15. Mai 2012

1) Informationen zu den Stämmen Totikhail, Marikhel und Akhundzada

Die ethnische Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung der Provinz Nangarhar wird in einem Provinzprofil des afghanischen Ministeriums für ländlichen Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (MRRD) aus dem Jahr 2007 wie folgt beschrieben:

„The major ethnic groups living in Nangarhar province are Pashtoons (90%) followed by Pashayee (7%) and other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, and Gujjars (3 %). This includes major tribes such as Momand, Shenwari, Khogaini, Sapi, Nasir, Ibrahimkhail, Hoodkhail, Kharoti, Jabarkhail, Nuristani, Pashayee, Niazi, and Tajik. Pashtu is spoken by 92.1% of the villages. The remaining eight percent speak Pashayee (60 villages), Dari (36 villages) and some other unspecified languages. Nangarhar province also has a population of Kuchis or nomads whose numbers vary in different seasons.“ (MRRD, 2007, S. 2)

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zu Stämmen namens Totikhail, Marikhel und Akhundzada gefunden werden, die sich auf die Provinz Nangarhar beziehen. Es wurden folgende Informationen zu tribalen Gruppen gleicher oder ähnlicher Bezeichnung in anderen Provinzen Afghanistans (Paktia und Helmand) gefunden:

Totikhail

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zu einem Stamm mit der genauen Bezeichnung Totikhail gefunden werden. Folgende Quellen erwähnen eine tribale Gruppe namens Tota Khail bzw. Totakhel in der Provinz Paktia:

In einem Bericht vom Dezember 2009 geht die Heinrich Böll Stiftung wie folgt auf Beziehungen zwischen Stämmen im Gebiet Machalghu in der Provinz Paktia ein und erwähnt dabei den Stamm Tota Khail:

„The Machalgho area has also been plagued by tensions between the Machalgho (and also neighbouring Mangal) and Tota Khail tribes. This was aggravated in 2002 when young men from the Tota Khail tribe started robbing travellers in an area belonging to Ahmadzai and Mangal tribes. It is alleged that the robbers were backed by a Tota Khail jihadi commander with good relations to an infamous regional strongman. Mangal and Machalgho elders approached Tota Khail elders who agreed to reign in their fellow tribesmen, but ultimately were unable to do so. The subsequent killing of four members of the Tota Khail tribe (including the son of said jihadi commander) by Machalgho tribesmen escalated tensions into a blood feud between the leading families of both tribes. A district official asserted that the Tota Khail strongman is waiting for a chance to take revenge. The Machalgho tribal agreement drawn up several years after the shootout strengthens the commitment of the different sub-tribes to act united in case of outside intrusion, by making references to robbers. Some allege that the agreement also serves to protect Machalgho families in their blood feud with Tota Khail families.” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Dezember 2009, S. 8)

„In comparison to other tribes in Paktia, the authority of Ahmadzai elders is particularly strong and for the most part goes uncontested. […] The Tota Khail elders of the area neighbouring Ahmad Aba, for example, lost much of their influence during the jihad. The family of a particular jihadi commander profited greatly from their alliance with a regional strongman. As a result, as noted earlier, Tota Khail elders are now unable to exert influence over the young men of the tribe, e.g. for reigning in robberies.” (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Dezember 2009, S. 10)

Die Autoren Conrad Schetter, Rainer Glassner und Mosood Karokhail gehen in einem im Jahr 2007 erschienenen Artikel auf Stammesbeziehungen in der Provinz Paktia ein. Dabei findet Erwähnung, dass zwischen den benachbarten Stämmen Ahmadzai und Totakhel eine langjährige Stammesfehde bestehe:

„Paktia province is located in the eastern part of the so-called Pashtun belt and is more or less ethnically homogenous. […] The Pashtuns of Paktia are divided along tribal lines. Tribal identities are still perceived as the most important points of reference, incorporating ideas of honor and justice as well as day-to-day behavior (Steul 1981; Glatzer 2002) […] Due to this tribal structure and the underlying egalitarian understanding of society, political leadership is always strongly contested (Anderson 1983; Steul 1981). This is why the last two decades have been characterized by a continuous struggle between the tribes on the one hand and individual warlords challenging the tribal system, on the other. Very often, strong men – first »mujahidin,« then warlords – endeavored to gain a powerful status within their tribes. But as soon as they acted contrary to the code of the ’pashtunwali,’ conflicts arose between them and the tribes. This was especially the case after the collapse of the Taliban in winter 2001/2, when Bacha Khan of the Zadran tribe seized power in Paktia even without the legitimacy of his own tribe. Bacha Khan was initially backed by the Northern Alliance and the Coalition Forces for his operations against the Taliban. He was able to mobilize warriors from his Zadran tribe as well as small warlords such as Raz Mohammad and Wazir Khan. As a result of his arbitrary path to power over the province, disregarding the rules of the ’pashtunwali,’ most of the tribes regarded him as an illegitimate ’bandit‘ or ’jang salar.’ Within a few days, the tribes reacted to Bacha Khan’s seizure of power and managed to build up a counter force across tribal boundaries. After several days of heavy clashes in Gardez, which left about 100 people dead, the tribes were able to oust Bacha Khan from the town. […] Since that incident, policing in the tribal areas of Paktia has been carried out by the ’arbakee,’ a sort of traditional tribal police. […] One example is the long lasting tribal feud between the Ahmadzai tribe and the neighboring Totakhel tribe, which was aggravated by the establishment of the »arbakee.«” (Schetter, 2007, S. 146-148)

