Background information

Collection of information on developments concerning the SDF and Kurdish-controlled areas

In January 2026, the conflict between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalated. This was triggered by the expiry of a deadline set by the transitional government for the integration of the SDF into state structures and the government's declared goal of regaining complete territorial control over north-eastern Syria (DW, 20 January 2026).

Fighting in Aleppo and displacement of the civilian population

In early January, intense fighting broke out in the predominantly Kurdish neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo between government troops, pro-government militias and SDF-affiliated forces (MEI, 13 January 2026). On 10 January, Kurdish police forces were withdrawn from the last remaining Kurdish neighbourhood and troops of the Syrian transitional government took control of the entire city of Aleppo. Several thousand Kurds fled the city to Afrin and to Kurdish-controlled areas east of the Euphrates (Schmidinger, 23 January 2026). By the end of January, the situation in the previously contested districts had stabilised. Ninety per cent of those who had been displaced had returned, and the destroyed infrastructure was being repaired. A continuing challenge in the city and the surrounding area of Aleppo is the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left behind by SDF fighters (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).

Expansion of the offensive in north-eastern Syria and support for the transitional government by Arab tribes

On 16 January, the Transitional Ministry of Defence announced an operation to capture Deir Hafer and Maskana, parts of the last SDF-held areas in the east of Aleppo province. Within less than 24 hours, pro-government forces took control of both locations and expanded their offensive to areas of Raqqa province and other SDF-controlled regions in northeastern Syria. On 17 January, pro-government forces, including units from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior as well as allied tribal militias, launched an offensive from the directions of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. By the end of the same day, the Al-Schamiyeh region in the west of Raqqa province had fallen, and shortly afterwards, pro-government forces began advancing on the city of Raqqa. In the province of Deir Ezzor, tribal fighters attacked SDF positions even before the transitional government forces arrived. The rapid advance was aided by the considerable weakening of the SDF as a result of desertions and by the support of influential Arab tribes for the transitional authorities. With the exception of Al-Shaddadeh, much of the southern outskirts of Hasakah province also came under the control of the transitional government (Etana Syria, 20 January 2026; see also: Schmidinger, 23 January 2026).

According to Syria expert Charles Lister, isolated crimes were committed by government troops and Kurdish militiamen during the offensive. There are confirmed cases of desecration of corpses, the destruction of an SDF cemetery and the use of unguided munitions in civilian areas by the Syrian army. At the same time, Kurdish fighters are accused of killing nearly 20 civilians with sniper fire and carrying out several extrajudicial executions (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).

Ceasefire and further agreements

On 18 January, representatives of the transitional government and the SDF agreed on a ceasefire, which was followed by fighting (Al Jazeera, 20 January 2026). On 24 January, the ceasefire was extended for another 15 days, with a call for the SDF to lay down its arms and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army (Reuters, 24 January 2026). Even during this agreed ceasefire, there were mutual attacks (Der Standard, 26 January 2026, The National, 29. Jänner 2026). On 29 January, for example, Syrian military drones carried out attacks on SDF positions in the vicinity of the Al Qahtaniyah subdistrict in Hasakah Province (Long War Journal, 29. Jänner 2026). On 30 January, the two sides agreed on a comprehensive agreement for the gradual integration of Kurdsih military and civilian institutions into the state (France 24, 2 February 2026; see also: Reuters, 2 February 2026). In a circular published on February 16, the Syrian Ministry of the Interior set a deadline of the end of February 2026 for members of the SDF to legalize their status and lay down their arms. This can be done at registration centers in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa (The New Arab, 16 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (The New Arab, 14 February 2026). On 21 February, state media reported the appointment of Brigadier General Ziad Al-Ayesh as presidential envoy with the task of implementing the 29 January agreement with the SDF and overseeing the integration process (Rudaw, 21 February 2026). In March, the Syrian Ministry of Defence appoints Sipan Hamo, commander of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), as Deputy Minister of Defence for the eastern regions of the country (Reuters, 10 March 2026). Also in March, the transitional government and the SDF will begin exchanging their respective prisoners as part of their agreement of 29 January (Rudaw, 10 March 2026). ). Also as part of the agreement, Syrian state media are reporting the organisation of the return of hundreds of displaced families to the city of Afrin Afrin (Rudaw, 9 March 2026; also see: ANF News, 10 March 2026).

