DFAT Country Information Report Lebanon

CONTENTS ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................................... 2 GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................. 4 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ................................................................................................................................ 5 COUNTRY OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................... 5 DEMOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................................................. 5 ECONOMIC OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................. 5 POLITICAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................................ 9 HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................................... 10 SECURITY SITUATION .................................................................................................................................................. 10 3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS ............................................................................................................................ 13 RACE/NATIONALITY .................................................................................................................................................... 13 RELIGION ..................................................................................................................................................................... 15 POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) .............................................................................................................. 19 GROUPS OF INTEREST ................................................................................................................................................. 22 4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS ............................................................................................................. 27 ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE .............................................................................................................................. 27 DEATH PENALTY .......................................................................................................................................................... 27 CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT .......................................................................... 28 5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 30 STATE PROTECTION .................................................................................................................................................... 30 INTERNAL RELOCATION .............................................................................................................................................. 34 TREATMENT OF RETURNEES ....................................................................................................................................... 34 DOCUMENTATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 35    ACRONYMS AUD CSO DGGS DGPS DRA ESSN IDF IDP ILO IMF INGO ISF LAF LBP LGBTQIA+  MoIM NACC NDA NID NMHP  NPTP MoPH MoSD PRL PRS UNDP UNHCR UNICEF UNRWA WHO Australian Dollar Civil Society Organisation  Directorate General of General Security Directorate General for Personal Status Directorate of Refugee Affairs Emergency Social Safety Net  Israel Defense Forces Internally Displaced Persons International Labour Organization International Monetary Fund  International Non-Government Organisation Internal Security Forces (police) Lebanese Armed Forces (military) Lebanese Pound (also known as Lebanese Lira) Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex or Asexual Ministry of Interior and Municipalities National Anti-Corruption Commission National Disability Allowance National Identity Card National Mental Health Programme National Poverty Targeting Program Ministry of Public Health Ministry of Social Development  Palestinian Resident in Lebanon Palestinian Resident in Syria United Nations Development Programme Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund  United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East World Health Organization 2 GLOSSARY Mukhtar  Sharia  Shura Wasta Local mayor Islamic religious law Principle of Islamic governance in which leaders consult with a council or the community before making an important decision Personal connections and favouritism Terms used in this report Almost certain   Likely    Possibly   Unlikely   Rare    Official discrimination This treatment is expected to occur in nearly all circumstances. This treatment is expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment may occur in some circumstances. This treatment is not expected to occur in most circumstances. This treatment is only expected to occur in exceptional circumstances. 1. legal or regulatory measures applying to a particular group that impede access to state protection or services that are available to other sections of the population (examples might include but are not limited to difficulties in obtaining personal registrations or identity papers, difficulties in having papers recognised, arbitrary arrest and detention) 2. behaviour by state employees towards a particular group that impedes access to state protection or services otherwise available, including by failure to implement legislative or administrative measures Societal discrimination  1. behaviour by members of society (including family members, employers or service providers) that impedes access by a particular group to goods or services normally available to other sections of society (examples could include but are not limited to refusal to let property, refusal to sell goods or services, or employment discrimination) 2. ostracism or exclusion by members of society (including family, acquaintances, employers, colleagues or service providers). 3 1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1 This report was prepared for protection status decision makers by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It provides a factual overview distinct from Australian Government policy and does not contain policy guidance for decision makers. 1.2 1.3 According to Ministerial Direction 84 of 24 June 2019, issued under the Migration Act 1958: Where the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has prepared [a] country information assessment expressly for protection status determination processes, and that assessment is available to the decision maker, the decision maker must take into account that assessment, where relevant, in making their decision. The decision maker is not precluded from considering other relevant information about the country. This report was prepared with regard to the current protection visa caseload without reference to individual applications. It provides DFAT’s best assessment at the time of writing.  1.4 This report draws on in-country knowledge and discussions. It takes into account reporting from a range of credible sources including: other governments, United Nations agencies, human rights and civil society organisations, local and international media and academia. Source details may be omitted to protect sources. 1.5 This Country Information Report replaces the DFAT report on Lebanon published on 26 June 2023. 4 2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION COUNTRY OVERVIEW 2.1 Tensions between pro- and anti-Palestinian factions in Lebanon, fuelled by sectarian disputes between Christian and Muslim communities, led to civil war in 1975. The Taif Accord, brokered by the Arab League in 1989, created new power-sharing agreements between Christian and Muslim communities. The Accord called for the disarmament of local militias except for Hizballah, a Shi’a political party and militant group. As a result of the Accord, fighting in Lebanon largely ceased by 1990.  2.2 Following the civil war, Lebanon experienced a series of economic and political crises, including the assassination of prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. Protests surrounding Hariri’s assassination prompted Syrian forces that occupied parts of Lebanon since 1976 to depart the country. Other notable crises included the 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel, and Hizballah’s take-over of west Beirut in 2008. Frustration with tax increases, corruption and sectarian rule led to mass protests in 2019 as the economic downturn began. In August 2020, a fire ignited nearly 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate causing a massive explosion that destroyed the Port of Beirut. Two hundred and twenty people died and more than 6,500 were injured. Mass protests broke out again, forcing prime minister Hassan Diab and his entire cabinet to resign.  2.3 Parliamentary elections in 2022 failed to resolve the political deadlock and Lebanon was left without a fully functioning government until a new president, prime minister and cabinet were installed in early 2025. The country’s economic crisis worsened in 2023 causing the Lebanese Pound (LBP) to lose over 90 per cent of its value. Israel launched a major military campaign against Hizballah in September 2024, which included a ground invasion of southern Lebanon and airstrikes that killed the group's leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The Israel-Hizballah conflict displaced more than 20 per cent of Lebanon’s population. Under a November 2024 ceasefire agreement, Israel agreed to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon and Hizballah agreed to move its forces north of the Litani River. At the time of writing, the agreement had not been fully implemented and Israeli strikes continued.  DEMOGRAPHY 2.4 Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932 due to the political sensitivity of demographics in the country but its population was estimated to be 5.36 million in 2025. Ninety-five per cent of the population is Arab, although many Lebanese Christians do not identify as Arab but as ‘Phoenicians’. The remaining 5 per cent is mainly Armenian. The majority of Lebanese nationals live on and around the Mediterranean coast, especially in Beirut. The national language is Arabic. For religious demography, see Religion.  ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 2.5 Lebanon is a lower middle-income country with well-established service and agricultural sectors. Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was LBP472,271,000 (AUD8,080) in 2024. By the end of 2024, Lebanon’s GDP had dropped 40 per cent since 2019 when the major economic downturn began. However, the World Bank projected GDP growth of 4.7 per cent and inflation would moderate to 15.2 per cent in 2025. The World Bank reported the country’s fiscal stance was improving, supported by stronger revenue collection and a balanced budget approved by government decree. 2.6 Lebanese nationals face cost of living pressures according to in-country sources. The government's decision to remove subsidies on fuel, electricity and food items significantly impacted poorer families, with food insecurity becoming more prevalent. Forty-four per cent of people in Lebanon were living below the poverty line in 2022 according to World Bank data (most recent available), although rates varied by region and nationality. For example, the poverty rate in Beirut was 2 per cent, compared with 62 per cent in Akkar region in the north of the country. The poverty rate among Lebanese nationals was 33 per cent, while it exceeded 87 per cent among Syrians in Lebanon. 2.7 In-country sources said many households had reduced spending due to cost of living pressures but the average Lebanese national was still able to access services (including healthcare and education) and afford food, 5 water, medication, electricity and fuel. DFAT assesses cost of living pressures are almost certainly a major push factor for both legal and illegal migration abroad from across Lebanon (see also Employment). Employment 2.8 Lebanon’s Constitution guarantees a free market economic system and the right to private property. The Labour Code 1946 applies to all employers and employees, except those engaged in domestic work in private houses, agricultural work and civil servants. The Labour Code 1946 prohibits discrimination based on gender. It also bans employers from dismissing employees who are pregnant or on maternity leave. Employers who infringe provisions of the Labour Code 1946 face fines or imprisonment. 2.9 A statutory minimum wage applies to all employees covered under the Labour Code 1946 who are at least 20 years of age. The minimum wage is set by the government, following consultation with representatives of employers and trade unions. The minimum wage was LBP28,000,000 (AUD476) per month in July 2025. 2.10 Labour arbitration councils, made up of a judge plus representatives for employers and employees, operate in all of Lebanon’s governorates. These councils arbitrate disputes over dismissals, resignations, disciplinary fines, the minimum wage, occupational accidents and other matters relating to the application of the Labour Code 1946. Rulings of labour arbitration councils may be appealed to the Court of Cassation (see also Legal system). 2.11 Lebanon's unemployment rate was 11.5 per cent in 2023 according to the World Bank (most recent data available). In-country sources said the actual unemployment rate was likely higher. Some businesses ceased trading when the economic crisis began in 2019. Public sector austerity measures had also reduced employment. Women were disproportionately affected by large-scale layoffs between 2019 and 2022. 2.12 The youth unemployment rate (for those aged 15 to 24 years) was 23.6 per cent in 2023. According to International Labour Organization (ILO) data, youth with a university degree had the highest unemployment rate at 36 per cent. As a result, many university educated youth leave Lebanon in search of better opportunities abroad, especially in Gulf countries. 2.13 DFAT assesses low rates of pay and weak economic opportunities likely act as a push factor for emigration from Lebanon, particularly for young Lebanese nationals. DFAT assesses it is rare for Lebanese nationals to be purposefully excluded from the economy or from accessing state resources on the basis of their religion, gender, sexual orientation or disability. Welfare 2.14 Lebanon’s formal social safety net includes the Aman Program and the National Disability Allowance (NDA). In-country sources said Lebanese nationals were able to access government-run programs without discrimination. Lebanese nationals who do not meet eligibility criteria are able to access services provided by non-governmental organisations, faith-based groups and political organisations. Some rely on financial support from family members living abroad.  2.15 Aman became Lebanon’s main social safety net program in 2024, after merging with the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP). Aman delivers monthly multi-purpose cash transfers including a base amount of AUD30 per household member (for up to 6 individuals) and AUD38 per household, with a ceiling of AUD219 per household per month. This transfer covers approximately 30 per cent of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) for an average household, which defines the essential, culturally-adjusted items needed for a household to survive acute crises. Aman reached around 166,000 households in 2025, reflecting a coverage rate of 61 per cent of those in need. The NDA is a highly targeted social grant covering people with disability between the ages of 15 and 30, providing a monthly allowance of approximately AUD61. The NDA covered approximately 20,000 people living with disability in 2024.  2.16 Religious charities, non-governmental organisations, UN agencies and sectarian political organisations provide financial aid, shelter, food and sometimes employment to those in need throughout Lebanon. Religious and sectarian-based organisations are unregulated and often supported by political leaders who may use social aid as an 6 instrument of political patronage. In-country sources said political and faith-based organisations did not refuse assistance to people in need, even if they came from different religious backgrounds or political viewpoints. Health 2.17 Average life expectancy in Lebanon was 78 years in 2023 according to the World Bank (most recent data available). Mortality rates are highest for non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, cirrhosis of the liver, kidney disease and diabetes according to the World Health Organization (WHO).  2.18 The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) is responsible for Lebanon’s primary health care system, emergency care, vaccination programs, as well as maternal and child health services. MoPH’s National Health Strategy: Vision 2030 aims to promote universal health coverage, service delivery and financial sustainability. 2.19 The Lebanese health system comprises a mix of private and public services. The country had 153 hospitals in 2024. Lebanon had 2.7 hospital beds per 1,000 people (higher than Australia’s 2.5 public hospital beds), as well as 2.6 doctors and 1.9 nurses per 1,000 people according to the most recent World Bank data. WHO reported the health sector had shown remarkable resilience despite an outflux of medical professionals and ongoing resourcing constraints since 2019 but the needs were vast and growing. 2.20 In-country sources said out-of-pocket costs for healthcare visits were low (often less than AUD5) in 2025 unless specialist treatment for a chronic condition was required. Most basic medicines were available. Many were heavily subsidised. Donor funding helped ensure the public health system continued to function adequately. In-country sources said while wait times to access public hospitals could be long, services and medicines were generally accessible and affordable for all Lebanese nationals.  2.21 The private sector supplements Lebanon’s public health facilities. Private hospitals and clinics offer a much higher standard of health care than public facilities. Private hospitals sometimes employ internationally trained doctors and specialists.  2.22 Lebanon has multiple public and private health insurance schemes. Public health insurance programs include the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), which provides health insurance to employees in the formal sector and covers healthcare costs for workers, their dependents and pensioners. Historically, most Lebanese nationals relied on private health insurance provided through employers or purchased individually. In-country sources said many Lebanese nationals could no longer afford private health insurance and were reliant on the public health system. 2.23 DFAT assesses Lebanese nationals are almost certain to be able to access healthcare services without discrimination and generally with minimal out-of-pocket costs but wait times and availability of services vary widely. DFAT assesses it is rare for Palestinians and Syrians in Lebanon to access public healthcare services. Palestinians and Syrians are almost certain to be able to access private healthcare and are likely to have access to services offered through UN and other aid agencies. Mental Health 2.24 Mental health services in Lebanon are the responsibility of MoPH, which hosts the National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) to coordinate national efforts. Legislative Decree 72/1983 regulates the legal protection and treatment of patients with mental health conditions. Psychiatrists claim the decree is outdated and conflicts with international standards, hence it is seldom referenced in clinical practice. Lebanon’s National Mental Health Strategy 2024-30 aims to develop sustainable, universally accessible, high quality, safe, integrated and people-centred mental health services. 