Background information

Collection of information on developments concerning the SDF and Kurdish-controlled areas

In January 2026, the conflict between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) escalated. This was triggered by the expiry of a deadline set by the transitional government for the integration of the SDF into state structures and the government's declared goal of regaining complete territorial control over north-eastern Syria (DW, 20 January 2026).

Fighting in Aleppo and displacement of the civilian population

In early January, intense fighting broke out in the predominantly Kurdish neighbourhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh in Aleppo between government troops, pro-government militias and SDF-affiliated forces (MEI, 13 January 2026). On 10 January, Kurdish police forces were withdrawn from the last remaining Kurdish neighbourhood and troops of the Syrian transitional government took control of the entire city of Aleppo. Several thousand Kurds fled the city to Afrin and to Kurdish-controlled areas east of the Euphrates (Schmidinger, 23 January 2026). By the end of January, the situation in the previously contested districts had stabilised. Ninety per cent of those who had been displaced had returned, and the destroyed infrastructure was being repaired. A continuing challenge in the city and the surrounding area of Aleppo is the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left behind by SDF fighters (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).

Expansion of the offensive in north-eastern Syria and support for the transitional government by Arab tribes

On 16 January, the Transitional Ministry of Defence announced an operation to capture Deir Hafer and Maskana, parts of the last SDF-held areas in the east of Aleppo province. Within less than 24 hours, pro-government forces took control of both locations and expanded their offensive to areas of Raqqa province and other SDF-controlled regions in northeastern Syria. On 17 January, pro-government forces, including units from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior as well as allied tribal militias, launched an offensive from the directions of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. By the end of the same day, the Al-Schamiyeh region in the west of Raqqa province had fallen, and shortly afterwards, pro-government forces began advancing on the city of Raqqa. In the province of Deir Ezzor, tribal fighters attacked SDF positions even before the transitional government forces arrived. The rapid advance was aided by the considerable weakening of the SDF as a result of desertions and by the support of influential Arab tribes for the transitional authorities. With the exception of Al-Shaddadeh, much of the southern outskirts of Hasakah province also came under the control of the transitional government (Etana Syria, 20 January 2026; see also: Schmidinger, 23 January 2026).

According to Syria expert Charles Lister, isolated crimes were committed by government troops and Kurdish militiamen during the offensive. There are confirmed cases of desecration of corpses, the destruction of an SDF cemetery and the use of unguided munitions in civilian areas by the Syrian army. At the same time, Kurdish fighters are accused of killing nearly 20 civilians with sniper fire and carrying out several extrajudicial executions (MEI, 29. Jänner 2026).

Ceasefire and further agreements

On 18 January, representatives of the transitional government and the SDF agreed on a ceasefire, which was followed by fighting (Al Jazeera, 20 January 2026). On 24 January, the ceasefire was extended for another 15 days, with a call for the SDF to lay down its arms and present a plan for integration into the Syrian army (Reuters, 24 January 2026). Even during this agreed ceasefire, there were mutual attacks (Der Standard, 26 January 2026, The National, 29. Jänner 2026). On 29 January, for example, Syrian military drones carried out attacks on SDF positions in the vicinity of the Al Qahtaniyah subdistrict in Hasakah Province (Long War Journal, 29. Jänner 2026). On 30 January, the two sides agreed on a comprehensive agreement for the gradual integration of Kurdsih military and civilian institutions into the state (France 24, 2 February 2026; see also: Reuters, 2 February 2026). In a circular published on February 16, the Syrian Ministry of the Interior set a deadline of the end of February 2026 for members of the SDF to legalize their status and lay down their arms. This can be done at registration centers in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa (The New Arab, 16 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (The New Arab, 14 February 2026). On 21 February, state media reported the appointment of Brigadier General Ziad Al-Ayesh as presidential envoy with the task of implementing the 29 January agreement with the SDF and overseeing the integration process (Rudaw, 21 February 2026). In March, the Syrian Ministry of Defence appoints Sipan Hamo, commander of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), as Deputy Minister of Defence for the eastern regions of the country (Reuters, 10 March 2026). Also in March, the transitional government and the SDF will begin exchanging their respective prisoners as part of their agreement of 29 January (Rudaw, 10 March 2026). ). Also as part of the agreement, Syrian state media are reporting the organisation of the return of hundreds of displaced families to the city of Afrin Afrin (Rudaw, 9 March 2026; also see: ANF News, 10 March 2026).