Control over prisons and IS prisoners

As a result of the fighting described above, suspected members of Islamic State (IS) escaped from a prison in Shaddadi. While the Syrian government reported that around 120 prisoners had escaped, the SDF put the number at 1,500. The Syrian army imposed a curfew on Shaddadi and launched search and arrest operations, in which, according to official figures, 81 people were recaptured. Further fighting and prison breaks were also reported in the city of Raqqa (The Guardian, 20 January 2026).

As part of the ceasefire, the Syrian army took control of the al-Hol camp, which houses thousands of people, mainly family members of IS members (AP News, 25 January 2026). The UN subsequently took over responsibility for camp management, but was still unable to enter the camp as of 22 January for security reasons (Reuters, 22 January 2026). In mid-February, humanitarian, diplomatic, and local sources told Al Jazeera that the number of residents in the main al-Hol camp had fallen dramatically. Reports on how people left the camp are contradictory. According to local sources, most Syrians from al-Hol returned to their home towns, while many foreigners traveled to the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo (Al Jazeera, 17 February 2026).

Reuters reported that the US had begun transferring IS prisoners from Syria to Iraq. The first transfers involved 150 people, with further transfers – of up to 7,000 prisoners – planned (Reuters, 21 January 2026).

According to the news platform Asharq Al-Awsat, attacks by IS have increased significantly since the SDF withdrew from the al-Hol camp. In the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in particular, there have been attacks by lone IS members against security forces (Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 February 2026).

Situation in Hasakah

The SDF continues to control predominantly Kurdish areas. Government troops did not enter these regions, in particular the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah in north-eastern Syria and Kobane in the province of Aleppo near the Turkish border. The background to this are ongoing negotiations on the future administration of these areas and the return of state institutions. According to the Syrian news website Enab Baladi, both sides are preparing for further possible combat operations. Both the SDF and pro-government forces moved military reinforcements to the contact lines south of Hasakah, while the SDF expanded its positions, continued patrols and raids in the city districts, and converted a civilian hospital into a military hospital ( Enab Baladi, 24 January 2026). On 2 February, journalists present at the scene reported that a convoy of government vehicles had entered the city of Hasakah as a result of the agreement of 30 January described above (France 24, 2 February 2026; Reuters, 2 February 2026). The following day, Syrian government forces entered the city of Qamishli. (Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 February 2026). On 10 February, the Syrian army began handing over command in parts of Hasakah to the internal Syrian security forces (Welat, 11 February 2026), while at the same time the SDF withdrew from the frontlines in the south of the city of Hakah as part of an agreement between the two parties to the conflict and deployed its own internal security forces (Asaish) in the areas (Kurd Press, 11 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (SOHR, 16 February 2026). On 21 February, the Syrian authorities took over the administration of Qamishli Airport (Al-Arabiya, 22 February 2026).

On 5 February, US forces withdrew from the Al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah province (The New Arab, 5 February 2026). On 21 February, the US-led coalition began evacuating the Qasrak military base (Shafaq News, 21 February 2026).

At the beginning of March, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported that 116,900 internally displaced persons remain displaced in 165 communities in the provinces of Aleppo and Hasakah. Furthermore, the failure of critical infrastructure is hampering basic services. Frequent power cuts are affecting water stations and medical care. At the same time, some important road links between the city of Hasakah and the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor were reopened after around 40 days of closure (UN OCHA, 8 March 2026, p. 1).

