Country Briefing

Area:	187,437 km²
Capital:	Damascus
Population:	22,933,531 (2023 estimate)[1] , including 6,865,000 internally displaced persons (early 2023)[2] , and 5,105,919 registered Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries (Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and other countries in North Africa) (11 January 2024)[3]
Official language:	Arabic
Currency:	Syrian Lira (also called Syrian Pound)[4]

1. Brief overview

Syria can be divided into four topographical regions: the western coastal strip, the forested mountains in the north-west, the agricultural steppe, where the most important cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Al-Qamishli are located, and finally the desert region.[5] This desert region, also known as Badia, extends over four provinces and occupies large parts of the centre of the country.[6]

The majority of the population is Arabic, with a Kurdish minority living mainly in the north-east of the country (-> ecoi.net search on Kurds in Syria). In addition, there are also Armenian (-> ecoi.net search) and Turkmen communities in the country, (-> ecoi.net search) as well as Syriac-speaking Assyrians (-> ecoi.net search).[7] It is estimated that around two thirds of the population are Sunni Muslims, including Arabs, Kurds and other smaller communities. Other Muslim groups such as Alawites (-> ecoi.net search), Ismailis (-> ecoi.net search) and Shiites (-> ecoi.net search) together make up around 13 per cent of the population.[8] Alawites hold key positions in the state, especially in the military.[9] The share of the Christian population (-> ecoi.net) is estimated at 10 per cent, but a large part of this community is said to have left the country as a result of the war.[10] The southern province of Suwayda is largely inhabited by Druze (-> ecoi.net). [11]

Approximately 56 per cent of Syria's population live in urban centres[12] and 44 per cent in rural areas. Before 2011, almost half of the population earned their living as part of the centrally planned agricultural sector. [13]

The north-east of the country is seen as a tribal society due to the large number of Arab tribes living there (-> ecoi.net search on tribes in Syria). But tribes also play an important role in other parts of the country, such as in the province of Daraa in the south, although tribal ties have lost some of their significance in the course of the conflict.[14]

2. Historical development of the conflict

In 1946, Syria was released from mandate rule into independence by France.[15] After years of political instability, Hafiz Al-Assad came to power as leader of the Baath Party in a coup in 1970 and ruled the country in an authoritarian style for decades.[16] Power remained in the hands of the Alawite Al-Assad family when Bashar Al-Assad, Hafiz's son, took over the government in 2000.[17] In March 2011, the first protests for democracy took place in the southern city of Daraa, which spread to the whole country by the summer of the same year. The government used violence against the demonstrators.[18] As a result of the violence, the demonstrators also increasingly took up arms and in the summer of 2011, deserted soldiers from the Syrian army founded the rebel group Free Syrian Army (FSA).[19] In the course of 2012, the situation developed into a civil war that increasingly divided the conflicting parties along religious and sectarian lines[20] and resulted in the de facto autonomy of the Kurdish areas in the north-east of the country (called Rojava or Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, AANES).[21] The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group infiltrated Syria and established a caliphate in eastern Syria and western Iraq in 2014, forcing the FSA to fight on two fronts against both government forces and IS.[22] (-> ecoi.net search on IS in Syria) Türkiye conducted several operations in Syrian territory in 2016, 2018 and 2019 to push Kurdish forces out of the border area.[23] With Lebanese Hezbollah’s and consequently Iran’s support for the Syrian government in 2013, Russia’s entry into the war in 2015,Türkiye's invasion campaigns in the north of the country and the US engangement against IS, Syria increasingly became an international battleground.[24] While the front lines largely solidified by March 2020,[25] the civilian population was massively affected by regime barrel bombing of residential areas[26] and siege tactics by individual parties to the conflict.[27] Chemical weapons were also used.[28]

According to the United Nations in May 2023, almost 307,000 civilians were killed between the start of the war and 2022.[29] The Syrian opposition monitoring centre Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimates far higher casualty figures and states that around 606,000 people have been killed in ten years of war.[30] According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), more than 230,000 Syrian civilians have been killed since the war began in March 2023, of whom more than 15,000 have died as a result of torture. Almost 155,000 have been arbitrarily detained or subjected to enforced disappearance and around 14 million have been displaced.[31]

