Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Aktivitäten des Islamischen Staates (IS) (Beginn der Aktivitäten; geografische Verbreitung; hochrangige Anführer; Kennzeichen des IS bzw. seiner Untergruppierungen; Vorgehen des Staates und anderer Organisationen gegen (ehemalige) Mitglieder dieser Gruppierungen; Auseinandersetzungen mit den Sicherheitskräften) [a-9962-2 (9963)]

20. Jänner 2017

Das vorliegende Dokument beruht auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie gegebenenfalls auf Expertenauskünften, und wurde in Übereinstimmung mit den Standards von ACCORD und den Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) erstellt.

Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Alle Übersetzungen stellen Arbeitsübersetzungen dar, für die keine Gewähr übernommen werden kann.

Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien im Original durchzusehen. Originaldokumente, die nicht kostenfrei oder online abrufbar sind, können bei ACCORD eingesehen oder angefordert werden.

 

Bitte beachten Sie, dass die in dieser Anfragebeantwortung enthaltene Übersetzung aus dem Norwegischen unter Verwendung von technischen Übersetzungshilfen erstellt wurde. Es besteht daher ein erhöhtes Risiko, dass diese Arbeitsübersetzung Ungenauigkeiten enthält.

Beginn der Aktivitäten

Das Herkunftsländerinformationszentrum Landinfo, ein unabhängiges Organ der norwegischen Migrationsbehörden, hält fest, dass die Gruppe „Islamischer Staat“ (IS) erstmals gegen Ende 2014/Anfang 2015 in Afghanistan Fuß gefasst habe (Landinfo, 13. Oktober 2016, S. 12).

 

Borhan Osman, Forscher beim Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), einer unabhängigen, gemeinnützigen Forschungsorganisation mit Hauptsitz in Kabul, die Analysen zu politischen Themen in Afghanistan und der umliegenden Region erstellt, schreibt, dass die Gruppe „Islamische Staat“ Ende Jänner 2015 ihre Expansion in die „Provinz Khorasan“ bekannt gegeben habe. (Osman, 27. Juli 2016)

 

In einem Artikel vom September 2016 schreibt Osman, dass der „Islamische Staat - Provinz Chorasan“ (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province, ISIL-KPm, auch ISKP), der Ableger der Gruppe „Islamischer Staat“ in Afghanistan und Pakistan, im Mai 2015 an die Öffentlichkeit getreten sei. Erste Zusammenstöße mit den Taliban hätten indes schon im Dezember 2014 stattgefunden. (Osman, 27. September 2016)

Geografische Verbreitung

Der UNO-Generalsekretär bemerkt im Dezember 2016 in seinem Bericht an die UNO-Generalversammlung, dass Operationen der afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte (mit Unterstützung internationaler Streitkräfte) zu einer Reduzierung der Präsenz des IS in Afghanistan (im Wesentlichen) in den Provinzen Nangarhar und Kunar geführt hätten. Eine weitere, kleinere Präsenz des IS existiere in der Provinz Nuristan:

„In addition to the armed conflict between the Afghan security forces and the Taliban, fighting continued with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant — Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP). Since my previous report, Afghan security forces, supported by international military assets, have conducted regular air and ground operations against ISIL-KP in both Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces. These operations have confined the group’s presence in both provinces. An additional, smaller presence of ISIL-KP exists in Nuristan Province.” (UN General Assembly, 13. Dezember 2016)

Voice of America (VOA), der offizielle staatliche Auslandssender der USA, schrieb indes im September 2016 unter Berufung auf Behörden und Augenzeugen, dass Kämpfer, die mit dem IS in Verbindung stehen würden, den Großteil der früheren Hochburgen der Gruppe zurückerobert hätten, nachdem sie sich zuvor angesichts groß angelegter staatlicher Sicherheitsoperationen in Verstecke in den Bergen zurückgezogen hätten. Die nun betroffenen Gebiete befänden sich in den Distrikten Achin, Naziyan, Kot und Haska Meena (allesamt in der Provinz Nangarhar):