2.25 Lebanon has five dedicated psychiatric hospitals and eight psychiatric wards within general hospitals. Deir El Saleeb is the largest psychiatric hospital, offering 1,000 psychiatric beds, followed by Dar El Ajaza offering 377 psychiatric beds. Lebanon has approximately 1,350 mental health professionals, including 1.2 psychiatrists, 3.1 nurses and 3.3 psychologists per 100,000 people. Limited mental health services are available through subsidised providers (including through primary healthcare centres), with the patient paying 20 per cent or more of the cost of services or psychotropic drugs. Publicly subsidised mental health services are limited in scope and difficult to access due to inadequate funding and excess demand. In-country sources said private psychiatric therapy services were available but expensive. Most private insurance does not cover mental health services. 7 2.26 A 2022 academic study found heightened rates of probable depression (47 per cent), anxiety (45 per cent) and post-traumatic stress disorder (43 per cent) within the general population. The study also highlighted a high societal awareness of the importance of seeking assistance for mental health conditions. In-country sources said views on mental health had positively shifted in recent years and stigma around accessing mental health services had reduced. Accessing mental health services in more isolated rural areas sometimes carried stigma. 2.27 MoPH has led several campaigns to raise awareness surrounding mental health and tackle misconceptions. These campaigns were run in cooperation with WHO, INGOs and CSOs. The Lebanese Government also runs 24/7 hotlines to integrate mental health into public health responses. In-country sources said strong social media campaigns and access to hotlines had significantly lessened the stigma of discussing issues related to mental health. 2.28 DFAT assesses Lebanese nationals are almost certain to be able to access public mental health care services without discrimination but availability varies widely and can be inadequate. The poor and most vulnerable, those least able to afford private mental health care services, often reside in areas where public mental health care services are less available. People with Disability 2.29 According to household surveys, 23 per cent of Lebanese, as well as 32 per cent of Palestinian and Syrian households in Lebanon have at least one family member with disability. Lebanon signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2007 and ratified it on 5 June 2025.  2.30 Law 220/2000 addresses the rights of persons with disability. It is based on a medical approach focused on ‘impairment’, rather than a rights-based approach focused on interaction with environmental barriers. The law establishes the right of people with disability to education, rehabilitation services, employment, medical services and political participation. According to the UN Inter-Agency Coordination in Lebanon, most of the provisions of Law 220/2000 are not being implemented. Law 220/2000 does not generally align with the CRPD. 2.31 Approximately 400,000 people with disability hold government-issued Personal Disability cards allowing them to receive national support, including emergency cash transfers. The Ministry of Social Development (MoSD), in partnership with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the ILO, launched the NDA program in April 2023 to provide a monthly financial allowance to 20,000 people with disability (see Welfare). MoSD works with the WFP to provide door-to-door validation and distributions to eligible individuals with severe mobility challenges. MoSD also works in partnership with WFP, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education and Higher Education to assist out-of-school children, including those with disability. 2.32 Lack of accessibility to public spaces and buildings limits the ability of people with disability to access essential services and participate in public life. Many schools and universities do not have the resources to support students with disability. Many employers are unwilling to hire people with disability. 2.33 Women with disability face higher levels of discrimination, marginalisation and lack of inclusion than men with disability and women without disability, according to the UN Inter-Agency Coordination in Lebanon. Women and girls with disability also face greater exposure to violence, including gender-based violence (GBV), exploitation, coercion and abuse than those without disability (see Women). 2.34 DFAT assesses people with disability possibly face official discrimination in the form of inequitable access to education and appropriate social services. DFAT assesses people with disability possibly face societal discrimination in terms of access to employment. DFAT assesses people with disability are unlikely to face societal violence in the form of physical or sexual abuse. People with disability who are female, children and/or poor may face elevated risks. Education 2.35 Article 10 of the Constitution states education is free and should not offend the dignity of any religions or creeds. It further states there will be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules regulating public instruction.  2.36 The education system is centralised, with both public and private institutions overseen by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education. There are approximately 1.5 million students across Lebanon and the government 8 allocated 6.1 per cent of the 2024 budget to education. Primary education is compulsory, begins at age 6 and lasts for six years. The Intermediate level of education is three years, beginning at age 12 and ending at age 15. The Secondary level of education lasts three years, beginning at age 15 and ending at age 18. Higher education in Lebanon is provided by Technical and Vocational Institutes, University Colleges, University Institutes and Universities. Around 60 per cent of students attend private schools, which have traditionally benefited from more government support than public schools. 2.37 In-country sources said the quality of public education in Lebanon had declined due to resource constraints and ongoing teacher strikes over low salaries. By contrast, in-country sources said the private sector had fared better and offered a higher quality based on its better trained teachers and facilities.  Lebanon’s public education system has also suffered due to disruptions from the Israel-Hizballah conflict, leading to significant learning loss among students at all levels. In particular, the conflict has affected large numbers of students and teachers in southern Lebanon since 2023, where public schools were used as shelters for internally displaced people (IDPs).   2.38 DFAT assesses Lebanese nationals are almost certain to be able to access education without discrimination, although schools and universities may not have adequate resources to support students with disability. 

POLITICAL SYSTEM 2.39 Lebanon is a multi-confessional consociational democratic parliamentary republic. It seeks to maintain equilibrium and stability between different sectarian groups through the allocation of parliamentary seats, ministerial posts and key offices of state among the various religious communities. The National Pact adopted at independence in 1943 stipulated the office of president would be reserved for a Maronite Christian, the office of prime minister for a Sunni Muslim and the office of speaker of the house for a Shi’a Muslim. Following the 1989 Taif Accord, the Constitution’s preamble was amended to envisage the long-term abolition of political confessionalism (the proportional distribution of power along religious lines). This had not occurred at the time of writing. 2.40 Lebanon’s National Assembly is a unicameral parliament made up of 128 members with equal representation for Christians and Muslims. National Assembly members are elected by popular vote to serve terms of four years. Lebanon’s head of state is the president, elected by the National Assembly for a six-year term. The prime minister and deputy prime minister are appointed by the president in consultation with the National Assembly. The Council of Ministers is the equivalent of Cabinet and is usually chaired by the prime minister. The country is divided into governorates (administrative divisions). Some communities have municipal government or a village or town council of elders. 2.41 Parliamentary elections were last held in May 2022. The National Assembly elected General Joseph Aoun as President on 9 January 2025, ending a two year long vacancy. Nawaf Salam was appointed Prime Minister following MP consultations with President Aoun. Parliamentary elections are next scheduled to be held in May 2026. 2.42 In the 2022 parliamentary election the Hizballah-led bloc lost their majority but still won the election for parliamentary speaker. Hizballah’s political influence and control over state institutions declined significantly in 2024 following Israel’s military campaign and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. In-country sources said the death of Hizballah’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had caused internal divisions and forced the organisation to focus on reestablishing command and control structures instead of seeking to influence state institutions.   2.43 Some Hizballah-aligned political appointees and government officials had their security clearances revoked and/or were removed from office in 2025. In July 2025, President Aoun said Lebanon was demanding ‘the extension of the Lebanese state’s authority over all its territory, the removal of weapons from all armed groups including Hizballah and their handover to the Lebanese Army’. Cabinet formally tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with disarming all non-state actors in Lebanon, including Hizballah, in August 2025.  Corruption 2.44 Lebanon is a State Party to the UN Convention Against Corruption. The Penal Code 1943 sets the foundational principles against bribery and similar offences, with most corruption-related offences punishable by fines or periods of imprisonment varying between three months to three years. Some specific bribery and misappropriation offences 9 constitute felonies punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment and deprivation of certain civil rights. Lebanon has a comprehensive legislative framework against corruption including Law No. 189/2020 on asset disclosure and illicit enrichment, Law No. 32/2008 on anti-money laundering, Law No. 175/2020 on combatting corruption in the public sector and Law No. 214/2021 on the recovery of corruption proceeds. 2.45 Despite a strong official framework, corruption regularly occurs throughout Lebanon. Transparency International ranked Lebanon 154 out of 180 countries in its 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (where one is perceived least corrupt and 180 most corrupt). The World Justice Project’s 2025 Rule of Law Index ranked Lebanon 107 out of 143 countries, with data showing the majority of Lebanese nationals were concerned officials in the executive and legislative branches used public office for private gain. The US Department of State determined the Lebanese Government lacked control over rampant corruption and there was limited parliamentary or auditing oversight of revenue collection and expenditures. The report found the most common types of corruption included political patronage, judicial misconduct in investigations of official wrongdoing and bribery at multiple levels within the national and municipal governments. According to the report, various initiatives intended to limit corruption were not successful. 2.46 Lebanese nationals must often contend with political patronage and clientelism in the public and private sectors, which is layered on top of communally enabled corruption. In-country sources said entrenched patronage networks monopolised the economy, public services and municipalities. Corruption and trading in influence in Lebanon is facilitated through the use of wasta, a form of personal connection and favouritism. Using or invoking wasta means asking someone to intervene or mediate to obtain some kind of advantage from a third party. For example, Lebanese nationals often use wasta to ask politicians or political parties for ‘favours’ to get to the front of the line in a public hospital or to have an official document or licence issued. Bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged when applying for public utilities and wasta is a common way to navigate public administration. Without wasta, government services are carried out more slowly and people must contend with additional bureaucratic barriers. Not having wasta can also be a barrier to employment or career progression.  2.47 Anti-corruption laws are loosely enforced according to Freedom House, in part because institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) lack adequate funding and regulatory support. Historically, when law enforcement bodies acted, cases were sometimes pursued selectively or politicised. High-profile corruption cases rarely resulted in substantial penalties, creating a perception of impunity. Chronic corruption has affected state-owned companies and utilities, contributing to poor service delivery and routine electricity blackouts. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 2.48 Lebanon’s Constitution states it is consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and embodies its principles without exception. The Constitution guarantees fundamental rights, including to equality, individual liberty and the freedoms of conscience and religion, expression, the press and assembly and association. 2.49 Lebanon is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC) and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and its Optional Protocol. Lebanon has not acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.  SECURITY SITUATION 2.50 Lebanon’s security situation was volatile at the time of writing due to the ongoing Israel-Hizballah conflict and tensions with the Syrian Government. In-country sources said the LAF had proven effective in deconflicting spaces with Hizballah in the south and managing sectarian tensions in the north of the country. Mount Lebanon and Beirut remained largely unaffected by conflict, with the notable exception of the Shi’a Muslim areas of south Beirut and its southern suburbs that experienced occasional targeted Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes.  10 2.51 A number of listed terrorist organisations including Al Jemmah al-Islamiyah, Hamas, ISIS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have or had established presences in Lebanon. All of these groups are monitored and effectively contained by the Internal Security Forces (ISF), whose mandate includes counter-terrorism and maintaining public order. Lebanon generally has low rates of serious and violent crime, including in Beirut. 2.52 The IDF destroyed civilian infrastructure and extensively damaged agricultural land in southern Lebanon following the outbreak of conflict in October 2023. Human Rights Watch reported approximately 4,000 people were killed and over one million Lebanese nationals displaced since October 2023. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) reported tens of thousands of houses, businesses and agricultural establishments were damaged or destroyed. This included 83 educational institutions, 36 health facilities, 40 water facilities, 18 telecommunication facilities and 36 public electricity facilities located in the Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil and Tyre districts of southern Lebanon. Amnesty International found 70 per cent or more of all structures in the municipalities of Yarine, Dhayra and Boustane along the southern border were destroyed during the Israel-Hizballah conflict. In-country sources said the first kilometre north of the border with Israel was completely destroyed, except for Christian-majority villages that were largely untouched by the IDF.  2.53 The 26 November 2024 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon was established under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The agreement stated the IDF would withdraw south of the ‘Blue Line’ dividing Lebanon from Israel and the Golan Heights, while the LAF would deploy to positions south of the Litani River. The cessation of hostilities arrangement established Israel would not carry out offensive military operations against Lebanese targets in Lebanon and the Lebanese Government would prevent Hizballah and other armed groups from conducting operations against Israel. In addition, the LAF was tasked with dismantling ‘unauthorised infrastructure’ and confiscating ‘unauthorised arms’. 2.54 By mid-February 2025, the IDF had withdrawn from some areas in southern Lebanon (where the LAF had deployed) but continued to target alleged Hizballah assets in southern Lebanon, south Beirut and the Beqaa Valley. According to a 13 February 2025 statement by UN independent experts, the IDF had targeted civilians, demolished housing and destroyed crops and infrastructure with tanks, bulldozers and heavy weaponry. On 18 February 2025, the IDF withdrew from most areas in southern Lebanon but retained a presence in five positions in Lebanese territory near the Blue Line. The IDF stated it would retain these positions until it was ‘certain that Hizballah will not return to the area south of the Litani River’. Approximately 86 per cent of IDPs had returned to their homes by February 2025, with many renting houses if they found theirs had been destroyed. 2.55 The 2024 ceasefire agreement was largely holding at the time of writing despite violations. In-country sources said the IDF continued to target and destroy critical infrastructure in southern Lebanon, although strikes had become more ‘specialised’ and ‘targeted’ further from the Blue Line. According to the UN Secretary-General’s report covering the period from 21 February to 20 June 2025, at least 79 Lebanese civilians were killed by IDF operations since the cessation of hostilities arrangement came into effect. By October 2025, 64,417 IDPs remained, most located near Tyre. In-country sources said the remaining IDPs could not return home because they lacked security, suitable housing or finances. Most IDPs were hopeful they would be able to return in the near future. INGOs and CSOs were providing support to IDPs including food, shelter and financial assistance.  2.56 In Beirut, the IDF carried out airstrikes on 28 March and 1 April 2025 following rocket fire from Palestinian militants. The LAF announced the arrest of a group of Lebanese and Palestinians on 16 April 2025 in connection with the rocket launches. On 27 April and 5 June 2025, Israel carried out airstrikes in the suburbs of Beirut, claiming it had targeted missile storage and drone production facilities belonging to Hizballah. On 23 November 2025 an Israeli strike killed Hizballah military chief of staff Haitham Tabtabai in the southern suburbs of Beirut. 2.57 The LAF increased its presence in southern Lebanon in 2025 to around 9,000 soldiers. In-country sources said Hizballah had handed over its small arms, with Prime Minister Salam stating Hizballah’s disarmament was 80 per cent complete. Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi stated on 9 September 2025 the LAF would fully disarm Hizballah in southern Lebanon within three months and ensure all weapons were controlled by the state. The LAF was also disarming some militant Palestinian groups operating in Lebanon, including by arresting Hamas operatives involved in rocket attacks on Israel. For example, following a meeting in May 2025 between President Aoun and 11 Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinians in Burj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut began to hand over some heavy weapons to the LAF in August 2025. Hamas and other factions have resisted calls to disarm. 2.58 For the information on the security situation in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, see Palestinians. For further information on sectarian conflicts, see Alawites and Druze. 