Marikhel

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnte im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche nur ein Dokument gefunden werden, in dem ein Stamm mit der genauen Bezeichnung Marikhel Erwähnung findet:

Der Wikipedia-Eintrag zur Provinz Paktia erwähnt einen Clan namens Marikhel, der zur Gruppe der Muqbel gehöre. Die Muqbel seien Teil des Stammes Karlanri, der eine der wichtigsten paschtunischen Gruppen in der Provinz darstelle (Wikipedia, ohne Datum).

Es wurden weiters folgende Informationen zu einer Stammesgruppe mit der Bezeichnung Mali Khel gefunden:

Eine im Rahmen des Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (CCS) der US-amerikanischen Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) veröffentlichte graphische Übersicht zu Stämmen in Afghanistan, die sich auf die Publikation „Tribal Hierarchy & Dictionary of Afghanistan“ aus dem Jahr 2007 beruft, erwähnt eine tribale Gruppe namens Mali Khel. Die Mali Khel würden zu den Kaisar Khel gehören, die eine Untergruppe der Suleiman Khel seien. Letztere seien Teil des Ghilzai-Überstamms der Paschtunen (CCS, 2007a). Es liegen keine Informationen darüber vor, ob die Mali Khel mit den Marikhel ident sind.

Akhundzada

In einem Artikel vom Mai 2009 erwähnt das US-amerikanische Tribal Analysis Center (TAC) die „Akhundzada-Familie“ im Kontext von Konflikten in der Provinz Helmand:

„The Alizai’s Hassanzai subtribe lost its khans/maliks to the intra-tribal conflict generated by the ‘Akhundzada’ family that is now represented by Helmand Province’s former governor, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. This subtribe and its Akhundzada leadership has been heavily involved in the opium trade, fought a war in Helmand Province with Hezb-Islami (Gulbuddin), or HIG, and was allied with Mohammad Nabi Mohammedi’s Harakat political and military party. Sher Mohammad is now generally allied with the Government of Afghanistan, but the Harakat party his father and uncles supported is also the source of most of the Taliban’s leadership – including Mullah Omar.” (TAC, Mai 2009)

In einem Artikel vom Dezember 2011 schreibt die britische Tageszeitung Guardian unter Berufung auf diplomatische Dokumente, die auf Wikileaks veröffentlicht wurden, dass Sher Mohammad Akhundzada ein Anführer des Stammes Alizai sei und von 2001 bis 2005 Gouverneur der Provinz Helmand gewesen sei:

„On several occasions the British thwarted Karzai's plan to replace Gulab Mangal – the technocratic governor of Helmand praised to the skies by the US and UK – with Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, a leader of the Alizai tribe who served as governor of the province from 2001 to 2005.” (Guardian, 2. Dezember 2011)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) berichtet im September 2007, dass südafghanische Stammesführer wie Sher Mohammad Akhundzada „mit dem Segen“ von Präsident Karsai private Milizen einsetzen würden:

„In southern Afghanistan, tribal chiefs, like Sher Mohammad Akhundzada the former governor of Helmand province who was removed due to allegations of corruption and involvement in the drug trade, have been allowed to operate private militias with the blessing of President Karzai.” (HRW, 28. September 2006)

2) Situation und Einfluss von Stämmen, insbesondere die Lage von Minderheitenstämmen

Auf einer Stammeskarte der Provinz Nangarhar, veröffentlicht vom Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (CCS), findet sich in jedem Bezirk Nangarhars der Name jener Stammesgruppe eingezeichnet, die in dem Bezirk dominierend sei (CCS, ohne Datum a). Die Bezeichnungen Totikhail, Marikhel und Akhundzada kommen darin als solche nicht vor. Auch werden diese Stämme nicht unter den jeweils dominierenden Stämmen in den Bezirken der Provinz Paktia (CCS, ohne Datum a) sowie der Provinz Helmand angeführt (CCS, ohne Datum b).