„Officials and witnesses in Afghanistan say fighters linked to Islamic State have regained control of most of the militant group's former strongholds in the country, weeks after retreating to remote mountain hideouts in the face of major Afghan security operations. The troubled areas are located in Achin, Naziyan, Kot and Haska Meena districts of the eastern Nangarhar province, which borders Pakistan.” (VOA, 26. September 2016)

Die Die Unterstützungsmission der Vereinten Nationen in Afghanistan (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA) schreibt in ihrem Halbjahresbericht vom Juli 2016 (Berichtszeitraum: Jänner bis Juni 2016), dass Gruppen, die nach eigenen Angaben dem IS gegenüber loyal seien, in der Provinz Nangarhar weiterhin für zivile Opfer verantwortlich seien. Weiters seien solche Gruppen auch in den Provinzen Kunar, Logar und Wardak aktiv:

„Consistent with trends documented by UNAMA in 2015, groups claiming allegiance to the organization self-identified as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - known in Afghanistan by the Arabic acronym Daesh continued to cause civilian casualties, in Nangarhar province, although groups claiming allegiance to ISIL/Daesh are reportedly operational in Kunar, Logar, and Wardak provinces.” (UNAMA, 25. Juli 2016, S. 71)

In einem im Oktober 2016 veröffentlichten Bericht zur Sicherheitslage in der Provinz Nangarhar schreibt Landinfo, dass sich die Kerngebiete des IS in Nangarhar in den südöstlichen Distrikten der Provinz befänden. Die höchste Zahl an Sicherheitsvorfällen mit Beteiligung des IS bzw. dessen Sympathisanten habe es laut einer internationalen Quelle in den Distrikten Achin, Kot und Deh Balah gegeben (Stand: August 2016):

Etter at Daesh for første gang fikk fotfeste i Afghanistan rundt årsskiftet 2014/2015, har Nangarhar-provinsen, men få unntak, vært både oppholdssted og operasjonsområde for bevegelsen. Kjerneområdene har vært de sørøstlige distriktene, med hovedsete i Achin-distriktet.” (Landinfo, 13. Oktober 2016, S. 12)

„Ifølge en internasjonal kilde (e-post 2016) har antallet sikkerhetshendelser der Daesh eller antatte Daesh-sympatisører har deltatt, vært høyest i distriktene Achin, Kot og Deh Balah. Registreringen gjelder til og med august 2016.“ (Landinfo, 13. Oktober 2016, S. 14)

Borhan Osman vom Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) schreibt im September 2016, dass sich die Gebietskontrolle durch den IS in Nangarhar nunmehr im Wesentlichen auf vier heftig umkämpfte Distrikte beschränke:

ISKP in Nangarhar emerged publicly in May 2015, but had its first clash with the Taleban in December 2014. Within a month of its public emergence, it had captured most of the territory of eight districts, becoming the dominant insurgent group there. After being fought back by the Taleban and pounded by US air strikes, ISKP’s territory had shrunk mainly to four districts. These four districts remain heavily contested. Unlike in other provinces where ISKP was eliminated quickly, ISKP managed to hold onto territory and has proved reasonably resilient in Nangarhar for the last one and a half years. […]

In Helmand, Farah, Logar and Zabul provinces, emerging pro-IS groups were defeated relatively easily by the Taleban. In Nangarhar, the two sides remain stuck in fighting without a decisive victory for either.” (Osman, 27. September 2016)

