Iraq - Country Briefing

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Country Briefing

Area: 438,317 km²
Capital: Baghdad
Population: 42,083,436 (2024 estimate)
Official language: Arabic, Kurdish
Currency: Iraqi dinar (CIA, 14 May 2025)

1. Brief overview

Iraq is one of the most eastern countries in the Arab world. It is characterised by the two rivers Euphrates and Tigris, mountain ranges in the north-east of the country and desert in the west and south (Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 15 May 2025). Iraq's population of around 42 million consists of 75 to 80 per cent Arabs and 15 to 20 per cent Kurds. Between 95 and 98 per cent of the population are Muslim, of which 61 to 64 per cent are Shia and 29 to 34 per cent Sunni. The rest of the population is made up of ethnic and religious minorities (CIA, 14 May 2025). The north-east of the country, the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (KRI), which essentially consists of the three provinces of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, is run by a Kurdish regional government (Kurdistan Regional Government, undated). Sunnis predominate in the north and west of the country, including in the provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninawa and Diyala (Rudaw, 11 January 2020). The region south of Baghdad is dominated by Shiites (Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, 27 February 2021).

Many Arabs identify more strongly with their family and tribe than their national or religious affiliation (Britannica Online Encyclopaedia, 15 May 2025). There are around 150 tribes in Iraq, to which 75 per cent of the total Iraqi population belong (EUAA, April 2023, p. 17).

After the First World War, the country's heterogeneous population found itself in a common national territory, initially as a British mandate territory, as a result of decisions made by major and regional powers. From 1979, the country was led by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab who fought his critics with the help of a massive and complex security apparatus, often using brutal means. In 2003, Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party were overthrown by the United States and its allies. This created a security vacuum that led to the spread of insurgent armed groups and an outbreak of sectarian violence that peaked in 2006-2007. After the withdrawal of the USA in 2011, the situation in the country remained unstable. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, there was a sectarian upheaval in the country's political leadership and the Shiite Arabs gained the political upper hand in the country. Nouri Al-Maliki, who served as prime minister between 2006 and 2014, was accused of promoting the marginalisation of the Sunni population, increasing the power of his own party and suppressing the opposition. In this context, the Sunni-dominated Islamic State (IS), an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, came to the fore. At the end of 2014, IS controlled around a third of Iraqi territory. The atrocities committed by IS led to millions of internally displaced persons in the country. In response to the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in Mosul, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called on Iraqis to take up arms to defend their country from the threat of IS. In response, thousands of Iraqi men, mainly Shia, volunteered to fight, leading to the formation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) (MRGI, May 2018), which have played a crucial role in the country's politics since the collapse of IS territory (-> Further information on the PMF) (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, p. i-ii). Between October 2019 and 2021, protests repeatedly flared up in Iraq against the existing system of government, corruption, high unemployment, infrastructure deficiencies and foreign influence (EPIC, 30 September 2021, pp. 3-4, 35, 47). Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Sudani has ruled the country since October 2022, supported by an Iranian-backed alliance of several party coalitions close to former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and the PMF groups (MEI, 31 January 2023). The next parliamentary elections will take place in November 2025 (The New Arab, 9 April 2025).

2. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

The KRI is recognised as an independent federal region in the Iraqi constitution of 2005 (Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 117). Kurds see themselves as an ethnically distinct group (Kelly, May 2010, p. 710), whose society is traditionally based on tribes (Britannica online Encyclopaedia, 15 May 2025). The majority are Sunni Muslims (The Kurdish Project, undated). Under Saddam Hussein, the Kurds were victims of a process of Arabisation that culminated in the "Anfal" campaign in the late 1980s , during which several Kurdish regions were bombed with chemical weapons (HRW, July 1993). In 1991, the current KRI gained autonomy from central Iraq (AFP, 27 September 2018). In the following years, the currently dominant parties in the region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), came to power (LSE, 15 April 2020; Culturico, 6 February 2021). The KDP is dominated by the Barzani family, from which both the President and the Prime Minister of the Region have come as of May 2025 (The Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, undated; Kurdistan Regional Government, undated). Other parties in the Region include the Gorran Movement, the New Generation Movement, Islamic parties and a number of minority parties (Kurdistan Parliament, undated).

The Kurds and especially the Peshmerga fighters, the armed forces of the Kurdish Regional Government (GPPi, March 2018, p. 6), were actively involved in the fight against IS (Clingendael, March 2018, p. 19). Military gains against IS enabled the KRI to expand its control over disputed territories, which were lost again after a controversial independence referendum was held and the central government reacted strongly (The New Humanitarian, 26 September 2019). The volatile security situation emerging in 2014, the massive drop in oil prices from 2015 onwards and differences with the Iraqi central government led the KRI into an economic crisis after years of economic and political advancement (Kurdistan24, 8 January 2016; see also: MEMO, 14 August 2020), which continues into 2025 (The Conversation, 11 March 2025). Turkey's military attacks against the PKK on KRI territory have posed problems in the past (Al Jazeera, 27 December 2023) and it is still unclear how the dissolution of the PKK (see France24, 12 May 2025) will affect Turkey's presence in the KRI. Parliamentary elections were held in the region in October 2024, with the KDP winning 39 out of 100 seats and the PUK 23 seats (Al-Jazeera, 30 October 2024). However, as of May 2025, the newly elected parliament remained deadlocked and was unable to form a government or elect a speaker. In response to the ongoing stalemate, incumbent Speaker Mohammed Sulaiman of the opposition New Generation Movement (NGM) called on the regional president to formally dissolve parliament for failing to meet constitutional deadlines (The New Arab, 8 May 2025). The NGM then took the case to the Iraqi Supreme Court and sought a legal mandate to force the dissolution of parliament (The Arab Weekly, 27 May 2025).

3. Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

The Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF or Al-Hashd Al-Sha'abi, is a heterogeneous umbrella organisation of about 40 to 70 armed groups[30] of different political and ideological orientation.[31] The largest bloc, which includes the Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haqq and Kata'ib Hezbollah, is closely linked to Iran, the second bloc follows the Shi'ite cleric Ali Al-Sistani, and the third bloc, Saraya Al-Salam, follows the Iraqi cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr,[32] the latter two of which are characterised by a comparatively nationalist attitude.[33]

At the end of 2016, the PMF were granted a legal status equivalent to the Iraqi armed forces, which means that they are formally subordinate to the Prime Minister.[34] Since the end of the fighting against IS, the PMF have expanded their sphere of influence. They are politically and economically active and have their own party bloc in parliament.[35] Strong gains in the 2018 parliamentary elections[36] and government participation in 2022[37] have allowed the PMF to expand their power in state institutions and they are indistinguishable from the original state actors in their day-to-day activities.[38] In late 2022/early 2023, after years of effort, the PMF received the Iraqi government's support to establish an economic entity called Muhandis General Company (Sharikat Al-Muhandis),[39] described by several sources as the Iraqi counterpart to Iran's Khatam Al-Anbia, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard company.[40] The company, which specializes in construction projects, received government start-up capital of 100 billion Iraqi dinars, or about $67 million.[41] In addition to their political role, the PMF as of January 2024 remain active militarily and as a security actor.[42]

Especially in the north and west of Iraq, harassment and interference in municipal and administrative affairs by members of the PMF have been repeatedly reported,[43] and also the demonstrators in Baghdad and southern Iraq in 2019 showed their displeasure about the Iranian supported PMF fractions.[44]

Detailed information on the Shiite militias in Iraq can be found in the ecoi.net featured topic on Iraq.

(-> ecoi.net search on PMF)

4. Ethno-religious minorities

In addition to Shia and Sunni Arabs and the predominantly Sunni Kurds, Iraq is home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities (MRGI, May 2018). The 2005 Constitution recognises that Iraq is a country with a multitude of nationalities, religions and denominations (Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 3). Ethno-religious minorities include the Turkmen (à ecoi.net search), the Christians (à ecoi.net search), the Yezidis (à ecoi.net search), the Circassians (à ecoi.net search), the Faili Kurds (à ecoi.net search), the Kaka'i (à ecoi.net search), the Mandaean-Sabaeans (à ecoi.net search), the Roma (à ecoi.net search), the Shabak (à ecoi.net search), the Baha'i (à ecoi.net search) (IILHR, May 2013, S-3-4) and, as of 2013, a very small number of Jews (à ecoi.net search) (IILHR, May 2013, p. 10). In addition to the ethno-religious minorities, there are also Palestinian refugees (à ecoi.net search), stateless Bidun (à ecoi.net search) and Iraqis of African descent (à ecoi.net search). During the past decades of violence in the country, first under Saddam Hussein, then after his fall in 2003 (HRW, 2010, p. 65) and after the spread of IS in 2014, members of minority groups in particular were subjected to attacks, resulting in many being displaced (Carnegie Endowment, 17 October 2024).

On the subject of religious freedom, the Iraqi constitution specifically mentions Christians, Yazidis and Mandaean-Sabaeans and names Arabic and Kurdish as the official languages of the country. The constitution also provides for education in the mother tongue and specifically mentions Turkmen, Assyrian and Armenian (Constitution of Iraq 2005, Articles 2 and 4).

Reports of discrimination and violence against minorities include harassment and arbitrary arrests, intimidation and denial of services, violent attacks by non-state actors and general societal discrimination in everyday life (EUAA, January 2022, pp. 45-47; 51-52; 54-62; see also: USCIRF, March 2025) (à ecoi.net search on minorities in Iraq).

5. Sources

Table of contents

1. Brief overview

2. Kurdistan Region of Iraq

3. Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

4. Ethno-religious minorities

5. Sources

Cite as

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net: Iraq - Country Briefing, 3 June 2025
https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/iraq/briefing/

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  • Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)

ecoi.net is run by the Austrian Red Cross (department ACCORD) in cooperation with Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration. ecoi.net is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Caritas Austria. ecoi.net is supported by ECRE & UNHCR.