Ein Bericht des Afghanistan-Experten Antonio Giustozzi, der im September 2011 von der norwegischen Herkunftsinformationsstelle Landinfo veröffentlicht wurde, nimmt wie folgt Bezug auf den Einfluss von Stammesstrukturen in Südost- und Ostafghanistan gegenüber aufständischen Gruppierungen:

„South-East

Most of the south-east is a contested area, particularly Loya Paktia. In this case, because of the strength of tribal structure in this area, the fact that neither side is in control has played to the advantage of the civilian population, which through the tribes has managed to extract a more respectful behaviour from the insurgents in particular. Civilian victimisation still occurs, but not proportionally to the level of violence registered in this region.

East

With the redeployment of US forces in 2010, all of Nuristan and much of Kunar have in fact been conceded to the insurgents. The rest of Kunar, most of Nangarhar and almost all of Laghman are now contested areas. In some areas, particularly Nangarhar, the tribes were strong enough to negotiate with the insurgents and limit their encroachments as desired. Some areas, tribally more mixed, have seen greater insurgent penetration. In 2010-11 even the most resilient tribes seem to have conceded access to the insurgents.” (Landinfo, 9. September 2011, S. 16)

Die United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) berichtet im ihrem Jahresbericht vom Februar 2012 Folgendes:

„In 2011, the Taliban claimed responsibility for numerous targeted killings of civilian government officials, tribal elders, government workers, contractors, drivers, translators and other civilians and included such civilians in their public lists of targets to kill or capture. In an October 2011 statement responding to the Government’s convening of a Loya Jirga, the Taliban identified as lawful targets a broad range of civilians participating in the Jirga or associated with the Government“ (UNAMA, Februar 2012, S. vi)

Das kanadische Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) schreibt in einer Anfragebeantwortung vom Dezember 2011 unter Berufung auf ein telefonisches Interview mit einem Assistenzprofessor an der Universität Syracuse, dass die Taliban unter anderem gezielt gegen Dorfälteste vorgehen würden:

„The Assistant Professor indicated that the Taliban specifically targets police commanders, police chiefs, deputy commissioners, village elders, clerics who work with the government, and high-ranking bureaucrats (13 Dec. 2011).” (IRB, 30. Dezember 2011)

Asia Times berichtet in einem Artikel vom Dezember 2011 wie folgt über Konflikte um Land, die unter anderem zwischen der Regierung und Einzelpersonen bzw. Stämmen oder auch zwischen Stämmen stattfinden würden:

„Since the US-led invasion in 2001, the threat of violence over land disputes has increased dramatically. Land grabbing by corrupt government officials and warlords is endemic throughout the country, and absentee land is often resold or occupied, without the original owner's knowledge. […] Land disputes are most commonly fought between individuals, including family inheritance claims. Others pit the government against individuals or tribes, or tribes versus tribes. The majority of landowners prefer to abide by customary law and resolve disputes using traditional mechanisms because it takes less time. The courts are regarded as time consuming - always an expensive undertaking for those involved - and are suspected of corruption.” (Asia Times, 6. Dezember 2011)

Die afghanische Nachrichtenagentur Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN) berichtet im Februar 2012 zu einem vorangegangenen mehrjährigen Stammenkonflikt in der Provinz Nangarhar:

„Two major tribes have agreed on a three-year ceasefire over a land dispute that had claimed several lives from the two sides in the eastern province of Nangarhar, an official said on Monday. Speaking at a joint conference with Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sehrzai, presidential adviser on tribal affairs, Asadullah Wafa, hoped the ceasefire between the two sub-tribes of Shinwari tribe --- Seepai and Alisherkhel --- would end the two-year-old dispute. Several men of the tribes have been killed in clashes over the land in Kahi desert situated between Achin and Spinghar districts, he added. […] As many as 200 people have so far been killed or wounded as a result of the conflict between the two tribes over the past two years.” (PAN, 6. Februar 2012)

3) Streitvorfall zwischen den genannten Stämmen seit 2010?