Situation in Kobane (also known as Ain al-Arab)

The city of Kobane, which is predominantly inhabited by Kurds, is surrounded by the Turkish border to the north and by pro-government forces on all other sides . It is home to numerous internally displaced persons as a result of the recent fighting and has become a humanitarian hotspot. Kurdish forces accused the Syrian army of besieging the city, and activists warned of a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of food, water and electricity. Following the extension of the ceasefire on 24 January, two humanitarian corridors were established and a United Nations humanitarian convoy reached the city (DW, 25 January 2026; see also: France 24, 25 January 2026). The New Arab reported on 29 January that hundreds of armed Iraqi Kurds had travelled to Hasakah province as volunteers over the previous two days (The New Arab, 29. Jänner 2026). The Kurdish news website ANF News reported on 5 February that Kobane had been under siege for 17 days. Some basic foodstuffs were no longer available and others were running low, as were medicines and medical supplies. The above-mentioned agreement between the transitional government and the SDF had provided for the lifting of the siege, but was not being implemented. (ANF News, 5 February 2026). According to Kurdish media and NGOs, Kobane continues to be besieged by the armed forces of the Syrian transitional government in mid-February 2026, which has a negative impact on health services. Also, there are only two hours of electricity per day, and the siege has led to a drastic increase in the price of food and heating oil (Kurdistan 24, 11 February 2026; see also: STJ, 11 February 2026; Kurdistan 24, 15 February 2026). During the same week, a UN team conducted a fact-finding mission in the city and confirmed that basic services were severely affected by the current situation. Goods and fuel were reaching the city, but not in the quantities needed (UN, 10 February 2026). On 21 February, SOHR reported human rights violations by government forces and allied armed groups in the predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Syria in the rural areas around Kobane. According to local sources, civilians were shot at directly, the body of a young man was left lying in public for two weeks, and a funeral was prevented. In addition, civilians' mobile phones and other property (such as combine harvesters and trucks) were confiscated (SOHR, 21 February 2026). At the end of February, Kurdish news reports announced the start of the integration process of the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) of the Kobane region into the Syrian Ministry of the Interior (Kurdistan 24, 27 February 2026). As of 11 March 2026, the city of Kobane has been under siege for over 50 days. According to the co-chair of the municipal health authority, Ahmad Mahmoud, there is a shortage of medicines and much of the medical equipment has broken down (ANHA, 11 March 2026).

The most recent documents on the issue

These are the most recent documents from a search for relevant terms: (You can find more, and customise your search under this search link.)

Considered synonyms: (kurdisch kurdish) areas, (kurdisch kurdish) majority areas, autonome administration nord und ostsyrien, autonome administration von nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung von nord und ostsyrien, autonomous administration of north and east syria, democratic federation of northern syria, demokratische föderation nordsyrien, demokratische föderation nordsyriens, demokratische kräfte syriens, dfns, dks, fds, forze democratiche siriane, föderation nordsyrien rojava, kurdisch kontrollierte gebiete, kurdish controlled areas, kurdish controlled territories, kurdish self administration, kurdistan as suriyya, kurdistān as sūriyya, qasad, qsd, quwwat suriya al dimuqratiya, rojavaya kurdistane, rojavaya kurdistanê, sanes, sdf controlled areas, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien rojava, self administration in northeast syria, syrian democratic forces, von sdf kontrollierte gebiete, von ypg kontrollierte gebiete, westkurdistan, ypg controlled areas
  • Report on the human rights situation (covering 2025)

    The State of the World's Human Rights; Syria 2025 (Periodical Report, English)

    • Arbitrary detention continued to be used by the government and by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in north-eastern Syria. More than 30,000 people in SDF custody continued to be subjected to human rights violations. Government forces, government-backed forces and militia members unlawfully killed people from the Alawite minority and extrajudicially executed members of the Druze community. […] On 10 March, President al-Sharaa and Mazloum Abdi, commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – the military wing of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria – signed an agreement to integrate the civilian and military institutions in north-eastern Syria into the Syrian government. The agreement was not implemented. […] A witness said his brother, who was among the 25, was arrested by general security officers and that his fate and whereabouts were undisclosed. === Syrian Democratic Forces === The SDF was responsible for the large-scale violation of the rights of more than 30,000 people in their custody for their perceived affiliation with the Islamic State armed group. […] Activists reported that SDF forces arbitrarily arrested at least five people, predominantly Arabs, for expressing views online in support of President al-Sharaa’s government. == Unlawful killings == On 6 March, armed groups affiliated with the former government launched multiple coordinated attacks on security and military sites in the predominately Alawite coastal governorates of Latakia and
  • Report on the human rights situation (covering 2025)