Control over prisons and IS prisoners

As a result of the fighting described above, suspected members of Islamic State (IS) escaped from a prison in Shaddadi. While the Syrian government reported that around 120 prisoners had escaped, the SDF put the number at 1,500. The Syrian army imposed a curfew on Shaddadi and launched search and arrest operations, in which, according to official figures, 81 people were recaptured. Further fighting and prison breaks were also reported in the city of Raqqa (The Guardian, 20 January 2026).

As part of the ceasefire, the Syrian army took control of the al-Hol camp, which houses thousands of people, mainly family members of IS members (AP News, 25 January 2026). The UN subsequently took over responsibility for camp management, but was still unable to enter the camp as of 22 January for security reasons (Reuters, 22 January 2026). In mid-February, humanitarian, diplomatic, and local sources told Al Jazeera that the number of residents in the main al-Hol camp had fallen dramatically. Reports on how people left the camp are contradictory. According to local sources, most Syrians from al-Hol returned to their home towns, while many foreigners traveled to the provinces of Idlib and Aleppo (Al Jazeera, 17 February 2026).

Reuters reported that the US had begun transferring IS prisoners from Syria to Iraq. The first transfers involved 150 people, with further transfers – of up to 7,000 prisoners – planned (Reuters, 21 January 2026).

According to the news platform Asharq Al-Awsat, attacks by IS have increased significantly since the SDF withdrew from the al-Hol camp. In the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in particular, there have been attacks by lone IS members against security forces (Asharq Al-Awsat, 27 February 2026).

Situation in Hasakah

The SDF continues to control predominantly Kurdish areas. Government troops did not enter these regions, in particular the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah in north-eastern Syria and Kobane in the province of Aleppo near the Turkish border. The background to this are ongoing negotiations on the future administration of these areas and the return of state institutions. According to the Syrian news website Enab Baladi, both sides are preparing for further possible combat operations. Both the SDF and pro-government forces moved military reinforcements to the contact lines south of Hasakah, while the SDF expanded its positions, continued patrols and raids in the city districts, and converted a civilian hospital into a military hospital ( Enab Baladi, 24 January 2026). On 2 February, journalists present at the scene reported that a convoy of government vehicles had entered the city of Hasakah as a result of the agreement of 30 January described above (France 24, 2 February 2026; Reuters, 2 February 2026). The following day, Syrian government forces entered the city of Qamishli. (Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 February 2026). On 10 February, the Syrian army began handing over command in parts of Hasakah to the internal Syrian security forces (Welat, 11 February 2026), while at the same time the SDF withdrew from the frontlines in the south of the city of Hakah as part of an agreement between the two parties to the conflict and deployed its own internal security forces (Asaish) in the areas (Kurd Press, 11 February 2026). At the same time, The New Arab reports that, as part of a ceasefire agreement, the SDF will be restructured into four brigades, one of which will be stationed around the city of Kobane and the other three in northeastern Syria (SOHR, 16 February 2026). On 21 February, the Syrian authorities took over the administration of Qamishli Airport (Al-Arabiya, 22 February 2026).

On 5 February, US forces withdrew from the Al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah province (The New Arab, 5 February 2026). On 21 February, the US-led coalition began evacuating the Qasrak military base (Shafaq News, 21 February 2026).

At the beginning of March, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) reported that 116,900 internally displaced persons remain displaced in 165 communities in the provinces of Aleppo and Hasakah. Furthermore, the failure of critical infrastructure is hampering basic services. Frequent power cuts are affecting water stations and medical care. At the same time, some important road links between the city of Hasakah and the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor were reopened after around 40 days of closure (UN OCHA, 8 March 2026, p. 1).