According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), there were 6.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria in 2022, many of whom do not see the possibility of returning to their home of origin due to the deteriorating economic situation in the country and a lack of basic services.[32] 15.3 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian aid.[33]

The years of conflict, the major earthquake in 2023, economic instability in Lebanon and Türkiye, the war in Ukraine, as well as the introduction of stricter US sanctions and a severe drought in the country led to a problematic economic situation in the country.[34]

3. Regions and conflict actors

The front lines have now more or less stabilised[35] and four areas have de facto emerged under the control of various conflict actors (areas under the control of the Syrian government, areas under the control of the Kurdish self-administration, the area under the control of the "Syrian Salvation Government" and areas under the control of Türkiye and allied militias).[36]

The following map by the US think tank The Carter Center shows the areas of control of the various parties to the conflict in Syria as of September 2023:

(The Carter Center, 30 September 2023 )[37]

3.1 Areas under the control of the Syrian government

The Syrian government controls over 60 percent of the country's entire territory, including the centre, the Mediterranean coast and the south of the country. In addition, all important urban areas, including the largest cities of Damascus, Homs, Aleppo and Hama, are located in this area.[38] Control is enforced with the help of the various internal security forces.[39] Conflict-related violence occurs only occasionally, but there is a security risk due to arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and armed and criminal groups acting with impunity.[40] Arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances continue to be among the most common human rights violations. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented 2,317 cases of arbitrary arrests in 2023.[41] In the two southern provinces of Daraa (-> ecoi.net search on Daraa) and Suwayda (-> ecoi.net search on Suwayda), however, government control remains weak and could only be maintained with the help of a small Russian military presence. [42]

3.2 Areas under the control of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)

At the beginning of 2012, a silent agreement was reached between the Syrian government and the Kurdish party PYD, which granted the latter a certain degree of autonomy in areas with a Kurdish majority in the north-east of the country. In return, the PYD did not participate in the revolution and maintained economic ties with the central government.[43] The armed arm of the PYD, the People's Defence Units (YPG), fought the Islamic State (IS) and enabled the Kurdish party to expand its sphere of influence to Arab cities such as Raqqa.[44] In 2018, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) was founded (-> ecoi.net search for AANES).[45] The YPG plays a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an armed group made up of Arabs, Kurds and other minorities, which is supported by the USA and acts against remnants of IS in the region,[46] but also generally acts as the military of the autonomous self-administration.[47] (-> ecoi.net search on the SDF)

Areas under SDF control now include large parts of the provinces of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Hasaka and parts of Aleppo province, totalling around 25 per cent of the country's territory.[48]

The notorious al-Hol camp, where around 45,000 mostly women and children of IS fighters live,[49] and several prisons in which members of IS are imprisoned are located on the territory of the Kurdish self-administration. The al-Sina prison in Hasaka, where 3,500 IS fighters are detained, was the target of an IS attack that lasted almost nine days in January 2021.[50]

At the end of 2023, there are repeated airstrikes by Türkiye in the AANES areas.[51]

3.3 Areas under the control of the HTS (Syrian Salvation Government, SSG)

The north-western part of Idlib province on the border with Türkiye (as well as small parts of the neighbouring provinces of Aleppo, Latakia and Hama) is the last remaining enclave of the original opposition to the government. Dozens of predominantly Islamist groups can be found there, including the Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) group, which sets the tone.[52] It is trying to establish an authoritarian system with an Islamist agenda, but this is controversial among the population.[53] In 2017, the "Syrian Salvation Government" (SSG) was formed under the influence of the HTS, with the task of administering the small region.[54] The area administered by the SSG is home to 2-3 million Syrians[55] , most of whom are internally displaced persons who either fled there or came to Idlib as a result of so-called "reconciliation" agreements with the Syrian government.[56] The large number IDPs, attacks by Syria and Russia on civilian infrastructure and high inflation have resulted in economic collapse and a devastating humanitarian situation.[57] The Syrian government and its most important ally, Russia, are working to prevent the provision of international aid to the population of Idlib.[58] (-> ecoi.net search on HTS in Syria)

