Report of the joint mission charged with investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights violations occurring in eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) since September 1996 (A/51/942)
|
Distr. GENERAL
A/51/942 2 July 1997
ENGLISH Original: SPANISH |
Fifty-first session
Agenda item 110 (c)
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS AND
REPORTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS AND REPRESENTATIVES
Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in any part
of
the world, with particular reference to colonial and other
dependent countries and
territories
Note by the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to
the General Assembly the report of the joint mission charged with investigating
allegations of massacres and other human rights violations occurring in eastern
Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) since September 1996, pursuant to
paragraph 6 of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/58.
Report of the joint mission charged with investigating
allegations of massacres and
other human rights violations occurring in eastern Zaire
(now Democratic
Republic
of the Congo) since September 1996
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Origins of the joint
mission
B. Contacts between the High Commissioner
and the Alliance des forces docratiques pour la libation du Congo-Zae
(AFDL)
C. Mandate and methodology of the joint
mission
II. CONDUCT OF THE
MISSION
A. Contacts by the delegation of
negotiators
B. The role of the security
team
C. Activities of the joint mission in
Kigali
III. OBJECTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE AND
POSITION OF THE JOINT MISSION
A. Objections of the
Alliance
B. Position of the joint
mission
IV. ATTACKS ON REFUGEE
CAMPS
V. ALLEGATIONS OF MASSACRES AND OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A. Human rights violations attributed to
the Alliance des forces docratiques pour la libation du
Congo-Zae
B. Human rights violations attributed to
the Zairian armed forces
C. Allegations of human rights violations
attributed to members of the former Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe
militias
D. Allegations of human rights violations
attributed to other parties to the conflict
VI. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
VII. FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT
MISSION
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
B. Recommendations
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Origins of the
joint mission1
1. In its
resolution 1997/58 of 15 April 1997, the Commission on Human Rights requested
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire,2 the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and
arbitrary executions and a member of the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances to carry out a joint mission to investigate
allegations of massacres and other issues affecting human rights which had
arisen from the situation prevailing in eastern Zaire since September 1996
and to report to the General Assembly by 30 June 1997 and to the
Commission at its fifty-fourth session.
2. By that resolution, the Commission was acting on
the recommendation made by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Zaire following a preliminary mission, sent at the recommendation of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights.3 In his report to the Commission on Human Rights at its
fifty-third session, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Zaire had recommended that, in conformity with the procedure laid down in
Economic and Social Council resolution 1235 (XLII), the Commission should
decide to investigate the gross violations of the right to life committed in
eastern Zaire against refugees and the local population, by establishing a
commission which could comprise representatives of the competent organs
responsible for implementing the special public procedures of the Commission on
Human Rights and which should be provided with all necessary technical and
financial support, including the participation of forensic experts,
anthropologists, ballistics experts and such other experts as were required.
B. Contacts between the High Commissioner and the Alliance
des forces docratiques pour la libation du Congo-Zae (AFDL)
3. On 22
April, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights was informed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs
that the joint United Nations/Organization of African Unity Special
Representative for the Great Lakes region had received from the AFDL President
Laurent DirKabila, in South Africa, a promise that he would facilitate the
work of the joint mission.
4. On 25
April, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mr. Ralph Zacklin, wrote to the President of the Alliance, on behalf of
the joint mission, informing him that the mission would arrive in Goma, from
Kigali, on 4 May and requesting his assistance in ensuring that the
mission, which would be preceded by a team of officials from the Centre for
Human Rights and security officers, would be able to perform its task.
5. On 30 April, the
Secretary-General, reaffirming a statement made by its President on
24 April, called on AFDL and the other parties concerned to cooperate fully
with the joint mission by ensuring access to the areas and sites under
investigation, as well as the security of all members of the mission.
6. On 28 April, the AFDL
Commissioner-General for Justice, Mwenze Kongolo, informed the Officer-in-Charge
of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that he agreed in
principle to the investigation, while expressing disappointment that the
Alliance had not been invited to participate in that effort and objecting to the
participation of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Zaire, Mr. Roberto Garret, who, he said had benefited from his assistance
during his preliminary visit and had written a superficial report on him which
was not, he felt, impartial. He proposed moreover, that the mission's visit
should be delayed in order to allow investigators from the AFDL Justice
Department to take part in the investigation. Otherwise, AFDL would not be
prepared to allow the mission into the liberated areas.
7. This letter and a telephone conversation between
the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
and Commissioner Kongolo were nevertheless taken as a green light for the visit,
or at least a "yellow light". On 1 and 2 May, the Officer-in-Charge informed the
Commissioner that last-minute preparations were under way for the visit, that
negotiators had been sent to settle the details and that the mission would
arrive in Kigali on 3 May. AFDL agreed to receive the mission's emissaries
in Lubumbashi on 4 May 1997.
C. Mandate and
methodology of the joint mission
8. Prior to its departure, the joint
mission held two days of consultations in Geneva to analyse its own mandate and
the modalities which it would follow in performing its task. During these two
days, the members of the mission met with the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and with representatives of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and various
non-governmental organizations working in the region. They also met with the
Chargd'affaires of Zaire to the international organizations in Geneva and with
a Mr. E. Angulu, whom the joint mission contacted because he had been
claiming to be the AFDL spokesman in Europe. However, it should be noted that
the Alliance authorities told the joint mission's negotiators, in Lubumbashi,
that they had no knowledge of any such person.
Mandate
9. The members of the joint mission
analysed the mandate, entrusted to them by the Commission on Human Rights under
its resolution 1997/58, in an internal document entitled "Mandate". According to
this document, the mandate was understood to cover:
(a) Ratione
materiae, allegations of grave and
massive violations of human rights, especially the right to life, and violations
of international humanitarian law, particularly article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions;
(b) Ratione loci,
eastern Zaire and any other part of the territory of Zaire caught up in the
conflict between government troops and AFDL combatants, as well as any other
place or country which the mission might decide to visit;
(c) Ratione
temporis, the period between 1 September
1996 and the end of the fifty-fourth session of the Commission on Human Rights;
(d) Ratione personae,
the acts and deeds of anyone involved in the conflict in the territory in
question, whether soldiers of the Zairian armed forces, AFDL combatants,
mercenaries or foreign troops participating in the hostilities.
Methodology
10. A word of caution is in order
regarding the preliminary nature of this report. It was understood among the
members of the joint mission that the mission would concentrate on verifying
whether the acts committed had been systematic and planned and whether some of
them constituted acts of genocide under the terms of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.
11. It was also understood that the mandate of the
joint mission included gathering information that would help to establish the
responsibility of those accused of the acts to be investigated.
12. Until the mission is able to conduct its visits
in situ in conformity with the provisions of Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1997/58, it will be difficult to regard its findings as
definitive, even if the information analysed supports them. It is nevertheless
possible to present the situation as it appears on the ground, to make an
initial legal analysis and to formulate preliminary conclusions and
recommendations.
