Background information
Collection of information on developments concerning the SDF and Kurdish-controlled areas
In January 2026, the conflict between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalated. This was triggered by the expiry of a deadline set by the transitional government for the integration of the SDF into state structures and the government's declared goal of regaining complete territorial control over north-eastern Syria (DW, 20 January 2026).
Fighting in Aleppo and displacement of the civilian population
In early January, intense fighting broke out in the predominantly Kurdish neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo between government troops, pro-government militias and SDF-affiliated forces (MEI, 13 January 2026). On 10 January, Kurdish police forces were withdrawn from the last remaining Kurdish neighbourhood and troops of the Syrian transitional government took control of the entire city of Aleppo. Several thousand Kurds fled the city to Afrin and to Kurdish-controlled areas east of the Euphrates (Schmidinger, 23 January 2026). By the end of January, the situation in the previously contested districts had stabilised. Ninety per cent of those who had been displaced had returned, and the destroyed infrastructure was being repaired. A continuing challenge in the city and the surrounding area of Aleppo is the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left behind by SDF fighters (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).
Expansion of the offensive in north-eastern Syria and support for the transitional government by Arab tribes
On 16 January, the Transitional Ministry of Defence announced an operation to capture Deir Hafer and Maskana, parts of the last SDF-held areas in the east of Aleppo province. Within less than 24 hours, pro-government forces took control of both locations and expanded their offensive to areas of Raqqa province and other SDF-controlled regions in northeastern Syria. On 17 January, pro-government forces, including units from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior as well as allied tribal militias, launched an offensive from the directions of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. By the end of the same day, the Al-Schamiyeh region in the west of Raqqa province had fallen, and shortly afterwards, pro-government forces began advancing on the city of Raqqa. In the province of Deir Ezzor, tribal fighters attacked SDF positions even before the transitional government forces arrived. The rapid advance was aided by the considerable weakening of the SDF as a result of desertions and by the support of influential Arab tribes for the transitional authorities. With the exception of Al-Shaddadeh, much of the southern outskirts of Hasakah province also came under the control of the transitional government (Etana Syria, 20 January 2026; see also: Schmidinger, 23 January 2026).
According to Syria expert Charles Lister, isolated crimes were committed by government troops and Kurdish militiamen during the offensive. There are confirmed cases of desecration of corpses, the destruction of an SDF cemetery and the use of unguided munitions in civilian areas by the Syrian army. At the same time, Kurdish fighters are accused of killing nearly 20 civilians with sniper fire and carrying out several extrajudicial executions (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).
Ceasefire and further agreements
On 18 January, representatives of the transitional government and the SDF agreed on a ceasefire, which was followed by fighting (Al Jazeera, 20 January 2026). On 24 January, the ceasefire was extended for another 15 days, with a call for the SDF to lay down its arms and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army (Reuters, 24 January 2026). Even during this agreed ceasefire, there were mutual attacks (Der Standard, 26 January 2026, The National, 29. Jänner 2026). On 29 January, for example, Syrian military drones carried out attacks on SDF positions in the vicinity of the Al Qahtaniyah subdistrict in Hasakah Province (Long War Journal, 29. Jänner 2026). On 30 January, the two sides agreed on a comprehensive agreement for the gradual integration of Kurdsih military and civilian institutions into the state (France 24, 2 February 2026; see also: Reuters, 2 February 2026). In a circular published on February 16, the Syrian Ministry of the Interior set a deadline of the end of February 2026 for members of the SDF to legalize their status and lay down their arms. This can be done at registration centers in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa (The New Arab, 16 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (The New Arab, 14 February 2026). On 21 February, state media reported the appointment of Brigadier General Ziad Al-Ayesh as presidential envoy with the task of implementing the 29 January agreement with the SDF and overseeing the integration process (Rudaw, 21 February 2026). In March, the Syrian Ministry of Defence appoints Sipan Hamo, commander of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), as Deputy Minister of Defence for the eastern regions of the country (Reuters, 10 March 2026). Also in March, the transitional government and the SDF will begin exchanging their respective prisoners as part of their agreement of 29 January (Rudaw, 10 March 2026). ). Also as part of the agreement, Syrian state media are reporting the organisation of the return of hundreds of displaced families to the city of Afrin Afrin (Rudaw, 9 March 2026; also see: ANF News, 10 March 2026).
Control over prisons and IS prisoners
As a result of the fighting described above, suspected members of Islamic State (IS) escaped from a prison in Shaddadi. While the Syrian government reported that around 120 prisoners had escaped, the SDF put the number at 1,500. The Syrian army imposed a curfew on Shaddadi and launched search and arrest operations, in which, according to official figures, 81 people were recaptured. Further fighting and prison breaks were also reported in the city of Raqqa (The Guardian, 20 January 2026).
