ecoi.net's featured topics offer an overview on selected issues. The featured topic for Nigeria covers the main current security incidents in the northern, southern, and central parts of Nigeria. The information was found in selected sources and does not purport to be exhaustive.

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1. Background Information

“Nigeria hat über 190 Millionen Einwohner·innen. Damit lebt fast die Hälfte der Bevölkerung Westafrikas in Nigeria. Die Wirtschaft des Landes ist weitgehend von den Einnahmen aus dem Erdölgeschäft abhängig. Der rückläufige Ölpreis, interne Konflikte und der Wertverfall der Landeswährung haben Nigeria in eine Rezession geführt. Zwar erholt sich die Konjunktur allmählich, doch ein inklusives Wirtschaftswachstum liegt in weiter Ferne. Mehr als zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung leben nach wie vor in extremer Armut.” (GIZ, 31 December 2020)[i]

“Nigeria ist mit mehr als 200 Millionen Einwohnern der bevölkerungsreichste Staat Afrikas. Die Bevölkerung wächst derzeit jährlich um circa 2,6 Prozent. Die Vereinten Nationen (United Nations, UN) gehen von einer Verdopplung der Bevölkerung auf 400 Millionen Menschen bis zur Mitte des Jahrhunderts aus. Die Stadt Lagos ist mit ihren rund 14 Millionen Einwohnern das wirtschaftliche Zentrum des Landes und zugleich die zweitgrößte Stadt des afrikanischen Kontinents, die Hauptstadt ist Abuja. Etwa die Hälfte der Bevölkerung lebt in ländlichen Gebieten.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 1)[ii]

“Nigeria ist die größte Volkswirtschaft des afrikanischen Kontinents und gehört zu den wichtigsten Erdölproduzenten weltweit. Doch trotz hoher Einnahmen aus der Rohstoffindustrie und wirtschaftspolitischer Reformen ist es den nigerianischen Regierungen bislang nicht gelungen, spürbare Verbesserungen für die Menschen im Land zu erreichen.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 2)

“Mehr als die Hälfte der Bevölkerung lebt nach wie vor in extremer Armut. Die durchschnittliche Lebenserwartung ist mit rund 54 Jahren eine der niedrigsten weltweit. Die Analphabetenquote liegt bei etwa 40 Prozent.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 2)

“Hinzu kommen Defizite in der Regierungsführung, ein hohes Maß an Korruption, ein geringes Wirtschaftswachstum und eine marode Infrastruktur. Hohe Arbeitslosigkeit, große soziale Ungleichheiten und mangelnde Zukunftsperspektiven sorgen zudem für Spannungen innerhalb der Gesellschaft und tragen dazu bei, dass das Land immer wieder von gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen erschüttert wird. Oft werden soziale und wirtschaftliche Konflikte ethnisch oder religiös instrumentalisiert.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 2)

“Staatsform: Präsidiale Bundesrepublik mit 36 Bundesstaaten und einem Federal Capital Territory” (KAS, undated)[iii]

“There are 774 local government authorities (LGAs) and six area councils.” (CLGF, 2019, p. 161)[iv]

“Nigeria is a federal republic with a bicameral national assembly and 36 state assemblies.” (CLGF, 2019, p. 161)

“These [the 36 subnational legislatures in Nigeria] are called State Houses of Assembly.” (The Conversation, 14 January 2021)[v]

“Nigeria faces security challenges on several fronts. In the northeast, conflict between the military and two U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) – Boko Haram and an Islamic State-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – has killed tens of thousands over the past decade, displaced millions, and caused a protracted humanitarian crisis. […] In Nigeria’s northwest, conflict between pastoralists and farmers recently has escalated amid a broader deterioration in security conditions involving cattle rustling, kidnapping, ethnic massacres, and emergent Islamist extremist activity. Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities. In the south, criminality and militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta have impeded development and contributed to insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea for decades.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“Yet corruption, infrastructure gaps, insecurity, and a failure to diversify the economy away from petroleum production have constrained economic growth and development.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“1983 December - Maj-Gen Muhammad Buhari seizes power in bloodless coup.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)[vi]

“1999 - Parliamentary and presidential elections. Olusegun Obasanjo sworn in as president.

2000 - Adoption of Islamic Sharia law by several northern states in the face of opposition from Christians. Tension over the issue results in hundreds of deaths in clashes between Christians and Muslims.

2001 - Tribal war in Benue State, in eastern-central Nigeria, displaces thousands of people. Troops sent to quash the fighting kill more than 200 unarmed civilians, apparently in retaliation for the abduction and murder of 19 soldiers.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2006 January onwards - Militants in the Niger Delta attack pipelines and other oil facilities and kidnap foreign oil workers. The rebels demand more control over the region's oil wealth.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2010 May - President Umaru Yar'Adua dies after a long illness. Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, already acting in Yar'Adua's stead, succeeds him.

2011 March - Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan wins presidential elections.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“2015 March - Muhammadu Buhari wins the presidential election, becoming the first opposition candidate to do so in Nigeria's history.” (BBC, 18 February 2019)

“More than 15 million Nigerians chose Muhammadu Buhari as their president in 2019, close to the number that elected him in 2015, indicating that four years in office have not diminished his appeal.” (BBC, 27 February 2019)

“Die unabhängige nigerianische Wahlkommission INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) hat am Mittwoch, den 27. Februar 2019, den amtierenden Präsidenten Muhammadu Buhari zum offiziellen Wahlsieger erklärt. Mit etwa 15,2 Millionen Stimmen erhielt er fast 4 Millionen Stimmen mehr als Atiku Abubakar (11,3 Millionen Stimmen). Insgesamt waren 82,3 Millionen Menschen wahlberechtigt, 28,6 Millionen Stimmen wurden abgegeben, davon waren 27,3 Millionen gültig. Der Wahlsieger Buhari bekam 55,6%, Abubakar 41,2% der Stimmen.” (SWP, 21 April 2019, p. 1)[vii]

“Der 76-jährige Buhari führte Nigeria bereits von 1983 bis 1985 als Staatsoberhaupt – er hatte sich an die Macht geputscht. Nach drei erfolglosen Versuchen, auf demokratischem Weg noch einmal Präsident zu werden, gelang es ihm 2015, sich gegen Goodluck Jonathan durchzusetzen. In seinem damaligen Wahlkampf versprach er, die Sicherheit angesichts der Bedrohung durch Boko Haram wiederherzustellen, die Korruption zu bekämpfen und die am Boden liegende Wirtschaft anzukurbeln.” (SWP, 21 April 2019, p. 2) [viii]

“Nigeria hat seit seiner Unabhängigkeit (1960) das Stadium des unfertigen Staates noch immer nicht überwunden und verfügt auch unter demokratischen Vorzeichen der IV. Republik (seit 1999) nur in Ansätzen über eine funktionierende Staatlichkeit. So konnten von der postkolonialen Phase bis in die Gegenwart hinein widerstreitende ethnische und religiöse Identitäten und Narrative über Herkunft, Interessen und Machtansprüche gedeihen.

Die tiefste Kluft verläuft zwischen dem islamisch geprägten Norden und dem überwiegend christlich geprägten Süden des Landes. Die Geschichte Nigerias ist ein Prozess der zunehmenden Entfremdung zwischen Muslimen und Christen. Hintergrund sind der wachsende Fundamentalismus in beiden Religionen sowie erstarkende ethnische Polarisierungen und erbitterter Verteilungskämpfe um die Zuweisungen der Zentralregierung. In der Folge konnte der Middle Belt seine Rolle als Übergangs- und Pufferzone zwischen dem weniger entwickelten Norden und dem prosperierenden Süden nicht mehr wahrnehmen und geriet seinerseits immer mehr in den Sog der Destabilisierung.