3. REFUGEE CONVENTION CLAIMS RACE/NATIONALITY 3.1 The Lebanese population is largely Arab, except for a small minority of ethnic Armenians. Article 2 of the Constitution guarantees all citizens equality before the law under which they enjoy civil and political rights and are bound by public obligations and duties without distinction. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of reports of systematic discrimination or violence perpetrated against any group of Lebanese citizens based on their race. Lebanon also hosts large numbers of Palestinian refugees and their descendants, as well as Syrian asylum seekers. Palestinians 3.2 Palestinians are an Arab group in the Levant that share close religious, linguistic and cultural ties with the Lebanese. There are approximately 230,000 Palestinians residing in Lebanon according to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This includes 27,000 Palestinians secondarily displaced from Syria. Approximately 45 per cent of Palestinians in Lebanon live in 12 refugee camps, with the rest spread throughout the country. 3.3 The Palestinian community in Lebanon is divided into several different categories based on legal registration status and origin. The first is Palestinians Resident in Lebanon (PRL), those whose normal place of residence during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 was Palestine and who lost both their home and livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict. The descendants of Palestinian refugee males, including legally adopted children, are included in this category. The second category is Palestinians Resident in Syria (PRS), comprising Palestinian refugees who fled Syria as a result of the Syrian civil war from 2011 to 2024. The third category is a group of between 3,000 and 5,000 Palestinians who arrived in Lebanon with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) after its defeat in 1970 in the Black September conflict in Jordan. This third group is not registered with UNRWA and is effectively stateless. 3.4 Despite their longstanding presence in Lebanon, PRL and PRS remain excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life. While PRL are free to move throughout the country, they are prohibited from legally acquiring, transferring or inheriting property and cannot bring building materials into refugee camps to repair their homes. PRS face restrictions on their movement into and within Lebanon. Both PRL and PRS are unable to access Lebanese public education, health or social services. For political reasons, both Lebanese authorities and Palestinian political factions have opposed moves to grant Lebanese citizenship to PRL and PRS.  3.5 The 12 officially designated refugee camps for PRL in Lebanon are generally overcrowded and have decaying infrastructure. PRL receive assistance and services directly provided by UNRWA, while access by PRS is generally more limited. UNRWA provides access to water, waste collection, healthcare and education services. UNRWA had begun scaling back its education and healthcare services within refugee camps at the time of writing due to a significant shortfall in its operating budget. 3.6 Under arrangements with the Lebanese Government, Palestinian authorities have sole responsibility for administration of the camps and their security. Camps are run directly by Palestinian political factions, including Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Violent conflict between Palestinian political factions is common in some camps. For example, armed clashes between members of Fatah and Hamas in the Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp in 2023 left dozens dead. The LAF is not permitted within refugee camps but often sets up checkpoints nearby to monitor and control those entering or exiting the camps.  3.7 PRL are prohibited from working in the Lebanese public sector and in 39 regulated occupations (syndicates) including medicine, law and engineering. PRL are also restricted from working in skilled and semi-skilled jobs such as farming, fishery and public transportation unless they hold a valid work permit. PRL are treated as foreigners under employment laws and bound by reciprocity agreements, under which they can only hold positions available to Lebanese nationals in the State of Palestine. Applying for a work permit from the Ministry of Labour is free of charge for PRL but involves a lengthy administrative process that often depends on the goodwill of the employer. Very few PRL have either a work permit or an employment contract. PRS must pay the same fees for a work permit as other non-Lebanese nationals and are excluded from the streamlined application processes available to PRL. 13 3.8 Both PRL and PRS can pursue work of any kind within refugee camps. UNRWA is a major employer of Palestinians within refugee camps but most PRL and PRS work the informal employment. UNRWA estimated the unemployment rate for Palestinians in Lebanon in 2025 was between 30 and 40 per cent. In-country sources said the poverty rate among Palestinians was approximately 80 per cent in 2025. 3.9 Palestinians sometimes face societal discrimination in Lebanon. While anti-refugee sentiment has generally been focused towards Syrians, some public figures have called for the deportation and resettlement of Palestinian refugees based on security and societal concerns. According to reports from UN agencies, government officials and Palestinian advocacy groups, there has been long-standing social discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon, especially in terms of accessing employment. Children of PRL and PRS may face difficulties during the birth registration process due to discriminatory bureaucratic and administrative procedures at the Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees. 3.10 DFAT assesses Palestinians are likely to face official discrimination based on their nationality in the form of access to Lebanese Government services and documentation, restrictions on employment and the ability to purchase property. DFAT assesses Palestinians are likely to face societal discrimination based on their nationality in the form of access to employment. DFAT assesses Palestinians possibly face violence in refugee camps in Lebanon.  Syrians 3.11 Syrians are a predominantly Arab group in the Levant that share close religious, linguistic and cultural ties with the Lebanese. The Lebanese Government estimates there are 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon of which 750,000 were registered with the UNHCR as of 31 December 2024. In-country sources said there had been a high number of spontaneous, voluntary returns to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. According to the UNHCR, more than 430,000 Syrians had returned home since December 2024. 3.12 The Lebanese Government halted UNHCR registration for Syrians in October 2014 as increasing numbers of asylum seekers fled the civil war in Syria. Since then, the Lebanese Government has adjusted entry categories and requirements to make it harder for Syrians to enter. New rules were also introduced for those renewing their residency, making it more difficult for Syrians to obtain or maintain legal status in Lebanon. Approximately 20 per cent of Syrians in Lebanon over the age of 15 held a valid residency permit in 2023. In-country sources said a Syrian’s lack of status or residency would not be a factor in their accessing of state protection, including contacting the ISF and pursuing matters through the justice system. 3.13 Syrians in Lebanon without status or residency are liable to be detained and deported by authorities for entering the country irregularly. At least 5,600 Syrians were deported between January and October 2024 according to the UNHCR. Those deported regularly receive re-entry bans of between 1 and 15 years in length. In-country sources said there had been isolated instances in 2023 where Syrians were beaten to death while in detention. These alleged extrajudicial killings were being investigated at the time of writing. In July 2025, the MoSD announced a voluntary repatriation plan, under which returning Syrians would be provided AUD150 per family before departure and an additional AUD600 upon arrival in Syria. UNHCR is also supporting refugees with assisted transport. The Lebanese Government temporarily waived overstay fees and lifted the re-entry ban for voluntary returnees in 2025. 3.14 There are no formal refugee camps for Syrians in Lebanon. Syrians are scattered throughout urban and rural communities, often sharing basic lodgings in overcrowded conditions. Syrians are unable to access Lebanese public education, health or social services unless they arrived in Lebanon prior to October 2014 and registered with the UNHCR. In-country sources said Syrians were able to access healthcare through UNHCR-subsidised hospital services but due to UNHCR’s funding shortages no support was planned beyond 1 December 2025. CSOs and faith-based organisations provide financial assistance to Syrians, complementing the work of larger UN agencies. The UNHCR also provides in-kind assistance, including food and temporary shelter. An estimated 90 per cent of Syrians in Lebanon live in extreme poverty according to the World Bank. Most Syrians lack employment rights so work in the informal sector.  3.15 Syrians in Lebanon often face societal discrimination. In-country sources said anti-refugee sentiment was primarily focused on Syrians, with growing domestic sentiment Syrians should return home following the fall of the Assad regime. UNDP public opinion surveys show 67 per cent of Lebanese nationals perceive Syrians contribute to 14 insecurity in Lebanon. A majority favoured restrictive measures being taken against Syrians, including document checks and curfews. In-country sources said 35 municipalities in southern Lebanon had restricted the return of Syrians following 26 November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangement due to a lack of housing and insufficient services. International media reported vigilantes sometimes set up informal checkpoints halting passing traffic to identify Syrians and, in some cases, beat them. 3.16 DFAT assesses Syrians are almost certain to face official discrimination based on their nationality in the form of access to Lebanese Government services and documentation, curfews and document checks. DFAT assesses Syrians are likely to face societal discrimination based on their nationality in the form of access to employment. DFAT assesses Syrians are unlikely to face violence at informal checkpoints and while in detention facilities. 3.17 For additional information on Syrian Alawites and Druze in Lebanon, see Alawites and Druze.  RELIGION 3.18  Lebanon officially recognises 18 religious denominations, including 12 Christian groups (Armenian Catholics, Greek Catholics, Latin/Roman Catholics, Syriac Catholics, Chaldeans, Copts, Evangelicals, Armenian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Nestorian Assyrians, and Maronites), five Muslim groups (Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, Shi’a and Sunni) and Judaism. Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932 and does not collect statistics on the size of religious communities. Unofficial estimates vary but generally agree combined Muslim communities now outnumber combined Christian communities. Individuals from all of Lebanon’s 18 recognised religious communities are involved in political life and government. 3.19 Article 9 of the Constitution guarantees absolute freedom of conscience, under which the state respects all religions and creeds. It also protects the free exercise of all religious rites provided public order is not disturbed. Instead of a unified civil code for personal status matters, Lebanon has 15 separate religion-specific laws covering marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance administered by religious courts. Attempts to create a unified civil code have faced significant opposition from the country’s religious authorities. 3.20 Lebanese nationals can legally change their religious affiliation by converting from Christianity to Islam or from Islam to Christianity. Conversions sometimes take place between different Christian denominations or, more rarely, between followers of different branches of Islam. To convert to a different religion, a local senior official of the religious group the person wishes to join must approve the change. The newly joined religious group must then issue a document confirming the convert’s new religion. The convert can then register their new religion with the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) Personal Status Directorate. Those converting to different religions often encounter disapproval from their former religious community and can be ostracised by members of their family. At the time of writing there were no official statistics on the numbers of religious conversions in Lebanon. 3.21 Religious communities generally coexist peacefully and often live in close proximity to one another according to in-country sources. Local academics report Lebanon has the most mixed marriages per capita in the Middle East. Mixed marriages occur between Christians and Muslims, as well as between those from different Christian denominations or schools of Islam. Mixed marriages can be registered provided they comply with Lebanon’s laws, even if they take place outside of Lebanon. Children of mixed marriages officially take the father’s religion. Mixed marriages must contend with traditional patriarchal views if they contrast with the wishes of their families or broader societal expectations. Those in mixed marriages often encounter disapproval and can be ostracised by members of their family. However, local academics report in the Lebanese context, a marriage partner’s social class and educational background often matter more than their religious affiliation.  3.22 Civil marriages are not permitted in Lebanon. However, in-country sources said civil marriages of Lebanese nationals abroad (often performed in Cyprus) were recognised and could be registered by authorities if they complied with Lebanon’s personal status laws. Lebanese children born from civil marriages are officially recognised. Lebanon does not recognise same-sex marriage. 3.23 Unrecognised religious groups in Lebanon include Ahmadi, Baha’i, Buddhists, Hindus, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Zoroastrians. Human rights groups report unrecognised religious groups can legally own property and are able to assemble for worship and perform religious rites freely.  According to local CSOs, some Baha’i and 15 Jehovah’s Witnesses list themselves in government records as belonging to recognised religious groups to ensure their marriage and other personal status documents remain legally valid. Baha’i often list themselves as Shi’a Muslims. Jehovah’s Witnesses may register as evangelical Protestants. DFAT was not aware of incidents of societal discrimination or violence perpetrated against members of unrecognised religious groups at the time of writing. Blasphemy/Defamation of Religion  3.24 Article 473 of the Penal Code 1943 criminalises blaspheming or otherwise insulting religion and imposes sentences of a maximum of one year’s imprisonment. Article 474 of the Penal Code 1943 criminalises the defamation of publicly practiced religions and carries a penalty of six months to three years in prison. The Publication Law (Press Law) 14/9/1962 amended in 1977 regulates print media and includes provisions imposing fines or prison terms for sectarian provocation and publishing blasphemous content regarding the country’s officially recognised religions or content that may provoke sectarian feuds.  3.25 At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of blasphemy prosecutions in Lebanon resulting in criminal convictions or terms of imprisonment. In-country sources said religious authorities in rare instances filed criminal complaints against journalists and comedians accused of insulting religious rituals or stirring sectarian divisions. These were generally dismissed by judges. For example, Shi’a and Sunni Muslim religious authorities filed criminal complaints in May 2024 against comedian and LGBTQIA+ activist, Shaden Fakih, after a sketch about Muslim Friday prayers caused controversy online. At the time of writing the judiciary was still examining the complaints. Alawites 3.26 Alawism teaches God revealed aspects of divinity through the figure of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, while maintaining Ali was not a literal incarnation of God. Alawites have a complex spiritual system of beliefs extending beyond Islam, including recognition of spiritual/veiled truths in other religions, where these truths are consistent with Islamic spiritual meaning. Alawites observe Eid al-Ghadir, celebrating Muhammad’s appointment of Ali as his successor and the birth of Jesus on Christmas.  3.27 Alawism is officially recognised in Lebanon and in-country sources said Alawites were able to practice their religion freely and publicly, without government interference. Alawite organisations have the legal right to own houses of worship, hold bank accounts and publish religious literature. There are no official statistics on the number of Alawites in Lebanon. In-country sources estimated the sect had upwards of 150,000 adherents, mostly located in Tripoli, Beirut and the Akkar District.  3.28 More than 25,000 Syrian Alawites entered Lebanon after communities in Latakia and Tartous in Syria came under attack by Sunni fighters in March 2025. In-country sources said almost all Syrian Alawites entered Lebanon irregularly and were not registered by the UNHCR. The international Red Crescent and the Alawite Islamic Council were providing support for the Syrian Alawites, including food, temporary shelter and financial assistance, complementing efforts by UN Agencies. Most Syrian Alawites transited through Tripoli before relocating to Alawite villages along the border with Syria, often with the assistance of Lebanese family members. In-country sources said tensions in Tripoli and Akkar District between local Sunni and recently arrived Syrian Alawites were being managed effectively through community dialogue and interventions by the LAF when needed.  