As part of the ceasefire, the Syrian army took control of the al-Hol camp, which houses thousands of people, mainly family members of IS members (AP News, 25 January 2026). The UN subsequently took over responsibility for camp management, but was still unable to enter the camp as of 22 January for security reasons (Reuters, 22 January 2026). In mid-February, humanitarian, diplomatic, and local sources told Al Jazeera that the number of residents in the main al-Hol camp had fallen dramatically. Reports on how people left the camp are contradictory. According to local sources, most Syrians from al-Hol returned to their home towns, while many foreigners traveled to the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo (Al Jazeera, 17 February 2026).
Reuters reported that the US had begun transferring IS prisoners from Syria to Iraq. The first transfers involved 150 people, with further transfers – of up to 7,000 prisoners – planned (Reuters, 21 January 2026).
According to the news platform Asharq Al-Awsat, attacks by IS have increased significantly since the SDF withdrew from the al-Hol camp. In the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in particular, there have been attacks by lone IS members against security forces (Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 February 2026).
Situation in Hasakah
The SDF continues to control predominantly Kurdish areas. Government troops did not enter these regions, in particular the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah in north-eastern Syria and Kobane in the province of Aleppo near the Turkish border. The background to this are ongoing negotiations on the future administration of these areas and the return of state institutions. According to the Syrian news website Enab Baladi, both sides are preparing for further possible combat operations. Both the SDF and pro-government forces moved military reinforcements to the contact lines south of Hasakah, while the SDF expanded its positions, continued patrols and raids in the city districts, and converted a civilian hospital into a military hospital ( Enab Baladi, 24 January 2026). On 2 February, journalists present at the scene reported that a convoy of government vehicles had entered the city of Hasakah as a result of the agreement of 30 January described above (France 24, 2 February 2026; Reuters, 2 February 2026). The following day, Syrian government forces entered the city of Qamishli. (Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 February 2026). On 10 February, the Syrian army began handing over command in parts of Hasakah to the internal Syrian security forces (Welat, 11 February 2026), while at the same time the SDF withdrew from the frontlines in the south of the city of Hakah as part of an agreement between the two parties to the conflict and deployed its own internal security forces (Asaish) in the areas (Kurd Press, 11 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (SOHR, 16 February 2026). On 21 February, the Syrian authorities took over the administration of Qamishli Airport (Al-Arabiya, 22 February 2026).
On 5 February, US forces withdrew from the Al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah province (The New Arab, 5 February 2026). On 21 February, the US-led coalition began evacuating the Qasrak military base (Shafaq News, 21 February 2026).
At the beginning of March, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported that 116,900 internally displaced persons remain displaced in 165 communities in the provinces of Aleppo and Hasakah. Furthermore, the failure of critical infrastructure is hampering basic services. Frequent power cuts are affecting water stations and medical care. At the same time, some important road links between the city of Hasakah and the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor were reopened after around 40 days of closure (UN OCHA, 8 March 2026, p. 1).
Situation in Kobane (also known as Ain al-Arab)
The city of Kobane, which is predominantly inhabited by Kurds, is surrounded by the Turkish border to the north and by pro-government forces on all other sides . It is home to numerous internally displaced persons as a result of the recent fighting and has become a humanitarian hotspot. Kurdish forces accused the Syrian army of besieging the city, and activists warned of a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of food, water and electricity. Following the extension of the ceasefire on 24 January, two humanitarian corridors were established and a United Nations humanitarian convoy reached the city (DW, 25 January 2026; see also: France 24, 25 January 2026). The New Arab reported on 29 January that hundreds of armed Iraqi Kurds had travelled to Hasakah province as volunteers over the previous two days (The New Arab, 29. Jänner 2026). The Kurdish news website ANF News reported on 5 February that Kobane had been under siege for 17 days. Some basic foodstuffs were no longer available and others were running low, as were medicines and medical supplies. The above-mentioned agreement between the transitional government and the SDF had provided for the lifting of the siege, but was not being implemented. (ANF News, 5 February 2026). According to Kurdish media and NGOs, Kobane continues to be besieged by the armed forces of the Syrian transitional government in mid-February 2026, which has a negative impact on health services. Also, there are only two hours of electricity per day, and the siege has led to a drastic increase in the price of food and heating oil (Kurdistan 24, 11 February 2026; see also: STJ, 11 February 2026; Kurdistan 24, 15 February 2026). During the same week, a UN team conducted a fact-finding mission in the city and confirmed that basic services were severely affected by the current situation. Goods and fuel were reaching the city, but not in the quantities needed (UN, 10 February 2026). On 21 February, SOHR reported human rights violations by government forces and allied armed groups in the predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Syria in the rural areas around Kobane. According to local sources, civilians were shot at directly, the body of a young man was left lying in public for two weeks, and a funeral was prevented. In addition, civilians' mobile phones and other property (such as combine harvesters and trucks) were confiscated (SOHR, 21 February 2026). At the end of February, Kurdish news reports announced the start of the integration process of the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) of the Kobane region into the Syrian Ministry of the Interior (Kurdistan 24, 27 February 2026). As of 11 March 2026, the city of Kobane has been under siege for over 50 days. According to the co-chair of the municipal health authority, Ahmad Mahmoud, there is a shortage of medicines and much of the medical equipment has broken down (ANHA, 11 March 2026).