13. The present
report is submitted pursuant to resolution 1997/58, entitled "Situation of human
rights in Zaire". It is divided into eight sections. The introduction described
the origins and mandate of the joint mission. Section II describes the
conduct of the mission and its activities on the ground. Section III
presents the objections of the Alliance and the position of the joint mission.
In section IV, the mission examines attacks on refugee camps and the situation
of internally displaced persons. Section V deals with allegations of massacres
and other human rights violations. In section VI, the joint mission analyses the
situation in eastern Zaire from the standpoint of the provisions of
international law, more particularly those relating to crimes against humanity,
the crime of genocide and international humanitarian law. Lastly, section VII
presents the mission's future activities and section VIII its conclusions and
recommendations.
II. CONDUCT OF THE MISSION
14. The joint
mission consisted of three components:
(a) A delegation of negotiators responsible for
obtaining the Alliance's agreement on the modalities of the mission and for
ensuring security;
(b) A United
Nations team responsible for evaluating security in the region and establishing
the conditions of that security;
(c)
The members of the mission as such, namely, the independent experts belonging to
the joint mission and their technical assistants.
A. Contacts by the delegation of negotiators
15. On 28
April, a team consisting of two officials of the Centre for Human Rights went to
Kigali, from which point they were to proceed to Goma in order to begin talks
with the Alliance to settle the details of the mission's visit. The negotiators
had to wait until 4 May for the Alliance's authorization to go to Goma.
16. On 4 May, these two officials
appointed by the joint mission finally reached Goma; from there, they went on to
Lubumbashi on 5 May. After encountering numerous obstacles, they succeeded in
contacting the Commissioner for Justice, Mwenze Kongolo; the Commissioner for
Foreign Affairs, Bizima Karaha; the General Commissioner for Information;
and the Chef de Cabinet of the AFDL President. In the course of two meetings,
each of which lasted more than two hours, they explained the mission's mandate.
The Commissioner for Justice finally submitted a document containing the
Alliance's comments on the proposed investigation, an analysis of which appears
below.
17. The delegation returned
to Kigali after six days of fruitless efforts to persuade the Alliance to accept
the mission's mandate, as approved by consensus by the Commission on Human
Rights, despite the concomitant efforts being made to that end from Geneva, New
York and Kigali. B.
The role of the security
team
18. The joint mission sent a security expert to the
region. His evaluation report shows that many Alliance soldiers, all of whom are
very young, react very negatively to the prospect of an investigation of their
actions. In particular, the name of one member of the joint mission appointed by
the Commission on Human Rights came up in all contacts. Strikingly, all the
young soldiers seemed to be perfectly aware of the mandate and objectives of the
joint mission, despite the relative isolation of eastern Zaire. They appeared to
have received explicit instructions in this regard.
19. The report indicates that travel outside Goma was
particularly complicated for security reasons.
20. The report notes the following three significant
incidents:
(a) The first incident
took place at a military roadblock near Sake, when a United Nations security
officer tried to go to Masisi. About 2 kilometres from the roadblock, he came
upon an AFDL patrol led by a soldier who was about 15 years old. While the
United Nations official was talking to him, another soldier, about 14 years old,
fired five shots in his direction at a distance of less than 10 metres; there
was no reaction from the patrol leader. The soldier who fired said that it had
been an accident. The leader, however, commented that the Alliance did not need
"foreigners from the United Nations to come and make sure that the soldiers
aren't hurting anyone";
(b) The
second incident consisted of a military parade, accompanied by military songs,
which took place just as the United Nations security officer was finishing
making reservations for the members of the joint mission, in anticipation of
authorization of the visit at a hotel reception desk;
(c) The third incident was the following: the United
Nations security officer was accosted as he left the town of Goma. Some soldiers
asked him whether he was with the joint mission. He answered in the affirmative.
They told him that they had heard about the mission on British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) Radio and that they knew from their superiors that it would go
to Southern Kivu. At that point, one of the soldiers fired a shot over the
officer's head, telling him that it was meant as a warning to a specific member
of the joint mission never to come back to the area.
21. The report concludes that, according to all the
information and testimony gathered there is a permanent atmosphere of insecurity
and extreme tension in the area.
22.
It should be noted that many people succeeded in contacting the United Nations
security officer to recount the dramatic incidents which they had experienced
and the human rights violations which they had suffered.
C. Activities of
the joint mission in Kigali
23. While waiting in Kigali for
authorization to visit eastern Zaire, the members of the joint mission studied
all the available documentation and heard many spontaneous testimonies. They met
with representatives of United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations
and members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Kigali. They also talked to
journalists arriving from Kisangani and others who had spent many months in the
region, and heard the testimony of repatriated former Rwandan refugees. They
viewed filmed testimonies and unpublished photographs, all of which helped to
shape the opinion presented in this report. The joint mission studied a total of
33 reports of agencies and testimonies of victims; it also saw many photographs
and a videotape of massacre sites and mass graves. Many of the accounts and
written reports were confirmed orally by their authors.
24. The members of the joint mission had to return to
Geneva without managing to visit the area where they were to conduct the
investigation. They made this fact public in a press release issued on 9 May
1997. Although the mission was unable to attain its primary objectives, its
presence in Kigali, in addition to enabling it to gather the information
mentioned above, served to draw the attention of the international community to
the importance of including the issue of human rights in the process of conflict
settlement and political transition in Zaire.
III. OBJECTIONS OF THE ALLIANCE AND
POSITION OF THE JOINT MISSION
A. Objections of
the Alliance
25. The Alliance's objections primarily concern the
content of the report of the preliminary mission conducted by the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire, the composition of the
joint mission and, in particular, the participation of Mr.
Roberto Garret, as well as the mandate of the joint mission.
Report of the preliminary mission and composition of the
joint mission
26. The Alliance, in the document which its
Commissioner for Justice submitted to the negotiators appointed by the joint
mission, complains that it did not see the report of the preliminary
mission4 until 5 May, when it received a copy from one of the
negotiators. It also complains of not having been invited to Geneva by the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
27. With respect to the
composition of the joint mission, the Alliance expresses "serious reservations"
about the participation of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Zaire, Mr. Roberto Garret, for the following reasons:
(a)
His report relied on the statements of Kamanda wa Kamanda, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Zaire, as almost irrefutable evidence of the allegations made against
the Alliance; and
(b) He did not
propose to conduct any investigation of human rights violations committed during
the ethnic conflicts in Zaire.