Situation in Kobane (also known as Ain al-Arab)

The city of Kobane, which is predominantly inhabited by Kurds, is surrounded by the Turkish border to the north and by pro-government forces on all other sides . It is home to numerous internally displaced persons as a result of the recent fighting and has become a humanitarian hotspot. Kurdish forces accused the Syrian army of besieging the city, and activists warned of a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of food, water and electricity. Following the extension of the ceasefire on 24 January, two humanitarian corridors were established and a United Nations humanitarian convoy reached the city (DW, 25 January 2026; see also: France 24, 25 January 2026). The New Arab reported on 29 January that hundreds of armed Iraqi Kurds had travelled to Hasakah province as volunteers over the previous two days (The New Arab, 29. Jänner 2026). The Kurdish news website ANF News reported on 5 February that Kobane had been under siege for 17 days. Some basic foodstuffs were no longer available and others were running low, as were medicines and medical supplies. The above-mentioned agreement between the transitional government and the SDF had provided for the lifting of the siege, but was not being implemented. (ANF News, 5 February 2026). According to Kurdish media and NGOs, Kobane continues to be besieged by the armed forces of the Syrian transitional government in mid-February 2026, which has a negative impact on health services. Also, there are only two hours of electricity per day, and the siege has led to a drastic increase in the price of food and heating oil (Kurdistan 24, 11 February 2026; see also: STJ, 11 February 2026; Kurdistan 24, 15 February 2026). During the same week, a UN team conducted a fact-finding mission in the city and confirmed that basic services were severely affected by the current situation. Goods and fuel were reaching the city, but not in the quantities needed (UN, 10 February 2026). On 21 February, SOHR reported human rights violations by government forces and allied armed groups in the predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Syria in the rural areas around Kobane. According to local sources, civilians were shot at directly, the body of a young man was left lying in public for two weeks, and a funeral was prevented. In addition, civilians' mobile phones and other property (such as combine harvesters and trucks) were confiscated (SOHR, 21 February 2026). At the end of February, Kurdish news reports announced the start of the integration process of the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) of the Kobane region into the Syrian Ministry of the Interior (Kurdistan 24, 27 February 2026). As of 11 March 2026, the city of Kobane has been under siege for over 50 days. According to the co-chair of the municipal health authority, Ahmad Mahmoud, there is a shortage of medicines and much of the medical equipment has broken down (ANHA, 11 March 2026).

The most recent documents on the issue

These are the most recent documents from a search for relevant terms: (You can find more, and customise your search under this search link.)

Considered synonyms: (kurdisch kurdish) areas, (kurdisch kurdish) majority areas, autonome administration nord und ostsyrien, autonome administration von nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung nord und ostsyrien, autonome verwaltung von nord und ostsyrien, autonomous administration of north and east syria, democratic federation of northern syria, demokratische föderation nordsyrien, demokratische föderation nordsyriens, demokratische kräfte syriens, dfns, dks, fds, forze democratiche siriane, föderation nordsyrien rojava, kurdisch kontrollierte gebiete, kurdish controlled areas, kurdish controlled territories, kurdish self administration, kurdistan as suriyya, kurdistān as sūriyya, qasad, qsd, quwwat suriya al dimuqratiya, rojavaya kurdistane, rojavaya kurdistanê, sanes, sdf controlled areas, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien, selbstverwaltung in nordostsyrien rojava, self administration in northeast syria, syrian democratic forces, von sdf kontrollierte gebiete, von ypg kontrollierte gebiete, westkurdistan, ypg controlled areas
  • Deir ez-Zor Governorate: Report on humanitarian situation (as of August 2026)

    Northeast Syria Needs Update; Deir-ez-Zor Governorate Profile; August 2026; Syria (Periodical Report, English)

    • = = FACTSHEET Context & Rationale On 30 January 2026, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the Government of Syria entered into a ceasefire agreement and initiated the formalised integration of governance structures in the governorates of Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa, in addition to the Ain-al-Arab district of Aleppo.
  • Al-Raqqah Governorate: Report on humanitarian situation (as of August 2026)

    Northeast Syria Needs Update: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Profile, August 2026; Syria (Periodical Report, English)

    • = = FACTSHEET Context & Rationale On 30 January 2026, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the Government of Syria entered into a ceasefire agreement and initiated the formalised integration of governance structures in the governorates of Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa, in addition to the Ain-al-Arab district of Aleppo. […] UXO contamination16 was generally limited across the governorate, although important pockets remained in Ein Issa (46%) and Tel Abiad (15%), both located on the border with Ain-al-Arab, where tensions continue to be heightened between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Government of Syria forces. 6NORTHEAST SYRIA NEEDS UPDATE | AR-RAQQA Accountability to Affected People (AAP) Households’
  • Northeast Syria: Report on humanitarian situation (as of August 2026)

