

·      JF - Jamestown Foundation: Foreign Fighters and Sectarian Strikes: Islamic State Makes Gains in ‘Af-Pak’ Region, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 24, 15. Dezember 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/333833/475478_de.html

·      Osman, Borhan: The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar, 27. Juli 2016
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/

·      Osman, Borhan: Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, 27. September 2016 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/330274/471388_de.html

·      Tolo News: Daesh Presence 'Widespread' In Nangarhar Province, 8. Jänner 2016 (aktualisiert am 18. Oktober 2016)
http://www.tolonews.com/node/12513