Das öl- und gasreiche Nigerdelta schafft den größten Reichtum Nigerias, der von einer für afrikanische Maßstäbe zahlenmäßig vergleichsweise großen Elite vereinnahmt wird. Ethnisch definierte gewaltbereite und gut organisierte Gruppen fordern seit Beginn der Demokratisierung 1998/99 diese Elitenherrschaft immer wieder heraus. Dabei waren einige Milizen mit der Anwendung von Gewalt partiell erfolgreich und konnten zumindest einen Teil dieses Reichtums zu ihren Gunsten umverteilen.

Der blutige Sezessionskrieg um Biafra (1967–1970), dessen Ursachen und Folgen nie aufgearbeitet wurden, sodass sich keiner der Hauptakteure der Verantwortung stellen musste, markiert bislang den einzigen "Betriebsunfall" für die nigerianischen Eliten. Seitdem gilt die ungeschriebene Staatsdoktrin, wonach ein derartiges Ereignis sich nicht wiederholen darf. Dies soll ein Elitenkonsens garantieren, der darin besteht, die Pfründe so reibungslos wie möglich untereinander aufzuteilen und den Zusammenhalt des Zentralstaates nicht zu gefährden. Doch geriet dieser Konsens bereits mehrfach in Gefahr – so unter Militärdiktator Sani Abacha und Präsident Goodluck Jonathan. Angesichts der bislang mageren Bilanz von Präsident Buhari, die sich in der Handhabung der COVID-19 Pandemie bestätig[t], droht erneut die Aufkündigung des Konsenses mit unabsehbaren Folgen. ” (BPB, 6 July 2020)[ix]

“Maiduguri is where Boko Haram Islamist militants were first based when they began their insurgency six years ago.

Some 17,000 people are said to have been killed in that time and attacks by the group have intensified since Muhammadu Buhari became president in [2015], vowing to defeat the insurgents.” (BBC, 2 October 2015)

“Nigeria gilt als ein Vielvölkerstaat: Die rund 400 unterschiedlichen Volksgruppen verteilen sich auf die verschiedenen Regionen des Landes. Die drei größten Volksgruppen bilden hierbei die Haussa (im Norden), Igbo (im Südosten) und Yoruba (im Südwesten). Amtssprache ist Englisch. Etwa die Hälfte der Bevölkerung bekennt sich zum Islam, rund 45 Prozent sind Anhänger des Christentums. Während der Norden des Landes vorwiegend muslimisch geprägt ist, leben im Zentrum und im Süden größtenteils Christen.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 1)

“Vor 20 Jahren gab der erste Gouverneur im Norden Nigerias die Einführung der Scharia bekannt. Das Rechtssystem sollte dem sozialen Frieden dienen. Die Hoffnungen auf besser Lebensverhältnisse wurden enttäuscht. Konflikte zwischen Muslimen und Christen haben sich verschärft.” (Deutschlandfunk, 24 October 2019)[x]

“Since 2009, an Islamist insurgency based in northeastern Nigeria has killed tens of thousands of people and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger […]. Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Sunni Muslim reform movement, Boko Haram, which roughly translates to ‘Western cultureis forbidden,’ has evolved into one of the world’s deadliest Islamist armed groups. Since 2016, an Islamic State (IS)-affiliated splinter faction, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (IS-WA, aka ISIS-WA or ISWAP) has surpassed Boko Haram in size and capacity, and now ranks among IS’s most active affiliates.” (CRS, 26 March 2021, p. 1)

“Zuletzt haben sich die Sicherheitslage und die humanitäre Situation im Nordosten des Landes verschlechtert. Die islamistische Terrorgruppe Boko Haram verübt in dieser Region immer wieder schwere Anschläge mit zahlreichen Todesopfern. Das Flüchtlingshilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR) beziffert die Zahl der nigerianischen Binnenvertriebenen aktuell auf mehr als zwei Millionen.” (GTAI, 4 December 2020, p. 2)

“Nigeria’s North East, especially Borno state, but also parts of Adamawa and Yobe states, are continually under siege by two jihadist factions, the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaat Ahl al-Sunna li-Dawa wal-Jihad, collectively referred to as Boko Haram. In many other states across the North West and North Central zones, the presence of armed groups, whom authorities and the media loosely refer to as ‘bandits’, has left residents and travellers vulnerable to robbery and kidnapping for ransom, especially on roads, on farms and, more recently, in schools. Elsewhere, intra and inter-communal conflicts pose security risks.” (ICG, 4 May 2021, p. 17)[xi]

“Farmer-herder violence also has surged in the central Middle Belt, where disputes over resource access coincide with ethno-religious cleavages between Christian and Muslim communities.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, Summary)

“In the Middle Belt – a loosely defined region spanning Nigeria’s North Central geopolitical zone and adjacent parts of the North East and North West […] – violence between sedentary farmers and mobile livestock herders has surged in recent years.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 8)

“Political unrest, criminality, and intermittent bouts of armed militancy linked to grievances over perceived exploitation and environmental degradation have afflicted the southern, oil-rich Niger Delta region for decades.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 10)

“In 2009, in response to a wave of attacks on oil infrastructure that sharply reduced output, the government launched an amnesty and monthly stipend for militants. The program has curbed large attacks on oil facilities, but root causes of insecurity remain unaddressed and ex-militants routinely threaten to resume violence.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 11)

“The Niger Delta also is the epicenter of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: for several years, waters off Nigeria have ranked among the world’s most dangerous for attacks at sea. The region has become a hotspot for kidnappings targeting shipping personnel, as attackers exploit vast river networks to hide abducted crew while negotiating ransoms.” (CRS, 18 September 2020, p. 11)

“On 4 October 2020, a video went viral showing SARS officers dragging two men from a hotel and shooting one of them outside. A few days later, protests erupted across Nigeria. On 11 October, SARS is disbanded. But it was the 5th time since 2015 that the Nigerian authorities pledged to reform the police and disband SARS. Protests continued demanding more than empty promises.

On 20 October, the Nigerian army violently repressed a peaceful protest at the Lekki toll gate, shooting at the protesters and killing at least 12 people. Since that day, the Nigerian authorities have tried to cover up the events of the Lekki Toll Gate Shooting. They froze protests leaders' bank accounts and fined news agencies who diffused videos of the shooting.

“But the ‘Soro Soke (‘Speak up’ in Yoruba) generation won't give up the fight for justice. They demand answers” (AI, undated)[xii]

“The government ordered each of Nigeria's 36 states, along with the capital, to look into the abuses.