Wie Osman im Juli 2016 ausführt, seien die Elemente, die den Kern von ISKP bilden sollten, bereits seit langer Zeit im Konflikt in Afghanistan präsent gewesen. Den ersten Fall einer IS-Präsenz, der öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit erhalten habe, sei im Jänner 2015 aus der Provinz Helmand berichtet worden. Doch die eigentliche „Vorhut“ des IS sei in Nangarhar entstanden. Bei diesen „Pionieren“ handle es sich um pakistanische Kämpfer, die bereits seit langem in den südöstlichen Distrikten von Nangarhar angesiedelt gewesen seien, die an die pakistanischen Stammesgebiete angrenzen würden. Bereits im Dezember 2014 hätten bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen zwischen diesen „Gast-Kämpfern“ und den afghanischen Taliban begonnen. Im Mai habe der IS die Taliban bei Kämpfen in den Distrikten Nazian, Kot und im Mamand-Tal zum Rückzug gezwungen. Im Zuge weiterer Kämpfe mit den Taliban habe der IS den Großteil des Territoriums der Distrikte Bati Kot, Chaparhar, Deh Bala, Khogyani und Sherzad erobert bzw. dort den Taliban die Herrschaft strittig gemacht. Schließlich habe der IS im Juni 2015, seinem bisherigen Höhepunkt, die Kontrolle über acht Distrikte gehabt. Bei Gegenoffensiven der Taliban habe der IS dann die meisten Gebiete in den südwestlichen Distrikten (etwa in Pachir wa Agam, Khogyani and Deh Bala und Chaparhar) wieder verloren. Beim ihren Versuchen, die südöstlichen Distrikte wiederzuerobern, seien die Taliban jedoch zunächst weniger erfolgreich gewesen. Nach einer Fatwa der Taliban-freundlichen afghanischen Ulama, die zum Dschihad gegen den IS aufgerufen habe, hätten die Taliban im Jänner 2016 jedoch eine großangelegte Operation durchgeführt, in deren Zuge der IS aus den Distrikten Bati Kot und Chaparhar vertrieben worden sei und die Kontrolle des IS auf die Distrikte Achin, Deh Bala, Kot und Nazian beschränkt worden sei:

As of July 2016, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) group has established a secure footing in four districts of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. Elsewhere in the country, it has failed […]. […]

The elements of what would become IS Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) main contingent had, however, long existed on the Afghan battlefield. Although the first case of an ISKP presence that grabbed public attention took place in Helmand that January […], the actual IS vanguards emerged from Nangarhar province. The IS fighters who pioneered the Khorasan franchise of the IS were Pakistani militants who had long been settled in the southeastern districts of Nangarhar, in the Spin Ghar mountains or its foothills, bordering the tribal agencies on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. […]

Tensions between the ‘guest’ militants and the Afghan Taleban started in December 2014. […]

The first clashes took place in Nazian district, triggered by an ambush by the guests-turned-ISKP fighters against the Afghan Taleban, killing two of their district chiefs. This incident was followed by Taleban attacks on ISKP in Kot and later in the Mamand valley. By mid-May 2015, the Afghan Taleban, being a minority in all three districts, quickly withdrew. ISKP forces went after the Taleban in Bati Kot, Chaparhar, Deh Bala, Khogyani, Sherzad, Pachir wa Agam, Rodat and Ghanikhel districts, capturing or heavily contesting most of their territory in the first five districts. By the end of June, ISKP was in a comfortable position in eight districts – and this represented the peak of the group’s territorial control. […]

The local Taleban fighters were joined by some of the movement’s new elite forces under brutal commanders from Loya Paktia and Loy Kandahar. Within two weeks, ISKP had lost most of its territory to the Taleban in the southwestern districts, such as Pachir wa Agam, Khogyani and Deh Bala as well as in Chaparhar, on the outskirts of Jalalabad. The Taleban also seized a huge ISKP cache of weapons in Deh Bala. The movement’s campaign in the southeastern districts, such as Achin, Kot, Bati Kot and Nazian, however, was less successful. […]

In the intense turf war, districts such as Pachir wa Agam, Chaparhar, Bati Kot and Deh Bala, changed hands three to four times. […]

The fight over Chaparhar reminded the Taleban of ISKP’s resilience and effective fighting ability and prompted it to take its rival more seriously. On 4 January 2016, after receiving a fatwa from the pro-Taleban Afghan ulama in favour of an offensive ‘jihad’ against ISKP, the Taleban mounted a large-scale operation, which involved units of the Taleban ‘elite forces’ dispatched from ten provinces plus Nangarhar, totalling over 3000 fighters. Within three days, they had routed the ISKP from Chaparhar and Bati Kot, restricting the group’s control to Achin, Deh Bala, Kot and the tiny district of Nazian.” (Osman, 27. Juli 2016)