3.4 Areas under the control of Türkiye and allied militias (Syrian Interim Government, SIG)

The Syrian National Army (SNA) is the second largest rebel group in Syria after HTS, is supported by Türkiye and consists of various factions of the former Free Syrian Army (FSA). It is more of a coalition formed from several mergers, whose individual groups act independently of each other and sometimes even fight each other.[59] Türkiye has set up local councils in the areas under its control, which are subordinate to the Turkish provinces they border. The Turkish provincial governments oversee the provision of some basic services. Many of the original inhabitants of the Turkish-controlled areas live as internally displaced persons in AANES camps. The Syrian Interim Government (SIG) was established in 2013. It is based in Azaz (Aleppo province). Although the SNA operates in the SIG's territory, the SIG lacks authority over the SNA's armed forces.[60] The SNA is involved in the Turkish conflict with the SDF,[61] and in conflicts with HTS.[62] (-> ecoi.net search for SNA)

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[1] CIA - Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book - Syria, Country Summary, 17 January 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/syria/summaries

[2] NRC - Norwegian Refugee Council: NRC in Syria, undated, https://www.nrc.no/countries/middle-east/syria/

[3] UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Syria Regional Refugee Response, 11 January 2024, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria

[4] Britannica Online Encyclopaedia: Syria, Facts & Stats, 12 October 2022, https://www.britannica.com/facts/Syria

[5] Britannica Online Encyclopaedia: Syria, People, 12 October 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria/The-winds

[6] MEI - Middle East Institute: The growing threat of ISIS in Syria's Badia, 17 April 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/growing-threat-isis-syrias-badia

[7] Britannica Online Encyclopaedia: Syria, People, 12 October 2022, https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria/The-winds

[8] USDOS - US Department of State: 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2073954.html

[9] MEI - Middle East Institute: Divided Syria: An examination of stabilisation efforts and prospects for state continuity, 26 April 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/divided-syria-examination-stabilization-efforts-and-prospects-state-continuity

[10] USDOS - US Department of State: 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Syria, 2 June 2022, https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2073954.html

[11] Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre: Making the Druze Choose, 29 August 2022, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/87771

[12] Statista: Syria: Urbanisation from 2011 to 2021, 10 November 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/455937/urbanization-in-syria/

[13] FAO - Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: FAO in Syria, 24 April 2022, https://www.fao.org/syria/fao-in-syria/syria-at-a-glance/en/

[14] WINEP - Washington Institute for Near East Policy: The Role of Syrian Tribes: Betting on a Lost Cause, Fikra Forum, 26 March 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/role-syrian-tribes-betting-lost-cause

[15] BBC News - Syria Profile - timeline, as at 14 January 2019, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995

[16] CFR - Council on Foreign Relations: Remembering Hafez al-Assad, 11 November 2011, https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-hafez-al-assad

[17] Al Jazeera: Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne, 10 October 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/10/10/assads-alawites-the-guardians-of-the-throne

[18] BBC News: Syria: The story of the conflict, 11 March 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868; CFR - Council on Foreign Relations: Syria's Civil War: The Descent Into Horror, 17 March 2021, https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war

[19] CFR - Council on Foreign Relations: Syria's Civil War: The Descent Into Horror, 17 March 2021, https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war

[20] SWP - German Institute for International and Security Affairs: Civil War in Syria, December 2021, pp. 2-3, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2012C43_ass_wmm.pdf

[21] Qantara: Kurdish autonomy in northeast Syria, Between Assad and Erdogan, 7 February 2022, https://en.qantara.de/content/kurdish-autonomy-in-northeast-syria-between-assad-and-erdogan

[22] Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2022 Country Report Syria, 23 February 2022, p. 5, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069699/country_report_2022_SYR.pdf