Seven states did not comply - Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara - and those where the judicial panels did sit were hit by prolonged adjournments with members of the police not showing up when called to give testimony, and were criticised for a lack of transparency.” (BBC News, 7 October 2021)

“In Nigeria, justice is still outstanding in the case of the violent response to protestors at the Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos in October 2020, where between nine to over 70 people were killed by security forces, and at Kaduna State College of Education, where two students were shot and killed in June 2021 while gathered with others at the college gates to protest a hike in school fees. Nigerian forces also open fire regularly on peaceful Shi’a protestors and processions.” (CSW, 29 September 2021)

2. Central Nigeria and Abuja

(States: Adamawa, Benue, Federal Capital Territory, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, Taraba)

2.1. Background Information

“Although Nigeria chiefly is known for its oil and gas production, agriculture employs about 70 per cent of its labour force. Small-holders in the country’s centre and south harvest most of the country’s tuber and vegetable crops while pastoralists in the north raise most of its grains and livestock. […] Historically, relations between herders and sedentary farming communities have been harmonious. By and large, they lived in a peaceful, symbiotic relationship: herders’ cattle would fertilise the farmers’ land in exchange for grazing rights. But tensions have grown over the past decade, with increasingly violent flare-ups spreading throughout central and southern states; incidents have occurred in at least 22 of the country’s 36 states.” (ICG, 19 September 2017, p. 1)

“Amnesty International visited 56 communities in Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Taraba, and Zamfara states affected by the clashes and conducted 262 interviews, including remotely with members of communities in Nasarawa and Plateau states. In all these communities, members of farmer communities said they had lived in peace with members of herder communities, who are Fulani. The Fulani herders also said the same thing about living in peace with the farmers. In some communities, farmers said problems started over the destruction of their crops due to the animals of the herders grazing on their farmlands, while in other communities, they could not explain the reasons for the attacks. In some cases, farmers received prior information or heard rumours that they would be attacked, but in other cases, the attacks were unexpected. The Fulani herders blamed farmers for trying to chase them out of their communities by rustling their cattle and attacking them.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 6)

“A Fulani chief in Adamawa State explained how trouble began between farmers and herder communities in the state: ‘We have been trying to manage the crisis by creating grazing areas because a number of the grazing routes have been occupied. Farmers farm on the cattle routes. There are international cattle routes that other Fulani [herders] from Mali and other countries frequently use and once they find the routes have been occupied [and used as farmlands], they go ahead and pass along the routes because to them, that is supposed to be their way.’ Amnesty International’s research revealed that one of the major causes of the clashes between herders and farmers is the scarcity of and competition for resources, mainly land, water and pasture.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 12)

“In the early 1970s, livestock production was distinctly separate from crop production, particularly in northern Nigeria, where the main links between the two were in the area of cattle grazing on crop residues after harvest and some farmers making use of draught oxen. During this time (as recent as the early 1970s), herders did not have established land rights because land was communally owned and in the hands of traditional rulers and family heads. The herder received permission (grazing permits) to graze their cattle in areas not under agricultural use.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 13)

“But over time, it has become difficult to separate the two means of livelihood [crop production and livestock production] because increasingly, the Fulani herders are taking to farming crops as a means of livelihood, while members of farming communities also now own cattle.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 14)

“This increase in farming and other large scale developmental activities such as schools, petrol stations, markets and power installations in the country, have resulted in growing encroachment on what used to be grazing routes or reserves, meaning access to land for grazing or passage is diminishing at the same time the region is seeing a growing cattle

population.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 15)

“Amnesty International has documented 312 incidents of attacks and reprisal attacks in 22 states and Abuja between January 2016 and October 2018. As a result of these attacks Amnesty International estimates that at least 3,641 people may have been killed, 406 injured, 5,000 houses burnt down and 182,530 people displaced.” (AI, 17 December 2018, p. 16)

“Violent conflict between largely Muslim Fulani herders and ethnically diverse farmers in predominantly Christian areas has taken on tribal, religious and regional dimensions. Clashes across the central belt and spreading southward, are killing some 2,500 people a year. The conflict is now so deadly that many Nigerians fear it could become as dangerous as the Boko Haram insurgency. Escalating internally, the conflict could also spread regionally: herders might seek to draw fighters from their kin in other West and Central African countries, as some Fulani leaders have warned. This in turn could undermine a fragile region already struggling to defeat the Boko Haram insurgents.” (ICG, 20 July 2017)

“Land disputes, competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. Ethnocultural and religious affiliation also were factors attributed to some local conflicts. Nevertheless, many international organizations, including International Crisis Group, assessed that these divisions were incidental to the farmer-herder conflict. During the past year, the conflict between herdsmen and farmers in north-central states steadily slowed due to government policies and civil society conflict-resolution mechanisms. ‘Silent killings,’ in which individuals disappeared and later were found dead, occurred throughout the year. Conflicts concerning land rights continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 6)[xiii]

“The rise of farmer-herder conflict in Africa is more pernicious than fatality figures alone, however, since it is often amplified by the emotionally potent issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, and land.[…]

[t]he stakes quickly shift from questions over resource access or local politics to deep-seated notions of identity. Entire communities are labeled bandits, insurgents, or terrorists.” (Brottem, 12 July 2021 p. 1)[xiv]

“Nigeria has experienced the highest number of farmer-herder fatalities in West or Central Africa over the past decade. This trend has been largely upward, with 2,000 deaths recorded in 2018. Violent events between pastoralist and farming communities in Nigeria have been concentrated in the northwestern, Middle Belt, and recently southern states.” (Brottem, 12 July 2021 p. 4)

“More than 1,531 people died and thousands were displaced in inter-communal violence mostly between herdsmen and farming communities, as well as in attacks by bandits, in the north-central and north-western regions. More than 1,015 people were taken hostage by unidentified gunmen; in December, over 300 students of Government Science Secondary School in Kankara in Katsina state were abducted from their hostels, although they were released a few days later. The violence forced many farming families to flee to urban areas or displacement camps.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“Land disputes, competition over dwindling resources, ethnic differences, and settler-indigene tensions contributed to clashes between herdsmen and farmers throughout the north-central part of the country. […]

Conflicts concerning land rights continued among members of the Tiv, Kwalla, Jukun, Fulani, and Azara ethnic groups living near the convergence of Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba States.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 6)

2.2. Current Situation

“About eight persons were allegedly killed on Tuesday when members of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), also known as Shiites, and security operatives clashed in Abuja.

The Shiites were observing their annual Arbaeen Symbolic Trek in the federal capital, causing heavy traffic gridlock.

Arbaeen is a religious practice observed on 20th Safar of Islamic calendar to mark the 40th day of the killing of Imam Hussein, Prophet Mohammed’s grandson. He was killed on 10th Muharram.

The peaceful procession, which began early Tuesday morning, allegedly turned bloody when members of the movement clashed with security operatives near Gwarimpa along Kubwa road, leaving some dead while many more sustained severe injuries following sporadic gun shots from policemen and soldiers.

An IMN leader, Abdullahi Musa, who spoke with PREMIUM TIMES, alleged that eight members of the group were killed and others injured during the procession following the clash.

[…]

‘The total number of the arrested Shiite members is 57. The males are 39 and the females are 18. None of our security operatives were injured,‘ the Command’s spokesperson, Josephine Adah, told PREMIUM TIMES in a telephone interview.” (Premium Times, 28 September 2021)

“Findings from our interviews with local witnesses confirmed no violence from the demonstrators. ARTICLE 19 seeks to remind the Nigerian authorities that an unauthorised protest is not necessarily illegal and that the evidence so far available clearly shows that the police did not need to use such extreme force against this gathering.” (ARTICLE 19, 1 October 2021)[xv].