Mandate and
modalities of the investigation
28. Another of the Alliance's
objections is that the mandate of the joint mission is limited to the period
after 1 September 1996, when the war began, a time-frame which, it claims, was
proposed by the Kinshasa Government. It suggests:
(a) That the mission should investigate the incidents
that took place after 20 March 1993, when a conflict broke out in Northern Kivu
which claimed many victims in Masisi, Rutshuru, Kalehe, Lubero, Goma and
Nyragongo;
(b) That an investigation should be conducted on the alleged
victims of the Zairian armed forces after the death of Colonel Makabe, the
alleged victims of Zairian soldiers in the refugee camps between 1994 and 1996
and the acts of genocide committed by the INTERAHAMWE;
(c) That an investigation should also be conducted
into the cases of Rwandan refugees in Zaire who died as a result of cholera and
dysentery, as well as into the refusal of the INTERAHAMWE militias in the
refugee camps to lay down their arms.
29. The document submitted by the Alliance proposes
some practical modalities for cooperation, in particular:
(a) That the investigation should take opposing
viewpoints into account, that it should be conducted with the participation of a
team of four national experts, that joint working meetings should be held and
that the confidentiality of the testimony to be heard by the joint mission
should be guaranteed, with the Alliance giving the necessary security
guarantees;
(b) That the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire, Mr. Roberto Garret,
should not participate in the investigation because of the positions previously
taken by him. 30. AFDL added two
other conditions orally: the participation of observers from the Organization of
African Unity and verification of the selection criteria for the legal experts.
B. Position of the
joint mission
31. The joint mission rejected all of the
above-mentioned conditions for the following reasons.
Report of the
preliminary mission
32. In the first place, the joint mission points out
that the report of the preliminary mission conducted by the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in Zaire4 was published on 2 April and could have been
consulted by any interested person, since it was a document for general
distribution. Moreover, it is hard to understand how, if AFDL did not see the
report until 5 May, it could have expressed reservations about the
impartiality of the report's author and refused to agree to his participation in
the joint mission as far back as 27 April, if not earlier. In addition,
AFDL does not invoke any legally established basis to justify its protest at not
having been officially invited by the Commission on Human Rights to participate
in the debates of its latest session.
33. With regard to the quotations taken from a
communiqufrom the then Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, contained in the preliminary report, the
joint mission notes that the report5 mentions 50 incidents involving grave violations of the
right to life and that only in relation to five of them is there a reference to
a report by Mr. Kamanda, presented as only one of the sources cited.
Moreover, the references to this information are designed to prove the obvious
contradictions between the figures deriving from different sources.6 The report does not in any way accord Mr. Kamanda's
report the status of "almost irrefutable" evidence or even simply an established
presumption of evidence.
Mandate and
modalities of the investigation
34. The accusation that the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire refused to conduct
investigations into the human rights violations committed between 1993 and 1996
during the ethnic conflicts in Kivu is unfounded. Indeed:
(a) In his first report on the situation of human
rights in Zaire in 1994, the Special Rapporteur studied the ethnic conflicts in
Northern Kivu, specifically following the Ntoto market massacre in
March 1993, and also the participation of the Nande, Nyanga and Hunde
ethnic groups and the support of the Zairian armed forces for the
aggressors;7
(b) In his
second report, concerning the year 1995, the Special Rapporteur again looked at
the question in depth;8
(c)
Moreover, during a mission to Rwanda in July 1996, the Special Rapporteur made a
special investigation of the events in Northern Kivu to which AFDL is now
referring. The investigation was carried out in Rwanda because the Kinshasa
authorities had not authorized the Special Rapporteur to enter Zaire, and in the
corresponding report, the responsibility of the Zairian Government is clearly
established;9
(d) His third annual report10 updated the information contained in the report on his
latest mission.
35. The period
covered by the investigation was established by the Commission on Human Rights,
by consensus, not by the members of the mission.
36. The question of Rwandan refugees who died as a
result of cholera or dysentery falls within the mandate of the joint mission. As
to the refusal of the Interahamwe
militia5 to lay down their arms, the joint mission stresses that
this question was taken up by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Zaire in his earlier reports.11
37. The
mission cannot accept the Alliance's "practical modalities for cooperation"
because they are totally incompatible with the mandate established by Commission
on Human Rights resolution 1997/58:
(a) The joint mission cannot change its composition,
which was determined by a consensus resolution of the Commission on Human
Rights, either by removing one of the appointed members or by including persons
not mentioned by the Commission, who would be both judges and parties. Indeed,
in its resolution 1997/58, the Commission on Human Rights set up a team to carry
out a joint mission to investigate the allegations in question. The mission
cannot exclude one of its members without going back on the mandate entrusted to
it. Moreover, it would be inappropriate for one of the parties under
investigation to choose the persons who are to carry out the investigation; by
the same logic, each of the other parties covered by the investigation (Zairian
armed forces, former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe,
mercenaries, etc.) could object to the participation of any one of the mission's
members or demand the presence of their representatives;
(b) It would also be inappropriate to include
observers from a body which is not mentioned in the resolution and whose
participation would have to be agreed upon and accepted by the Commission on
Human Rights and the Organization of African Unity;
(c) The legal experts are performing their duties at
the request of the joint mission, which approved their participation after
satisfying itself as to their capabilities and their vast experience acquired
while carrying out similar tasks within the United Nations. It is for the joint
mission to analyse their observations and to evaluate them, under its
responsibility, in the report.
IV. ATTACKS ON REFUGEE CAMPS
38. The tragedy which led the Commission on Human
Rights to order investigations to be undertaken in eastern Zaire - a decision
supported by the Security Council - was the existence of allegations that
massacres had been committed inside the camps of Rwandan refugees who had
entered Zaire after the Tutsi genocide and the massacres of moderate Hutus in
Rwanda in 1994. The very existence of these camps was one of the causes that
triggered the conflict in eastern Zaire - reason enough for devoting an
entire section to this issue.12
39.
Following the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Rwanda, some
1.2 million people, most of them Hutus, fled to Zaire. Among them were
routed former members of the Rwandan armed forces and militia members known as
Interahamwe or "those who attack together". Many testimonies
referred to by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire
in his report9 emphasize their savagery, as well as their incursions
into Rwanda to eliminate witnesses of the genocide;13 such incursions are also being made into Uganda and it
is feared that they will be made into Burundi.14 This massive refugee presence inflicted tremendous
damage on Zaire's economy and environment and led to violent incidents between
the refugees and the Zairian armed forces and also the local population, who saw
thousands of their fellow countrymen leave in search of security and better
living conditions.
40. According to
AFDL forces and the Rwandan Government, most of the refugees are persons guilty
of genocide, members of the former Rwandan armed forces and members of the
Interahamwe militias,15 whether they are in the camps, hiding in the forests,
have laid down their arms or are ill. A Mr. E. Angulu, who claims to be the AFDL
representative in Europe and is regarded as such in various circles, told the
joint mission that until the refugees are separated from members of the former
Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe, they
will all be viewed as the enemy, since they serve as its shield.
41. One cannot, of course, ignore
the presence of persons guilty of genocide, soldiers and militia members among
the refugees. Unfortunately, the Government of Zaire repeatedly opposed attempts
to remove them, despite repeated requests from UNHCR and from the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire. It is nevertheless
unacceptable to claim that more than 1 million people, including large
numbers of children, should be collectively designated as persons guilty of
genocide and liable to execution without trial.