The most recent documents on the issue
These are the most recent documents from a search for relevant terms: (You can find more, and customise your search under this search link.)
Considered synonyms: (kurdisch kurdish) areas, (kurdisch kurdish) majority areas, autonome administration nord und ostsyrien, autonome administration von nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung von nord und ostsyrien, autonomous administration of north and east syria, democratic federation of northern syria, demokratische föderation nordsyrien, demokratische föderation nordsyriens, demokratische kräfte syriens, dfns, dks, fds, forze democratiche siriane, föderation nordsyrien rojava, kurdisch kontrollierte gebiete, kurdish controlled areas, kurdish controlled territories, kurdish self administration, kurdistan as suriyya, kurdistān as sūriyya, qasad, qsd, quwwat suriya al dimuqratiya, rojavaya kurdistane, rojavaya kurdistanê, sanes, sdf controlled areas, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien rojava, self administration in northeast syria, syrian democratic forces, von sdf kontrollierte gebiete, von ypg kontrollierte gebiete, westkurdistan, ypg controlled areas
28 April 2026 | UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Report on return dynamics, reintegration and protection risks affecting refugee returnees, IDP returnees and host communities
Syria: Protection and Reintegration Insights; Voices of returnees and host communities across Syria (January - March 2026) (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- Armed confrontations between Syrian forces and the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) escalated in early January in parts of Aleppo city
before spreading to Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh, resulting in civilian casualties and
the displacement of over 190,000 people, primarily to Qamishli and
Al-Malakiyeh.
28 April 2026 | OHCHR – UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Continuing human rights violations in several parts of the country, including killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, intimidation and movement restrictions; also, since the fall of the Assad government, several individuals have been arrested by Israeli forces and taken to prisons in Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan
Human rights update on Syria (Appeal or News Release, English)
- During the
five-day visit, our colleagues were also informed that three mass graves had
been uncovered in Al-Hassakeh last month, including one inside a former
detention facility operated by Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). […] Our team also heard testimonies from families of disappeared people,
including children and women, who reported loved ones having disappeared while
being detained by SDF or international coalition forces. The coalition says it
transferred 7,000 detainees to Iraq, around half of them Syrians, in January
2026. We fear that many of them have no access to families or legal
representation.
21 April 2026 | Amnesty International (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Report on the human rights situation (covering 2025)
The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025 (Periodical Report, English)
- Arbitrary detention continued to
be used by the government and by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in
north-eastern Syria. More than 30,000 people in SDF custody continued to be
subjected to human rights violations. Government forces, government-backed
forces and militia members unlawfully killed people from the Alawite minority
and extrajudicially executed members of the Druze community. […] On 10 March, President al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF) – the military wing of the Kurdish-led Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria – signed an agreement to integrate the
civilian and military institutions in north-eastern Syria into the Syrian
government. The agreement was not implemented. […] A witness said his brother, who was among
the 25, was arrested by general security officers and that his fate and
whereabouts were undisclosed.
=== Syrian Democratic Forces ===
The SDF was responsible for the large-scale violation of the rights of more
than 30,000 people in their custody for their perceived affiliation with the
Islamic State armed group. […] Activists reported that SDF forces arbitrarily arrested at least five people,
predominantly Arabs, for expressing views online in support of President
al-Sharaa’s government.
