a-5271 (ACC-RUS-5271)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Prague Watchdog schreibt in einer Analyse der tschetschenischen Gesellschaft vom Mai 2003, dass die Tradition der Blutrache im Kaukasus, und besonders in Tschetschenien und Inguschetien, auf die eine oder andere Art immer noch bestehe:
“Although the blood feud tradition gradually disappeared among most ethnic groups of the Caucasus due to social developments of the past decades, in the mountainous areas of Dagestan, many northern areas of Georgia and Azerbaijan, a number of republics of the northern Caucasus, and essentially throughout Chechnya and Ingushetia it still persists in one way or another.” (Prague Watchdog, 25. Mai 2003)
Das Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) berichtete im Juni 2006 über eine Serie von Anschlägen auf Beamte und Polizisten in Inguschetien, der innerhalb weniger Wochen mindestens 16 Personen zum Opfer gefallen seien, unter anderem der stellvertretende Innenminister Inguschetiens, Dschabrail Kostojew (engl. Schreibweisen: Jabrail oder Dzhabrail Kostoyev). Bei einem Teil dieser Anschläge, besonders bei dem auf Kostojew, werde angenommen, dass sie auf Blutrache zurückzuführen seien. Den russischen Sicherheitsdiensten würde vorgeworfen, für das Verschwinden von Personen verantwortlich zu sein, und daher würde angenommen, dass Familien, deren Angehörige verschwunden seien, Rache üben würden, indem sie Russen töten würden. Kostojew sei für eine besonders brutale Einheit verantwortlich gewesen, daher werde angenommen, dass dies ein Grund für seine Ermordung gewesen sei. Kostojews harte Haltung wiederum sei eine Folge der Tötung von mehreren seiner nahen Verwandten. So sei auch Abubakar Kostojew, der inguschetische Polizeichef, bei einem Angriff von tschetschenischen Rebellen vor zwei Jahren getötet worden:
“The authorities have blamed the upsurge in attacks against officials, police and members of the Russian community on Chechen separatists apparently intent on expanding their activities in Ingushetia, but analysts and ordinary people here are not so sure.
In fact the situation is so grim that many fear their republic is edging towards the kind of lawlessness and bloodletting that gripped its neighbour for years. “What's taking place in Ingushetia reminds me of the situation in Chechnya in the mid-Nineties,” said Nazran resident Bagaudin Mogushkov, 42. “I’m afraid that something like that may happen here too.”
In the most serious incident to date on June 9, unidentified assassins shot dead senior police official Musa Nalgiev in his car. His three children and two bodyguards, who were traveling with him, were also killed. Minutes later, assailants attacked a senior figure in the Sunzhensky District administration, Galina Gubina. She later died of her injuries.
In the last three weeks alone, acting deputy head of the Ingush interior ministry Jabrail Kostoyev was killed along with his two bodyguards and four passers-by; Healthcare Minister Magomet Aliskhanov narrowly escaped death when his car was raked by gunfire; and two members of the Federal Security Services, FSB, were shot dead.
And finally, “blood revenge” is believed to account for a number of the killings, in particular that of Kostoeyev. Ingush blame Russian security services for the disappearances that have plagued the republic in recent years. It’s thought that families whose menfolk have gone missing avenge them by killing Russians. Kostoyev was known to have been in charge of a squad that was especially harsh in its treatment of detainees and may have been murdered for this reason.
Kostoyev’s tough handling of detainees reportedly followed the killing of several his close relatives, including the republic’s police chief Abubakar Kostoyev, who died in a Chechen rebel attack on Ingushetia two years ago.” (IWPR, 15. Juni 2006)
Die Jamestown Foundation berichtete schon im Mai 2006 über diese Gewaltwelle in Inguschetien und erwähnt unter Berufung auf Newsru.com einen Artikel, der bereits im November 2005 auf der Website ingushetiya.ru erschienen sei. Dieser Artikel sei zwei Tage nach der Ermordung von Subeir Kostojew (engl. Schreibweise: Zubeir), einem Bruder von Dschabrail Kostojew, veröffentlicht worden, und lege nahe, dass es sich bei diesem Mord um Rache von inguschischen Kämpfern handle, die einen Krieg gegen Dschabail Kostojew und seine Brüder erklärt hätten. Dies sei die Rache für außergerichtliche Tötungen, Inhaftierungen, Folter und andere harte Maßnahmen gegen junge Männer, die den Islam streng befolgen würden. Die inguschischen Militanten hätten geschworen, Dschabail Kostojew und seine Brüder, die alle bei den Sicherheitskräften arbeiteten, zu „zerstören“:
„Newsru.com on May 17 linked to an item posted on the Ingushetiya.ru website back on November 4, 2005, two days after the murder of Zubeir Kostoev, Dhabrail Kostoev’s younger brother, providing a different – although not necessarily contradictory – explanation for the assassination of both men and the attempts on the lives of other members of the Kostoev clan.