Direct attacks
by soldiers and/or civilians under the command of Alliance
forces
42. According to the information received, savage
attacks were launched early on in the war against the camps housing both Rwandan
and Burundi refugees at Uvira (22 and 23 October), Bukavu (29 October and the
following days), Goma (3 November) and on the outskirts of these towns. It
mattered little whether or not the victims were persons guilty of genocide,
Interahamwe, members of the former Rwandan armed forces or even
intimidators. The same was true of the attacks on the Shabunda camp in
mid-January 1997 and the Tingi-Tingi and Amisi camps in February. According to
witnesses, the clashes and attacks were followed by massacres of refugees and
murders of non-combatant civilians, almost all of whom were Hutus.
43.
According to the data available, of 1.2 million refugees who settled in
Zaire in or after July 1994, 1,150,000 were still in the refugee camps when the
conflict began in September 1996. The arrival of the rebels and the attacks on
the camps prompted some 600,000 Rwandan and 100,000 Burundi refugees to return
to their countries at their own risk. By 6 May 1997, 183,000 refugees had been
repatriated to Rwanda by UNHCR. Some 120,000 refugees fled to Kisangani, Ubundu
and Masisi, and a further 2,100 took refuge in Tanzania. There is no news of
some 140,000 refugees, even though on more than one occasion missing refugees
were later found wandering westwards, hiding in the forests or lying low in some
locality. The 250,000 refugees lost in November and only found again on
20 December between Shabunda, Tingi-Tingi and Walikale are not an isolated
case.16
44. The
refugees were forced to flee from one camp to another. Some of them went through
as many as five camps, perhaps more. They had to travel hundreds of kilometres
on foot, without any assistance. They were dispersed over particularly
inhospitable areas inaccessible to humanitarian organizations, which meant that
most deaths were caused by exhaustion and undernourishment, as well as malaria,
cholera and dysentery.
45. Another
stratagem used to attack the refugees was recently reported: according to
numerous accounts, Alliance forces announce the arrival of humanitarian agencies
so that refugees hiding in the forests and listening to the radio will assemble
to receive aid; they are then killed or disappear definitively. When the aid
agencies arrive, they find no survivors. This happened at Kisuki on 27 March and
at Matebo three days later, and there are many other examples.
46. The accounts heard or read by the joint mission
show that most of the acts of violence attributed to AFDL were carried out
against refugees inside the camps, not only at the beginning of the war but up
to at least May of this year. Very often, the targets were neither
Interahamwe combatants nor soldiers of the former FAR: they were
women, children, the wounded, the sick, the dying and the elderly, and the
attacks seem to have had no precise military objective. Often the massacres were
carried out after militia members and former FAR soldiers had begun to retreat.
47. The most recent incidents brought to the attention of the joint
mission took place at Mbandaka on 13 May. Refugees, most of them women, children
and unarmed men, who were fleeing westwards, were murdered and their bodies
thrown into the Congo river, while some 140 refugees were buried by humanitarian
organizations and peasants in communal graves. Responsibility for the killings
was attributed to the unit responsible for "clean-up" operations, which had
already operated in the area south of Kisangani. According to eyewitness
accounts, which prompted the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
in Zaire and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions to launch an urgent joint appeal, more than 30 civilians were
murdered at Uvira on 26 May by AFDL security forces, while taking part in a
demonstration organized in protest at the murder some time earlier of five
people who had been kidnapped by Alliance members.
48. Moreover, even in the case of genuine combatants,
it should be recalled that neither the Banyamulenge and the Alliance rebels nor
the Interahamwe militias and former FAR members take prisoners. This
fact was acknowledged by the person known as the Alliance representative in
Europe, a Mr. E. Angulu, who also reported that former FAR members and
Interahamwe combatants wounded in combat would be taken by their
protectors, members of the Zairian armed forces, to Kinshasa, where they could
be seen in hospital.
49. However,
attacks on the camps were not the only method used to eliminate the refugees.
Blockade of humanitarian assistance
50. The
blockading of humanitarian assistance has been a common occurrence, particularly
in the days immediately following the conquest or "liberation" of an area. The
first such blockade took place at Uvira. For almost the entire month of
November, UNHCR was prevented from travelling to the Rutshuru area, and some
areas were totally off-limits to it, for instance, the road between Hombo and
Walikale, where extremely serious incidents are reported to have taken place.
This was also the case in certain areas of Masisi and in the camp near Ikela. As
recently as 15 May, the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees,
Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, was prevented from travelling beyond
kilometre 42 south of Kisangani, where thousands of refugees were awaiting
assistance. At the end of May, the blockade was still in force in various areas.
51. These incidents are never
presented as a denial of access by the authorities, who generally cite reasons
of security. This was the reason given to the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Zaire when, on 28 March, he was informed that
he could not travel to Nyakariba and Niabitaba.17 A similar situation occurred at Kisangani, where the
same objection was made to the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees.
52. At other times, access to
humanitarian assistance has been restricted to a few hours during the day and,
in some cases, to a few days. 53.
Lack of access to humanitarian assistance has extremely serious consequences:
according to some sources, the mortality rate in the camps is between 5 and 25
deaths a day per 10,000 refugees and, in at least one case, 89.5 deaths a
day per 10,000 refugees (in disaster situations, even a rate of 1 death a
day per 10,000 persons is considered excessive). Nearly half the victims are
children under the age of five.
54. Not only is the attitude which the
Alliance forces have maintained for eight months now, despite repeated appeals
from humanitarian agencies, difficult to explain, but it also prompts the
suspicion that it is a more subtle but no less effective tactic aimed at
eliminating the Rwandan refugees. The general impression of witnesses is that it
is not just a question of sporadic violence, but rather of a skilfully applied
stratagem. Those who escape attack risk their lives in the forests, despite the
efforts of humanitarian organizations. This impression is borne out by the fact
that a number of people claim to have been warned that simply helping Hutu
refugees made them the enemy. Clearly, no amount of insecurity or instability in
neighbouring countries can be invoked to justify these occurrences.
Situation of internally displaced persons
55. Since
the beginning of the conflict in Northern Kivu,18 large numbers of Zairians have taken refuge in Rwanda -
and, in 1996, 40,000 of them in Tanzania - and in other parts of the
country. As of 29 July 1996, the number of internally displaced persons was
between 250,000 and 400,000.
56. The situation of these persons remains
as precarious as that of the refugees. Worse, in fact, since no specialized
agency is dealing with their plight. Displaced persons and the Zairian
population in general see the refugees as a "privileged" group who receive
assistance from international intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations despite the damage - and this is a fact - which their presence has
done to the local way of life and environment.
V.