“Amid sustained violence in north, local authorities warned of jihadist expansion into Middle Belt”. (ICG, October 2021)

“In Niger state (Middle Belt), local govt official 3 Oct said Boko Haram (BH) had taken over multiple villages; Niger’s information commission later confirmed militants’ inroads in state, which borders Federal Capital Territory. Also in Niger state, unidentified gunmen 25 Oct killed at least 18 worshippers and reportedly abducted another 11 at mosque in Mashegu area.” (ICG, October 2021)

“Violence continued unabated in […] North Central […] zones, herder-farmer violence persisted […]. In […] North Central zones, armed groups continued deadly attacks.” (ICG, November 2021)

“Notably, armed attacks 10-12 Nov killed at least 23 in farming villages in Taraba and Kaduna states, 26 Nov killed at least ten in Plateau state.” (ICG, November 2021)

“Schon am 16.11.21 hatten Medien unter Berufung auf einen Vertreter des Bundesstaats Niger berichtet, dass Boko Haram dort in den Bezirken Shiroro und Rafi mindestens sechs Gemeinden unter Kontrolle bringen konnte. Tausende Einwohner der betroffenen Gemeinden in den Bezirken Shiroro und Rafi seien infolge der Attacken geflohen, andere hätten sich den Angreifern angeschlossen. Bereits in der Vergangenheit vermuteten Beobachter der Situation in Nordnigeria, dass es bei Aktivitäten örtlicher Krimineller zu einer Art Kooperation mit Dschihadisten kommt (vgl. BN v. 21.12.20).” (BAMF, 29 November 2021, p. 12)[xvi]

“Governor Abubakar Bello-led government has lamented that Boko Haram terrorists are in control of five communities in Rafi and Shiroto Local Government Areas of Niger State.

The development was disclosed by the Secretary to the State Government, Ahmed Matane on Monday.

Matane in his statement identified the affected communities as – Kurebe, Farina Kuka, Gussau in Shiroro LGA and Madaka, Hanawanka in Rafi LGAs of the state.

He further stated that the activities of the insurgents in these communities have forced residents of the communities to migrate to the safer part of the state and outside the state.” (Naija News, 16 November 2021)[xvii]

“In Niger state (North Central zone), unidentified armed groups 18 Nov abducted 22 girls for forced marriage at Kurebe village in Shiroro area; 21-27 Nov attacked communities in Munya and Shiroro areas, leaving five dead, at least 63 abducted and over 30 women sexually assaulted; senior state official 23 Nov said Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) had set up camp near Kainji National Park in Borgu area along border with Benin Republic, and other extremist elements were settling into communities in Shiroro area. Military 25 Nov said troops killed 128 armed elements across North West and North Central zones 11-25 Nov. Federal High Court 26 Nov declared North West armed groups “terrorists”.” (ICG, November 2021)

In Plateau state capital Jos, gunmen 28 Nov stormed prison, enabled 262 inmates to escape; incident left 11 dead.” (ICG, November 2021)

“According to di statement wey di tok-tok pesin for di correctional facility OF Enobore sign, one prison officer plus 9 inmates na dem die for di attack.

E explain say one officer plus six inmates bin wunjure during di attack and 262 inmates bin escape but dat dem don recapture 10 of dem.” (BBC News, 28 November 2021)

“Eleven people have been reported dead and seven injured in the invasion of the Jos Medium Security Custodial Centre on Sunday.

In a statement on Monday by the spokesman of the Nigeria Correctional Service, Francis Enobore, nine inmates died and six others were injured during a gun duel between the attackers and Armed Squad officers of the service.

Enonbore disclosed that one of the gunmen trapped within the facility was killed and identified as one of those attackers of the federal facility

The Service spokesman also revealed that an official of the Service lost his life in the encounter while another officer was severely injured.

He, however, said that ten fleeing inmates that escaped from the facility have been recaptured, adding that 252 inmates are still on the run.” (Naija News, 29 November 2021)

3. Northeastern States (Boko Haram and IS-West Africa)

(States: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Yobe,)

3.1. Background Information

“Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth who worshipped at the Al- Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, in the 1990s. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, began as a preacher and leader in the youth wing, Shababul Islam (Islamic Youth Vanguard), of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group. […] Most accounts date the beginning of Boko Haram – its formal Arabic name is Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad) – to 2002, when it began to attract official attention.” (ICG, 3 April 2014, p. 7)

“Initially referred to as the Yusufiyya or Nigerian Taliban and later as Boko Haram, it also rejected all secular authority.” (ICG, 3 April 2014, p. 9)

“In 2014 Boko Haram killed more than 4,000 people, although the true figure is almost certainly higher. In the first three months of 2015, Boko Haram fighters killed at least 1,500 civilians. The group bombed civilian targets across Nigeria, raided towns and villages in the north-east and from July 2014 began to capture major towns. By February 2015, it controlled the majority of Borno state, as well as northern Adamawa state and eastern Yobe state. In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau, the group’s leader, proclaimed this territory to be a caliphate. Tens of thousands of civilians were subjected to Boko Haram’s brutal rule.” (AI, 13 April 2015, p. 3)

Boko Haram wurde ungefähr 2002 vom salafistischen Prediger Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, der Hauptstadt des nigerianischen Bundesstaats Borno, gegründet. Yusuf lehnte den nigerianischen Staat als "unislamisch" ab und plädierte für die Einführung der Scharia. Sein Vorgehen war zunächst gewaltlos und zielte darauf ab, die Bevölkerung für sich zu gewinnen. Aufgrund der hohen Armut und Arbeitslosigkeit im Norden Nigerias konnte die Gruppe zu Beginn einen hohen Zulauf junger Menschen verzeichnen. 2009 wurde Yusuf von nigerianischen Sicherheitskräften getötet. Anschließend lag die Führung bei Abubakar Shekau. Unter ihm begann Boko Haram damit, das nigerianische Militär, Polizeistationen und Zivilisten zu attackieren. Es gibt regelmäßig Terroranschläge auf Kirchen und öffentliche Plätze sowie staatliche Institutionen wie Universitäten und Schulen. Dabei werden auch Kinder als Selbstmordattentäter eingesetzt. Shekau soll laut der nigerianischen Armee 2016 während eines Luftangriffs getötet worden sein.” (Die Zeit, updated on 29 March 2018)[xviii]

“In March 2015, BH [Boko Haram] pledged allegiance to ISIS in an audiotape message. ISIS accepted the group’s pledge and the group began calling itself ISIS-West Africa. In August 2016, ISIS announced that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was to replace Abubakar Shekau as the new leader of the group. Infighting then led the group to split. Shekau maintains a group of followers and affiliates concentrated primarily in the Sambisa Forest; this faction is known as Boko Haram. The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria routinely call both groups Boko Haram, with some differentiation on the ‘Shekau faction’ versus the ‘al-Barnawi faction.’” (USDOS, 19 September 2018)

“’We are in an Islamic caliphate,’ said Mr Shekau, flanked by masked fighters and carrying a machine gun. ‘We have nothing to do with Nigeria. We don't believe in this name.’” (BBC, 24 November 2016)

“Boko Haram overtakes ISIL to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2014 to 6,644.“ (IEP, November 2015, p. 4)[xix].