3.29 Alawites do not face societal discrimination in Lebanon and sectarian relations are generally amicable according to in-country sources. Alawites regularly engage and cooperate with the broader Muslim community in Lebanon, including with Shi’a and Sunni Muslims in Beirut and Tripoli. In-country sources said past conflicts in Tripoli between Alawites and Sunnis were not sectarian but initiated by a few militants within the Salafi movement. In-country sources said conflicts involving Alawites and other religious sects were primarily due to personal or business disputes, not religious issues. Alawites generally reported feeling safe within Lebanon, even in the poorest neighbourhoods of Beirut and Tripoli. The Arab Democratic Party (ADP) is a prominent Alawite political party. 3.30 Alawites sometimes face official discrimination by security authorities who view them as disloyal or Syrian sympathisers because their sect was politically dominant in Syria while the Assad regime held power there. In-country sources said fewer Alawites were employed in the public service than other religious groups and there were no Alawite judges or brigadier generals.  16 3.31 DFAT assesses Alawites are unlikely to face official discrimination in Lebanon in the form of harassment by ISF and reduced opportunities within Lebanon’s public service. DFAT assesses it is rare for Alawites to face societal discrimination or sectarian violence. Atheists 3.32 There are no laws preventing disbelief in or lack of belief in the existence of God or gods in Lebanon, however in-country sources said the centrality of religion was rarely questioned. It is permissible to renounce one’s religion but administratively Lebanese nationals would still need to be linked to an officially recognised sect. Lebanon’s personal status laws are exclusively based upon religious identity, meaning all Lebanese nationals are officially dealt with according to their sect. As non-religious identities do not legally exist, non-religious people are dealt with by authorities according to the religious laws they acquired at birth, even if they no longer believe in or recognise them. There are no official statistics on the number of atheists in Lebanon but estimates range upwards of 100,000 strict non-believers. 3.33 It is difficult to live in Lebanon completely free of religious tradition. Lebanese nationals’ religious sects are fused with their identity at birth, meaning a person legally carries a fixed religious identity throughout their lifetime. It is possible for Lebanese nationals to voluntarily remove their religious identity from their public records but this would mean losing certain rights under personal status laws. This could include rights related to marriage, inheritance, public office, divorce and other personal matters. For example, only religious marriages are legally permitted in Lebanon, meaning atheists wanting to marry first need to register a religious identity in conflict with their beliefs or marry outside of the country. According to local CSOs, most atheists list themselves in government records as belonging to a recognised religious group to ensure their marriage and other personal status documents remain valid. Unlike officially recognised religious sects, no quota exists for atheists to access government or parliamentary positions. Secular political parties include the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party in Lebanon, Khatt Ahmar, Lana – Social Democratic Party, Marada, ReLebanon, Taqaddom and the Watani Alliance. 3.34 A 2021 study on atheists conducted by Freethought Lebanon with the financial support of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation examined discrimination and human rights violations in Lebanon. The study found some atheists had experienced physical and psychological abuse by their families. The most recurring form of abuse documented in this survey of atheists was the forced veiling of women and girls by family members using physical or emotional abuse. Atheists also reported 'unjust treatment' at religious schools, where they were shunned by their peers or publicly shamed by teachers. The study recorded feelings of discrimination were highest in the South and Nabatieh governorates, especially among those with a Shi’a, Sunni  or mixed religious background. There was no significant difference in feelings of discrimination found between males and females but perceptions of discrimination decreased significantly with age. In-country sources said atheists rarely encountered societal discrimination or violence outside their families unless they publicly advocated for atheism. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of societal violence targeting atheists. 3.35 Non‑religious identities do not legally exist in Lebanon. Administratively, Lebanese nationals must be linked to a recognised religious sect, at least nominally, under the country’s personal status laws. DFAT assesses it is rare for atheists to face societal discrimination in Lebanon based on their lack of religion unless they publicly promote the practice. DFAT assesses atheists are unlikely to face violence from family members and rarely face societal violence. Christians 3.36 There are 12 officially recognised Christian denominations in Lebanon with distinct beliefs and practices centred on differing interpretations of scripture, church authority and tradition. Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East where Christians do not have minority status. There are no official statistics on the number of Christians in Lebanon but estimates are approximately 1.79 million adherents. Approximately 53 per cent of Christians in Lebanon are Maronite, 25 per cent are Greek Orthodox and the remaining population is made up of a wide array of Christian groups. Many Lebanese Christians identify primarily as Christian rather than their distinct confessional group. Lebanese Christians are primarily concentrated in areas east of Beirut, along the northern coast in the mountains of Mount Lebanon and in some villages in the south. 17 3.37 The Lebanese Government recognises the right of Christians to practice their religion publicly. Christians have their own personal status laws and their organisations have the legal right to own houses of worship, hold bank accounts and publish religious literature. Christians do not face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon and sectarian relations are generally amicable according to in-country sources.  3.38 Christians are the most prosperous of all religious groups in Lebanon according to in-country sources. Christians control approximately 50 per cent of all Lebanese businesses and almost 60 percent of the country’s land. Half of the officers in the LAF are Christian. The deteriorating economic situation is the primary reason cited for Christians to emigrate, as it is for members of all other religious groups. 3.39 Christians hold significant power within the Lebanese political system, attributed to the fact they constituted 50 per cent of the population at the time of the 1932 Census (most recent). Maronites Christians hold a dominant position considering they are the only denomination eligible for the presidency. The roles of governor of the Lebanese Central bank and the commander of the LAF are reserved for a Maronite Christian.  3.40 In the Lebanese Parliament, Christians hold 64 seats of which over half are allocated to Maronites (34 seats). Greek Orthodox hold 14 seats, Greek Catholic hold eight, Catholic and Orthodox Armenians hold six, Evangelicals hold one and the remaining smaller Christian denominations share the remaining seat. Prominent Christian political parties include the Lebanese Forces (LF), Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Kataeb (LF).  3.41 DFAT assesses it is rare for Christians to face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon based on their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Christians to face sectarian violence. Druze 3.42 The Druze faith combines traditional Islamic teachings with certain philosophical ideas and mystic practices. Druze (also known as al-Muwahhidun) have no formal rituals or houses of worship and religious knowledge is restricted to a spiritual elite known as the uqqal (‘the wise’). Druze revere several biblical figures including Jethro, who was the father-in-law of Moses. Other key tenets of the Druze religion include a belief in reincarnation and a refusal to accept converts.  3.43 The Druze faith is officially recognised in Lebanon and in-country sources said Druze were able to practice their religion freely, without government interference. The Druze have their own personal status law and their organisations have the legal right to own property, hold bank accounts and publish religious literature. There are no official statistics on Druze in Lebanon but estimates range upwards of 250,000 adherents. Druze are primarily located in and around Beirut, Mount Lebanon and in smaller communities in Wadi al-Taym in southern Lebanon. 3.44 More than 780 Druze entered Lebanon after their communities in and around Damascus in Syria came under attack by Sunni fighters in May 2025. In-country sources said almost all of those Syrian Druze entered Lebanon irregularly and were not registered by the UNHCR. The international Red Crescent and CSOs were providing support for the Syrian Druze, including food, temporary shelter and financial assistance. The LAF was effectively managing tensions between local communities and recently arrived Syrian Druze.  3.45 Druze do not face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon and sectarian relations are generally amicable according to in-country sources. Druze regularly engage and cooperate with the broader Christian and Muslim communities in Lebanon, including with Shi’a and Sunni. Eight Druze delegates are elected to parliament from six constituencies located in Beirut, South Lebanon, Beqaa and Mount Lebanon. The Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) is the dominant Druze party. 3.46 DFAT assesses it is rare for Druze to face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon based on their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Druze to face sectarian violence. Shi’a 3.47 Shi’a Islam places importance on the Ten Obligatory Acts and mourns the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. It is officially recognised in Lebanon and in-country sources said Shi’a were able to practice their religion freely, without government interference. Shi’a have their own personal status law and their organisations have the legal right to own houses of worship, hold bank accounts and publish religious literature. There are no official statistics on the 18 number of Shi’a in Lebanon but estimates range upwards of 1.66 million adherents. Shi’a are primarily located in the Beqaa Valley, southern Lebanon and in the southern suburbs of Beirut (Dahiya). 3.48 Shi’a are diverse in terms of socio-economic status and political views. They range from the very poor to the very rich, have attained a range of education levels and hold varied professions. Shi’a do not face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon and sectarian relations are generally amicable according to in-country sources. In the Lebanese Parliament, Shi’a hold 27 seats overall, the same number as Sunni Muslims. The role of speaker of parliament is reserved for a Shi’a Muslim. Prominent Shi’a political parties include Amal and Hizballah. 3.49 Shi’a communities were significantly affected by the Israel-Hizballah conflict in 2024 but were not directly targeted based on their religion. Armed clashes occurred along the border with Syria between Lebanese Shi’a tribes and the Syrian Government forces in 2025. These were not of a sectarian nature according to in-country sources but instead related to control over smuggling routes. In-country sources said conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims in the Beqaa Valley was being managed effectively through community dialogue and LAF interventions when needed.  3.50 DFAT assesses it is rare for Shi’a to face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon based on their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Shi’a to face sectarian violence.  3.51 Sunni 3.52 For additional information on political opinion related to Shi’a, see Critics of Hizballah. Sunni Islam places importance on the Five Pillars of Islam, the Sunna (practices and customs of the Prophet Muhammad) and the Quran as the literal word of God. It is officially recognised in Lebanon and in-country sources said Sunni were able to practice their religion freely, without government interference. Sunni have their own personal status law and their organisations have the legal right to own houses of worship, hold bank accounts and publish religious literature. There are no official statistics on the number of Sunni in Lebanon but estimates range upwards of 1.6 million adherents. Sunni are primarily located in and around Beirut, as well as Tripoli, Sidon, Beqaa Valley and Akkar District. 3.53 Sunni are diverse in terms of socio-economic status and political views. They range from the very poor to the very rich, have attained a range of education levels and hold varied professions. Sunni do not face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon and sectarian relations are generally amicable according to in-country sources. In the Lebanese Parliament, Sunni hold 27 seats overall, the same number as Shi’a Muslims. The role of prime minister is reserved for a Sunni Muslim. The Future Movement, the most prominent Sunni political party, has not been active since 2022. Sunni representation in parliament is effectively made up of independents or loose coalitions.  3.54 Tensions in Tripoli and Akkar District between Sunni and recently arrived Syrian Alawites were being managed effectively in 2025 through community dialogue and interventions by the LAF when needed. In-country sources said conflicts between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in the Beqaa Valley were also under control, at times with assistance from the LAF.  3.55 DFAT assesses it is rare for Sunni to face official or societal discrimination in Lebanon based on their religion. DFAT assesses it is rare for Sunni to face sectarian violence.  POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED) 3.56 Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, assembly and association for all Lebanese nationals within the limits established by law.  Limits include insulting the head of state (president), national flag or state emblems, criminalised under Article 384 of the Penal Code 1943. Libel and slander against public officials are criminalised under Article 385 of Penal Code 1943. 3.57 Lebanon has a diverse political landscape. A wide range of views are reflected in its parliament, other levels of government and society. In-country sources said authorities generally respected constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms of speech, assembly and association. According to Freedom House, there have been some instances where individuals publicly criticising the government, LAF or other powerful entities faced police questioning, short detentions or fines under defamation laws. For example, Amnesty International reported four people were summoned for questioning in 2024 in cases that ‘appeared to be retaliatory, targeting speech protected under 19 international human rights law, rather than addressing actual harm caused’. By the end of 2024, charges had been dropped in two of these cases, while the outcome of the other two cases remained uncertain. The US Department of State reported those found guilty of libel or slander in criminal courts were generally ordered to remove the offending material from the internet or pay fines. At the time of writing, DFAT was not aware of recent instances of Lebanese nationals being sentenced to terms of imprisonment for libel, slander or insults made to the head of state, national flag or emblems. 3.58 Protesters are required to apply for permits ahead of demonstrations, which are generally approved by authorities. The US Department of State reported security forces occasionally intervened to disperse demonstrations, usually when protesters caused property damage or clashes broke out between protesters. The ISF sometimes used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters engaging in violence or vandalism. In some instances, the LAF used non-lethal force to disperse protesters who resisted efforts to clear thoroughfares. Human rights organisations reported security forces used excessive force against protesters on some occasions. 3.59 DFAT assesses human rights activists who publicly criticise the president, other politicians, the LAF or state symbols are unlikely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, short periods of detention and the payment of fines. DFAT assesses it is rare for human rights activists to face societal discrimination or violence. DFAT assesses people who participate in protests possibly face official discrimination and/or violence. DFAT assesses it is rare for protesters to face societal discrimination.  Civil Society  3.60 CSOs in Lebanon are governed by the Law on Associations 1909 and must comply with other applicable laws relating to labour, finance and immigration. No prior authorisation is required to form associations but the MoIM must be informed to gain legal recognition. The MoIM sometimes liaises with security services as part of its verification efforts. In-country sources said while registration timelines could be lengthy, the process was generally transparent and organisations were treated fairly by authorities. INGOs and CSOs are obligated to invite MoIM representatives to their general assemblies to validate votes and elections. If organisations fail to comply, they can be dissolved by the Council of Ministers.   3.61 Lebanon has a strong and independent civil society that often collaborates effectively with government ministries. More than 8,500 CSOs were operating as of 2021 according to MoIM, including at least 200 INGOs. In-country sources said CSOs rarely faced bureaucratic obstruction or intimidation by security services. According to Freedom House, groups that focused on, or were led and staffed by Syrians, were susceptible to additional scrutiny and interference by authorities. The US Department of State reported independent CSOs operating in areas under Hizballah’s influence sometimes faced harassment and intimidation, including social, political and financial pressures. 