ALLEGATIONS OF MASSACRES AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
57. The joint mission has received numerous reports
and eyewitness accounts concerning allegations of massacres and other human
rights violations. It goes without saying that an investigation in situ, as
requested by the Commission on Human Rights, will permit these allegations to be
verified first-hand.
A. Human rights violations attributed to the Alliance des
forces docratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zae
58. The
number of reports received by the joint mission has almost tripled by comparison
with the 50 allegations of massacres contained in the preliminary report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire.19 The joint mission did not focus its investigations on
individual cases of summary execution, enforced disappearance, torture or other
human rights violations, since its core mandate was to gather information and
testimony on massacres and other massive violations of human rights. It
nevertheless received numerous testimonies concerning such occurrences.
59. The joint mission received
information on 134 alleged massacres, most of them carried out by AFDL and the
Banyamulenge rebels. Of these, 93 allegedly took place in Northern Kivu, 29 in
Southern Kivu and 2 in Upper Zaire. The victims were mainly refugees accused of
belonging to the Interahamwe
militias or the former FAR, but they also included the residents of
predominantly Hutu Zairian villages presumed to have helped the refugees.
According to the information received, several thousand people were killed,
including large numbers of women and children. Tens of thousands of others,
particularly refugees, disappeared involuntarily. Some of them, forced to take
to the forests, probably died of disease or malnutrition, if they were not
massacred. Some testimonies came from people who had themselves buried bodies in
communal graves. Pieces of UNHCR tarpaulin were reportedly still visible on
these graves. Many testimonies also mentioned the unbearable stench from mass
graves almost everywhere in Kivu.
60. It should be added that, according to some
reports, AFDL on several occasions forced the local population to participate in
atrocities. For example, Zairian civilians launched a machete attack on the
Kisesa I camp (housing some 25,000 people) on 21 April and the Kisesa II camp at
kilometre 25 (30,000 refugees) on 22 April, destroying buildings and ransacking
the equipment of humanitarian organizations and UNHCR. The reports and testimony
received nevertheless assert that the local population participated in these
attacks at the instigation and with the support of AFDL soldiers. The current
authorities have ordered no investigation into these allegations; on the
contrary, they have issued numerous denials. According to many eyewitness
accounts, attempts were made to remove all trace of mass and communal graves,
for instance, by setting fire to them.
61. Access to Kivu remains very difficult for
humanitarian organizations, even as businessmen of all nationalities criss-cross
the region in search of lucrative deals, escorted by AFDL forces paid for out of
their own pockets.
B. Human rights violations attributed to the Zairian armed
forces
62. The joint mission received testimonies and
reports of the involvement of members of the Zairian armed forces, acting alone
or with others (Bembe militias, for example), in human rights violations. The
information received concerns 33 alleged violations, which are different from
those already mentioned by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in Zaire in his preliminary report.4
63. Of these
33 alleged human rights violations, 19 were allegedly committed in Southern
Kivu, 5 in Upper Zaire, 4 in Northern Kivu, 2 in Shaba and 1 in Eastern Kasai.
Twenty-three allegations describe executions and massacres, most of whose
victims were Zairian civilians and, more particularly, Banyarwanda. The
remaining allegations concern other types of human rights violations, such as
torture, rape and pillaging.
64. Both the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Zaire, on his visit to Goma from 27 to 29 March,
and the negotiators who talked to the AFDL authorities at Lubumbashi indicated
their willingness to receive any complaint which AFDL might make against the
other parties to the conflict, whether members of the Zairian armed forces,
mercenaries or any other person, and to examine and investigate those
complaints.
65. In both instances, representatives of the Alliance
undertook to provide the relevant information to the Special Rapporteur or the
joint mission, as appropriate. Unfortunately, thus far, neither the Special
Rapporteur nor the joint mission has received any such information.
C. Allegations of
human rights violations attributed to members of the former Rwandan armed forces
and the Interahamwe militias
66. The joint mission received 19
allegations of violations committed by members of the former FAR and the
Interahamwe militias. Many testimonies reveal that members of the
Interahamwe militias and the former FAR engaged in acts of
intimidation to dissuade refugees from returning home. One witness said that he
had stayed in a number of camps (Idjwii, Kashusha, Nyabibwe, Tebero, Walikale,
Tingi-Tingi and Bula) and that the situation was the same in all of them. Many
of those who tried to return home, simply announced their intention of doing so
or were suspected of wanting to leave were executed.67. The mission
regrets the lack of cooperation from AFDL, which went back on its undertaking to
transmit the evidence which it claims to have of atrocities committed by members
of the former FAR and the Interahamwe
militias.
D. Allegations of human rights violations attributed to
other parties to the conflict
68. There is no doubt about the involvement of other parties in the war,
including the Rwandan Patriotic Army and the armed forces of Burundi, as well as
mercenaries and other militias such as the Mai-Mai and those of the Bembe ethnic
group. In any event, the latter always seem to act in concert with other
participants and only rarely on their own. When they do so, they appear to be
linked with the main parties.
Rwandan
Patriotic Army
69. In his annual report, the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Zaire says that "on at least one occasion (30
October), the Government of Rwanda admitted making an incursion into Zairian
territory, and numerous witnesses have confirmed the presence of Rwandan
soldiers in Zaire", and that the allegations about a foreign and, in particular,
Rwandan military presence in Zaire are plausible.20
70. Such foreign involvement could be explained
as follows: the Zairian Government did not want to separate members of the
Interahamwe militias and the former FAR from the genuine refugees,
and thus allowed them to make the incursions mentioned above. As early as March
1995, the Vice-President of Rwanda, General Paul Kagame, expressed concern at
the failure of the international community to prevent the militarization of the
refugee camps, which was making incursions possible into his country. He said
then that his Government would pursue any criminals who attacked Rwanda by
attacking the country in which they were to be found.
71. In September, the President of Rwanda, Pasteur
Bizimungu, issued a call from Cyangungu urging young Banyamulenge to send their
wives and children to Rwanda and to take up arms again in defence of their
rights. This particularly inflammatory speech was criticized by the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire in his annual
report.21
72. Furthermore, quite a number of Banyamulenge
belong to the Alliance and many of them fought alongside the Rwandan Patriotic
Front in 1994, as the Vice-President of Rwanda acknowledged in November 1996.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire even stressed
that many Zairian Banyamulenge had secured posts in the Rwandan
Government.22 Many of them returned to fight in their homeland.
Similarly, the Rwandan Government and the Burundi Government (both of which,
like the Banyamulenge, are predominantly Tutsi), reciprocated the support which
they had received by sending soldiers to fight against Marshall Mobutu, the
former protector of Juvenal Habyarimana's regime.
73. The testimony accusing AFDL of human rights
violations often refers to APR complicity. Other testimony, however, especially
that received by the joint mission, refers only to the involvement of APR. Most
of the victims of the four alleged massacres reported to the mission were
refugees, whose bodies were allegedly found in the Semliki, Karoroma, Lubero and
Luhule rivers.