“Inside the Kostoevs’ inner circle they speak of revenge by the underground of Ingush militants who declared war on Dzhabrail Kostoev and his brothers (who all work in the law enforcement organs) for extra-judicial executions, detentions, torture and other rough actions toward young lads [who] strictly observe the norms of Islam and, due to this, are declared ‘Wahabbis,’” Ingushetiya.ru wrote last November. “The group of Ingush militants supposedly vowed to destroy Dzhabrail Kostoev and all of his brothers for this.” (Jamestown Foundation, 18. Mai 2006)
Im August 2006 veröffentlichte auch ingushetiya.ru einen Artikel, der sich mit der andauernden Gewaltwelle gegen inguschetische Sicherheitskräfte befasst und diese in den Zusammenhang einer Blutfehde zwischen Angehörigen von Untergrundgruppierungen und Sicherheitskräften stellt. Am 21./22. Juni 2004 seien bei einem Überfall 80 Personen, darunter Polizeibeamte und Staatsanwälte, von Militanten getötet worden. Dieser Überfall sei angeblich aus Rache gegen Angehörige des Innenministeriums ausgeführt worden, weil diese erbarmungslos gegen die illegalen Gruppen vorgegangen seien. Daraufhin hätte sowohl die Polizei als auch die Verwandten der getöteten Personen begonnen, nach den Kämpfern zu suchen, um Rache zu üben.
In Tschetschenien seien Blutfehden im Gange, die Jahrzehnte andauern könnten, Inguschetien sei erst an der Schwelle zu diesem Zustand. Neben anderen Maßnahmen fordert ingushetiya.ru, dass die Clanältesten und die Geistlichkeit Inguschetiens sich bemühen müssten, diejenigen zu versöhnen, die in Blutfehden verwickelt seien. Dazu müsse festgestellt werden, in welcher Form diese Fehden ausgetragen werden, wer dahinter steht, und von dem sie ausgeführt werden:
„Two people - one a present and one a former member of the police - were killed in the village of Alkhasty in Ingushetia's Sunzhenskiy District on the night of 19-20 August. This is not the first crime committed against the Ingush security forces. The murders of Deputy Interior Minister Dzhabrail Kostoyev, OMON [special-purpose police detachment] commander Musa Nalgiyev, with three young children, the burning of the homes of police officers in the village of Yandar, an assassination attempt on the chief of the department of internal affairs of the town of Karabulak [Akhmet Murzabekov], and yesterday's attack on [Timur] Khamkhoyev [staff member of regional operational headquarters] in the village of Nesterovskaya all remind one of some kind of organized destruction, with no sign of an end to it.
What is happening? Could any of us even ten years ago have imagined in their wildest dreams that Ingushetia would find itself in this situation? In analysing the current situation, I will try to draw a picture of the events in Ingushetia over the past few years.
On the night of 21-22 June 2004, the republic came under attack from militants, which led to 80 people being killed. The militants killed police officers and prosecutors. What happened, not without the help of the media, was portrayed as retribution by militants against members of the Ingush Interior Ministry who had unleashed a merciless struggle against illegal armed formations.
The relatives of the police officers killed on that terrible night wasted no time. They vigorously searched for the attackers from among the Ingush and many of them were killed or are either under investigation, at large or have been given long prison terms. Thus, the law-enforcement bodies, as well as the relatives of the dead policemen, are searching for the attackers. The members of illegal armed formations who are still at large are also not waiting for the security officers to come after them or for a bullet from someone settling a blood feud, but are waging a real struggle with the republic's law-enforcement bodies. No-one knows how many years this struggle will go on for. The relatives of the dead and the detained from both sides are virtually taking part in a bloody feud of retribution against one another. There may be some other unknown quantity here, but either we will never know or we will only know in many decades to come.
Foreign agencies linked to blood feuds?