Weiters berichtet Osman, dass es IS-Gruppen in den Provinzen Helmand, Farah, Logar und Zabul gegeben habe, die jedoch alle von den Taliban im Verlauf des Jahres 2015 vernichtet worden seien. Indes gebe es zum Berichtszeitpunkt (Juli 2016) in der Provinz Kunar mindestens zwei ehemalige Taliban-Gruppierungen, die zum IS übergelaufen seien. Diese Gruppen hätten in der Provinz eine Art „Basis“, würden aber keine Gebiete kontrollieren. Verschiedene Quellen hätten von „Trainingslagern“ in Kunar gesprochen, jedoch habe es bisher in der Provinz keine Berichte über militärische Aktivitäten des IS gegeben:

The first verifiable news of an IS emergence in Afghanistan came from Helmand in January 2015, right in the centre of the Taleban’s heartland. The group suffered a first setback when their leader Abdul Rauf Khadem, once the second-most important Taleban commander from that province, was killed in a drone attack on 9 February 2015, less than a month after he announced his affiliation with the IS. It entered a pre-emptive ceasefire with the Taleban and ceased to grow. Fighting erupted again in late September 2015 between the two sides in northern Helmand, in Kajaki district, where the IS cell was based, and the 60-strong group was almost routed in two days of fighting. One sub-commander managed to escape to remote mountains further north in Baghran district. Since then, only one incident involving this IS cell has been recorded […].

After Helmand, a group of self-proclaimed IS fighters emerged in Farah under the leadership of two disgruntled mid-level Taleban commanders. The Farah group, with over 60 people, was widely reported to be well-equipped and well-funded (while, as in other instances, the source of this funding remains an area of speculation). When the group was trying to expand its presence from Khak-e Safid district to other areas in late May 2015, the Taleban led an offensive against it, putting an end to the Farah cell as well. […]

The third failed attempt outside Nangarhar was the closest to Kabul, in Logar province, with a mobile base in Khoshi and Azra districts. It was led by yet another disgruntled Taleban commander, Abdul Hadi aka Saad Emarati, who was officially ousted by the Taleban in 2013 but continued armed activities into 2014 in the Pakistani tribal agencies, as well as amid the Pakistani militants in Nangarhar. His men were reportedly involved in a few cases of sectarian targeting of the local Shia population in Khoshi between April and June 2015. This cell was eliminated in July 2015 by the Taleban, who laid siege to it. In the last moment before the Taleban attacked, Emarati slipped through the siege and fled to Nangarhar. […]

The fourth attempt took place in Zabul, and saw a bloodier end than the previous three attempts. The Zabul ISKP cell was made up of approximately 200 Central Asian (and perhaps North Caucasian) militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) who had been driven out of their decade-long shelter in North Waziristan by Pakistani army operations in the summer of 2014. From spring 2015, they rebelled against their Afghan Taleban patrons who had helped them to settle among the Zabul population, and rebranded themselves as IS. In the summer of 2015, some of these militants left Zabul to join ISKP in Nangarhar, increasing the number of Central Asians there to more than 100; others left to northern Afghanistan and continued living with the Taleban. The remaining militants, including their leader Usman Ghazi, pledged allegiance to IS. In November 2015, the Taleban brutally crushed this group in clashes that lasted for a week […].

ISKP has yet to see whether it can make a comeback in at least one additional province. At least two groups based in Kunar, one that belonged to a district governor of the Afghan Taleban and the other to the Pakistani Taleban originally from Bajaur, have defected to the IS. Most members of these two groups have been fighting in Nangarhar, but their influence back in Kunar seems to have allowed ISKP to establish some sort of a base, albeit not yet an area of expanding influence or control, in that province. Various sources have talked about ISKP training ‘camps’ in Kunar, but there have been no reports of any military activity in that province.” (Osman, 27. Juli 2016)

