Iraq - Country Briefing

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Country Briefing

Area: 435,052 km²
Capital: Baghdad
Population: 46,752,000 (2026 estimate)
Official language: Arabic, Kurdish
Currency: Iraqi dinar (Britannica, 1 June 2026)

1. Brief overview

Iraq is one of the easternmost countries in the Arab world, characterised by the two rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris, mountain ranges in the north-east of the country, and desert in the west and south (Britannica, 1 June 2026). Iraq’s population of approximately 46 million (Iraq Business News, 27 November 2025) consists of Arabs, Kurds and a variety of ethnic minorities, such as Turkmen, Shabak, Assyrians, Armenians, Iraqis of African descent and Roma (MRGI, May 2018), although the number of members of the various ethnic groups was not recorded in the last census of November 2024 (TWI, 28 November 2024). According to estimates, between 95 and 98 per cent of the population are Muslim, of whom 61 to 64 per cent are Shia and 29 to 34 per cent are Sunni. The remainder of the population consists of religious minorities (USCIRF, March 2026, p. 65). The north-east of the country, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), comprising the four provinces of Dohuk, Erbil (known as Hawler in Kurdish) and Sulaimaniyya and Halabja (VFI, undated), is governed by a Kurdish regional government (Kurdistan Regional Government, undated). Sunnis predominate in the north and west of the country, including in the provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninawa and Diyala (Rudaw, 11 January 2020). The region south of Baghdad is predominantly Shia (Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, 27 February 2021).

Many Arabs identify more strongly with their family and tribe than with their national or religious affiliation (Britannica, 1 June 2026). There are around 150 tribes in Iraq, to which 75 per cent of the total Iraqi population belong (EUAA, April 2023, p. 17).

Following the First World War, the country’s diverse population found itself united within a single territory as a result of decisions taken by major and regional powers, initially as a British Mandate. From 1979 onwards, the country was led by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni Arab, who suppressed his critics with the aid of a massive and complex security apparatus, often resorting to brutal methods. In 2003, Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party were overthrown by the United States and its allies. This created a security vacuum that led to the proliferation of insurgent armed groups and the outbreak of sectarian violence, which reached its peak in 2006–2007. Following the US withdrawal in 2011, the situation in the country remained unstable. A sectarian upheaval occurred in the country’s political leadership, and the Shia Arabs gained the political upper hand. Nouri Al-Maliki, who served as Prime Minister between 2006 and 2014, was accused of promoting the marginalisation of the Sunni population, expanding the power of his own party and suppressing the opposition. In this context, the Sunni-dominated Islamic State (IS), an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, came to the fore. By the end of 2014, IS controlled around a third of Iraqi territory. The atrocities committed by IS led to millions of internally displaced persons within the country. In response to the collapse of the Iraqi security forces in Mosul, the religious leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani called on Iraqis to take up arms to defend their country against the threat posed by IS. Consequently, thousands of predominantly Shia Iraqi men signed up as volunteer fighters, leading to the formation of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) (MRGI, May 2018), which have played a decisive role in the country’s politics since the collapse of IS territory (--> Further information on the PMF) (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, pp. i–ii; The New Region, 23 March 2026). Since October 2022, Prime Minister Mohammed Al-Sudani has governed the country, supported by an Iran-aligned alliance of several party coalitions close to former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and the PMF groups (MEI, 31 January 2023). The same coalition also emerged victorious in the parliamentary elections of November 2025 and proposed Al-Maliki as the new Prime Minister in January 2026, but no government was formed (Long War Journal, 11 February 2026). At the end of March 2026, the governing parties decided to postpone the election of the next prime minister until the end of the ongoing war between the US, Israel and Iran (Shafaq News, 22 March 2026). In doing so, the Iraqi government sought to distance itself from the hostilities in the region (Asharq Al-Awsat , 3 March 2026). Despite this, attacks took place in Iraq by all three main warring parties, and pro-Iranian armed groups disregarded Baghdad’s official policy of neutrality. Six months after the parliamentary elections, on 14 May 2026, the Iraqi Parliament approved an incomplete government under the newly appointed Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, a businessman with no political experience (International Crisis Group, 28 May 2026).

2. Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (ARK)

The KRG is recognised as an autonomous federal region in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution ( Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 117). Kurds regard themselves as an ethnically distinct group (Kelly, May 2010, p. 710), whose society is traditionally based on tribes (Britannica, 1 June 2026). The majority are Sunni Muslims (The Kurdish Project, undated). Under Saddam Hussein, the Kurds were victims of a process of Arabisation that culminated in the late 1980s in the ‘Anfal’ campaign, during which several Kurdish regions were bombed with chemical weapons (HRW, July 1993). In 1991, what is now the KRG gained autonomy from central Iraq (AFP, 27 September 2018). In the years that followed, the region’s currently dominant parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), came to power (LSE, 15 April 2020; Culturico, 6 February 2021). The KDP is dominated by the Barzani family, from which both the President and the Prime Minister of the region hail (The Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, undated; Kurdistan Regional Government, undated). Other parties in the region include the Gorran Movement, the New Generation Movement, Islamic parties and a number of minority parties (Kurdistan Parliament, undated).