    Amnesty Report 2025/26: Zur Lage der Menschenrechte weltweit; Syrien 2025 (Periodical Report, German)

    • Sowohl Regierungskräfte als auch Mitglieder des Militärbündnisses SDF (Syrische Demokratische Kräfte) waren im Nordosten Syriens weiterhin für willkürliche Inhaftierungen verantwortlich. Mehr als 30.000 Menschen befanden sich in Gewahrsam der SDF und erlitten Menschenrechtsverletzungen. […] März 2025 unterzeichnete der Präsident ein Abkommen mit Mazloum Abdi, dem Kommandeur der Syrischen Demokratischen Kräfte (SDF), dem militärischen Flügel der kurdisch geführten Autonomieverwaltung von Nord- und Ostsyrien. Darin wurde vereinbart, die zivilen und militärischen Einrichtungen im Nordosten Syriens der syrischen Regierung zu unterstellen. Das Abkommen wurde nicht umgesetzt. […] Syrische Demokratische Kräfte (SDF) Mehr als 30.000 Personen befanden sich 2025 in Gewahrsam der SDF, weil ihnen Verbindungen zu der bewaffneten Gruppe Islamischer Staat vorgeworfen wurden. […] SDF-Mitglieder waren für Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegen die Inhaftierten – darunter zahlreiche Minderjährige – verantwortlich, die in mindestens 27 Hafteinrichtungen sowie in den Lagern Al-Hol und Roj im Nordosten des Landes festgehalten wurden. Viele von ihnen waren bereits seit 2019 inhaftiert. […] Aktivist*innen berichteten, SDF-Kräfte hätten mindestens fünf Männer willkürlich festgenommen, weil diese im Internet ihre Unterstützung für die Regierung von Präsident al-Scharaa bekundet hatten. Die meisten von ihnen waren Araber. == Rechtswidrige Tötungen == Am 6.
  • North-east Syria: Brief update on military, security and political developments

    BRIEF: Recent developments in north-east Syria (Special or Analytical Report, English)

    • == As of 9 April 2026, 16:00 local time == While military integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus have remained constructive, translating paper agreements into tangible implementation is likely to provoke significant local reactions. […] This dynamic has already been reflected in Arab protests in Kobane, Ras al-Ain and Suluk, opposing the incorporation of SDF-affiliated personnel into local security structures. […] The core issues under negotiation include the structure of command and control, the status and ranking of SDF officers within the Syrian army, and the future of security forces such as theAsayish. While Damascus continues to push for centralized absorption of SDF units into existing military hierarchies, the SDF has sought to preserve elements of its autonomous command framework. […] Arabs in Deir Ezzor and Hasakeh have accused the SDF of adding the names of Arab detainees to lists it is providing of ISIS members to be transferred to Iraq. […] The appointment suggests Damascus may be positioning him as the de facto authority, while the current SDF-affiliated director, Adnan al-Bari, remains a nominal, largely symbolic figure in the administration.
  • Report on victims of extrajudicial killing (covering January - March 2025)

    Quarterly Report on Cased of Arbitrary Arrest and Detention in Syria; No less than 210 Cases of Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions in the First Quarter of 2026 (Periodical Report, English)

    • These operations included the arrest of civilians for criticizing the practices of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the areas under their control, reflecting an escalation in detentions during that period and its connection to the context of local tensions. […] Syrian Democratic Forces: 42, including 1 woman. The chart above shows that the highest number of arbitrary arrests/detentions were in the governo- rates of Deir Ez-Zour and Quneitra, followed by Homs, then Tartus and Hasaka. […] Continued arbitrary arrests in the absence of due process: Documented data shows that numerous arrests were carried out by various actors (the Syrian government, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and Israeli forces) without warrants, without informing detainees of the reasons for their arrest, and without allowing them to appear before a judge within a reasonable time. […] Violations by the Syrian Democratic Forces: The report documented violations committed by the Syrian Dem- ocratic Forces, including arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance, as well as allegations of torture. […] As a party to a non-international armed conflict, the Syrian Democratic Forces are bound by Common Article 3 of the Ge- neva Conventions and the provisions of Additional Protocol II, as well as customary international humanitarian law.
  • Quarterly report on victims of extrajudicial killing (covering January - March 2025)