In einem Artikel vom November 2016 berichtet Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), dass sich der IS vor Kurzem von Nangarhar aus in die Provinzen Kunar und Zabul ausgebreitet habe:

IS militants have been active in Nangarhar, where they have seized pockets of territory in the past two years. The group has recently spread to the neighboring provinces of Kunar and Zabul, located along the porous border with Pakistan.” (RFE/RL, 20. November 2016)

Obaid Ali, Forscher beim AAN, schreibt in einem Artikel vom Juli 2016, dass sich in Nordostafghanistan die Gruppe Jundallah dem IS angeschlossen habe und über kurze Zeit IS-Fahnen in einigen wenigen Gebieten zweier Distrikte gehisst worden seien. Die IS-Kämpfer seien jedoch auf starken Widerstand der Taliban gestoßen, und auch lokale usbekische Stammesführer hätten ihnen die Unterstützung verweigert. So seien die IS-Kämpfer von Distrikt zu Distrikt gejagt worden und hätten sich schließlich nach Nangarhar zurückgezogen, und es sei ihnen nicht gelungen in Nordostafghanistan zu expandieren. Allerdings gebe es im Nordosten nach wie vor IS-Sympathisanten, die jedoch im Untergrund tätig seien. Es sei indes schwierig, die genaue Zahl der IS-Anhänger im Nordosten zu eruieren:

Looking at these events, the threat of Daesh in the northeast – through Jundullah affiliating itself to IS – is neither widespread, nor immediate. The ‘flag raisings’ were limited to a few areas of two districts and did not last long. The pro-Daesh fighters were chased from district to district, not unlike what happened in Farah in early 2015 […], and finally had to retreat to Daesh’s only remaining stronghold in the country, in Nangarhar. The Daesh sympathisers in the north eastern region were unable to expand not only because of strong local Taleban resistance – they did not want to tolerate the slightest insurgent action independent of them, but also the intervention of local Uzbek elders once they saw their relationship with the (stronger) Taleban strained due to the pro-Daesh activities in their midst. As a result, local Uzbek communities do not seem willing to host local Daesh groups.

There are still some Daesh sympathisers and supporters for in the northeast. They appear to be from among the religiously educated, radicalised youth and to be working underground. Currently, they seem to be limiting their activities mostly to translating Daesh statements and video messages into Dari (the common language, locally, so also attracts non-Uzbek speakers) and circulating them on social media. In May 2016, for example they released a video of the alleged killings of supporters of Haji Zaher’s militia in Nangarhar by local Daesh fighters. Some local sources told AAN that a small number of radical young people from Baghlan and Kunduz provinces – mainly from Uzbeks and Tajiks – were fighting for Daesh in Nangarhar, but that there is no visible Daesh front in the northeast anymore.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of Daesh supporters in the northeast region or of north eastern fighters from the old Jundullah group in Nangarhar. In social media, however, there have been reports of casualties among them. In March 2016, a list with the names of nine men from Qala-ye Zal district of Kunduz alone who had been killed in Nangarhar were published on a Facebook account (the face book page named them as Mujahedin-e Qala-ye Zal, seen by AAN, but later deleted).

Far from the flag raising signalling a success for Daesh, the switch of allegiance by a local group of Uzbek fighters in the Baghlan-Takhar-Kunduz triangle actually represented another failed attempt to establish the Islamic State in Afghanistan. It showed again that IS mainly attracts splinter groups of insurgent groups, and that attempts to establish it mainly represent a re-arrangement of existing forces rather than a new, additional phenomenon.” (Ali, 15. Juli 2016)

In einem Artikel vom September 2016 schreibt der Journalist Franz Marty, dass es Berichte über eine IS-Präsenz in den nördlichen Provinzen Kundus, Baghlan und Badakhshan gegeben habe. Marty resümiert jedoch, dass es keine harten Fakten gebe, die für eine Anwesenheit des IS in Badakhshan bzw. Nordafghanistan sprechen würden, auch wenn eine solche Präsenz nicht ausgeschlossen werden könne:

Initial reports of an actual ISIS presence in Afghanistan emerged in late 2014 and early 2015 and Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, an official spokesman of ISIS, announced on January 26, 2015 the establishment of the province of Khorasan, an ancient name referring to a region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan and other nearby areas, including parts of Central Asia. Afterwards, several accounts claimed that, during late 2015 and 2016, ISIS has expanded its presence that has so far been limited to eastern Afghanistan to the north of the country with the goal to infiltrate Central Asia from there.