Armed forces of Burundi
74. As in
the case of Rwanda, the desire to persecute Hutu refugees could explain the
involvement of the Burundi authorities in the war in eastern Zaire. It should be
recalled that, according to many accounts, the extremist Burundi Hutus of the
National Council for the Defence of Democracy were broadcasting messages from
Zairian territory inciting people to take up arms against the Government of
Burundi.23
75. Various
accounts refer to the involvement of the armed forces of Burundi, especially at
the beginning of the offensive by the Banyamulenge rebels. These accounts
mention four incidents in which hundreds of Hutu refugees were allegedly
massacred, especially at Gatuma camp in Southern Kivu.
Mercenaries
76. The involvement of mercenaries
in the massacres was also finally confirmed. In this connection, the best
documented incident is the one which occurred on 8 March, when members of
the Zairian armed forces, together with Serbian mercenaries, tortured to death
many Zairian civilians, including two priests, in the Kisangani area. The joint
mission was also informed that in February 1997, mercenaries, together with
members of the Zairian armed forces flying Yugoslav aircraft, allegedly bombed
markets and civilian areas in Walikale in Northern Kivu, killing many people.
Similar incidents are said to have occurred at Shabunda in Southern Kivu.
VI. APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
77.
The question that should be asked is whether or not incidents such as those
described above were planned or systematic. From the reports and testimony
received, it seems that their systematic nature and advance planning cannot be
ruled out. This is illustrated by, inter alia,
the tactic of laying siege to camps before attacking them, irrespective of their
importance as military targets; summoning the inhabitants of predominantly Hutu
towns to meetings in schools or churches, so as to massacre them; issuing
appeals over the official radio station urging all those hiding in the forests
to come out for medical care and food aid, so as to murder them; and hampering
or opposing humanitarian operations in the camps.
78. The involvement of Alliance forces in these
incidents is no longer in dispute: such incidents can be explained by a desire
to exact revenge for the genocide perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994 and for the
persecution and killings in Northern Kivu since March 1993. It should not be
forgotten that the Banyamulenge, who admitted to the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Zaire that they were arming themselves in
self-defence,24 are members of the Alliance and that many of them joined
the ranks of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, whose victory triggered the exodus of
Rwandan refugees to Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania.
Do the
incidents described constitute a crime of genocide?
79. An
initial question is whether or not the incidents described here constitute
genocide. According to article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, "genocide means any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group." 80. There is no denying that ethnic massacres were
committed and that the victims were mostly Hutus from Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire.
The joint mission's preliminary opinion is that some of these alleged massacres
could constitute acts of genocide. However, the joint mission cannot issue a
precise, definitive opinion on the basis of the information currently available
to it. An in-depth investigation in the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo would clarify this situation.
Do the
incidents described constitute violations of international humanitarian
law?
81. There is absolutely no doubt that the incidents
in question occurred in the context of an armed conflict. None of the parties
has denied this and the situation is therefore covered by the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, to which Zaire is a party. It is also clear that the conflict involves
third countries and has repercussions for other States (return of refugees, new
refugee flows, etc.). Nevertheless, the conflict is taking place within the
territory of one State. Although the Zairian Government denounced foreign
intervention, the entire international community has treated the conflict as a
non-international conflict.
82. On
the other hand, the obstruction of humanitarian operations and the very serious
violations of human rights and humanitarian law documented here can be viewed as
a threat to international peace and security, within the meaning of Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations.
83. As a result, both the serious incidents reported
here and the fact that the rebel forces have effectively controlled certain
parts of Zairian territory since September 1996 must be viewed as much more than
merely internal disturbances or tensions.
84. Based on the foregoing, the joint mission is of
the view that the provisions of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions25 must be applied to the conflict in eastern Zaire.
85. The allegations referred to in this report suggest that while there
have been serious breaches of this provision, such breaches can be attributed
not only to the Alliance but also to the other parties to the conflict.
Do the incidents described constitute crimes against
humanity?
86. The final question is whether or not the
incidents described here constitute crimes against humanity.
87. The concept of crimes against humanity was taken
up in article 6 (c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Nrnberg, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, in the report of the
Commission of Experts established by Security Council resolution 780 (1992)
concerning the former Yugoslavia and, lastly, in the draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, prepared by the International Law
Commission. Article 18 of the draft Code states that a crime against humanity
means "any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic manner or on a
large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or
group: murder; extermination; torture; enslavement; persecution on political,
racial, religious or ethnic grounds; institutionalized discrimination on racial,
ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights
and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population;
arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population; arbitrary
imprisonment; forced disappearance of persons; rape, enforced prostitution and
other forms of sexual abuse; other inhumane acts which severely damage physical
or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe
bodily harm".
88. In the joint
mission's opinion, the concept of crimes against humanity could also be applied
to the situation which reigned and continues to reign in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
VII.
FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE JOINT MISSION
89. The joint mission regrets that the authorities in
power in the conflict area prevented it from fulfilling its mandate more
effectively. In any event, it is awaiting the resolution to be adopted by the
General Assembly pursuant to the last part of paragraph 6 (a) of
Commission resolution 1997/58 and hopes that the current Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo will remove the obstacles that the mission
encountered when it attempted to visit the area in question and will agree to
respect the decisions of the competent United Nations organs.
90. The joint mission has already begun preparations
for a further attempt to visit the area where the conflict took place.
91. The difficulties of conducting
an investigation of the kind proposed must be understood: it is not easy to
coordinate the normal activities of the three members of the joint mission, each
of whom has functions to perform in his own country which he cannot simply
abandon. Coupled with these considerations is the fact that the planning of work
on the ground must be coordinated with the Argentine anthropology and forensic
medicine team, which had to change its programme of work at the time of the
abortive visit to Zaire.
92. The
joint mission therefore hopes that, within the framework of the preparatory
mission sent to Zaire on 20 June 1997 by the Secretary-General
following consultations with President Laurent DirKabila, the authorities of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo will provide the necessary guarantees for
the investigation to be conducted in strict compliance with resolution 1997/58,
as interpreted by the mission within the above-mentioned terms of reference. As
this report was being finalized, the preparatory mission was holding discussions
with the Minister for Emergency Reconstruction and Planning and a "Liaison
Committee" established for that purpose, but there was still no definite sign
that the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were prepared to
respect the above-mentioned resolution.
93. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo will also have to adopt and enforce very tight security measures in order
to prevent a recurrence of the situations described above and to ensure the
freedom of movement of the joint mission.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
94. In addition to the analysis
contained in the report of the preliminary mission of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Zaire to eastern Zaire in March 1997, the
joint mission received testimony and information on the perpetration of
massacres and other serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law. Since the preliminary mission, the number of allegations
received concerning massacres and mass grave sites has quadrupled. In addition,
it was particularly shocking to note the absence of prisoners of war and the
attacks on hospitals and medical centres. These massacres and human rights
violations were the result of:
(a)
Indiscriminate attacks on refugee camps, in which not only members of the former
Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe,
authors of threats and persons guilty of genocide were killed and wounded, but
also many innocent civilians, particularly children, women and the elderly;
(b) The systematic blockade of
humanitarian assistance intended for refugee camps, which meant that many
refugees died of malnutrition and disease;
(c) The policy of war without quarter, which
precluded the taking of prisoners;
(d) Measures of intimidation aimed at forcing
refugees to flee into the forests and towards hostile areas where access by
humanitarian missions was absolutely impossible.