    Quarterly Report on Victims of Unlawful Killings in Syria; The Killing of 268 Civilians in the First Quarter of 2026 in Syria, including 43 Children, 27 Women, and 1 person due to torture was Documented (Periodical Report, English)

    • A key development was the agreement reached at the end of January 2016, which stipulated the gradual integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with its civilian formations and security and military apparatuses, into Syrian state and government institutions, in exchange for the entry of civilian, security, and military state institutions into the central areas previously under SDF control […] Ten of these attacks were carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with most occurring in Aleppo Governorate. These attacks included: three attacks on educational facilities (schools), four on medical facilities, and one on a place of worship (mosque). […] Indiscriminate bombing: The indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks carried out by the Syrian Democratic Forces and, to a lesser extent, by Syrian government forces, constitute a clear violation of international humanitarian law. 4. […] To the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry (COI): • Pay particular attention in future investigations to patterns of killings related to the transitional phase, including security lapses and killings by unidentified actors, as well as violations attributed to the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeast Syria. […] To the Syrian Democratic Forces: • Form an internal investigation committee to examine the violations committed by the Syrian Democratic Forces, hold those responsible accountable, and compensate the victims. • Refrain from establishing military positions in civilian areas, which endangers civilian lives.
  • Country information and protection guidelines for British asylum authorities on criticism of the government (legal context; political context; freedom of expression and civil liberties; media environment; government response to criticism and political opposition; treatment of former opponents of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS))

    Country Policy and Information Note Syria: Criticism of the government [Version 1.0] (Expert Opinion or Position, English)

    • The Kurdish and Druze appointees in the government are not affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) nor represent the Druze spiritual leadership or Sweida’s armed factions.’15 8.2.2 The December 2025 CSIS article stated: ‘The rapid collapse of the Assad regime at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al- Sham (HTS) prompted […] ‘In the end, 119 MP’s [sic] were elected, as voting could not be held in two regions – the area still partially controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in the north-east and the mainly Druze region of Suwayda – due to security conditions. […] CPIT was unable to find confirmation of this report by any major international media outlet or human rights organisation. 11.3.4 During clashes between government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Aleppo in October 2025, Syria Direct reported that ‘government forces deployed tear gas to disperse protesters denouncing the closure of roads into the [SDF-controlled] neighborhoods [ […] For further information about Kurds, see the CPIN Syria: Kurds and Kurdish areas. […] / [https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/] https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/ [https://syriadirect.org/in-aleppos-kurdish-neighborhoods-another-setback-for-sdf-damascus-integration/] https://syriadirect.org/syrian-artists-fight-for-a-free-space-of-creation-post-assad
  • Report on the security situation, based on data from ACLED (covering October 2025 to February 2026)

    Syrië; Veiligheidssituatie (ACLED) (Special or Analytical Report, Dutch)

    • De eerste betreft gevechten De eerste betreft gevechten in Aleppo tussen 7 en 10 januari 2026, gevolgd door een grootschalig offensief van het Syrische leger tegen de Koerdische regio Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) in de tweede helft van januari. Eind januari wordt een staakt-het-vuren bereikt, waarna het geweld in februari aanzienlijk afneemt. […] The first peak saw fighting in Aleppo from 7 to 10 January, followed by a large-scale offensive by the Syrian army against the Kurdish region of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) during the second half of the month. A ceasefire was reached at the end of January, after which violence declined significantly in February. […] Veiligheidssituatie (ACLED) 31 maart 2026 Pagina 5 van 46 CG – 825b N Lijst van afkortingen ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project DAANES Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria IDF Israel Defense Forces IED Improvised Explosive Device ISW Institute for the Study of War Liveuamap Live Universal Awareness Map SDF Syrian Democratic Forces SNA […] Dit hield verband met het offensief dat het regeringsleger en geallieerde milities in opdracht van president Ahmed al-Sharaa inzetten tegen de koerdische autonome regio Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) en de militair-politionele eenheden van de Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) en de Asayish, gecommandeerd door Bashir Abdi. […] : Syrian Democratic Forces - Intelligence 1 Tabel 1: Onderverdeling van de actor “Other” in Grafiek 6 SYRIË.
  • Country report on political participation; rule of law; stability of democratic institutions; socioeconomic development; economic transformation; private property; etc. (covering February 2023 to January 2025)