Such reports came, for example, from the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan and, more recently, also from the northeastern province of Badakhshan, which shares a long border with Tajikistan. However, on July 25, 2016, U.S. Army Brigadier General Charles Cleveland, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications of the international coalition in Afghanistan, stated that Daesh, the Arabic acronym for ISIS, is still believed to be primarily present in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Nangarhar with ‘some’ presence in the neighboring province of Kunar and ‘a couple of other smaller locations,’ but that there is no spread to the northeast and that Daesh is under pressure from Afghan security forces, U.S. airstrikes and even the Taliban who reject and fight the so-called Islamic State.

During this author’s visit to the remote district of Raghistan in Badakhshan in early August, locals nevertheless contradicted this assessment. […]

In the end, and although it cannot be ruled out completely that ISIS sympathizers are located in Raghistan, there is no compelling evidence of an ISIS presence there and the self-styled Caliphate remains a mere phantom menace. The same applies to Badakhshan as a whole and to northern Afghanistan, where many stories circulate, but lack hard facts. Perhaps the clearest sign of this is that even locals question the claims about ISIS.” (Marty, 8. September 2016)

Hochrangige Anführer

Die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters berichtet, dass der ISKP-Anführer Hafiz Saeed Khan im Juli 2016 durch einen Drohnenangriff im Distrikt Kot der Provinz Nangarhar getötet worden sei:

The leader of Islamic State's branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan was killed in a U.S. drone strike on July 26, a Pentagon spokesman said on Friday after the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan announced the news to Reuters. The death of Hafiz Saeed Khan is a blow to efforts by Islamic State - also known as ISIS or Daesh - to expand from its heartlands in Syria and Iraq into Afghanistan and Pakistan, already crowded with jihadist movements including the Taliban and al Qaeda. […]

On Friday, however, Afghan Ambassador Omar Zakhilwal told Reuters he had seen confirmation from Afghan security forces. ‘I can confirm that ISIS Khurasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan) leader Hafiz Saeed Khan along with his senior commanders and fighters died in a U.S. drone strike on July 26 in Kot district of Afghanistan's Nangharhar province,’ he said. Pentagon spokesman Gordon Trowbridge confirmed Khan's death, and said in a statement that the air strike took place during joint operations by U.S. and Afghan special operations forces against IS in the southern part of Nangarhar province. Trowbridge said the airstrike was in Achin district, as opposed to Kot district.” (Reuters, 13. August 2016)

Weiters berichten Medien über die Tötung von Mullah Bozorg, dem Anführer des IS in Afghanistan, durch eine Drohne im Distrikt Kot im November 2016 (RFE/RL, 20. November 2016), des ISKP-Gründungsmitglieds Saad Emarati im Juli 2016 durch eine Militäroperation in Nangarhar (BBC News, 26. Juli 2016) sowie des hochrangigen IS-Kommandanten Mohammad Nasir im Dezember 2016 in der nordafghanischen Provinz Jawzjan (Khaama, 4. Dezember 2016). Weiters zitiert Reuters im November 2016 einen führenden IS-Kommandanten namens Abu Omar Khorasani (Reuters, 14. November 2016), und ein Kommandant namens Obidullah findet in einem Artikel der Afghanistan Times vom Dezember 2016 Erwähnung (Afghanistan Times, 16. Dezember 2016).

Kennzeichen des IS bzw. seiner Untergruppierungen

Ein im Juli 2016 veröffentlichter Artikel des AAN-Forschers Obaid Ali enthält ein Foto von IS-Kämpfern in Nordostafghanistan, welche die IS-Flagge in der Hand halten:

[Bild entfernt] (Ali, 15. Juli 2016)

 

Es konnten zu dieser Teilfrage keine weiteren Informationen gefunden werden.