The Kurds, and in particular the Peshmerga fighters—the armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (GPPi, März 2018, S. 6)—played an active role in the fight against IS (Clingendael, März 2018, S. 19). Military gains against IS enabled the PFC to extend its control over disputed territories, which were, however, lost again following a controversial independence referendum and the central government’s subsequent military response (The New Humanitarian, 26 September 2019). The volatile security situation from 2014 onwards, the massive fall in oil prices from 2015 and differences with the Iraqi central government plunged the KRG into an economic crisis following years of economic and political rise (Kurdistan24, 8 January 2016; see also: MEMO, 14 August 2020), which persists into 2026 and has been exacerbated by the Iran conflict (CNA, 23 March 2026). Turkish military attacks against the PKK on KRG territory have posed problems in the past (Al Jazeera, 27 December 2023) and, despite the announced dissolution of the PKK (France24, 12 May 2025) and the ongoing peace process, Turkey continues to maintain a military presence in the KRG (The National Context, 27 February 2026). Furthermore, the region found itself caught in the crossfire of the US–Israel–Iran conflict and, by March 2026, had been the target of several hundred drone and missile strikes (Rudaw, 12 March 2026). Parliamentary elections were held in the region in October 2024, in which the KDP won 39 out of 100 seats and the PUK 23 seats (Al Jazeera, 30 October 2024). Political tensions between the two parties paralysed the formation of a new cabinet (Shafaq News, 20 March 2026) and, as of the end of May 2026, there is still no new regional government (Federal Foreign Office, 22 May 2026).

3. Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

The Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF or Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi, are a heterogeneous umbrella organisation comprising some 40 to 70 armed groups (EPIC, 18 January 2017; Haddad, 5 March 2018; International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, p. 1) of varying political and ideological orientations (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, p. 3). The largest bloc, which includes the Badr Organisation, Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq and Kata’ib Hisbollah, among others, has close ties to Iran; the second bloc follows the Shia cleric Ali Al-Sistani; and the third bloc, Saraya Al-Salam, follows the Iraqi cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, pp. 3–4), with the latter two being characterised by a comparatively nationalist stance ( Clingendael, June 2018, p. 3).

At the end of 2016, the PMF were granted legal status equivalent to that of the Iraqi armed forces, meaning they are formally under the authority of the Prime Minister (RFE/RL, 26 November 2016). Since the end of the fighting against IS, the PMF have expanded their sphere of influence. They are politically and economically active and have their own parliamentary bloc (International Crisis Group, 30 July 2018, pp. i–ii). Following strong gains in the 2018 parliamentary elections (MENA Prison Forum, 17 October 2021) and their inclusion in the government in 2022 (MEI, 31 January 2023), the PMF have been able to extend their power within state institutions and are now indistinguishable from the original state actors in their day-to-day operations (War on the Rocks, 21 January 2021). Among other things, they are also exercising growing control over key economic sectors, such as customs offices, border crossings and logistics (Shafaq News, 6 May 2025). In late 2022/early 2023, after years of effort, the PMF secured the support of the Iraqi government to establish an economic enterprise named Muhandis General Company (Scharikat Al-Muhandis), which is viewed by several sources as the Iraqi counterpart to the Iranian Chatam Al-Anbia, the company of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( Arabic Post, 31 January 2023). In addition to their political and economic role, as of 2026 the PMF remain active militarily and as a security actor ( The New Region, 23 March 2026).

Detailed information on the Shia militias in Iraq can be found in the ecoi.net thematic dossier on Iraq (last updated: May 2024).

(-> ecoi.net search on PMF)

4. Ethno-religious minorities

In addition to Shia and Sunni Arabs and the predominantly Sunni Kurds, Iraq is home to numerous ethnic and religious minorities (MRGI, May 2018). The 2005 Constitution recognises that Iraq is a country with a multitude of nationalities, religions and denominations ( Constitution of Iraq 2005, Article 3). Ethno-religious minorities include, amongst others, the Turkmen (--> ecoi.net search), Christians (--> ecoi.net search), Yazidis (--> ecoi.net search), Circassians (--> ecoi.net search), Faili Kurds(--> ecoi.net search), the Kaka'i (--> ecoi.net search), the Mandaeans and Sabians (--> ecoi.net search), the Roma (--> ecoi.net search) and the Shabak (--> ecoi.net search) (IILHR, May 2013, pp. 3–4). In addition to the ethno-religious minorities, there are also Palestinian refugees (--> ecoi.net search), stateless Bidun (--> ecoi.net search) and Iraqis of African descent (--> ecoi.net search). During the past decades of violence in the country, initially under Saddam Hussein and then following his overthrow in 2003 (HRW, 2010, p. 65) and following the spread of IS in 2014, members of minority groups in particular were subjected to attacks, leading to the displacement of many (Carnegie Endowment, 17 October 2024).

The Iraqi Constitution specifically mentions Christians, Yazidis and Mandaeans-Sabeans in relation to religious freedom, and designates Arabic and Kurdish as the country’s official languages. Furthermore, the Constitution provides for education in the mother tongue and specifically names Turkmen, Assyrian and Armenian ( Constitution of Iraq 2005, Articles 2 and 4).

Reports confirm ongoing discrimination against and violence towards minorities, including by actors affiliated with the PMF (EUAA, October 2025, pp. 81–84; USCIRF, March 2026, p. 65). (--> ecoi.net search on minorities in Iraq).

5. Sources

Table of contents

1. Brief overview

2. Autonomous Region of Kurdistan (ARK)

3. Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)

4. Ethno-religious minorities

5. Sources

Cite as

ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net: Iraq - Country Briefing, 9 June 2026
https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/iraq/briefing/

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  • Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)

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