== Unlawful killings ==
On 6 March, armed groups affiliated with the former government launched
multiple coordinated attacks on security and military sites in the
predominately Alawite coastal governorates of Latakia and
21 April 2026 | Amnesty International (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Report on the human rights situation (covering 2025)
Amnesty Report 2025/26: Zur Lage der Menschenrechte weltweit; Syrien 2025 (Periodical Report, German)
- Sowohl Regierungskräfte als auch Mitglieder des
Militärbündnisses SDF (Syrische Demokratische Kräfte) waren im Nordosten
Syriens weiterhin für willkürliche Inhaftierungen verantwortlich. Mehr als
30.000 Menschen befanden sich in Gewahrsam der SDF und erlitten
Menschenrechtsverletzungen. […] März 2025 unterzeichnete der Präsident ein Abkommen mit Mazloum Abdi,
dem Kommandeur der Syrischen Demokratischen Kräfte (SDF), dem militärischen
Flügel der kurdisch geführten Autonomieverwaltung von Nord- und Ostsyrien.
Darin wurde vereinbart, die zivilen und militärischen Einrichtungen im
Nordosten Syriens der syrischen Regierung zu unterstellen. Das Abkommen wurde
nicht umgesetzt. […] Syrische Demokratische Kräfte (SDF)
Mehr als 30.000 Personen befanden sich 2025 in Gewahrsam der SDF, weil ihnen
Verbindungen zu der bewaffneten Gruppe Islamischer Staat vorgeworfen wurden. […] SDF-Mitglieder waren für Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegen die Inhaftierten –
darunter zahlreiche Minderjährige – verantwortlich, die in mindestens 27
Hafteinrichtungen sowie in den Lagern Al-Hol und Roj im Nordosten des Landes
festgehalten wurden. Viele von ihnen waren bereits seit 2019 inhaftiert. […] Aktivist*innen berichteten, SDF-Kräfte hätten mindestens fünf Männer
willkürlich festgenommen, weil diese im Internet ihre Unterstützung für die
Regierung von Präsident al-Scharaa bekundet hatten. Die meisten von ihnen waren
Araber.
== Rechtswidrige Tötungen ==
Am 6.
9 April 2026 | Etana (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
North-east Syria: Brief update on military, security and political developments
BRIEF: Recent developments in north-east Syria (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- == As of 9 April 2026, 16:00 local time ==
While military integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
and Damascus have remained constructive, translating paper agreements into
tangible implementation is likely to provoke significant local reactions. […] This
dynamic has already been reflected in Arab protests in Kobane, Ras al-Ain and
Suluk, opposing the incorporation of SDF-affiliated personnel into local
security structures. […] The core issues
under negotiation include the structure of command and control, the status and
ranking of SDF officers within the Syrian army, and the future of security
forces such as theAsayish. While Damascus continues to push for centralized
absorption of SDF units into existing military hierarchies, the SDF has sought
to preserve elements of its autonomous command framework. […] Arabs in
Deir Ezzor and Hasakeh have accused the SDF of adding the names of Arab
detainees to lists it is providing of ISIS members to be transferred to Iraq. […] The appointment suggests Damascus may be positioning him as the
de facto authority, while the current SDF-affiliated director, Adnan al-Bari,
remains a nominal, largely symbolic figure in the administration.
5 April 2026 | SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Report on victims of extrajudicial killing (covering January - March 2025)
Quarterly Report on Cased of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention in Syria; No less than 210 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions in the First Quarter of 2026 (Periodical Report, English)
- These
operations included the arrest of civilians for criticizing the practices of
the Syrian Democratic Forces in the areas under their control, reflecting an
escalation in detentions during that period and its connection to the context
of local tensions. […] Syrian Democratic Forces: 42, including 1 woman.
The chart above shows that the highest number of arbitrary arrests/detentions
were in the governo- rates of Deir Ez-Zour and Quneitra, followed by Homs, then
Tartus and Hasaka. […] Continued arbitrary arrests in the absence of due process:
Documented data shows that numerous arrests
were carried out by various actors (the Syrian government, the Syrian
Democratic Forces, and Israeli forces) without warrants, without informing
detainees of the reasons for their arrest, and without allowing them to appear
before a judge within a reasonable time. […] Violations by the Syrian Democratic Forces: The report documented
violations committed by the Syrian Dem- ocratic Forces, including arbitrary
arrest and enforced disappearance, as well as allegations of torture. […] As a
party to a non-international armed conflict, the Syrian Democratic Forces are
bound by Common Article 3 of the Ge- neva Conventions and the provisions of
Additional Protocol II, as well as customary international humanitarian law.
1 April 2026 | SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Quarterly report on victims of extrajudicial killing (covering January - March 2025)
Quarterly Report on Victims of Unlawful Killings in Syria; The Killing of 268 Civilians in the First Quarter of 2026 in Syria, including 43 Children, 27 Women, and 1 person due to torture was Documented (Periodical Report, English)
- A key development was the agreement reached at the end
of January 2016, which stipulated the gradual integration of the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), with its civilian formations and security and military
apparatuses, into Syrian state and government institutions, in exchange for the
entry of civilian, security, and military state institutions into the central
areas previously under SDF control […] Ten of these attacks were carried out by the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), with most occurring in Aleppo Governorate.