95. As of now, the joint mission can say that there
are reliable indications that persons belonging to one or other of the parties
to the conflict in eastern Zaire, now Democratic Republic of the Congo, probably
committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, particularly of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, between early
September 1996 and 17 May 1997. These violations of international
humanitarian law were committed mainly by AFDL, the Banyamulenge and their
allies (68.02 per cent of the allegations received). They were also
committed by the Zairian armed forces (16.75 per cent of the
allegations received); the former Rwandan armed forces and the Interahamwe
(9.64 per cent of the allegations received); the Rwandan Patriotic
Army (2.03 per cent of the allegations received); the armed forces of
Burundi (2.03 per cent of the allegations received); and mercenaries
(1.52 per cent of the allegations received) fighting on the side of
the Kinshasa Government. It should be stressed that the joint mission also
identified more than 30 cases in which the authors could not be determined.
Such crimes seem to be sufficiently massive and systematic to be characterized
as crimes against humanity. Until a more in-depth investigation is able to
identify their perpetrators, they should be declared not subject to statutory
limitations, in accordance with the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity of
26 November 1968. Moreover, their authors could be brought to trial
before international tribunals, as was decided in the case of the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
96. Following an in-depth study of all the
testimony and other information available, the question of whether a genocide
was planned and executed should be asked. The common ethnic identity of most of
the victims is a matter of record: Zairian Hutus and Hutu refugees from Rwanda
and Burundi. The methods used, namely, deliberate, premeditated massacres, the
dispersal of refugees to inaccessible, inhospitable areas, the systematic
blockade of humanitarian assistance and the stubborn opposition thus far to any
attempt to conduct an impartial, objective investigation into the very serious
allegations received are particularly troubling. However, in the absence of
access to the scenes of the alleged crimes and a more in-depth and comprehensive
investigation, the joint mission can only reserve its response to this question
for the time being. The seriousness and the number of the allegations received
confirm the need for the international community, particularly all the States
parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of 9 December 1948, to devote sustained attention and top
priority to the urgent need to bring an immediate halt to the human rights
violations and the blockades and to conduct in the territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and in any other territory that may be appropriate, the
in-depth, impartial and objective investigations that the question of genocide
warrants.
97. The joint mission is equally concerned at the persistence
of serious allegations of human rights violations and massacres committed,
particularly in Northern and Southern Kivu, and at the violent suppression of
mass demonstrations. In this connection, the summary executions which
accompanied the seizure of power in Kinshasa bear out concerns about the actions
of Alliance soldiers out of range of the cameras and raise worrying questions
about their future role in a society that is supposedly making the transition to
democracy. More than ever, the situation calls for in-depth, independent
investigations to be conducted urgently throughout the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
98. The joint mission regrets that its
mandate covers only those incidents which have occurred since
September 1996, as the main cause of the conflict in the Congo was the
massive influx of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi into the eastern part of the
country following the massacres and genocide which took place in Rwanda between
April and July 1994. The mission feels that its mandate could be altered
ratione temporis to permit more exhaustive investigations.
99. The joint mission expresses its
gratitude to the Secretariat and to the officials of the humanitarian agencies
of the United Nations system working in the Great Lakes region and at the
various headquarters, for the support which they provided, and to the
non-governmental organizations which transmitted invaluable information to it.
100. The joint mission was set up at
the proposal of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Zaire, who felt that the dissemination of the reports of the mechanisms of the
Commission on Human Rights, the confidence shown in them by human rights
organizations, the coordination that exists among all those mechanisms and the
expertise, impartiality and independence of the rapporteurs and members of
working groups on these questions would guarantee the credibility of its
reports.
101. Nevertheless, the
honorary, part-time nature of their mandates prevents the persons in charge of
these mechanisms from devoting themselves entirely to their tasks, which are
some of the most important tasks assigned by the United Nations in the area of
the protection of human rights. Moreover, these mechanisms were established by
the Commission on Human Rights, a technical organ of the Economic and Social
Council which does not have the means to implement its decisions. The special
rapporteurs' only strength lies in the professionalism of their reports, their
integrity and their reputation. The Alliance's case is not the first in which a
Government or authority under investigation has refused to cooperate in any way,
meaning that alternative investigation modalities have to be considered.
Whatever investigations may be conducted in future, they will have to meet the
following criteria: they will have to be thorough, impartial and professional
and entrusted to objective individuals with expertise in the field of human
rights who can devote themselves entirely to their tasks, in complete
independence and free from political influence of any kind, and who can
formulate their conclusions in a report that can be circulated widely.
B. Recommendations
To the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
102. The joint mission recommends to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo that it:
(a)
Clearly demonstrate its attachment to the cause of human rights by unequivocally
and publicly condemning the atrocities described in this report and by pledging
to do its utmost to put an end to them;
(b) Put an immediate end to the blockade of
humanitarian assistance intended for refugees and displaced persons and take all
appropriate steps to end the suffering of the most disadvantaged refugees,
particularly dispersed refugees, women,
the elderly and children;
(c)
Guarantee the security and the right to life and physical integrity of anyone
who is in the territory under its jurisdiction;
(d) Cooperate unreservedly with the mission charged
with investigating allegations of massacres and other human rights violations in
the eastern part of the Congo, ensure that it has unimpeded access to the
territory and give it the necessary security guarantees; protect the sites of
massacres and guarantee the security of any witnesses, in strict accordance with
the decisions of the competent United Nations organs, particularly Commission on
Human Rights resolution 1997/58. In particular, the mission's freedom of
movement and security must be guaranteed, so that the incidents reported by the
security officer and described in section II of this report do not recur;
(e) With respect to the allegations
of massacres and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law,
order official, impartial investigations which conform to United Nations norms
on the effective prevention and investigation of extrajudicial, arbitrary and
summary executions and other applicable norms. Investigation of the allegations
described in this report will have to be entrusted to persons of the highest
moral standing, acting with complete independence and having considerable
expertise in this field. The report will have to be made public. In addition,
all necessary measures will have to be taken to end impunity and the cycle of
criminal violence, in order to promote the full and complete attainment of the
rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(f) Promote the rule of law, in particular by
establishing an effective, independent and impartial judicial system that
provides guarantees against the impunity which, once again, is the main cause of
the persistence of human rights violations throughout the Great Lakes region;
(g) Establish a genuine civil service and, in particular, a civilian
police force that is separate from the military forces of the Alliance and that
respects international rules on the use of public force by law enforcement
officials. In this connection, anyone accused of participating in torture,
summary executions or enforced disappearances must not be admitted to the police
force;
(h) Enable United Nations
agencies, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights/Centre for Human Rights, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Food Programme, and
other humanitarian organizations to carry out their work with a view to solving
the problems confronting the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with particular
emphasis on the protection of women, children and the elderly, whether refugees
or victims of forcible dispersal or displacement, and of the sick and wounded.