[23] MEE - Middle East Eye: 's looming invasion of Syria tests US-Kurdish ties, 30 November 2022, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkeys-looming-invasion-syria-tests-us-kurdish-ties?ref=nl

[24] BPB - Federal Agency for Civic Education: Wars and Conflicts - Syria, 18 June 2020, https://www.bpb.de/themen/kriege-konflikte/dossier-kriege-konflikte/54705/syrien/

[25] The Carter Center: The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, p. 3, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/2022/state-of-the-syrian-national-army-march-2022.pdf

[26] SNHR - Syrian Network for Human Rights: In Nine Years, the Syrian Regime Has Dropped Nearly 82,000 Barrel Bombs, Killing 11,087 Civilians, Including 1,821 Children, 15 April 2021, https://snhr.org/blog/2021/04/15/56121/

[27] MSF - Medecins Sans Frontieres: Syria under siege, probably 2021, https://www.msf.org/de/Syrien-ohne-Ausweg-belagert

[28] UN Security Council: Syria's Failure to Remedy Pending Issues of Chemical Weapons Use Is 'Wake Up Call' for International Community, Disarmament Chief Tells Security Council, 9026th meeting, SC/14877, 29 April 2022, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14877.doc.htm

[29]

OHCHR - UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Behind the data: Recording civilian casualties in Syria, 11 May 2023,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2023/05/behind-data-recording-civilian-casualties-syria

[30] SOHR - Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the "Syrian Revolution", including 495,000 documented by SOHR, 1 June 2021, https://www.syriahr.com/en/217360/

[31] SNHR - Syrian Network for Human Rights: On the 12th Anniversary of the Popular Uprising: A Total of 230,224 Civilians Documented as Dead, including 15,275 Who Died due to Torture, 154,871 Arrested and/or Forcibly Disappeared, and Roughly 14 Million Syrians Displaced, 15 March 2023, https://snhr.org/blog/2023/03/15/on-the-12th-anniversary-of-the-popular-uprising-a-total-of-230224-civilians-documented-as-dead-including-15275-who-died-due-to-torture-154871-arrested-and-or-forcibly-disappeared-and-roughly-14/

[32] UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, December 2022, pp. 22-23,
https://www.unocha.org/attachments/5a13538d-a71c-4688-88c7-4f7ce8f4b4e0/hno_2023-rev-1.12.pdf

[33] UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, December 2022, p. 5, https://www.unocha.org/attachments/5a13538d-a71c-4688-88c7-4f7ce8f4b4e0/hno_2023-rev-1.12.pdf

[34] World Bank: Syria Economic Monitor, The Economic Aftershocks of Large Earthquakes, Summer 2023, p.7, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/d3f5dc06-058a-4c6a-a169-4f6534d84ec4/download

[35] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Country of origin information report Syria, May 2022, p. 23, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2081724/Country+of+origin+information+report+Syria.pdf

[36] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Country of origin information report Syria, May 2022, p. 15, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2081724/Country+of+origin+information+report+Syria.pdf

[37] The Carter Center: Quarterly Review of Syrian Political and Military Dynamics July-September 2023, 30 September 2023, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/2023/quarterly-conflict-summary-July-Sep-2023.pdf

[38] Jusoor for Studies: Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December 2021, https://www.jusoor.co/details/Map-of-Military-Control-in-Syria--End-of-2021-and-Beginning-of-2022/998/en

[39] MEI - Middle East Institute: Divided Syria: An examination of stabilisation efforts and prospects for state continuity, 26 April 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/divided-syria-examination-stabilization-efforts-and-prospects-state-continuity

[40] Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Country of origin information report Syria, May 2022, p. 16, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2081724/Country+of+origin+information+report+Syria.pdf

[41]SNHR - Syrian Network for Human Rights: At Least 2,317 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in 2023, Including of 129 Children and 87 Women, With 232 Documented in December Alone, 2 January 2024, https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/M230102E-1.pdf

[42] Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Centre: Chaos As the New Normal, 14 October 2022, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/88029