These attacks included: three attacks on educational facilities (schools),
four on medical facilities, and one on a place of worship (mosque). […] Indiscriminate bombing: The indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks
carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces and, to a lesser extent, by Syrian
government forces, constitute a clear violation of international humanitarian
law.
4. […] To the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI): • Pay
particular attention in future investigations to patterns of killings related
to the transitional
phase, including security lapses and killings by unidentified actors, as well
as violations attributed to the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria. […] To the Syrian Democratic Forces: • Form an internal investigation committee
to examine the violations committed by the Syrian
Democratic Forces, hold those responsible accountable, and compensate the
victims.
• Refrain from establishing military positions in civilian areas, which
endangers civilian lives.
April 2026 | UK Home Office (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Country information and protection guidelines for British asylum authorities on criticism of the government (legal context; political context; freedom of expression and civil liberties; media environment; government response to criticism and political opposition; treatment of former opponents of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS))
Country Policy and Information Note Syria: Criticism of the government [Version 1.0] (Expert Opinion or Position, English)
- The Kurdish and Druze appointees in the
government are not affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the
Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) nor
represent the Druze spiritual leadership or Sweida’s armed factions.’15
8.2.2 The December 2025 CSIS article stated:
‘The rapid collapse of the Assad regime at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al- Sham
(HTS) prompted […] ‘In the end, 119 MP’s [sic] were elected, as voting could not be held in two
regions – the area still partially controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian
Democratic Forces in the north-east and the mainly Druze region of Suwayda –
due to security conditions. […] CPIT was unable to find confirmation of this report by any major
international media outlet or human rights organisation.
11.3.4 During clashes between government forces and the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) in Aleppo in October 2025, Syria Direct reported that ‘government
forces deployed tear gas to disperse protesters denouncing the closure of roads
into the [SDF-controlled] neighborhoods [ […] For further information about
Kurds, see the CPIN Syria: Kurds and Kurdish areas. […] / [https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/]
https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/ [https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/]
https://syriadirect.org/syrian-artists-fight-for-a-free-space-of-creation-post-assad
April 2026 | Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (Author)
Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Yemen
Report with recommendations to the UN Secretary-General for the 2026 annual report on children and armed conflict concerning parties to armed conflicts that have committed grave violations against children
“A Credible List”: Recommendations for the SecretaryGeneral’s 2026 Annual Report on Children and Armed Conflict (Periodical Report, English)
- Syria: Kurdish forces, including Syrian Democratic Forces and the
Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement, for killing and maiming and abduction
s. Ukraine: Russian armed forces and affiliated armed groups for recruitment
and use, abduction, and rape and other forms of sexual violence
t. Ukraine: Ukrainian armed forces for attacks on schools and hospitals
u. […] Kurdish forces, including Syrian Democratic Forces and the Patriotic
Revolutionary Youth Movement Recommendation to Further Investigate to Determine
if Listing Is Warranted – Killing and Maiming
In the Secretary-General’s 2025 annual report on CAAC, Kurdish
forces—including YPG/YPJ and other components of the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF)— were responsible for killing and maiming 55 children.140 […] According to Air Wars, alleged SDF gunfire on October 23, 2025 led to the
injury of one child.141 Additionally, ACLED documented 13 incidents during
which members of the SDF killed six children and maimed ten other children,
including two child detainees who were tortured before being released.142 In
two other incidents that ACLED documented, SDF fighters physically assaulted
children, although […] ACLED documented three incidents during which SDF forces abducted a total
of four children, all for the purpose of conscription.146 Additionally, ACLED
documented the abduction of 36 children in 30 separate incidents perpetrated by
the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement, all for the purpose of
conscription.147
Ukraine In the Secretary-General’s 2025 report on CAAC, Russian armed forces
and
April 2026 | ReliefWeb (publishing platform), MMC - Mixed Migration Centre (Author)
Syrian Arab Republic
Report on reintegration of returnees (drivers of return; post-return conditions; assistance; access to services; other topics)
Home, under strain: return and reintegration in Syria (Special or Analytical Report, English)
- Fighting that resumed between Syrian
Government Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in early January
in densely populated neighbourhoods40 resulted in civilian casualties, damage
to homes and infrastructure,
disruption to health services and widespread restrictions on movement.41 Tens
of thousands of civilians fled affected areas in the initial phase of the
escalation, many of them women,
Click here to see more documents (169 total)