This slaughter must be stopped. But to achieve this those engaged in this feud must be brought together, and state-run establishments and the public must take action.
Third, it cannot be ruled out that all these bloody showdowns in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan are taking place with the participation of international terrorist organizations or foreign special services, who are well aware of the mentality of the Caucasus peoples. There must be a reason for the blood feuds which turn into murder. For example, the future of the mutual bloody animosity of many clans, who have been skilfully set one against the other following the numerous murders and reprisals carried out by militants and pro-Kadyrov [pro-Moscow Chechen prime minister] formations against one another, has been prepared in Chechnya for decades ahead. Ingushetia is currently only on the threshold of such a situation.
Fourth, the people in the republic, including elders and the clergy, must try to reconcile those who after the night of 21-22 June 2004 entered a blood feud and must try to improve the moral and psychological climate in Ingush society. The public can carry out this work more successfully than state-run establishments and the media. The main thing now is to determine, that is to know what form these bloody feuds are taking, who are behind them and who are carrying them out, etc. As pointed out earlier, the efforts of state bodies and the public are needed to achieve this. Then we will cease losing our brothers and sisters, and peace will reign.“ (ingushetiya.ru, 25. August 2006)
Bereits im Juli 2004 hatte die Website Human Rights Violations in Chechnya (HRVC) berichtet, dass nach dem Überfall vom 21./22. Juni 2004 die Verwandten von mehreren getöteten Inguschen erklärt hätten, dass der tschetschenische Feldkommandant Dokka Umarov für mehrere der Tötungen verantwortlich sei. Daraufhin hätten einige inguschische Clans eine Blutfehde gegen Umarow ausgerufen, und begonnnen, ihn zu suchen, „bevor er in die Hände der Justiz falle“:
“In the course of their own investigation conducted by the relatives of killed Ingushes on the 21st-22nd of June, it has been established that particular atrocities toward innocent civilians had been committed by the fighters of Chechen field commander Dokka Umarov.
Several Ingush teyps have declared a blood vengeance on Dokka Umarov and began their searches in order to liquidate him before he will fall into the hands of justice.” (HRVC, 2. Juli 2004)
Das Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) berichtete im September 2006 von einer Schießerei zwischen tschetschenischen und inguschetischen Sicherheitskräften, bei der acht Personen getötet und mehrere verwundet worden seien. Sowohl die tschetschenische als auch die inguschetische Führung hätten den Vorfall als „tragischen Fehler“ bezeichnet, die Polizeioffiziere beider Seiten würden aber die Schuld der jeweils anderen Seite zuschieben und von Rache sprechen. IWPR zitiert einen Tschetschenen, dass das Gesetz der Blutrache in Tschetschenien und Inguschetien nicht abgeschafft sei, nicht einmal unter der Sowjetherrschaft sei dieses Problem gelöst worden. Die getöteten Polizisten hätten Verwandten, Kollegen und Freunde, daher sei „alles möglich“. Ein namentlich nicht genannter tschetschenischer Offizier der Sondereinsatztruppe OMON habe angekündigt, dass er und seine Leute die Täter „nach dem Gesetz unser Vorfahren“ bestrafen würde, wenn sie nicht vom Gesetz streng bestraft würden:
“An unprecedented crisis has erupted between the security forces of Chechnya and Ingushetia after a clash between policemen from the two republics ended in heavy casualties.
The September 13 battle near the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya left eight policemen dead and many more wounded.
The leaders of both Chechnya and Ingushetia said called the incident a “tragic mistake” and said they hoped it would not lead to a worsening of relations between the two republics, whose people are close ethnic kin.
But police officers on each side are blaming the other for the deaths of their colleagues, and are talking of revenge.
Ingush president Murat Zyazikov and Chechnya’s prime minister and de facto leader Ramzan Kadyrov called the shootout a “tragic accident” and called for calm. However the incident has set nerves jangling in both republics.
“No one has abolished the laws of blood revenge in Chechnya and Ingushetia,” said Said Suleimanov, a 55-year-old resident of Grozny. “Even the Soviet authorities could not solve this problem. The dead and wounded Chechen and Ingush policemen have relatives, comrades and friends. So anything is possible.”
The authorities in both republics have promised to assist the wounded and the families of the dead. Few believe this is the end of the matter.