Vorgehen des Staates und anderer Organisationen gegen (ehemalige) Mitglieder dieser Gruppierungen

Medien berichten unter anderem über die Verhaftung von zehn IS-Anhängern in Kabul durch den afghanischen Inlandsgeheimdienst National Directorate of Security (NDS) im Dezember 2016 (Afghanistan Times, 16. Dezember 2016), die Verhaftung eines IS-Schattengouverneurs in Jawzjan im August 2016 (KP, 17. August 2016), von sieben IS-Anhängern in Nangarhar (KP, 27. Jänner 2016) und drei mutmaßlichen IS-Anhängern, darunter einer Frau, in Nangarhar im Jänner 2016 (Tolo News, 5. Jänner 2016).

 

Es konnten zu dieser Teilfrage keine weiteren Informationen gefunden werden.

Auseinandersetzungen mit den Sicherheitskräften

Der UNO-Generalsekretär schreibt in seinem Bericht an die UNO-Generalversammlung vom Dezember 2016:

„Since my previous report, Afghan security forces, supported by international military assets, have conducted regular air and ground operations against ISIL-KP in both Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces.” (UN General Assembly, 13. Dezember 2016)

Das niederländische Außenministerium (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, BZ) berichtet in seinem Herkunftsländerbericht vom November 2016:

„Nangarhar is door de ligging op de grens met Pakistan een strategische provincie voor zowel de Taliban als de Afghaanse troepen, met als gevolg veel gewapende confrontaties, aanslagen door de Taliban op de ANDSF en gewone burgers. Ook de hoofdstad Jalalabad is geregeld het toneel van aanslagen. Sinds eind 2014 is de veiligheidssituatie verder verslechterd door de opkomst van IS. Dit heeft geleid tot gewapende confrontaties tussen IS en de Taliban en de ANDSF, alsook de inzet van Amerikaanse drones. IS controleert het gebied ten zuiden van Jalalabad in de Nangarhar provincie, specifiek in dorpen in de districten Achin, Deh Bala, Bati Kot, Shinwar, Kot, en Chaparhar.“ (BZ, 15. November 2016, S. 47)

„Er is al een aantal jaar een verslechtering te zien van de veiligheidssituatie in Ghor. […] Eind oktober 2016 ontvoerde een aan IS-gelieerde groep minstens dertig mensen, onder wie een aantal kinderen, toen zij in de bergen hout aan het verzamelen waren. Bij een bevrijdingsactie door de politie werd een commandant van IS gedood. Als vergelding doodde IS in elk geval van de ontvoerden.“ (BZ, 15. November 2016, S. 49)

Borhan Osman vom AAN schreibt in seinem Artikel vom Juli 2016:

While the fight over territory pitted ISKP against the Taleban, who had traditionally claimed control in the countryside (the government had long ceased to hold much sway beyond the district centres in the south of Nangarhar), skirmishes also took place between ISKP and the ANSF. However, two months elapsed after the ISKP had established dominance over large swaths of territory before the two sides started to engage in fighting on a regular basis. An exception to this virtual ceasefire was an attack by the police at a Kot checkpoint in early June 2015, which was reportedly unprompted by ISKP. The group lost two of its fighters in the clash, one of them reportedly executed by the police after being wounded. Later, when the two sides started to engage each other, ISKP was able to overrun the ANSF, but also Afghan Local Police and so-called uprising militias’ checkpoints in about 12 cases, killing at least four dozen members of pro-government forces, including a district police chief for Deh Bala in June 2016.

In all these cases, however, ISKP occupation of ANSF positions has been short-lived, serving only as immediate morale boosts. In the largest of ISKP´s efforts aimed at ANSF, the overrunning of about a half dozen posts in Kot in late June 2016, the group suffered a devastatingly high number of casualties resulting from US air strikes and face-to-face fighting. ISKP seems to have lost more than 50 of its fighters (although government sources claim five times that number).