    Northeast Syria Needs Update: Ar-Raqqa Governorate Profile; August 2026; Syria (Periodical Report, English)

    • = = FACTSHEET Context & Rationale On 30 January 2026, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the Government of Syria entered into a ceasefire agreement and initiated the formalised integration of governance structures in the governorates of Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa, in addition to the Ain-al-Arab district of Aleppo.
  • Al-Hasakah Governorate: Report on humanitarian situation (as of August 2026)

    Northeast Syria Needs Update: Al-Hasakeh Governorate Profile; August 2026; Syria (Periodical Report, English)

    • = = FACTSHEET Context & Rationale On 30 January 2026, the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and the Government of Syria entered into a ceasefire agreement and initiated the formalised integration of governance structures in the governorates of Al- Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and Ar-Raqqa, in addition to the Ain-al-Arab district of Aleppo.
  • Report on security situation and profiles at risk in north and north-east 

    Syrie : situation sécuritaire et profils à risque dans le nord et le nord-est (Special or Analytical Report, French)

    • and Kurdish areas, 12 mars 2026: https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2137888.html 47 EUAA, décembre 2025, op.cit., p.42. 48 Etana, 9 juin 2026, op.cit. 49 La personne de contact A est un journaliste freelance avec une excellente connaissance des régions kurdes. […] La 80 HRC, 12 mars 2026, op.cit., p.16. 81 Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), Child Recruitment in SDF -Controlled Areas: Legal Framework and Documented Practices, 14 janvier 2026: https://snhr.org/blog/2026/01/14/child -recruitment-in-sdf- controlled-areas-legal-framework-and-documented-practices/ 82 CGRS-CEDOCA, 19 mai 2026, op.cit., p.24. 83 Syria Direct, Child recruitment persists […] despite SDF-Damascus integration agreement, 17 juin 2026: https://syriadirect.org/child -recruitment-persists-despite-sdf-damascus-integration-agreement/ 84 Selon le courriel envoyé à l’OSAR le 17 juin 2026 par la personne de contact A. […] https://snhr.org/blog/2026/01/14/child-recruitment-in-sdf-controlled-areas-legal-framework-and-documented-practices/ [https://snhr.org/blog/2026/01/14/child-recruitment-in-sdf-controlled-areas-legal-framework-and-documented-practices/] https://snhr.org/blog/2026/01/14/child-recruitment-in-sdf-controlled-areas-legal-framework-and-documented-practices/ [https://snhr.org/blog/2026/01/14/child-recruitment-in-sdf-controlled-areas-legal-framework-and-documented-practices […] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jan/22/revolutionary-women-rojava-grave-danger-syria [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jan/22/revolutionary-women-rojava-grave-danger-syria] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jan/22/revolutionary-women-rojava-grave-danger-syria [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/jan/22/revolutionary-women-rojava-grave-danger-syria
  • Update on returns to Syria from neighbouring countries (covering April to May 2026)

    Returns to Syria; Regional Update - (April - May 2026) (Periodical Report, English)

    • Some Syrian Kurdish refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I) continue to watch developments in north-east Syria, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)–Syrian Army agreement and discussions on nationality restoration which may influence decisions around return.
  • Joint submission by CSW and CSW-Nigeria highlighting violations of freedom of religion 

    54th session of the Universal Periodic Review - Syrian Arab Republic (Special or Analytical Report, English)

    • However, following the takeover by HTS and a major offensive in early 2026 in which the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast ceded much of their territories to Damascus, the central transitional government now holds formal control over most of the country. 8. Since the takeover, HTS has also given repeated assurances of protection and inclusion to religious communities. […] The administration agreed to a 180-day suspension of the imposition of US sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act,7 amid reports that Syria would be joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS,8 and would move forward with a plan to integrate the Kurdish-led SDF into the Syrian army. 11.
  • North-East: Brief update on military, security and political developments

    Brief: Recent developments in north-east Syria (Special or Analytical Report, English)