To the United Nations and the
international community
103. The
joint mission makes the following recommendations to the United Nations and the
international community:
(a) The
Security Council could envisage the immediate dispatch of military and/or police
observers to areas where there is little or no security;
(b) The necessary steps should be taken to ensure
that the investigation of massacres and other human rights violations can be
carried out in cooperation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, using all necessary technical and human resources;
(c) With reference to the content of
paragraph 102, the following two options can be envisaged:
(i) Either retain the existing mission and add
professional investigators to it who will remain in the field throughout the
mission's mandate and work under the authority of the independent experts, with
all necessary guarantees for their security and freedom of movement;
(ii) Or establish, under the aegis
of the Security Council, a standing commission whose experts will be able to
remain in the field for as long as their mandate requires, without prejudice to
the powers already attributed to the Commission's non-treaty mechanisms;
(d) Without prejudice to any
resolution that may be adopted by the General Assembly, the possibility should
be considered of convening a special session of the Commission on Human Rights,
given the ratione
temporis and ratione loci
limitations placed on the joint mission's mandate and the explosive situation
currently prevailing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(e) Humanitarian corridors should be established so
that refugees hiding in the forests can have access to humanitarian
organizations and be repatriated to their own countries if they so wish, and, in
general, the international duty of protection for refugees under the Convention
on the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 should be respected and
enforced;
(f) The necessary steps
should be taken to ensure that persons who are accused of participating in the
genocide in Rwanda and are currently mingled with the refugees appear before the
competent international criminal tribunal;
(g) The necessary steps should be taken to halt arms
trafficking in the Great Lakes region and to publicize the report prepared by
the International Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council
resolution 1013 (1995) and maintained pursuant to resolution
1053 (1996) on this question.
To the
Governments of neighbouring countries of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo
104. The joint mission recommends to neighbouring
countries that they:
(a) Take in the
refugees who are in their territory, respecting the right of asylum and halting
the mass expulsion of refugees;
(b)
Protect the refugees and disarm any asylum-seekers who may be armed;
(c) Prevent their territory from
being used to infiltrate and destabilize other neighbouring countries.
To the Government of Rwanda
105. The joint mission recommends to the
Government of Rwanda that it, in particular:
(a) Take in the Rwandan refugees, particularly those
repatriated from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, guaranteeing their
security and fully respecting their fundamental rights. In this connection, the
policy of rounding up returnees must not encourage the practice of summary
executions, enforced disappearances, settling of scores or arbitrary detentions.
Where there is reliable evidence of participation in the genocide, the persons
concerned must be given a fair trial which respects the presumption of innocence
and the rights of defence before an impartial court;
(b) Order in-depth, independent and impartial
investigations in accordance with the relevant United Nations rules, entrusting
them to independent persons of the highest moral standing and with the requisite
expertise, and bring the alleged perpetrators of such violations before the
courts, regardless of their rank;
(c) The Government of Rwanda must also clearly
demonstrate its attachment to the cause of human rights by unequivocally and
expressly condemning, like the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the atrocities described in this report.
Notes
1 The following abbreviations will be used in the present
report:
AFDL Alliance des forces
docratiques pour la libation du Congo-Zae
APR Rwandan Patriotic
Army
FAB Armed forces of Burundi
FAR Rwandan armed forces
FAZ Zairian armed forces
2
In the present report, the name Zaire will be used in all cases in which the
events in question occurred prior to 17 May 1997, and the name
Democratic Republic of the Congo will be used in the case of events occurring
from that date onwards.
3 That mission took place from 25 to 29
March 1997 and was intended to investigate allegations of massacres of Hutu
refugees in eastern Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2).
4
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2.
5 Ibid., paras. 21 and 45.
6 Ibid., para. 49.
7
E/CN.4/1995/67, paras. 85 to 95.
8
E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 23 to 32.
9
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1.
10 E/CN.4/1997/6, paras. 164 to
169.
11 Paras. 96 to 103 and 275 of the first report; paras.
44, 45, 51, 131 and 132 of the second report; paras. 157 to 163 and 233 of the
third report; and paras. 86 and 126 (d), (e), (f), (g) and (i) of the report on
the mission to Rwanda in July 1996.
12
For the causes and initial development of the conflict, see the report of the
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Zaire (E/CN.4/1997/6,
paras. 170 to 189). The Special Rapporteur warned against the possibility of
such a conflict, even before it broke out, in document E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2,
following his visit to Rwanda in July 1996. Briefly summarized, the long-term
causes of the conflict are that "frontiers were drawn between various colonies
regardless of the borders recognized by the 'original' ethnic groups and this
situation was aggravated by the transplantation of populations"; to these must
be added a political cause, the withdrawal of Zairian nationality from the
Banyamulenge, Tutsis who had been established in Zaire for generations; the
massive influx of Rwandan refugees following the genocide in their country, and
its disastrous consequences for the local economy and environment; and, lastly,
incitement by the authorities, who were pushing for the expulsion of all
Rwandans - Hutu or Tutsi - from the territory of Zaire. Such incitement prompted
the Banyamulenge to organize to defend themselves in the face of threats of
expulsion, so much so that initially the war was termed the war of the
Banyamulenge and was led by one of them, Miller Ruhimbika. The Banyamulenge
enjoyed the full support - weapons, personnel and resources - of the authorities
in power in Rwanda and Burundi, who were also Tutsis. The nationality issue
subsequently receded because the conflict, as it developed, turned into a war,
directed by AFDL under the leadership of Laurent Kabila, against the
dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, former ally of the late President of Rwanda,
Juvenal Habyarimana.
13 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1, paras. 121 and
123.
14 Ibid., paras. 122 and 124.
15
See the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
Zaire: E/CN.4/1995/67, para. 96; E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 32, 44 to 51 and 132;
E/CN.4/1997/6, para. 157; E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1, especially paras. 38 to 41, 51,
75 and 76.
16 E/CN.4/1997/6, para. 160.
17 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2, para. 13.
18
E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 23 and 31, and almost the entire report in document
E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.1.
19 E/CN.4/1997/6/Add.2.
20 E/CN.4/1997/6, paras. 178 and 179.
21
Ibid., para. 181 and note 11.
22
Ibid., para. 178 and note 10.
23
E/CN.4/1996/66, paras. 55 and 56.
24 Ibid., para. 37.
25
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention,
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) Violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b)
Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
2. The wounded and sick shall be
collected and cared for. (...) Verknüpfte Dokumente