More recently, Afghan government forces seem to have been engaged in their fiercest fighting against ISKP so far, again supported by US forces in Kot district and parts of Achin. This followed President Ghani ordering a decisive operation against the group to eliminate its threat and a visit of the defence minister to Nangarhar province in mid-July. The ANSF operations have, for the first time, overtaken ISKP’s fighting focus from the Taleban to the Afghan government.

The ANSF had been engaged in offensive operations against ISKP several times in Achin, Kot, Nazian and Bati Kot prior to these current operations. In the first two districts, previous operations have, a number of times, led to territory being retaken from ISKP. However, in other cases, the offensives have made no lasting gains, as some retaken territory was again recaptured by ISKP. The government has increasingly relied on so-called popular forces, ie militias raised by local power-brokers and run by the NDS. These forces have proved to be effective, at least in stopping ISKP from further advances. Lately, these local militias have become the prime targets of ISKP’s major attacks.” (Osman, 27. Juli 2016)

 

image002.gif 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 20. Jänner 2017)

·      Afghanistan Times: Ten Daesh fighters arrested in Kabul: NDS, 16. Dezember 2016
http://afghanistantimes.af/ten-daesh-fighters-arrested-in-kabul-nds/

·      Ali, Obaid: The 2016 Insurgency in the North: Raising the Daesh flag (although not for long), 15. Juli 2016 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/327287/467887_de.html

·      BBC News: Key IS leader Saad Emarati 'killed in Afghanistan', 26. Juli 2016
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36892100

·      BZ - Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Algemeen Ambtsbericht Afghanistan, 15. November 2016
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/ambtsberichten/2016/11/15/algemeen-ambtsbericht-afghanistan/algemeen ambtsbericht Afghanistan november 2016.pdf

·      KP - Khaama Press: Seven Daesh terrorists arrested in Nangarhar, 27. Jänner 2016
http://www.khaama.com/seven-daesh-terrorists-arrested-in-nangarhar-4522

·      KP - Khaama Press: ISIS shadow governor arrested in North of Afghanistan, 17. August 2016
http://www.khaama.com/isis-shadow-governor-arrested-in-north-of-afghanistan-01710

·      KP - Khaama Press: Prominent ISIS leader killed in North of Afghanistan, 4. Dezember 2016
http://www.khaama.com/prominent-isis-leader-killed-in-north-of-afghanistan-02421

·      Landinfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre: Afghanistan: Sikkerhetssituasjonen i provinsen Nangarhar, 13. Oktober 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1481627126_2.pdf

·      Marty, Franz: The phantom menace of ISIS in Northern Afghanistan, 8. September 2016 (veröffentlicht im Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst)
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13391-the-phantom-menace-of-isis-in-northern-afghanistan.html

·      Osman, Borhan: The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar, 27. Juli 2016
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/

·      Osman, Borhan: Descent into chaos: Why did Nangarhar turn into an IS hub?, 27. September 2016 (veröffentlicht von AAN, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/330274/471388_de.html

·      Reuters: U.S. drone kills Islamic State leader for Afghanistan, Pakistan: officials, 13. August 2016
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamicstate-idUSKCN10N21L

·      Reuters: Jihadists say Trump victory a rallying call for new recruits, 14. November 2016
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-jihadists-idUSKBN1390FO?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social

·      RFE/RL - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Top IS Commander Killed In Drone Strike In Afghanistan, 20. November 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/332173/473494_de.html

·      Tolo News: Suspected Female Daesh Fighter Arrested In Nangarhar, 5. Jänner 2016
http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/suspected-female-daesh-fighter-arrested-nangarhar

·      UNAMA - UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Afghanistan Midyear Report 2016; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 25. Juli 2016 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1470819956_protectionciviliansarmedconflict2016.pdf

·      UN General Assembly: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security [A/71/682–S/2016/1049], 13. Dezember 2016
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1482399597_n1641392.pdf

·      VOA – Voice of America: IS Retakes Control of Former Strongholds in Afghanistan, 26. September 2016
http://www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-retakes-control-of-former-strongholds-in-afghanistan/3525211.html