[43] Clingendael Institute: Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist - The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict, April 2021, p.22, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/the-ypgpyd-during-the-syrian-conflict.pdf

[44] Qantara: Assad is the laughing third, 14 January 2019, https://de.qantara.de/inhalt/die-kurdische-ypg-und-die-zukunft-des-syrischen-nordostens-assad-ist-der-lachende-dritte?nopaging=1

[45] Syrian Democratic Council U.S. Mission: Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, undated, https://www.syriandemocraticcouncil.us/1418-2/

[46] ECFR - European Council on Foreign Relations: Syrian Democratic Forces (Syria), (Author: Wladimir van Wilgenburg), undated, https://ecfr.eu/special/mena-armed-groups/syrian-democratic-forces-syria/

[47] MEI - Middle East Institute: Why the AANES is the best interim option for local communities in northeastern Syria, 7 July 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/why-aanes-best-interim-option-local-communities-northeastern-syria

[48] Jusoor for Studies: Map of Military Control in Syria End of 2021 and Beginning of 2022, 24 December 2021, https://www.jusoor.co/details/Map-of-Military-Control-in-Syria--End-of-2021-and-Beginning-of-2022/998/en

[49]Rudaw: Iraq repatriates over 600 ISIS-linked people from Rojava, arrests 17, 22 December 2023,https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/221220232

[50] MEI - Middle East Institute: A closer look at the ISIS attack on Syria's al-Sina Prison, 14 February 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/closer-look-isis-attack-syrias-al-sina-prison

[51]

MEI - Middle East Institute: Turkish escalation in northeastern Syria amid changes in military strategy, 11 October 2023, https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkish-escalation-northeastern-syria-amid-changes-military-strategy

Rudaw: Rojava administration denounces Turkish airstrikes on Rojava, 24 December 2023, https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/24122023

NPA - North Press Agency: AANES urges international action to stop Turkish attacks on NE Syria, 26 December 2023, https://npasyria.com/en/109271/

[52] MEI - Middle East Institute: Divided Syria: An examination of stabilisation efforts and prospects for state continuity, 26 April 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/divided-syria-examination-stabilization-efforts-and-prospects-state-continuity; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Country of origin information report Syria, May 2022, p. 25, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2081724/Country+of+origin+information+report+Syria.pdf

[53] Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2022 Country Report Syria, 23 February 2022, p. 8, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069699/country_report_2022_SYR.pdf

[54] Wilson Centre: HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group, 13 July 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group

[55] Bertelsmann Stiftung: BTI 2022 Country Report Syria, 23 February 2022, p. 6, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2069699/country_report_2022_SYR.pdf

[56] MEI - Middle East Institute: Divided Syria: An examination of stabilisation efforts and prospects for state continuity, 26 April 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/divided-syria-examination-stabilization-efforts-and-prospects-state-continuity

[57] MEI - Middle East Institute: Divided Syria: An examination of stabilisation efforts and prospects for state continuity, 26 April 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/divided-syria-examination-stabilization-efforts-and-prospects-state-continuity

[58] IEMed - European Institute of the Mediterranean: Syria: The Not So Frozen Crisis, 2022, https://www.iemed.org/publication/syria-the-not-so-frozen-crisis/

[59] The Carter Center: The State of the Syrian National Army, March 2022, p.3, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/2022/state-of-the-syrian-national-army-march-2022.pdf

[60] CRS - Congressional Research Service: Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, 8 November 2022, p.4, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf

[61] Al-Jazeera: Turkish-backed Syrian forces expect military operation soon, 10 June 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/10/turkish-backed-syrian-forces-expect-military-operation-soon

[62] The New Arab: Syria: HTS captures Afrin from Turkish-backed rebels, 14 October 2022, https://www.newarab.com/news/syria-hts-captures-afrin-turkish-backed-rebels ; Reuters: Inter-rebel clashes resume in northwest Syria after collapse of truce, 17 October 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/inter-rebel-clashes-resume-northwest-syria-after-collapse-truce-2022-10-17/