    BTI 2026 Country Report - Syria (Periodical Report, English)

    • BTI 2026 | Syria 6 The United States supported the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which took control of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. These areas east of the Euphrates, along with the Kurdish provinces of Hasakah and Qamishli, are now administered by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES). […] While the IS Group appears to have largely withdrawn from the Syrian desert, continued attacks in SDF-controlled areas show that IS still poses a challenge to the monopoly on the use of force, as documented by ETANA in its regular “Syria Updates.” […] The Kurdish areas of Syria, Hasakah and Qamishli, with the expanded control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) over all areas east of the Euphrates, have been referring to themselves as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), suggesting federalism as a possible future form of state organization. […] SDF endorsed democracy and changed its name to DAANES in December 2023, adding “Democratic” to its previous name, AANES, and developed more democratic institutions than in the rest of the country. […] Of the deaths documented by SNHR, 21 were attributed to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), making it the largest identified perpetrator, followed closely by the Syrian National Army (SNA) with 20 deaths.
  • Query response on Syria: Military service, situation of Kurds, and security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces (covering 1 October 2025 to 25. März 2026)

    Pakistan: Developments concerning military service, the situation of Kurds, and the security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces [Q11-2026] (Response, English)

    • Turkey.3 Sources indicated that the SDF retained between 70 0004 and 100 000 soldiers,5 although a considerable portion of their military force had defected, specifically Arab fighters, following the Syrian government’s military advances on 17–18 January 2026.6 As of June 2024, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), the Kurdish-led government entity in […] army offensive overjoys some, leaves others with ‘existential’ fear, 27 January 2026, url 15 SNHR, Condemning the Widespread Detention for Forced Conscription by the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor since 29 September 2025, 8 October 2025, url 16 SNHR, Condemning the Widespread Detention for Forced Conscription by the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor since 29 […] 10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/] https://www.newarab.com/news/sdf-drafts-young-men-amid-fear-conflict-syrian-govt [https://www.newarab.com/news/sdf-drafts-young-men-amid-fear-conflict-syrian-govt] https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since […] [https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas] https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas [https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas […] 10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/] https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/ [https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since
  • Query response on Syria: Developments concerning military service, the situation of Kurds, and the security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces (covering the period 1 October 2025 to 25 March 2026)

    COI Query - Syria; Developments concerning military service, the situation of Kurds, and the security situation in areas (formerly) controlled by Kurdish-led forces [Q11-2026] (Response, English)

    • Turkey.3 Sources indicated that the SDF retained between 70 0004 and 100 000 soldiers,5 although a considerable portion of their military force had defected, specifically Arab fighters, following the Syrian government’s military advances on 17–18 January 2026.6 As of June 2024, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), the Kurdish-led government entity in […] army offensive overjoys some, leaves others with ‘existential’ fear, 27 January 2026, url 15 SNHR, Condemning the Widespread Detention for Forced Conscription by the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor since 29 September 2025, 8 October 2025, url 16 SNHR, Condemning the Widespread Detention for Forced Conscription by the Syrian Democratic Forces in Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor since 29 […] 10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/] https://www.newarab.com/news/sdf-drafts-young-men-amid-fear-conflict-syrian-govt [https://www.newarab.com/news/sdf-drafts-young-men-amid-fear-conflict-syrian-govt] https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since […] [https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas] https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas [https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/syrian-arab-republic/featured-topics/information-collection-on-developments-regarding-the-sdf-and-kurdish-areas […] 10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/] https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since-29-september-2025/ [https://snhr.org/blog/2025/10/08/condemning-the-widespread-detention-for-forced-conscription-by-the-syrian-democratic-forces-in-raqqa-and-deir-ez-zor-since
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