    • Persistent fuel shortages generated near-daily protests across both Arab and Kurdish communities and created an unusual point of shared grievance against state authorities. === Damascus-SDF Security Integration === The gradual incorporation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into national military structures continued to advance in recent weeks broadly in line with the existing implementation […] June witnessed some of the clearest operational steps in the merger process to date, with the Syrian army’s 60th Division beginning to absorb former SDF personnel and the establishment of four new brigades composed of former SDF fighters. […] The issue reflects the political and ideological gulf between interim authorities and the SDF over issues such as the involvement of women in security forces (and particularly military units). […] Detainee exchanges have remained one of the least contentious aspects of negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, with June witnessing further incremental progress despite persistent irregularities. […] Al-Hilali announced the release of 28 female SDF fighters, bringing cumulative releases to more than 1,200, followed by roughly 50 additional SDF-affiliated detainees released from Aleppo later in the month. === Political & Humanitarian Developments === The visible return of Syrian state symbols across north-east Syria has generated occasional frictions.Asayish positions began raising the Syrian
  • Report on security-related developments in June 2026

    Syria; Monthly Security Overview; June 2026; A State Consolidating Its Institutions as the Ground Beneath Civilians Narrows (Periodical Report, English)

    • This is a high-tempo, low-lethality posture of arrests, seizures, cordon operations and checkpoints that reflects genuine consolidation, including the integration of four SDF brigades into the national armed forces and the release of approximately 1,300 SDF-affiliated detainees. But high state activity is not the same as improving security. […] The enabling conditions are structural: Ar-Raqqa’s police force is reported at roughly a fifth of required strength after the government’s rapid expansion into former SDF territory stretched a security apparatus that lacked the personnel to hold it. On current indicators the group is reconstituting rather than resurging. Operational implications. […] This is a posture of arrests, cordon and search operations, checkpoints and judicial enforcement, and it represents genuine institutional consolidation, including the integration of four SDF brigades onto the national payroll, the release of approximately 1,300 SDF-affiliated detainees, and a three-month counter-terrorism campaign that produced 235 arrests. […] The same rapid expansion into former SDF territory that produced these consolidation metrics stretched the apparatus beyond its trained personnel base, and it is precisely in the resulting gaps that the Islamic State has reconstituted. Operational implications.
  • Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den DAANES-Gebiet, Übergriffe auf Kurden in Derik

    Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den DAANES-Gebiet, Übergriffe auf Kurden in Derik (Response, German)

    • Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den DAANES-Gebiet, Übergriffe auf Kurden in Derik
    • Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den DAANES-Gebiet, Übergriffe auf Kurden in Derik
    • Anfragebeantwortung der Staatendokumentation zu Syrien: Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den DAANES-Gebiet, Übergriffe auf Kurden in Derik
    • Zusammenfassung: Gemäß den nachfolgend zitierten Quellen wurde die Selbstverteidigungspflicht in den nach wie vor von den Syrischen Demokratischen Kräften (Syrian Democratic Forces - SDF) kontrollierten Gebieten seit Ende der Kampfhandlungen im Jänner 2026 gestoppt, obwohl sie formal noch in Kraft ist. […] Einzelquellen: Der österreichische Experte für Kurdenfragen, Thomas Schmidinger, schreibt im von der Staatendokumentation in Auftrag gegebenen Themenbericht im Juli 2026, dass in einigen Regionen der Demokratischen Autonomen Administration von Nord- und Ostsyrien (Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East SyriaDAANES) seit 2018 eine Wehrpflicht gilt, die durch das im Juni 2019 […] Precisely, they had to sign a formal declaration known as waraqat taswiya (Arabic: ورقة تسوية – settlement agreement), committing them to permanently relinquishing the use of arms, where the legal implications of this declaration for individuals who later relocate to SDF-controlled areas have not been clarified by either party, and no official framework governing their ongoing status has been […] Clashes between SDF and STG forces continued, and the SDF had to retreat from most areas under its control (Rojava Information Center, 2026a). […] By the end of the month the clashes spread to nearby fronts like the Tishrin Dam The North East Syria still a divided area, there is several actors who still play a role in that area: * Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) / Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES, "Rojava"): control most of the Kurdish-majority and multiethnic areas across much of northeastern Syria (Hasakah, Raqqa
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