“Counterinsurgency efforts are reported to have become more effective following the inauguration in May 2015 of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari. By cutting off supply routes and targeting insurgent safe havens, the insurgents were driven from most of the territories they had previously occupied. Following their territorial losses, the insurgents reportedly changed their tactics towards asymmetric warfare, including the use of kidnapping, rape, forced recruitment of children and youth, suicide bombing, and sexual slavery. However, according to analysts a comprehensive military victory is unlikely, and the insurgents continue to pose a considerable security threat.“ (UNHCR, October 2016, p. 1-2) [xx]

“Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centers and security personnel in Borno State. Boko Haram also conducted limited attacks in Adamawa, while ISIS-WA attacked targets in Yobe. These groups targeted anyone perceived as disagreeing with the groups’ political or religious beliefs or interfering with their access to resources. While Boko Haram no longer controls as much territory as it once did, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. Both groups carried out infrequent attacks through roadside IEDs. ISIS-WA maintained the ability to carry out effective complex attacks on military positions.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 1g)

“Nigeria had the second largest fall in total deaths, owing largely to a 72 per cent reduction in fatalities attributed to Fulani extremists. Despite this decrease, the number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 25 per cent from 2018 to 2019. Renewed activity by Boko Haram in Nigeria and neighbouring countries, including Cameroon, Chad and Niger, remains a substantial threat to the region.” (IEP, November 2020, p. 13)

“Boko Haram and ISIS-WA attacked population centers, security personnel, and international organization and NGO personnel and facilities in Borno State. […] While Boko Haram no longer controlled as much territory as it did in 2016, the two insurgencies nevertheless maintained the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian and military targets across the Northeast. […]

Arbitrary arrests reportedly continued in the Northeast, and authorities held many individuals in poor and life-threatening conditions. There were reports some of the arrested and detained included children believed to be associated with Boko Haram, some of whom may have been forcibly recruited.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1g)

“Boko Haram continued to commit grave human rights abuses in the north-east, including killings and abductions of civilians, which amounted to war crimes and may have constituted crimes against humanity. More than 420 civilians died in around 45 attacks, many of them in Borno state, but also in Adamawa and Yobe. Meanwhile, Boko Haram continued to recruit child soldiers.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“Boko Haram and its splinter faction ISWAP continued attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers in the northeast.” (HRW, 13 January 2021)[xxi]

“The Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) militant group said in an audio recording heard by Reuters on Sunday that Abubakar Shekau, leader of rival Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram, was dead.

Shekau died around May 18 after detonating an explosive device when he was pursued by ISWAP fighters following a battle, a person purporting to be ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi said on the audio recording.” (Reuters, 7 June 2021)[xxii]

“Two people familiar with al-Barnawi told Reuters the voice on the recording was that of the ISWAP leader.” (Reuters, 7 June 2021)

“In north east, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) 6 June confirmed Boko Haram faction (JAS) leader Abubakar Shekau had killed himself in May, 26 June issued video of rival ISWAP and JAS fighters jointly pledging allegiance to Islamic State. ISWAP continued attacks in Borno state, notably on military base in Damboa area 15 June.” (ICG, June 2021)

“More than 1,000 Boko Haram fighters and their families have handed themselves over to army units in recent weeks in the southern Borno state towns of Konduga, Bama, and Mafa – including what the military has described as the group’s “chief bomb expert”. And hundreds more fighters have reportedly surrendered across the border in neighbouring Cameroon.

In staged ceremonies, troops have handed out food and clothes to groups of solemn men holding placards in English, some reading: ‘Nigerians please forgive us’; ‘peace is the only way’; and ‘surrender and live’.

The ‘massive surrendering’ is the result of a ‘recent escalation of offensive operations’, the military said in a triumphant statement earlier this week.

But analysts argue that the unprecedented scale of defections has more to do with the fallout over the death of Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau.” (TNH, 12 August 2021)[xxiii]

“The expansion of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), building on the defection from the Boko Haram faction previously led by Abubakar Shekau following his death, posed serious threats to the stability of the wider region.” (UN Security Council, 26 November 2021, p. 4)[xxiv]

“On 14 October, the Nigerian armed forces announced the death of the ISWAP leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi.” (UN Security Council, 26 November 2021, p. 4)

“Nigeria's military has announced the death of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of the West African branch of the Islamic State group.

[…]

The Islamic State West Africa Province (Iswap) has not commented on the claims.” (BBC News, 14 October 2021)

3.2. Current Situation

“Multiple NSAG attacks and clashes with Government Forces across LGAs directly targeted or affected civilians in Borno and Yobe states. In Chibok LGA of Borno, scores of civilians were temporarily displaced in Shikakir community following an attack by NSAG fighters who looted and destroyed several civilian homes, churches, and the only health facility in the area. At least five civilians were killed in the incident. In Yobe State, one civilian was killed and two children seriously wounded in crossfire during a deadly armed clash between NSAGs and Government Forces near Damaturu, the state capital. NSAG illegal vehicle checkpoints (IVCPs) were also recorded along major highways and supply routes, especially along Damboa-Biu and Gubio-Damasak roads. Civilian commuters

have been routinely stopped and robbed. In Kareto town, Mobbar LGA, NSAG operatives invaded the main community market and extorted money and valuables from traders for several hours and reportedly abducted five local individuals.” (UN OCHA, 31 October 2021, S. 1)[xxv]

“Violence continued unabated in North East […] zones, herder-farmer violence persisted.” (ICG, November 2021).)

“In North East, ISWAP 13 Nov killed army general and three soldiers in Borno state; in response, army killed about 50 insurgents.” (ICG, November 2021).)

“Amid persistent jihadist violence in north east, notably Borno state, military 14 Oct announced death of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi without providing further details; 28 Oct said it had killed ISWAP’s new leader Malam Bako earlier this month.” (ICG, November 2021).)

4. Northwestern States (kidnappping for ransom and violence of armed groups)

(States: Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara)

4.1. Background Information

“In Zamfara, as in the rest of the northwest, the term ‘bandit’ is shorthand for nomadic Fulani pastoralists. The elision not only stigmatises an entire community but skates over a complicated shared history with the politically dominant majority Hausa population.

Competition with Hausa farmers has sharpened over the past decade with both the intensification of agriculture and a drying climate. The expansion of farms across stock routes has meant access to both grazing and water have become issues of lethal contention.

Fulani herders are typically accused of ignoring boundaries, and their young men of being quick to violence. But the Fulani have also been victims of land-grabbing by the well-connected, and of extortion by local authorities when it comes to the levying of fines.

Organised Fulani raids began on Hausa villages from around 2014 in an escalation of what had been more localised conflicts. In self-defence, vigilante groups formed with the backing of the state government, but their revenge was often indiscriminate – turning towns into no-go areas and driving some Fulani communities into the forests.

Fulani militia responded with even greater ferocity – and better weaponry – calling on nomadic kin from across the region for assistance. Sweeping into Hausa villages on motorbikes, they typically killed all the men they could find, on the assumption they were all vigilantes.” (TNH, 19 January 2021)

“In the northwest, when village-based Yan Sai Kai vigilante were formed to combat bandits, they tended to target Fulani – whether involved in criminality or not. That set off a chain reaction of tit-for-tat violence that has forced more than 280,000 people from their homes and disrupted farming – raising concerns for this season’s harvest.” (TNH, 8 April 2021)

“What happened in Unguwar Haraha Gofe has been replicated in scores of villages in Southern Kaduna in recent years. At least 366 people were killed in communal violence in the first seven months of this year alone – deepening the bitterness that has complicated the many attempts to find peace.

This fertile agricultural zone is home to at least 30 ethnic groups – predominantly Christian farming communities. Collectively, they are a minority within Kaduna state, where political and economic power is held by the Hausa-Fulani majority, who are almost exclusively Muslim.

The flashpoint for conflict is typically a dispute between “indigenous” farmers and Fulani pastoralists, who range across West Africa with their herds. The expansion of settled farmland has blocked legally-demarcated stock routes, and when crops have been trampled and water points fouled – or cattle killed or stolen – trouble has quickly followed in a tit-for-tat spiral of ever-worsening violence that has displaced an estimated 50,000 people in recent years.” (TNH, 17 December 2020)

“The Nigerian authorities have left rural communities at the mercy of rampaging gunmen who have killed at least 1,126 people in the north of the country since January, Amnesty International said today.

The organization interviewed civilians in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, Taraba and Zamfara states, who said they live in fear of attacks and abductions as insecurity escalates in rural areas. Many of those interviewed described how security forces often arrive hours after attacks have ended, even when officers have been given information about impending attacks. During one attack in Unguwan Magaji in Kaduna state, security forces arrived at the scene but left when they saw the sophisticated ammunition the attackers were using. By the time they returned, at least 17 people had been killed.