3.62 DFAT assesses it is rare for Lebanese civil society actors to face official or societal discrimination. DFAT assesses it is rare for Lebanese civil society actors to face violence.  Critics of Hizballah 3.63 Hizballah is a prominent Lebanese Shi’a organisation comprising political and social elements, as well as a military wing. At the time of writing, Hizballah held 13 seats in Lebanon’s parliament and nominated two cabinet positions in the Lebanese Government. Its military wing supports a public policy of resisting Israel and defending Shi’a interests. Hizballah is listed as a terrorist organisation in Australia under the Criminal Code 1995 for directly or indirectly engaging in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act and/or advocating the doing of a terrorist act.  3.64 Hizballah exercises effective control over parts of Lebanese territory, particularly in South Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut (Dahiya) and eastern Beqaa Valley. Adherents of non-Shi’a religions are allowed to worship freely in the areas under Hizballah’s control. Hizballah maintains a social welfare network that includes education and health services. It also has its own judicial and internal security structures, including detention centres. In-country sources said Hizballah’s organisational capacity was diminished following Israel’s military campaign in 2024. Iran had scaled back its financial assistance to Hizballah, affecting the organisation’s ability to deliver education and health services, especially in South Lebanon. 20 3.65 Until the military conflict with Israel in late 2024, Hizballah actively worked to prevent the emergence of rival voices within the Shi’a community not beholden to it or Amal. This usually focused on exerting societal pressure on Shi’a critics, excluding them from Hizballah-run services and sometimes ‘blacklisting’ their businesses. Hizballah activists generally only threated violence or assaulted Shi’a critics when they felt their power was genuinely being threatened. Hizballah has largely moved away from using threats, intimidation and violence against critics within the Shi’a community since November 2024. In-country sources said Hizballah was no longer intimidating or engaging in violence against non-Shi’a, as the organisation generally ignored or disregarded criticism from members of other religious communities within Lebanon.  3.66 DFAT assesses since November 2024 Shi’a possibly face official or societal discrimination for criticising Hizballah, in the form of harassment by Hizballah activists, exclusion from Hizballah-run services and economic marginalisation. DFAT assesses since November 2024 it is unlikely non-Shi’a face societal discrimination for criticising Hizballah. DFAT assesses Shi’a and non-Shi’a are unlikely to face violence for criticising Hizballah. Media and Journalists  3.67 Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of the press within the limits established by law. Limits include insulting the head of state (president), national flag or state emblems criminalised under Article 384 of the Penal Code 1943. Libel and slander against public officials are criminalised under Article 385 of Penal Code 1943. The Publication Law (Press Law) 14/9/1962 amended in 1977 regulates print media and holds journalists responsible for erroneous or false news, threats or blackmail, insults, defamation and contempt. A new media law was being discussed by parliament at the time of writing. According to Amnesty International, the new draft law better protects the right to freedom of expression by abolishing pretrial detention and prison sentences for all speech-related violations. It also repeals criminal defamation and insult provisions from the Penal Code 1943 and military law. 3.68 Lebanon’s media scene is well developed, lively and diverse, which reflects the country’s pluralism. Lebanon is a regional media hub. Almost all television and radio stations are privately-owned. Reporters Without Borders stated ‘genuine freedom of expression exists in Lebanese media’ but the sector was largely controlled by those affiliated with political parties. Independent online media are widely consulted and play an important role in the country’s media landscape. Reporters without Borders recorded no journalists and media workers killed and none in detention in Lebanon during 2025. On three occasions, journalists were targeted and killed by IDF bombings at the border in southern Lebanon between 2023 and 2024.  3.69 Media outlets need a license from the Council of Ministers to broadcast political news and programs, which is based on a recommendation by the minister of information. The US Department of State reported the law governing audio-visual media banned live broadcasts of unauthorised political gatherings, certain religious events, content promoting a relationship with Israel and ‘programs deemed to harm public morals, ignite sectarian strife, or insult religious beliefs’. Authorities from any officially recognised religious group may request the Directorate of General Security to ban published material they find offensive. Such cases are prosecuted in the Publications Court along with other breaches of media law (see Legal system).  3.70 Civil and criminal cases have been filed against media outlets critical of senior political figures, political parties, well-connected individuals and security forces according to in-country sources. Most cases against journalists and media workers are ultimately dropped. Those detained by authorities are generally released quickly. Despite legal and practical obstacles, Freedom House stated journalists are able to report on sensitive topics such as state corruption, elite malfeasance and the behaviour of armed factions like Hizballah. In-country sources said journalists in Lebanon were skilled at reporting on human rights issues and corruption despite occasional legal pushback, although some topics, such as criticism of the LAF or the president, remained off limits.  3.71 Recent high profile legal cases filed against journalists include the summoning of the editor-in-chief of Daraj media organisation, Hazem al-Amin, by Lebanon’s Anti-Cybercrime and Intellectual Property Rights Bureau in March 2025.  Al-Amin was named in defamation lawsuits filed by the CEO of Lebanese bank Société Générale de Banque au Liban for Daraj’s reporting on the bank’s alleged financial malpractices. In another instance, journalist Riad Tawk was summoned to the Central Criminal Investigation Department in January 2024 following a defamation claim brought against him by Judge Sabouh Sleiman. Tawk had publicly criticised Sleiman’s decision to suspend the arrest warrant issued against public works minister Youssef Fenianos after he left office. Caretaker prime minister Najib Mikati also 21 filed several defamation lawsuits in 2024 against journalists and anti-corruption watchdogs. In July 2023, journalist and online commentator Dima Sadek was convicted and sentenced to one year in prison and a fine in relation to a criminal case filed against her in 2020 by leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) for ‘defamation, slander, and inciting sectarian strife’. Sadek remained free at the time of writing and was appealing the verdict. 3.72 The telecommunications industry in Lebanon is tightly regulated and largely owned by the government. Freedom House ranked Lebanon as ‘Partly Free’ in its Freedom on the Net 2025 report due to restrictions on accessing some political, social and religious content, as well as instances of bloggers being detained for posting political or social content. Websites are only blocked by court order, but website owners can appeal within 48 hours to have the block overturned. Websites blocked included those hosting online gambling, pornography, religiously provocative material, extremist ideology and Israeli websites.  3.73 The Court of Cassation ruled in 2016 speech promulgated on social media would be regulated by the Penal Code 1943 instead of the Publication Law (Press Law) 14/9/1962. Freedom House reported authorities sometimes prosecuted online speech using Article 317 of the Penal Code 1943 penalising incitement of sectarianism or racial strife. In addition, articles 383 to 387 criminalise defamation of public officials and Articles 473 and 474 concern blasphemy and religious rituals. According to Amnesty International, the Cybercrimes Bureau investigated 1,684 insult and defamation cases between January 2019 and March 2024, including 18 defamation cases between January and March 2024. The US Department of State reported those found guilty of libel or slander in criminal courts for online speech were generally ordered to remove the offending material from the internet or pay fines. 3.74 DFAT assesses journalists covering topics deemed sensitive by senior political figures, political parties, well-connected individuals and security forces are unlikely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by security forces, questioning and lawsuits. DFAT assesses it is rare for journalists to face societal discrimination or violence. DFAT assesses the majority of social media users in Lebanon can use platforms without incident. GROUPS OF INTEREST Women  3.75 Lebanon acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1997 but maintains reservations on a number of articles relating to personal status issues. Article 2 of the Constitution guarantees all citizens equality before the law, under which they enjoy civil and political rights and are bound by public obligations and duties without distinction. There are considerable legal protections for women in Lebanon, including the Domestic Violence Law (No. 293) 2014 and the Sexual Harassment Law (No. 205) 2020. The government’s National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2022-2030 aims to advance gender equality and women's empowerment to foster a more inclusive society. It focuses on enhancing women's participation in political and public life, ensuring equal economic opportunities and combating all forms of violence and discrimination against women through promoting legal reforms.  3.76 The 2025 World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report ranked Lebanon 136 out of 148 economies for women’s economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival and political empowerment. The report noted near parity between men and women in terms of educational attainment and literacy (90 per cent). Women also made up a majority of professional and technical workers in Lebanon. In-country sources said women's overall labour force participation was significantly lower than men because many had left employment since the economic crisis of 2019 to look after children. 3.77 Women are underrepresented in politics, although in-country sources said the number of female candidates for elected positions was increasing. In the 2022 national elections women comprised approximately 15 per cent of candidates but only 6 per cent of elected MPs (eight in total). At the local level, only 18 of Lebanon’s 1,020 mayors are women. In-country sources said some religious communities viewed it unacceptable for women to be involved in politics based on traditional cultural values and stereotypes. In 2025, Prime Minister Salam appointed five women to his 24-member Cabinet, in the roles of minister of education and higher education, minister of environment, minister of social development, minister of tourism, and minister of youth and sports. The number of women in Cabinet was just short of the record six women appointed in 2020. 22 3.78 Discriminatory laws and regulations based on gender exist. These include Lebanon’s 15 religion-specific personal status laws covering marriage, divorce, child custody and inheritance. Across all religious confessions, women face legal and other obstacles when terminating marriages, limitations on their financial rights and the risk of losing custody of their children if they remarry. Shi’a and Sunni personal status laws grant men an absolute right to divorce while women only have a conditional right for specific reasons. Under Christian personal status laws, spousal violence is insufficient to obtain a divorce, except in cases of attempted murder. Under all personal status codes, a husband’s obligation to support his spouse expires when the marriage is dissolved by a court judgment. In cases of separation, spousal maintenance for all confessions, except in Christian abandonment cases, is typically only granted as a temporary measure when husbands fail to provide for their wives.  3.79 GBV against women and girls takes many forms. It can be physical, emotional, psychological or sexual and may encompass threats of violence and coercion. The domestic violence hotline at the General Directorate of Internal Security Forces recorded 615 complaints of violence countrywide between January and October 2024 (excluding March where data was missing). UN survey data from 2020 showed 43 per cent of Lebanese women and 30 per cent of Lebanese men reported witnessing violence or knowing a woman who had experienced violence.  3.80 In-country sources said rates of violence against women continued to decrease in 2025 because awareness raising campaigns had proved effective and GBV was increasingly seen as unacceptable by society. Lebanon’s 2024 Gender-based Violence Information Management System’s Midyear 2025 Report stated disclosures of GBV may rise as survivors of conflict shift their focus away from immediate survival and basic needs towards other critical and life-saving concerns such as their exposure to GBV.  3.81 Family violence against men, including those targeted by the family of woman with whom they have a relationship, is rare. The 2024 Gender-based Violence Information Management System Annual Report stated only 2 per cent of GBV victims were men. 3.82 Articles 503 and 504 of the Penal Code 1943 define the crime of rape as the coercion by violence, threats, deception, or abuse of any person other than one’s spouse into sexual intercourse, which prescribes minimum penalties of five to seven years’ imprisonment. Rape within marriage is not a crime. The Domestic Violence Law 2014 was amended in 2020 to add ‘economic violence’ as one of the punishable types of violence, increase the number of judges in charge of investigating and examining domestic violence cases, establish a special account in the MoSD to help survivors and impose tougher penalties for perpetrators of domestic violence crimes. The amended law also allows a judge to include children up to age 13 in the protection decision filed by a mother, so if a mother escapes violence she can take her children, regardless of the personal status law her sect follows.  3.83 There are no official statistics available regarding the incidence of killings and assaults in Lebanon motivated by ‘honour’. CSOs recorded 18 instances of so-called ‘honour killings’ in 2023 and 17 in 2024, criminal offences they said the ISF took seriously and investigated vigorously. The penalty for so-called ‘honour killings’ is up to 25 years in prison. Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or other non-medical reasons, is reportedly rare in Lebanon. 3.84 State protection is available for all Lebanese women reporting GBV, regardless of their religion, including single, divorced, trans, gay and bisexual women. According to in-country sources, the ISF generally took allegations of GBV seriously. However, outcomes of GBV cases were generally more favourable in well-resourced urban areas with better-trained officers as compared to rural areas. Protection orders are issued at judges’ discretion and in-country sources said they were frequently granted. Protection orders sometimes require a forensics report to corroborate survivors’ statements.  3.85 Shelters to accommodate survivors of GBV exist in Lebanon, run primarily by CSOs and faith-based organisations. Shelters often provide social, family and psychological counselling, along with referrals to other service providers. Children can be accommodated in shelters but boys are only permitted until the age of 12. In-country sources said shelters did not always admit trans women, bisexual women or lesbians (see Sexual orientation and gender identity). Access to shelters is significantly better in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, where most are located, than in more rural areas of the country.  23 3.86 Historically it was socially taboo for women in Lebanon to live alone without a male relative or guardian. In-country sources said women were now able to live alone but were sometimes viewed with disapproval or shame. According to in-country sources, female-headed households often experienced difficulties securing accommodation. 3.87 There are no official barriers for single, divorced and widowed women accessing education and employment. Unofficial barriers for single mothers accessing education and employment may include childcare responsibilities and a lack of social support. Article 26 of the Labour Law 1946 forbids discrimination against women concerning work type, pay, employment, promotion, training and clothing. However, women are prohibited from working in certain hazardous industries, including underground mine work and jobs involving lead or explosives. Women across the socioeconomic spectrum experience sexual harassment, both verbal and physical. Sexual harassment is criminalised under Law No. 205/2020, with penalties of upwards of four years in prison and/or fines. Article 26 of the Labour Law 1946 and Law No. 205/2020 have both faced implementation challenges due to the burden of proof on victims, lack of clear reporting mechanisms and societal barriers. 3.88 DFAT assesses women possibly face official discrimination based on gender in the form of discriminatory laws and regulations including personal status. DFAT assesses women are unlikely to face societal discrimination based on gender in the form sexual harassment. DFAT assesses women possibly face violence in the form of GBV. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 3.89 Article 534 of the Penal Code 1943 prohibits ‘sexual intercourse against nature’ with a penalty of up to one year imprisonment. In-country sources said Article 534 of the Penal Code 1943 was not used to criminalise consensual same-sex relations, including men having sex with men, trans women or lesbians. A 2009 judicial ruling confirmed consensual same-sex relations were not ‘unnatural’ and thus not subject to penalty under Article 534, denying the application of criminal laws against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. Lebanon’s military courts also refused to convict people in the army of engaging in consensual same-sex relations.  3.90 Lebanon has historically been viewed as accommodating and progressive in terms of LGBTQIA+ rights, with LGBTQIA+ people from less tolerant countries throughout the Middle East moving there in significant numbers. In-country sources said official discrimination in Lebanon against people based on their sexual orientation and gender identity was rare. LGBTQIA+ people had few difficulties accessing government services, including education and healthcare. Harassment by authorities, including ISF raids on clubs, bars and safe spaces for LGBTQIA+ people had been rare since 2014 and primarily targeted drug trafficking, not people’s sexual orientation or gender identity. 3.91 Lebanon’s LGBTQIA+ community is diverse, encompassing people with a wide range of sexual orientations, gender identities and sex characteristics. Some live openly and publicly identify as LGBTQIA+ while others keep a low profile to avoid societal discrimination. Most LGBTQIA+ people work in the informal sector. According to a 2022 survey by a CSO in Lebanon, 35 per cent of LGBTQIA+ people faced discrimination accessing housing and 25 per cent faced discrimination in the retail/hospitality sector. Ten per cent reported facing no discrimination at all due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. Although societal violence was infrequent, family violence sometimes occurred against LGBTQIA+ people, especially against gay men as a result of Lebanon’s patriarchal culture. In-country sources said there was widespread tolerance of LGBTQIA+ people in Lebanon’s urban areas, but less in rural areas. LGBTQIA+ people often relocated to larger cities in Lebanon, especially Beirut, where they could generally live more openly. 3.92 Trans women often experience societal discrimination and find it difficult to secure formal employment. In-country sources said some trans women turned to prostitution, leaving them vulnerable to sexual abuse, harassment and arrest. Article 521 of the Penal Code 1943 states ‘any man who disguises himself as a woman and enters a place specifically for women only or a place in which anyone aside from women are prohibited from entering may be jailed for no more than 6 months’. Although this law was established specifically to target terrorism suspects disguised as women, it has sometimes been used by authorities to harass trans women, including sex workers. DFAT was not aware of societal discrimination against trans men and nonbinary identities at the time of writing. 3.93 There are few opportunities for trans women to receive gender affirming care in Lebanon, although some CSOs provide assistance. In-country sources said gender reassignment procedures were available but not common in Lebanese hospitals, meaning many trans women went abroad to places like Syria to undergo surgery. Human Rights Watch reported trans people could only change their names and gender markers on official documents 24 through a court ruling, often following a ‘gender dysphoria’ diagnosis and surgery. Some trans women were reportedly deterred from seeking these rulings due to high fees, lack of legal assistance and protracted court proceedings. DFAT was not aware of instances of trans men and nonbinary people attempting to change their names and gender markers on official documents the time of writing. 3.94 Lebanon has a support network for LGBTQIA+ people. In-country sources said CSOs in and around Beirut and Mount Lebanon were well established and funded, while those in more rural areas tended to be smaller and more informal. CSOs focused primarily on providing shelter, legal advice, financial assistance, mental health services, safe spaces for the community and human rights advocacy with the government and international organisations. 3.95 Political parties in Lebanon hold a diverse range of views on LGBTQIA+ issues. For example, Hizballah has been outspoken out against ‘homosexual relationships’, while the Free Patriotic Movement, Kataeb Party and Progressive Socialist Party have publicly supported LGBTQIA+ rights. Some political parties have attempted to politicise LGBTQIA+ issues to gain increased electoral support. For example, former interior minister Bassam al-Mawlawi directed the Internal Security and General Security in June 2022 to ban any gatherings aimed at ‘promoting sexual perversion’, understood to refer to gatherings by LGBTQIA+ groups. In August 2022, the Shura Council lifted Bassam Mawlawi's ban, ruling it incited violence and hatred against marginalised groups and violated LGBTQIA+ people's constitutional rights to equality, free expression and free assembly. 3.96 There were reports of isolated attacks on LGBTQIA+ people in 2023 by the far-right Christian extremist group Jnoud el Rab (‘Soldiers of God’). For example, three people were injured in Beirut in September 2023 when a march in defence of LGBTQIA+ rights was attacked by Jnoud el Rab. The ISF intervened to protect activists and assembled journalists after members of Jnoud el Rab threw stones at them. In another instance, Jnoud el Rab attacked a LGBTQIA+ bar in Beirut in August 2023. The bar’s owner stated the ISF responded to the attack to prevent assailants from entering the bar but did not make arrests.  DFAT is not aware of reports of attacks by Jnoud el Rab on LGBTQIA+ people in Lebanon since late 2023. 3.97 DFAT assesses LGBTQIA+ people are unlikely to face official discrimination in the form of harassment by authorities, which would occur due to individual prejudices rather than official policy. DFAT assesses LGBTQIA+ people possibly face societal discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender identity in the form of access to employment and housing. DFAT assesses LGBTQIA+ people are unlikely to experience societal violence but possibly experience family violence. DFAT assesses trans women are likely to face official discrimination when changing their gender on official documents. DFAT assesses trans women are likely to face societal discrimination and possibly experience societal violence. Children 3.98 Lebanon is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The country’s child protection system is secular and state-led, as outlined under the Protection of Children in Violation of the Law or Exposed to Danger (No. 422) 2002. The safety and security of a child is considered threatened in situations where they are exposed to exploitation, sexual abuse, physical violence or if they are found begging or homeless. In these cases, civil juvenile courts, juvenile judges and contracted social workers have the power to investigate maltreatment and make care plans. The age of criminal responsibility in Lebanon is 7 years of age. Children between the ages of 7 and 12 are presumed to have limited capacity and courts may order protective measures rather than criminal penalties. 3.99 Article 186 of the Penal Code 1943 provides a defence for the use of corporal punishment in child-rearing situations but not as a method of discipline in schools. In defining a child as ‘endangered’ under the law, Article 1 of the Protection of Children in Violation of the Law or Exposed to Danger (No. 422) 2002 refers to ‘physical assault that surpasses the limits of what is deemed culturally accepted as harmless corporal punishment’. 3.100 The minimum age of marriage ranges between religious denomination and can be different for boys and girls. For example, the minimum age of marriage for Christians is 16 for boys and 14 for girls. For Shi’a, the minimum age of marriage is 15 for males and the age of puberty for females but only with judicial permission below the age of 15 years. The Sunni Supreme Islamic Council raised the minimum age of marriage in 2020 to 18 years for both males and females who are Sunni. However, as an exception, minors are able to marry from the age of 15 with the 25 agreement of their legal guardian provided a medical examination is conducted to assess their mental, physical and psychological condition.  3.101 Lebanon is a signatory to the ILO’s Convention on Child Labour but enforcement is poor. Approximately 7 per cent of children in Lebanon are forced to work to provide income for their families. Many boys and young men work in agriculture, metalworking or factories, sometimes under difficult conditions. The Lebanese Government does not release data on the number of children exposed to the worst forms of child labour, such as drug trafficking, forced begging and commercial sexual exploitation. 3.102 DFAT assesses it is rare for children to face official or societal discrimination based on their juvenile status alone. DFAT assesses children are likely to face societal violence in the form of corporal punishment. Children who are poor, geographically isolated, female, living with disability or orphaned may face elevated risks. 26 

4. COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CLAIMS ARBITRARY DEPRIVATION OF LIFE Extrajudicial Killings 4.1 Extrajudicial killings occur when individuals are deliberately killed outside of any legal framework. Extrajudicial killings in Lebanon linked to security officials are rare. DFAT was aware of one recent reported extrajudicial killing at the time of writing. In this instance, a municipality policeman kicked the moving motorcycle of Syrian, Muhammad Zaid al-Hariri, at a checkpoint in Beirut in February 2024, resulting in his death. The LAF reportedly detained the policeman but the outcome of the investigation was unclear at the time of writing. The US Department of State stated there were no reports of the government or its agents committing arbitrary or unlawful killings during 2023. Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 4.2 Article 8 of the Constitution states no citizen may be arrested, imprisoned or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law. DFAT was not aware of recent reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances carried out in Lebanon at the time of writing. The US Department of State stated there were no known reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities during 2023. 4.3 The majority of historical cases of enforced or involuntary disappearance in Lebanon occurred prior to Syria's 2005 withdrawal from the country and during the civil war between 1975 and 1990. Human Rights Watch estimated a number of Palestinians were kidnapped or disappeared prior to the withdrawal of Syrian forces and 17,000 Lebanese nationals were kidnapped or disappeared during the civil war.  4.4 Lebanon’s Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Person Law (No. 105) 2018 establishes the right for families to know the fate of missing relatives. This law mandates those with information about missing people must disclose it to authorities and criminalises enforced disappearances. The independent National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared was established in 2020 to ‘clarify the fate and whereabouts of the missing and forcibly disappeared persons’. At the time of writing, the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Person Law had yet to be fully implemented and the National Commission lacked sustainable funding. Deaths in Custody 4.5 The Ministry of Interior does not consistently publish statistics on deaths in custody or their causes. However, deaths in custody of the Lebanese Government are generally attributable to illness or environmental issues rather than negligence or ill-treatment. The US Department of State reported the ISF investigated alleged abuses in prisons and detention centres but prison directors reportedly protected police and correctional officers under investigation. The Lebanese Government permits monitoring of prison and detention conditions by independent local and international human rights groups and the International Committee of the Red Cross. 4.6 In-country sources said there were reported instances of Syrian detainees held on terrorism-related charges being beaten to death while in custody prior to 2024. For example, Amnesty International reported five members of State Security were charged in November 2022 over the death in custody of Syrian, Bashar Abd Saud. The defendants were sentenced to time served in November 2024 after being found guilty under Article 166 of the Code of Military Justice for violating regulations, orders and general instructions. DEATH PENALTY 4.7 Lebanese law permits the death penalty for 41 crimes, with around half of the offences set out in the Penal Code 1943, the other half in the Code of Military Justice and a few under special laws. Several crimes punishable by death in Lebanon do not involve ‘death as a direct and intentional result’, such as treason, aggression aimed at inciting sedition, attempted homicide committed by an armed gang, desertion and abandoning one’s post in the presence of the enemy. The death penalty is not applicable for drug-related or sexual violence offences. The mandatory application of the death penalty for certain crimes was abolished in 2021. A draft law calling for the 27 abolition of the death penalty and its replacement with life imprisonment was adopted by the human rights committee in February 2026 and will be sent for examination by the National Assembly. 4.8 Ordinary courts, military courts and the Council of Justice can impose the death penalty. Observers report death sentences require the approval of the president, prime minister and justice minister. Lebanon’s president has the power to grant clemency. 4.9 Lebanon’s last execution took place in 2004. Lebanon has maintained a de facto moratorium on executions since 2010. Lebanon has not signed the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the Abolition of the Death Penalty and judges continue to hand down death sentences. At least 78 people were on death row at the end of 2023, mostly for terrorism-related crimes. CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT Torture 4.10 Lebanon is a state party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Other Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol. Torture is criminalised under the Punishment of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Law (No. 65) 2017, which provides punishments of between three months to three year’s imprisonment. The law has a statute of limitations of three to ten years for prosecuting torture beginning when a victim is released from custody or detention.  4.11 Human Rights Watch and other human rights advocacy organisations report criminal sentences imposed under the Punishment of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Law (No. 65) 2017 do not adequately reflect the grave nature of the crime of torture. The State Shura Council ruled in 2025 the government is liable to pay reparations when authorities fail to prohibit, prevent and adequately investigate allegations of torture and other ill-treatment. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment is not explicitly criminalised in Lebanon.  4.12 The Lebanese Government denies the systematic use of torture. In-country sources said violent abuse sometimes occurred during pre-trial detention at police stations and military installations to elicit confessions during interrogations. The Lebanese Center for Human Rights documented around 77 cases of torture by security forces in 2024. For example, a Syrian was arrested at a protest for Gaza solidarity in Beirut in March 2024 and reportedly confessed under torture to belonging to a terrorist organisation. According to Human Rights Watch, a medical exam conducted after his release showed the man had bruises and marks on his body resulting from ‘being beaten or hit … with a hard, cable-shaped object’. 4.13 The judiciary rarely investigates or prosecutes allegations of torture according to the US Department of State. The law also allows security force units accused of conducting abuses to conduct their own internal investigation and try implicated members in military court, even if the charges were unrelated to their official duties. Arbitrary Arrest and Detention 4.14 Article 8 of the Constitution states no citizen may be arrested, imprisoned or kept in custody except according to the provisions of the law. The US Department of State reported the right of Lebanese nationals to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court is generally observed by the government. CSOs report arbitrary arrest sometimes occurs but most of those arrested chose not to report violations. According to CSOs most cases involve members of vulnerable groups, such as asylum seekers, drug users, LGBTQIA+ people or migrant workers. DFAT was unable to verify whether or not Hizballah continued to be involved in extrajudicial arrests and detention at the time of writing.    Corporal Punishment 4.15 Corporal punishment is unlawful as a sentence for crime. It is not a permitted measure for offenders under the age of 18 years under the Protection of Juvenile Delinquents and Endangered Juveniles Law (No. 422) 2002. Corporal punishment is considered unlawful as a disciplinary measure in penal institutions for offenders under the age of 18 years but it is not explicitly prohibited. 28 4.16 Corporal punishment is lawful in Lebanese homes, alternative care settings and day care centres. Article 186 of the Penal Code 1943 states ‘the law permits types of non-violent discipline which are practiced by fathers and mothers on their children provided it does not leave any effect on the child's body or lead to harm to their physical or psychological health’. The Ministry of Education’s Child Protection Policy published in May 2018 explicitly prohibited corporal punishment (see also Children). 

5. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS STATE PROTECTION Military 5.1 The LAF is comprised of the Army, Navy and Air Force. It had 60,000 active personnel and 35,000 reserve personnel in 2025. The LAF is responsible for territorial defence, maintaining internal stability and security and undertaking relief operations in coordination with public and humanitarian institutions. Article 49 of the Constitution states the president presides over the Supreme Defense Council and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, which fall under the authority of the Council of Ministers. Like other institutions in Lebanon, senior positions in the LAF are allocated on a confessional basis under the National Pact. The LAF is always headed by a Maronite Christian, the chief of staff must be a Druze and other sects are also represented at senior levels. The rank-and-file of the LAF is multi-confessional, with soldiers drawn from Lebanon’s various sects. Since the conclusion of the civil war, the LAF has sought to avoid entanglement in sectarian issues and is generally respected by all sectarian groups. In-country sources said the LAF was generally effective. 5.2 The LAF operates throughout Lebanon but needs to negotiate and deconflict with Hizballah in the areas under Hizballah’s nominal control. Since November 2024, the LAF has been able to operate more independently, as Hizballah no longer possesses the economic resources, organisational cohesion or military capacity necessary to sustain its security influence at previous levels. For example, Hizballah reportedly had around 6,000 full-time fighters in 2025 as compared to a claimed 100,000 in 2021.  5.3 President Aoun stated in April 2025 the LAF was ‘fully carrying out its responsibilities’ in areas of southern Lebanon vacated by the IDF in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. President Aoun also emphasised the state’s exclusive right to bear arms, signalling a disavowal of Hizballah’s parallel military structure. For example, in 2025 the LAF conducted inspections of Iranian aircraft at Beirut’s airport alleged to be transporting weapons and denied landing rights to flights suspected of transporting funds for Hizballah. These unprecedented actions led to protests by Hizballah supporters, which were forcibly cleared by the LAF, in one of the first instances of acting directly against Hizballah-aligned civilians. In-country sources said the LAF had ‘done a good job’ disarming Hizballah south of the Litani River and managing tensions in the Beqaa Valley, Akkar District and Tripoli. 5.4 LAF salaries were low in 2025, starting at AUD448 a month for the lowest ranks and AUD1,389 for generals. Salaries and benefits in the Presidential Guards are the highest in the army due to additional funds from the presidency. Military personnel receive additional benefits such as medical care for themselves and their families, discounted medications and assistance with school fees for their children. Military officers also receive fuel vouchers, food aid, access to health clubs and extra funds for hiring housemaids. While some of these benefits were reduced in 2020 due to the economic crisis, they had returned by the end of 2024.  5.5 The Lebanese treasury is responsible for payments to military personnel but international donors such as the European Union, Qatar and the United States provide foreign aid including stipends for the LAF, fuel, food and equipment. Although the LAF had difficulties retaining staff during the economic crisis, many had returned by 2024. At the time of writing the LAF was recruiting an additional 5,000–10,000 soldiers to double its deployment in southern Lebanon. 5.6 Transparency International reported while the LAF benefits from public support transcending sectarian lines, ‘the institution faces high risks of corruption due to limited parliamentary oversight and access to information, amplified by the lack of transparency to citizens and accountability beyond the armed forces’. Local academics stated military bodies that try corruption cases, such as the Defence Committee to Combat Corruption and Military Capacity Development Office, often suffer from the same opaqueness they were created to address. In-country sources said corruption within the LAF was modest in comparison with other governmental agencies. Most corruption allegations related to preferential treatment and ‘skimming’ (defalcation). 30 Police 5.7 The ISF (also known as the ‘darak’) is Lebanon’s police and security body. It is tasked with maintaining public order and countering terrorism. The ISF falls under the authority of Lebanon’s Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and is guided by the Organisation of Internal Security Force Law (No. 17) 1990. Although headed by a Sunni Muslim as part of Lebanon’s confessional system, the ISF is nominally a non-sectarian organisation.  5.8 The Lebanese treasury is responsible for payments to ISF personnel but international donors such as the United Kingdom and the United States provide foreign aid including stipends, fuel, food and equipment. The economic crisis between 2019 and 2023 caused serious difficulties for the ISF and its personnel. Monthly salaries for ISF Non-Commissioned Officers dropped to as little as AUD90 a month due to the currency collapse, leading to many officers quitting or taking on second jobs. During this time, the ISF scaled back its law-and-order capacity and delegated more of its duties to the LAF.  In-country sources said monthly salaries for ISF Non-Commissioned Officers had increased to AUD1,070 a month at the time of writing, although many officers continued to work second jobs. The ISF had also successfully recruited between 800 to 1000 additional Non-Commissioned Officers in 2025. 5.9 In-country sources said the effectiveness of the ISF and its ability to respond to crime had improved considerably since its low point in 2022. It was generally viewed by society as an effective force in cities, less so in rural areas where it had fewer officers on the ground. The ISF was seen as most competent in counter-terrorism operations but less effective as a first responder to reportable crimes. In-country sources said ISF officers normally followed procedures around investigations, arrests and legal processes. The ISF generally treated all Lebanese nationals with dignity and respect, regardless of religion. According to in-country sources, the ISF took allegations of GBV seriously but resourcing and staffing constraints sometimes resulted in lengthy investigations. Human rights education had been integrated into ISF training programs, including sensitivity training in handling GBV cases. 5.10 Reliance on external aid, circumvention, downsizing and rent-seeking practices were common for the ISF during the economic crisis between 2019 and 2022. In-country sources said corrupt practices amongst ISF officers had lessened by 2025 but bribes were commonly solicited to avoid higher traffic fines. The ISF Code of Conduct and additional regulations issued by the Director-General of the ISF are binding. Judicial oversight over the ISF is generally weak because its personnel fall under the jurisdiction of military courts, which have historically been opaque.  5.11 Where they exist, Municipal Police provide first-response policing and a range of minor duties within municipalities. Municipal Police are not affiliated with the Ministry of Interior but subject to the authority of local mayors. Municipal Police are expected to ask for the support of the ISF in the event of a crime or disturbance related to public security. The Municipal Police was hit especially hard by the economic crisis and many officers were laid off. At the time of writing, Municipal Police rarely played an essential role in maintaining security. Legal System 5.12 Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary and prohibits interference in judicial affairs. The legal system of Lebanon is based on a combination of Civil Law, Islamic and Ottoman legal principles and the laws of the Lebanese legislature. The Judicial Organization Law (No. 7855) 1961 governs the structure and function of the judiciary. Senior judges are generally professional and independent but the quality and impartiality of judges at more junior levels varies. Women can serve as prosecutors and judges at all levels, except within the religious court system where they are often prohibited from holding judicial positions. 5.13 Lebanon’s judiciary is comprised of ordinary and exceptional courts. The ordinary courts are arranged in a hierarchy and subdivided into criminal and civil departments. The Courts of First Instance are organised into chambers of three judges each, although a single judge may adjudicate minor criminal cases. Judgments from the Courts of First Instance can be appealed to the Courts of Appeal, which have both appellate and original jurisdictions over felonies. In-country sources said those found guilty had 15 days from sentencing to file appeals, some of which succeeded on their merits.  5.14 There are six Courts of Appeal, one in each district of the country. They are presided over by a chief judge and comprise a Public Prosecution Department headed by an attorney general. Decisions of the Courts of Appeal may be appealed to the Court of Cassation (Supreme Court). In addition to hearing appeals from the lower courts, 31 the Court of Cassation adjudicates disputes between exceptional and ordinary courts or between two types of exceptional courts. 5.15 There are several special bodies with Lebanon's legal system. These include the Council of the State, empowered to try disputes between individuals and the state. The Sharia Courts settle matters of personal status, which are divided into Druze, Shi’a and Sunni units. The Ecclesiastical Courts are composed of various Christian divisions and settle matters of personal status for individuals from their communities. In addition, there are several other courts with specialised jurisdiction, including the Labour Court, Land Court, Customs Committee and Juvenile Courts (see Children). 5.16 Hizballah and Palestinian camp authorities run autonomous, informal legal systems in areas under their control. At the time of writing, DFAT was unable to verify the independence, legitimacy or equity of legal processes under these systems. 5.17 The Public Prosecution Office is an independent arm of the judiciary tasked with conducting neutral, unbiased investigations. It represents the public in civil and criminal courts through litigation and prosecutions. Prosecution offices are attached to the courts, including the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation. The Office is led by the State Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation in Beirut who oversees all prosecutions throughout the country. Criminal investigations are generally initiated based on complaints filed by citizens or government officials.  5.18 Those arrested are normally seen by the General Prosecutor within 24 hours but can be held on remand indefinitely without specific charges being brought. Time served on remand is counted as part of a prisoner’s sentence. The Lebanese criminal justice system moves very slowly. In 2024, 83 per cent of prisoners in Lebanon were being held on remand. Those accused who cannot afford a lawyer can request legal aid, which is provided at the discretion of the Lawyers Syndicate. 5.19 The Judicial Inspectorate is an independent body under the authority of the Minister of Justice tasked with monitoring the judiciary and investigating allegations of misconduct and corruption. Substantiated allegations are sent to a Disciplinary Council that can issue warnings, demotions, suspensions and dismissal. The US Department of State stated although the right of Lebanese nationals to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court was generally observed, there were several reported instances of officials subjecting the judiciary to intimidation or political pressure. In-country sources said defendants involved in routine civil and criminal proceedings sometimes used wasta to speed up trials or influence the outcomes of their cases (see Corruption). 5.20 Parliament adopted a law on reforms for the judiciary on 31 July 2025 to improve judicial independence. The draft law included provisions restricting the ability of authorities to suspend judges unless they were facing disciplinary measures. The law also limited the executive branch’s role in selecting judges for the Supreme Judicial Council. In September 2025, President Aoun returned the draft law on reforms for the judiciary to parliament for further review of the provision giving the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation the authority to order any prosecutor halt proceedings in an ongoing case. This measure had received public criticism in judicial circles and from human rights CSOs for its perceived infringement on the autonomy of magistrates. At the time of writing, parliament was reviewing the law. Military Courts and State Security Emergency Courts 5.21 The military court system is an exceptional judicial system falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. It includes investigative judges, trial judges, a Permanent Military Court and a Military Court of Cassation. Military judges are appointed by the minister for defence. They are not required to have a law degree or legal training and remain subordinate to the minister during their tenure. Access to military court proceedings is restricted, meaning human rights organisations and journalists are often not able to monitor trials.  5.22 Military courts handle cases related to military personnel and certain crimes threatening national security. The system has broad jurisdiction over civilians in national security cases, including those involving espionage, treason, unlawful contact with ‘the enemy’ (Israel) and weapons possession. Military courts also handle those involved in crimes harming the interest of the LAF and ISF, meaning civilians can be tried in military courts for any interaction or altercation with security services or their employees.  32 5.23 Human Rights Watch reported authorities sometimes used the military court’s legal jurisdiction over civilians as a means to ‘intimidate or punish them for political activism or to stamp out dissent’. For example, a military court issued a search warrant for journalist Mariam Majdoline al-Lahham in October 2024, reportedly for expressing her opinion on social media that those working for the Hizballah-affiliated Islamic Health Committee and targeted by Israeli air strikes were not neutral civilians. The case against al-Lahham for treason was pending at the time of writing.  Double Jeopardy 5.24 Lebanon’s legal system recognises and respects the principle of double jeopardy, with the concept of finality in criminal proceedings and preventing repeated prosecution for the same facts implied through established legal principles and international commitments. The only exceptions are crimes involving national security and specific types of counterfeiting and forgery. DFAT was not aware at the time of writing of recent instances where Lebanese nationals were tried for crimes overseas and then tried again upon return to Lebanon. National Human Rights Institution 5.25 The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was officially established in 2016 and incorporates the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The NHRC’s mission is to promote human rights in Lebanon following standards laid down in the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights conventions and treaties. Since the NHRC and CPT were established, they have faced funding issues and impediments to their operational independence. At the time of writing the NHRC was not an accredited member of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. Detention and Prison 5.26 All prisons in Lebanon are administered by the Ministry of Justice, except for military prisons run by the Ministry of Defence. There are 25 prison facilities located throughout the country, of which four are reserved for women (Baabda, Beirut, Tripoli and Zahlé) and two for juveniles. There were a total of 9,254 incarcerated people in Lebanon in 2023. The Director General of Prisons stated prisons were operating at 300 per cent capacity in January 2025 due to the destruction of six facilities (Baalbek, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, Nabatieh, Tibnin and Tyre) by IDF airstrikes. Roumieh Prison was reportedly the most overcrowded facility, holding 3,460 inmates in a facility designed for 1,000. 5.27 In-country sources said prisons were often overcrowded and lacked proper sanitation and ventilation. Inmates received three meals a day, with food, soft drinks and toiletries also available for purchase from prison shops. In most prisons there were basic cooking and clothes washing facilities. Prisoners were often not able to shower daily. Inmates were allowed into the prison yard every day for three hours of fresh air and exercise. In-country sources said medical facilities varied by prison but inmates had regular access to nurses and doctors. Inmates could obtain medication through prison pharmacies and if required drugs were unavailable locally, they could be purchased overseas with the prison’s agreement. 