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zu einem Streitvorfällen zwischen den Stämmen Totikhail, Marikhel und Akhundzada seit 2010 gefunden werden. Informationen zu Stammenkonflikten unter Beteiligung der Totakhel in Paktia entnehmen Sie bitte dem ersten Unterkapitel der vorliegenden Anfragebeantwortung (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Dezember 2009, S. 10; Schetter, 2007, S. 146-148). Darüber hinaus berichten folgende ältere Medienberichte aus dem Jahr 2003 über Vorfälle, die sich auf den Stamm Totakhel beziehen:

Der afghanische Fernsehsender E-Ariana berichtet im September 2003:

„At least 20 tribals were killed and 40 wounded in a dispute over land in Afghanistan's Paktia province, a news report said on Thursday. The Mengal and Totakhel tribes used light and heavy weapons in the clash over a piece of land in the Dum mountains, about 35km east of the provincial capital Gardez, according to the Afghan Islamic Press (AIP) agency. ’After three days, the fighting subsided on Thursday,’ a resident of nearby Sayed Karam town told the agency. The agency reported a similar feud occurred between the Babar and Nasir tribes in Logar province in which two people were reported killed and several others wounded.” (E-Ariana, 12. September 2003)

Der iranische Auslandsrundfunksender Islamic Voice of Iran berichtet im Mai 2003:

„A total of 11 people have died and been injured due to an eruption of tribal clashes in southeastern Afghanistan. The clashes flared up between the locals of the Totakhel tribe, located in the Sayd Karam District of Paktika Province and the people of Akhtar Mohammad. In these clashes, five people from the Totakhel tribe died and four others were injured, and two of Akhtar Mohammad's men were also seriously injured. No further reports are in hand about the reason for the clashes, but some other reports are indicating that these clashes took place due to personal disputes between the tribes and nomads of Sayd Karam District. Akhtar Mohammad and his sons, who are warlords from southeastern Afghanistan, are loyal to and support a discontented Afghan warlord Pacha Khan Zadran.” (Islamic Voice of Iran, 17. Mai 2003)

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 15. Mai 2012)

·      Asia Times:           Afghanistan: Land triggers new conflicts, 6. Dezember 2011

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ML06Df01.html

·      CCS - Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (Naval Postgraduate School, NPS): Eastern Tribal Map, ohne Datum a

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/PDF%20Maps/East_tribal_map07.pdf

·      CCS - Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (Naval Postgraduate School, NPS): Southern Tribal Map, ohne Datum b

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/PDF%20Maps/RCSouthTribalmap07.pdf

·      CCS - Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (Naval Postgraduate School, NPS): Tribal Trees: Suleiman Khel, Stand 2007 a

http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCs/Docs/Tribal%20Trees/Suleiman_Khel_Kaisar.pdf

·      E-Ariana: 20 killed in Afghan tribal clash, 12. September 2003

http://www.inarchive.com/page/2011-04-03/http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allPrintDocs/FFFD93609D27DA9987256D9F005A4D8F?OpenDocument

·      Guardian: WikiLeaks cables portray Hamid Karzai as corrupt and erratic, 2. Dezember 2011

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-cables-hamid-karzai-erratic

·      Heinrich Böll Stiftung: Tribal Jurisdiction and Agreements: The Key to Sub-National Governance in Southeastern Afghanistan, Dezember 2009

http://www.boell-afghanistan.org/downloads/TLO_Policy_Brief_-_Tribal_Contracts_-_2009.pdf

·      HRW – Human Rights Watch: Afghanistan: Bush, Karzai, Musharraf Must Act Now To Stop Militant Abuses, 28. September 2006

http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/09/26/afghanistan-bush-karzai-musharraf-must-act-now-stop-militant-abuses

·      IRB - Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada: The capacity of the Taliban to pursue individuals after they relocate to another region; their capacity to track individuals over the long term [AFG103923.E], 30. Dezember 2011 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/209274/314912_en.html

·      Islamic Voice of Iran: Eruption of tribal clashes leaves 11 dead in Paktika Province, 17. Mai 2003 (verfügbar auf Refworld)

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/407bbf394.pdf

·      Landinfo: Afghanistan: Human Rights and Security Situation (Autor: Antonio Giustozzi), 9. September 2011

http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1745/1/1745_1.pdf

·      MRRD - Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development: Provincial Development Plan, Nangarhar Provincial Profile, 2007

http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/Provincial%20Profiles/Nangarhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf

·      PAN - Pajhwok Afghan News: Warring Nangarhar tribes agree on truce, 6. Februar 2012

http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/02/06/warring-nangarhar-tribes-agree-truce

·      Schetter, Conrad / Glassner, Rainer / Masood Karokhail: Beyond Warlordism. The Local Security Architecture in Afghanistan. In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2007 Nr. 2, S. 136-152

http://www.fes.de/ipg/inhalt_d/pdf/10_Schetter_US.pdf

·      TAC - Tribal Analysis Center: Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan, Mai 2009

http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Putting%20It%20All%20Together.pdf

·      UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Annual Report 2011; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Februar 2012 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1328540271_unama-poc-2011-report-final-feb-2012.pdf

·      Wikipedia: Paktia Province, ohne Datum

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paktia_Province