Amnesty International has documented an alarming escalation in attacks and abductions in several states in north west and north central Nigeria since January 2020. Worst affected are villages in the south of Kaduna State, where armed men killed at least 366 people in multiple attacks between January and July 2020.” (AI, 24 August 2020)

“Kidnapping for ransom has become a particularly lucrative and attractive business to many in the North West region, especially among the many unemployed youths. Many residents lament how easily the armed banditry groups storm their communities in broad daylight to either rustle cattle or kidnap people. The kidnappers no longer are interested in kidnapping ordinary villagers, however. Rather, they realize that attacking schools and inter-state transportation routes brings in more money. The region, for example, recorded at least six mass kidnappings of school children and university students in the past six months […]” (Jamestown Foundation, 2 July 2021)[xxvi]

“Intercommunal violence continued in many parts of the country. In April, armed bandits killed at least 47 people in a coordinated attack on several villages in Katsina State in the northwest. According to the UN refugee agency, at least 1,126 people died between January and June in the northwest region, 210,000 people were internally displaced and over 70,000 fled to seek refuge in Niger as at August due to the insecurity in the region.” (HRW, 13 January 2021)

“The northern Nigerian state of Kaduna has suspended all schooling due to insecurity, state officials said on Monday, amid a spate of student kidnappings in the region that has rocked Africa's most populous country.

[…]

The state had already imposed a three-week suspension on schooling that expired on Sunday, said another official who asked not to be named because he was not authorised to speak to media.” (Reuters, 26 July 2021)

“The Kaduna State Schools Quality Assurance Authority has ordered the closures of 13 schools, most of which belong to Christian denominations or organisations, which it has identified as being “vulnerable,” following the abduction of staff and students from Bethel Baptist High School in the Chikun Local Government Area of southern Kaduna.” (CSW, 7 July 2021)

“For the last few years life in rural areas of north-western Zamfara state has been agonisingly brutish.

Gun-toting motorbike gangs have made the state of approximately 15,352 sq miles (39,761 sq km) - an area bigger than countries like Burundi, Lesotho and Rwanda - a haven for wanton killing, rape and kidnapping for ransom.

[…]

[T]he Zamfara authorities have now banned the movement and sale of animals, along with the weekly markets where farmers and business people go to trade. Stealing animals is one of the gangs' main streams of income.

The more drastic measure has been switching off all of Zamfara's 240 mobile phone towers.

The aim is to deny the criminals the means of communication with their informants and of negotiating ransoms with the families of those abducted.” (BBC, 12 September 2021)

4.2. Current Situation

“Zamfara, one of Nigeria’s poorest states, is at the centre of the banditry. It tops the country’s league table of violent deaths, with 495 reported killings between July and October. That’s far more fatalities than northeastern Borno – where ISWAP and Boko Haram operate.” (TNH, 8 November 2021)

“[C]riminal violence continued unabated in north west.” (ICG, October 2021)

“In Sokoto state, suspected vigilante group 7 Oct killed 11 Fulani herders in Gwadabawa area; unidentified gunmen next day raided market in Sabon Birni area, leaving at least 20 dead, and 17 Oct reportedly killed at least 49 people in Goronyo area. In Zamfara state, gunmen 5 Oct killed at least 19 in Kuryan Madaro village. Security forces 7 Oct rescued around 190 civilians held captive by armed bandits in Zamfara forest; operation part of weeks-long military offensive in north-western states.” (ICG, October 2021)

“Nigerianische Sicherheitskräfte haben bei Razzien in Lagern krimineller Banden fast 200 verschleppte Menschen befreit. Die 187 entführten Männer, Frauen und Kinder seien in dichten Wäldern im nordwestlichen Bundesstaat Zamfara gefunden worden, teilte die Polizei mit. Videoaufnahmen zeigen zahlreiche Menschen, die nach ihrer Rettung zusammengekauert auf dem Boden saßen.

Die Rettungsaktion war laut Behördenangaben Teil einer wochenlangen Militäroperation in Zamfara und weiteren Bundesstaaten im Nordwesten des Landes. Dabei sei unter anderem die Telekommunikation ausgesetzt worden, um die Kommunikation der Bandenmitglieder zu stören. Die Entführungsopfer hätten sich bereits seit Wochen in der Gewalt der Kriminellen befunden.

[…] Die nigerianische Armee hatte in der vergangenen Woche mitgeteilt, im Zuge der Operation gegen kriminelle Banden knapp 300 Bandenmitglieder ‘neutralisiert’ zu haben.

Am Dienstag meldeten die Sicherheitskräfte jedoch einen neuerlichen Angriff: Rund 100 Kriminelle fielen auf Motorrädern über das Dorf Kuryan Madaro im Bundesstaat Zamfara her, töteten 14 Einwohner und raubten Geld und Mobiltelefone” (DW, 8 October 2021)[xxvii]

“Nigerianische Sicherheitskräfte haben bei Razzien in Lagern krimineller Banden 187 Entführungsopfer befreit. Die Männer, Frauen und Kinder wurden in dichten Wäldern im nordwestlichen Bundesstaat Zamfara gefunden, gab die Polizei am Donnerstagabend bekannt. Auf Fotos waren dutzende Menschen zu sehen, die nach ihrer Rettung zusammengekauert auf dem Boden saßen.

[…]

Die Rettungsaktion war laut Behördenangaben Teil einer wochenlangen Militäroperation in Zamfara und weiteren Bundesstaaten im Nordwesten des Landes. Dabei sei unter anderem die Telekommunikation ausgesetzt worden, um die Kommunikation der Bandenmitglieder zu stören. Die Entführungsopfer befanden sich den Angaben zufolge seit Wochen in der Gewalt der Kriminellen.

Die nigerianische Armee hatte in der vergangenen Woche mitgeteilt, im Zuge der Operation gegen kriminelle Banden knapp 300 Bandenmitglieder ‚neutralisiert‘ zu haben. Am Dienstag meldeten die Sicherheitskräfte jedoch einen erneuten Angriff: Rund hundert Kriminelle fielen auf Motorrädern über das Dorf Kuryan Madaro im Bundesstaat Zamfara her, töteten 14 Einwohner und raubten Geld und Mobiltelefone.” (Der Standard, 8 October 2021)

“Unbekannte Täter haben bei einem Anschlag auf einen Marktplatz im Norden Nigerias dutzende Menschen getötet. "43 Menschen wurden nach dem Angriff von Banditen im Dorf Goronyo am Sonntag für tot erklärt", erklärte die Regionalregierung der Provinz Sokoto am Montag. Die Angreifer hätten am Sonntagabend wahllos in die Menschenmenge auf dem Markt von Goronyo im Teilstaat Sokoto geschossen, sagte der Gouverneur von Sokoto, Aminu Tambuwal, am Montag.