“I want to believe that it won’t happen again,” said Markha Isayeva, whose Chechen policeman son was killed two years ago. “It is terrible when law enforcement officers, who are meant to protect people from bandits and criminals, shoot at one another. The guilty parties, whoever they are, must be punished.”
Others are thinking about revenge.
“Our comrades were treacherously murdered while doing their professional duty,” said a Chechen OMON officer who did not want to be named. “And it doesn’t matter where it happened: Chechnya, Dagestan or Ingushetia.
“We are still waiting for the results of the investigation. If all those guilty for these murders aren’t severely punished under the law, then we will punish them ourselves – but by the laws of our ancestors.”” (IWPR, 21. September 2006)
Auch Prague Watchdog berichtete im September 2006 von diesem Vorfall und zitiert dabei  einen Einwohner von Grosny, der befürchtet, dass dieser Vorfall nicht durch Ermittler und Richter geregelt werde, sondern durch die Blutrache:
“An investigative group of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office is at present undertaking an inquiry into the circumstances of the incident.
 "It’s possible that the investigation will explain all the circumstances of what took place, it’s possible that those guilty for what took place will be identified and punished, it’s even possible that someone will be put on trial. But I have a feeling that it’s going to be settled not by investigators and judges, but by custom – the old Caucasian custom of blood vengeance. In order to prevent this, both sides will have to be reconciled with each other, and elders of both republics who possess authority and respect will have to intervene. After all, the reconciliation of opposing parties is also an old and very good Caucasian tradition," says 57-year-old Grozny resident Usman Mezhidov.” (Prague Watchdog, 22. September 2006)
Weitere Hinweise auf Blutrache finden sich auch im Zusammenhang mit der Geiselnahme im nordossetischen Ort Beslan im Jahr 2004. In zahlreichen Artikeln wird über Pläne und Befürchtungen von Blutrache berichtet, die Ossteen an Inguschen üben könnten, da unter den Geiselnehmern viele Inguschen gewesen seien (siehe unter anderem Prague Watchdog, 4. November 2004; Guardian, 12. September 2004).
Staatlicher Schutz bei Blutrache
Das IWPR schreibt in dem oben erwähnten Artikel vom Juni 2006 zur Gewaltserie in Inguschetien, dass die Behörden nichts oder nur wenig gegen die Gewalt unternehmen würden, und dass die Bewohner desillusioniert seien:
“Amid all the speculation, the authorities are doing little or nothing to address the violence, merely issuing statements about who they think might be behind it. Locals have become disillusioned with officials’ ineptitude. They point out that even a simple practical measure such as a ban on the movement of cars without number plates could curb some of the killings, as assassins often masquerade as law enforcers by using unmarked vehicles.” (IWPR, 15. Juni 2006)
Unter Berufung auf Newsru.com und ingushetiya.ru schreibt auch die Jamestown Foundation in ihrem bereits oben erwähnten Artikel zur Gewaltserie in Inguschetien, dass die inkompetente und korrupte Republiksführung in Inguschetien nichts unternehme und nicht in der Lage sei, auf die Situation Einfluss zu nehmen. Die Sicherheitskräfte würden oft unangemessen und übertrieben repressiv vorgehen, was wiederum zur Bildung von Untergrundgruppen führe, die Rache an den Behörden nehmen würden, unter anderem für ihre ermordeten, entführten oder verstümmelten Verwandten oder Freunde:
“Be that as it may, the processes taking place in the republic are cause for alarm. The foundations of traditional Ingush society are being undermined, the adats [code of standards and rules], the mountain traditions, respect for the elders and obedience to parents are moving off to the sidelines. The republic’s incompetent leadership, wallowing in corruption, is doing nothing, and is incabable of influencing the situation. Also, the law enforcement organs’ often improper, excessively repressive actions stimulate the appearance of underground detachments and groups, some of which take revenge on the authorities for corruption and poverty; others for their murdered, abducted or maimed brothers, relatives and friends; still others close ranks with armed Chechen formations and carry out a war for ideas incomprehensible to the man in the street. Therefore the hunt for the Kostoevs, taken alone, is only one episode of a rapidly spreading disease in our republic, and will hardly stop with simply the Kostoevs, the Malsagovs or those with other last names. There has been too much blood, violence and injustice here lately, and those who have experienced this first hand often have no other choice but to act using such methods.”” (Jamestown Foundation, 18. Mai 2006)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine weiteren Informationen zu staatlichem Schutz bei Blutfehden gefunden werden.

Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.