5.28 The Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Affairs and NGOs, occasionally organises educational programs and workshops for inmates. Prison libraries have access to books required for educational courses, including at the tertiary level. Inmates are entitled to take part in religious services, although detention facilities are not staffed by religious ministers. 5.29 Conditions in military prisons and police stations were worse than those in regular prisons according to in-country sources. Inmates in military prisons were often handcuffed and blindfolded when being moved throughout facilities. Overcrowding was also an issue, with 30 or 40 inmates sharing cells meant to house eight people. Inmates in military prisons and police stations had access to religious materials, medical care and medicines.  5.30 Non-governmental entities, including Hizballah and Palestinian non-state militias, reportedly operate unofficial detention facilities, although DFAT was unable to verify information regarding conditions in these facilities. 33 INTERNAL RELOCATION 5.31 The Constitution guarantees freedom of movement and residence in Lebanon. The government does not impose any limitations on the freedom of movement of its citizens and all Lebanese nationals can legally relocate to, and resettle in, any part of the country. Lebanese nationals can and do relocate for a variety of reasons, including to major cities like Beirut that offer greater opportunities for employment. In-country sources said Beirut offered a greater degree of state protection than other areas of the country but Lebanon was small and people were able to be found by their respective communities. 5.32 DFAT assesses migrating to large urban areas like Beirut possibly mitigates risks posed by GBV and personal or business disputes. However, vulnerable groups such as single and divorced women from poorer and more rural areas leaving family violence situations likely face additional barriers to relocation including access to employment and housing. TREATMENT OF RETURNEES Exit and Entry Procedures 5.33 The Directorate General of General Security (DGGS) is responsible for conducting checks at ports of entry and exit which are strictly enforced. When entering the country, Lebanese nationals must present a passport or Individual Civil Status Extract. When exiting the country, Lebanese nationals must provide a passport or National ID Card (NID), along with a visa valid for the intended destination.  5.34 Lebanese border authorities maintain a database of ‘border alerts’ or ‘stop orders’, against which they check all travellers’ names on arrival and departure. Border alerts are raised when there are pending court cases or warrants for those wanted for, or convicted of, offences in Lebanon. Lebanese nationals returning from overseas are likely to be arrested or detained on return if they have an existing stop order against them. In addition, the husbands of married women and fathers of unmarried women and underage children can request travel bans against their dependants through a court order. Appeals against these travel bans are possible but rarely successful.  5.35 Beirut-Rafik Hariri International Airport was the only operational commercial airport in Lebanon at the time of writing. Along with the Port of Beirut, it is the main entry point into the country. Authorities regularly perform biometric checks (photograph and fingerprinting) on arriving passengers at the airport. In-country sources said authorities had made strenuous efforts to restrict Hizballah-affiliated officials from working at the airport in 2025, in large part by removing their security clearances. 5.36 There are four official border crossing points with Syria and none with Israel or Palestine. The standard of exit and entry formalities (including access to the online database) at the majority of official land border crossing points are not on par with that of the airport or Port of Beirut. Lebanon’s borders are porous and almost all recent arrivals from Syria have entered irregularly.  5.37 Travel to Israel by Lebanese nationals is illegal. Lebanese citizens are likely to be arrested or detained if authorities find evidence that they have travelled to Israel. Evidence of travel to Israel may include Israeli exit or entry stamps, Egyptian or Jordanian stamps from border crossings with Israel or travel itineraries or tickets that include Israel as a destination. Conditions for Returnees 5.38 It is not a crime for Lebanese nationals to seek asylum abroad. Returnees, both voluntary and involuntary, are processed at Lebanon’s ports of entry like other returning citizens. In-country sources said some failed asylum seekers had been questioned by border officials upon their return to ascertain if they were members of banned Islamic militant groups. Returnees may also come to the attention of authorities if they had an existing stop order against them (see Exit and entry procedures).  5.39 Lebanon’s diplomatic missions issue passports to citizens overseas, including those who have previously sought asylum. Although Lebanese authorities do not generally provide support for returnees, in-country sources said several CSOs provided financial assistance upon request.  34 5.40 DFAT assesses it is rare for people who return to Lebanon, even after several years’ absence, to face adverse attention by authorities on their return due to their absence. DFAT assesses it is rare for failed asylum seekers to face adverse attention from authorities because of their failed application for asylum when they return to Lebanon.  DOCUMENTATION 5.41 The Directorate General for Personal Status (DGPS) at MoIM is responsible for personal status records for Lebanese nationals, which are stored at personal status register in various districts of Lebanon. Personal status records are organised according to family, under which each family holds a unique serial number for all its descendants known as the register number. These records provide the proof of Lebanese citizenship necessary to obtain identification papers. The personal status record for an individual includes information including the person’s full name, sex, parents’ names, place and date of birth, marital status, religion and register number. Birth, Death and Marriage Certificates 5.42 The Law on Documenting Civil Status 1951, last amended in 1993, governs the registration of births, deaths, marriages, divorce and annulments. The registration system is primarily paper-based and decentralised, with registers in Arabic maintained at the district level. 5.43 Under law, births must be officially declared by a parent, guardian or doctor within 30 days from the birth date. After this period of 30 days, births can only be registered through a judicial decision at the request of the attorney general. Birth registration takes place with the mukhtar in the locality where the child was born. To complete this process, parents must present a medical birth certificate issued from the hospital where the child was born, witness testimony, the parents’ NIDs or a Family Civil Status Extract and the parents’ marriage certificate. All documents are submitted to the mukhtar, who then travels to the Civil Status Qalam of the father’s place of registration to submit the documents for registration in the father’s family civil register. In-country sources said the birth registration process was straight forward as long as both parents were Lebanese citizens. A child born to a foreign father and Lebanese mother can obtain a birth certificate registered in the DGPS’ Foreigner Events Department. A child born of a Lebanese father outside Lebanon can obtain a Lebanese birth certificate through a Lebanese diplomatic mission. 5.44 The DGPS issues birth certificates, which follow a common template and include a government stamp as well as the execution date and number in the bottom left-hand corner. Information on the certificate includes: the names of parents and their register number, name and sex of the newborn, place and date of birth, signature of the hospital representative, doctor or legal midwife who assisted the birth, position and signature of the person preparing the document, signature of mukhtar and witnesses. 5.45 Article 1 of the Nationality Law 1925 states a person is considered a Lebanese national if they were born to a Lebanese father, were born in Lebanon and did not acquire a foreign nationality upon birth or were born in Lebanon to parents of an unknown nationality. Lebanese nationality is patrilineal and in most instances a Lebanese woman cannot transmit her citizenship to her children, who would instead be eligible for ‘right to remain’ in Lebanon. A Lebanese woman can only pass her nationality to a child if they were born outside of legal marriage or if their father was deceased. 5.46 Deaths must be declared within 30 days by the mukhtar, doctor, or a director of hospitals, prisons or police. Registration of births and deaths is free of charge. There are financial penalties for delays in registration. 5.47 Members of Lebanon’s 18 officially recognised religious denominations can register marriages with documentation provided by the relevant religious authority. Following the marriage ceremony, the religious authority provides a ‘marriage contract’ or ‘attestation of marriage’, indicating the agreement between the two parties was made in the presence of the marrying authority and witnesses. It contains the signatures of the two parties to prove consent and the signature of two witnesses.   5.48 The act of marriage is not officially recognised until it is correctly registered at MoIM’s General Directorate of Civil Status (DGCSS). To recognise a marriage, parties must provide the marriage contract or attestation of marriage, recently issued Individual Civil Status Extract, Family Civil Status Extract and NIDs for both parties. 35 Registered Palestinian refugees are required to provide their Palestinian refugee ID. Unregistered Palestinians must show a valid passport issued by the Palestinian Authority and an Attestation of Nationality issued by the Directorate of Refugee Affairs (DRA) or a valid laissez-passer issued by any foreign country and an entry stamp showing the date of entry into Lebanon. In the absence of a legal framework for civil marriage such marriages are treated as civil contracts under the Law of Obligations and Contracts 1932. Lebanon does not recognise same-sex marriage. 5.49 Lebanese nationals and registered Palestinian refugees who marry outside Lebanon can register their marriage through Lebanese diplomatic missions. The parties must present the official marriage certificate issued by the competent authorities in the foreign country to the Lebanese diplomatic mission, along with all other required documents as listed above. The diplomatic mission then authenticates the marriage certificate, registers it, gives it a number and sends it to the Lebanese foreign ministry. Once in Lebanon, the foreign ministry transfers the certificate to the DGCSS, which conducts the process of registration and execution. The marriage certificate is not valid until an execution date is entered. The marriage certificate is ultimately sent to the civil status officer of the district where the husband has his civil status records or the DRA if the husband is a registered Palestinian refugee. National Identity Cards (NIDs) 5.50 MoIM issues NIDs, which are also known as Bitaqa al hawiya. NIDs are mandatory for all Lebanese nationals over 15 years of age. Citizens must apply in-person at NID registration centres located in each of Lebanon’s 49 districts. Lebanese nationals residing abroad can only apply for a new identity card at a NID registration centre after returning to the country. Fingerprints are collected as part of the NID application process, as well as biographic data including name, parent’s names, sex, blood type, birthplace, date of birth, marital status, place of registration, family number, religious sect, current residential address and telephone number. Applicants must provide a recent Individual Civil Status Extract, a residence identification statement completed by the mukhtar of the place of registration or residence, an official medical report indicating blood type and an official identity attestation form filled out and certified by the mukhtar of the place of registration. To replace a lost or stolen NID, a copy of the previous card and a police report are also needed. In-country sources said the process of obtaining a NID was stringent, resulting in the issuance of very few fraudulently obtained genuine documents.  5.51 NIDs are the primary form of identification for Lebanese nationals. NIDs are required to access services including healthcare, banking and financial services, education, employment, travel (to obtain a passport and for travel to Syria and Jordan), obtaining other documents (such as driver’s licences) and file insurance claims. Religious affiliation is no longer printed on NIDs but is listed on Lebanese nationals’ Personal Status Records which govern access to a number of important services. It is rare for failure to obtain a NID card to result in prosecution. Passports 5.52 DGGS issues Lebanese passports in Lebanon and the country’s diplomatic missions issue them abroad. The DGGS will not issue a passport to a person under arrest for a criminal offence or those deemed ‘dangerous’ in accordance with the International Police Agreement 1920. The Passports Act 2005 gives the minister for foreign affairs the power to refuse, cancel or suspend a passport on grounds including national security or health. Lebanese nationals who owe money to a child support enforcement agency may also be refused a passport. 5.53 All Lebanese passports issued by the DGGS have been biometric since August 2016, although non-biometric passports remain valid until their expiry date. Passports are issued for five or ten years. To obtain a passport, Lebanese nationals must provide their NID, as well as recent Individual Civil Status Extract if this is their first application for a biometric passport. Identity Documents for Palestinians 5.54 Palestinian refugee records are kept at the DRA at MoIM’s General Directorate of Political and Refugee Affairs. They form the legal basis for Palestinian refugees to enjoy legal residency in Lebanon and obtain IDs issued by Lebanese authorities. 5.55 The DRA’s Events Registration Department has adopted procedures for registering children born to Palestinian fathers registered in Lebanon. To organise a birth certificate, parents or guardians must provide the DRA 36 with: a birth attestation from the doctor or midwife who assisted the birth, the father’s Palestinian refugee card, a copy of the parents’ marriage certificate and an extract of the father’s Palestinian refugee family register. Once the birth certificate is in hand, parents or guardians must submit it to the DRA, along with an extract of the family personal status register for registered Palestinian refugees, a request by the mukhtar of the place of residence, a copy of the father’s Palestinian refugee card and two photographs of the child. If the declaration is made through a guardian, a copy of the guardianship decision must be presented. If it is made through someone delegated by the family, a copy of the delegation through a notary public must be provided. In most instances, Palestinian mothers married to non-Palestinians experience difficulties registering children in Lebanon. 5.56 Palestinians registered with UNRWA are entitled to travel documents valid for one or five years. Palestinians who are not registered with UNRWA can obtain travel documents valid for either one or three years. Fees payable for travel documents are similar to those paid by Lebanese nationals. In 2016, biometric passports replaced handwritten travel documents. Passports can be renewed in diplomatic missions abroad. Prevalence of Fraud 5.57 Identity fraud and fraudulently obtained genuine documents are rare in Lebanon according to in-country sources. Authorities issue core identity documents like birth certificates, NIDs, passports and Registry Documents in a nationally consistent format and maintain relevant records. Inconsistencies with spelling and incorrect dates sometimes occur. These are then reproduced and often compounded in subsequent documents. Transliteration variances from Arabic to English can also cause variations in names and other inconsistencies. In-country sources said altered and counterfeit secondary documents like bank, property and employment documents were common and easily obtained. Cases of identity fraud referred to or discovered by authorities are investigated and prosecuted. 5.58 Instances of fraudulent passports being used by Lebanese nationals overseas are rare but have occurred. For example, local news reported in 2024 that Hizballah had secured forged Lebanese biometric passports for Syrians linked to the former Assad regime. A military investigation carried out in May 2024 uncovered a network forging passports to help wanted individuals escape Lebanon in exchange for bribes worth tens of thousands of dollars. The investigation found officers had exploited a system designed for exceptional cases, such as issuing passports for medical emergencies. 37 

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