Augenzeugen berichteten von bis zu 60 Toten. Keine Gruppe reklamierte den Anschlag bisher für sich. Anfang Oktober kamen bereits 20 Menschen bei einem ähnlichen Angriff auf einen Markt in der Stadt Sabon Gari im gleichen Teilstaat ums Leben. Im Norden des bevölkerungsreichsten Land Afrikas kommt es häufig zu Anschlägen und Entführungen. Dahinter stecken sowohl islamistische Terroristengruppen wie Boko Haram als auch kriminelle Banden.” (Der Standard, 18 October 2021)

“In Katsina state, armed group 4-5 July killed at least 20 in three villages in Batsari area. In Kaduna state, gunmen 5 July abducted 121 students near state capital; armed groups 8-13 July killed 33 in Zangon Kataf area.” (ICG, July 2021)

“In Katsina state, armed groups 9-12 Nov killed at least 20 civilians, abducted at least 28. In Kaduna state, gunmen 5 Nov killed at least 20 in several attacks in Zangon Kataf area; 9 Nov killed retired air force general in Igabi area; 21-24 and 29 Nov repeatedly attacked travellers on Abuja-Kaduna highway, killing three and kidnapping dozens; suspected bandits also held on to 66 parishioners kidnapped late-Oct in Chikun area, demanded ransom. In Sokoto state, armed attacks 14-16 Nov killed at least 57.” (ICG, November 2021)

“Laut Medienberichten haben Unbekannte am 21.11.21 eine größere Anzahl von Personen entführt, die im nördlichen Bundesstaat Kaduna auf der Autobahn Abuja-Kaduna unterwegs waren. Auch sei bei dem von der Polizei bestätigten Vorfall eine Person zu Tode gekommen. Augenzeugen hätten von mindestens 40 Entführungsopfern und weiteren Toten gesprochen. Als wichtige Verbindungsstraße zwischen Nord- und Südnigeria kamen auf der Autobahn Abuja-Kaduna bereits in der Vergangenheit wiederholt Attacken von unbekannten Angreifern vor. Nach Einschätzung von Beobachtern werden nicht alle Vorfälle öffentlich bekannt.” (BAMF, 29 November 2021, p. 12)

“Im nordwestlichen Bundesstaat Zamfara hat die Polizei 24 Opfer verschiedener Entführungsfälle retten können. Das geht aus Medienberichten vom 24.11.21 hervor, die sich auf offizielle Behördenangaben vom Vortag berufen. Einige der Befreiten hätten mehr als 60 Tage in Gefangenschaft verbracht. Zamfara gilt als einer der von Entführungen und anderen kriminellen Aktivitäten bewaffneter Banden besonders betroffenen Bundesstaaten.” (BAMF, 29 November 2021, p. 12)

“In Kaduna, three students abducted from Bethel Baptist High School on 5 July 2021 have spent 149 days in captivity. At least 121 children between the ages of 10- 15 were abducted during the raid in Chikun local government area.

Children including an infant are among the 66 people still in captivity after their abduction on 31 October 2021 at Emmanuel Baptist Church, Chikun LGA, Kaduna state.“ (AI, 2 December 2021)

5. Southern Nigeria, Biafra and the Niger Delta (Piracy, criminality, militant groups, separatist movement, Police violence)

(States: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Cross River State, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Ondo, Rivers)

5.1. Background Information

“The Niger Delta, in southern Nigeria, is a paradox, rich in resources but poor and racked by insecurity. A combination of local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, the region’s share of oil revenues and its marginalisation in national politics led to protests that evolved into a full-blown insurgency in 2006. That rebellion, waged by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), severely disrupted Nigeria’s oil industry, slashing earnings from its exports, the country’s major revenue source. A June 2009 presidential amnesty for the militants ended the insurgency, restored some stability and created an opportunity for the government to address the multiple grievances and demands at their roots. That opportunity was lost to political inertia and bad governance. Many issues that triggered the conflict remain largely unaddressed. The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015), the first national leader from the region, stipends and training for the former militants and arrangements with insurgency leaders kept a lid on local agitation and conflict.” (ICG, 29 September 2015, p. 1)

“Incidences of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria have spiralled over the years. By way of example, such occurrences surged from 57 incidents in 1998 to over 2 500 incidents in 2008. This is rather ominous, considering the primacy of the petroleum sector vis-a-vis the sustenance of the Nigerian economy.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 5 September 2019) [xxviii]

“Since its advent in the 1970s, the petroleum sector has predominantly sustained the Nigerian economy. The sector has also been a centre for petro-rentier politics and corruption – more specifically crime and violence, including oil theft sabotage and pipeline vandalism. […] The characteristics of the Niger Delta social context have informed three patterns of petro-pipeline vandalism, represented in the “need-greed-grievance” schema. Need-based vandalism is driven by the imperative for subsistence and survival, while greed-based vandalism is associated with the quest for primitive accumulation of petro-wealth. Grievance-based vandalism, on the other hand, refers to pipeline vandalism as an avenue for the advancement of an environmental justice cause. What is common across all these patterns of petroleum pipeline vandalism is that each of them is driven by a socio-existential imperative.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 5 September 2019)

“Other organized criminal forces in the southern and middle parts of the country committed abuses, such as kidnappings. The overall level of violence in the Niger Delta, which declined briefly after a 2009 general amnesty, rose during the year.” (USDOS, 25 June 2015, Executive Summary)

“While amnesty lasted, there was some reprieve as militants sheathed their swords. However, there has been recourse to arms in the region in recent times as new militant groups emerged in 2016 with various demands. While the new names that emerged this time differ from the past ones, there is no doubt that this was old wine in new bottles. The new militants are still insisting on resource control and bombing of oil installations, which is re-immersing the country in conflict once again.” (African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, 12 September 2017)

“Militants in the Niger Delta have not launched any major attacks on oil installations since the federal government engaged the region’s ethnic and political leaders last November, pledging to revive infrastructure projects, clean up the polluted Ogoni environment and allow local communities to set up modular refineries. Yet the region’s situation remains fragile. Attacks against Igbos or other southerners in the north might lead some delta militants to target oil companies, either to pressure the federal and northern state governments to stop anti-Igbo violence, or to cover criminal activities.” (ICG, 20 July 2017)

“Criminal groups abducted civilians in the Niger Delta and the Southeast, often to collect ransom payments. Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. On July 13, for example, Nigerian pirates boarded a cargo vessel off the coast of Bayelsa, kidnapping 10 Turkish sailors and taking them away by speedboat. The pirates, initially demanding three million dollars as a ransom payment, reportedly released the sailors in August after weeks of negotiations.” (USDOS, 11 March 2020, Section 1b)

“Kidnappings by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea hit a record in 2020, with well-armed and violent gangs defying regional navies and marauding further out to sea, a report from the International Maritime Bureau said on Wednesday. Pirates in the West African region kidnapped 130 seafarers in 22 separate incidents, accounting for all but five of those seized worldwide last year. The previous record, in 2019, was 121.” (Reuters, 13 January 2021)

“Maritime kidnappings remained common as militants turned to piracy and related crimes to support themselves. For example, in July, Nigerian pirates attacked a Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel near Rivers State, kidnapping 11 crew members.” (USDOS, 30 March 2021, Section 1b)

“During protests between October 7 and 20, 2020, in states including Ogun, Oyo, and Lagos, and in Abuja, the nation’s capital, security forces repeatedly responded with what appeared to be excessive force, using gunfire, water cannons, and teargas fired at close range.” (HRW, 19 October 2021)

“In October, security forces used excessive force to disperse peaceful protests and assemblies, including the #EndSARS demonstrations, resulting in the deaths of 56 protesters, bystanders and members of the security forces.” (AI, 7 April 2021)

“The Nigerian army has rejected claims it killed unarmed protesters at a rally in Lagos in October, saying its soldiers were firing blank bullets.

Brigadier General Ahmed Taiwo presented video evidence to back up his claims made to a panel of inquiry.

Amnesty International says 12 people were killed when soldiers opened fire on a protest about police brutality in the wealthy Lagos suburb of Lekki.

Multiple eyewitnesses have told the BBC they saw soldiers shoot people.

Some 1,000 protesters had gathered at the Lekki toll gate on 20 October to prevent cars using a major motorway. Soldiers were reportedly seen barricading the protest site moments before the shooting started.

In video footage shared on social media at the time, shots could be heard as protesters sat down, locked arms and sang the national anthem together. Live footage was also streamed from the scene showing protesters tending to the wounded.

The attack had followed days of protests against the much-hated police unit, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Sars), which had morphed into greater calls for better governance.” (BBC, 15 November 2020)

“An investigation by the organization found that Nigerian army and police killed at least 12 people on 20 October 2020 at Lekki toll gate and Alausa in Lagos. Amnesty International was able to establish that pro-government supporters instigated violence at many of the demonstrations, providing cover for the police to use lethal force against peaceful protesters. The organization also found that detained protesters were tortured and refused or denied immediate access to lawyers” (AI, 19 October 2021)

“A judicial panel has found that army and police officers shot, injured, and killed unarmed protesters at the Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos, Nigeria during nationwide protests against police brutality in 2020, Human Rights Watch said today.” (HRW, 19 November 2021)

“According to the report by the inquiry panel, soldiers intentionally shot at protesters on 20 October at the Lekki toll gate in Lagos.

It also found that after the army retreated, police officers continued the violence and tried to clean up the scene, taking bodies away on trucks and removing bullets.” (BBC News, 16 November 2021)

“Journalists covering the protest movement were beaten, harassed, and fined by law enforcement. One reporter, Onifade Emmanuel Pelumi, was found dead at a mortuary on October 30, 2020; he was last seen alive in police custody after he covered unrest around the protests in Lagos” (IPS, 12 November 2021)[xxix]

“Federal govt 4 June ordered Internet providers to block access to social media platform Twitter; move came after Twitter suspended President Buhari’s account and removed post in which he vowed to “treat [Biafra secessionist groups] in the language they understand”. Numerous human rights groups protested shutdown as attempt to stifle free speech.” (ICG, June 2021)

5.2. Current Situation

“Schwer bewaffnete Männer haben ein Gefängnis im Südwesten Nigerias gestürmt und hunderte Häftlinge befreit. 575 Insassen seien nach dem Angriff am Freitagabend noch auf der Flucht, erklärte der Sprecher der Gefängnisverwaltung im Bundesstaat Oyo. Insgesamt entkamen demnach mehr als 800 Häftlinge aus der Untersuchungshaft, rund 250 wurden wieder in Gewahrsam genommen.” (DW, 24 October 2021)

“In third such attack this year, gunmen 22 Oct stormed jail in Oyo state (south west), reportedly freed all inmates.” (ICG, October 2021)

“[T]rial of Biafra separatist leader sparked lockdowns in south.

[…]

Trial of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader Nnamdi Kanu on charges of terrorism and treason 21 Oct resumed, was immediately adjourned to Nov; Umuahia and Aba cities in Kanu’s home state of Abia same day on total lockdown as part of months-long “sit-at-home” protest movement in south east calling for Kanu’s unconditional release.” (ICG, October 2021)

“The Nigerian separatist Nnamdi Kanu has pleaded not guilty to charges levelled against him by the authorities, including terrorism and treason.

[…]

Mr Kanu was originally arrested in 2015 but he fled Nigeria in 2017 while out on bail.

Ipob wants a group of states in the south-east of the country, which mostly comprises the Igbo ethnic group, to break away from Nigeria and form an independent nation called Biafra.

In 1967 Igbo leaders declared independence for the state of Biafra, but after a civil war, which led to the deaths of up to a million people, the secessionist rebellion was defeated.

But the idea of Biafra has never gone away and despite arrests of his members, Mr Kanu's movement has seen a recent swell in its numbers.” (BBC News, 21 October 2021)

“[G]unmen attacked oil facilities in Niger Delta.” (ICG, November 2021)

“In Niger Delta, new militant group, Bayan-Men, 23 and 27 Nov blew up Nigeria Agip Oil Company’s facilities in Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni area, Rivers state.” (ICG, November 2021)

6. Further Information on the security situation in Nigeria

Please see the following link to access the database of Nigeriawatch[xxx]:

  • Nigeriawatch: The Database; List of Events, undated

http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtListe&cherche=1

For further information on security incidents please also see:

ACAPS[xxxi]: Crisis Updates; Nigeria; Complex Crisis, undated

https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/crisis/complex-crisis

For maps on security incidents in Nigeria please also see:

  • CFR - Council on Foreign Relations[xxxii]: Nigeria Security Tracker; Mapping Violence in Nigeria, undated

http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483

7. Sources

(all links accessed on 15 December 2021)


[i] The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is a German state owned organisation that specializes in international development.

[ii] Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) is the economic development agency of the Federal Republic of Germany.

[iii] The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) is a political foundation, closely associated with the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU).

[iv] The Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF) is an international network bringing together all levels of government, with more than 200 members in 47 Commonwealth countries, including: local government associations; councils; and ministries with responsibility for local government; together with associate members – universities and professional organisations.

[v] The Conversation is an independent source of news and views, sourced from the academic and research community and delivered direct to the public

[vi] The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is the public service broadcaster of the United Kingdom.

[vii] The Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is a civil-law foundation and the founding institution behind the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

[viii] The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the public policy research arm of the United States Congress.

[ix] The Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BPB) [Federal Agency for Civic Education] is a federal public authority providing citizenship education and information on political issues for all people in Germany.

[x] Deutschlandfunk is part of the German radio station Deutschlandradio and has its headquarters in Cologne.

[xi] The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a transnational non-profit, non-governmental organisation that carries out field research on violent conflict and advances policies to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict

[xii] Amnesty International (AI) is a non-governmental organisation focused on human rights.

[xiii] The US Department of State (USDOS) is the ministry of foreign affairs of the United States.

[xiv] Leif Brottem is Associate Professor of Global Development Studies at Grinnell College. He researches pastoralism and rural livelihoods in West and Central Africa.

[xv] ARTICLE 19 is an international human rights organisation.

[xvi] BAMF is the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.

[xvii] Naija News is a Nigerian digital newspaper platform published by Polance Media Limited.

[xviii] Die Zeit is a German weekly newspaper

[xix] The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is a global think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia.

[xx] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN Refugee Agency.

[xxi] Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international human rights organisation.

[xxii] Thomson Reuters (Reuters) is an international news agency.

[xxiii] The New Humanitarian (TNH) (formerly IRIN News) is an independent non-profit news organisation. It was founded by the United Nations in 1995, in the wake of the Rwandan genocide.

[xxiv] United Nations Security Council

[xxv] UN OCHA ist das UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

[xxvi] The Jamestown Foundation, an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that provides information on terrorism, the former Soviet republics, Chechnya, China, and North Korea.

[xxvii] Deutsche Welle (DW) is a German international broadcaster.

[xxviii] The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes is a South Africa-based civil society organisation working throughout Africa and operating in the field of conflict prevention.

[xxix] Inter Press Service (IPS) is a global news agency.

[xxx] Nigeriawatch is a project of the University of Ibadan with the support of the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria)

[xxxi] Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) is a consortium of the two NGOs Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children based in Geneva.

[xxxii] The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is a private US think tank specialising on foreign policy.

[xxxiii] Partners for Peace (P4P) is a program of the Fund for Peace (FfP) promoting a peaceful Nigerdelta.

This featured topic was prepared after researching solely on ecoi.net and within time constraints. It is meant to offer an overview on an issue and is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection. Chronologies are not intended to be exhaustive. Every quotation is referred to with a hyperlink to the respective document.