Iran is not an electoral democracy. The most powerful figure in the Iranian government is the supreme leader (Vali-e-Faghih), currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; he is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, a clerics-only body whose 86 members are elected to eight-year terms by popular vote from a government-screened list of candidates. The supreme leader is commander in chief of the armed forces and appoints the leaders of the judiciary, the heads of state broadcast media, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Expediency Council, and half of the Council of Guardians. Although the president and Parliament are responsible for designating cabinet ministers, the supreme leader exercises de facto control over appointments to the ministries of Defense, the Interior, and Intelligence.P, both with four-year terms, are vetted for allegiance to the ruling theocracy and adherence to Islamic principles by the 12-person Council of Guardians. The council consists of six clergymen appointed by the supreme leader and six civil law experts selected by the head of the judiciary, all for six-year terms (the latter are nominally subject to parliamentary approval). The Council of Guardians also has the power to reject legislation approved by Parliament; disputes between the two are arbitrated by the Expediency Council, another unelected, conservative-dominated body, currently headed by former president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who has sided with the reformist camp to curb the influence of his rival, current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The recent elections in December 2006 for the Assembly of Experts were heavily vetted and even delayed by one month. The field of candidates fell sharply as the election cycle wound down; all of the women candidates were disqualified.

However, voter turnout was at 60 percent for the municipal elections, and voters sent a strong message to the current conservative administration. Moderate candidates came out on top in both elections, although the Interior Ministry submitted an election bill in July 2006 that would involve the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the election vetting process and increase the voting age to 18, as well as impose new qualifications for presidential candidates.

Corruption is pervasive. The hard-line clerical establishment has grown immensely wealthy through its control of tax-exempt foundations ( bonyads ) that monopolize many sectors of the economy, such as cement and sugar production. Iran was ranked 105 out of 163 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Freedom of expression is severely limited. The government directly controls all television and radio broadcasting. Satellite dishes are illegal, though generally tolerated. However, there have been increasing reports of satellite dish confiscation and steep fines. The authorities have had some success in jamming broadcasts by dissident overseas satellite stations and recently made it illegal to cooperate with any Persian-language satellite channel. In December 2005, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council blocked the launch of an independent satellite channel, Saba TV, run by former Parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi.

The Ministry of Culture must approve publication of all books and inspects foreign books prior to domestic distribution. The Press Court has extensive procedural and jurisdictional power in prosecuting journalists, editors, and publishers for such vaguely worded offenses as “insulting Islam” and “damaging the foundations of the Islamic Republic.” The authorities frequently issue ad hoc gag orders banning media coverage of specific topics and events. Despite a period of greater press freedom between the initial election of President Mohammed Khatami and a series of student protests in 1999, threats against and arrests of Iranian journalists have increased in recent years. Many journalists are banned from leaving Iran, and the Islamic Culture and Guidance Ministry announced in September 2006 that it would not allow U.S. reporters to work inside the country.

The Ahmadinejad government holds that the duty of the media is to report and support government actions, not comment on them. Sensitivity over the nuclear issue at home and abroad has led to a greater government crackdown on news reporting. Use of “suspicious sources,” or sources that criticize the government, is forbidden.

In 2006, the Iranian government shut down a number of newspapers that it perceived to be insufficiently supportive of the leadership and Ahmadinejad. Papers such as Sharq, Hafez, Nameh, Khatereh, and Karnameh have all recently been banned. They have been accused of “insulting religious, political, and national figures” as well as “fomenting discord.” State forces have also tried to influence editorial content, not only through arrests but by advising publications on the subjects they can cover and what sources they can use. The Intelligence, Security and Islamic Culture and Guidance ministries have instructed two state news agencies to coordinate coverage with them. In February, the Supreme National Security Council also instructed publications to portray Iran’s diplomatic efforts regarding the nuclear dispute as successful.

In July, the government announced that journalists who criticized the government would be prosecuted. Two editors of reformist publications, Lutfollah Meysami and Issa Saharkhiz, were arrested in August. Meysami was found guilty of insulting and libeling the police and propagandizing against the system. Saharkhiz was sentenced to a jail term and banned from journalistic activity for five years for publishing anticonstitutional articles and propagandizing against the government, among other offenses. The press crackdown under Ahmadinejad is not only due to sensitivities surrounding the nuclear negotiations, but was also an effort to control information that could have impacted the elections for the Assembly of Experts and municipal councils. However, it is worth noting that Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist who was arrested and served a six-year prison term was released in October 2006 after paying a fine of US$163,000. His release followed numerous domestic and international appeals to the government and a prolonged hunger strike.

The government systematically censors internet content by forcing internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to a growing list of “immoral sites and political sites that insult the country’s political and religious leaders.” At least a dozen journalists and bloggers (writers of internet journals known as weblogs, or blogs) were indicted or convicted of press offenses during 2006, and many more were summoned for questioning about their writings. In May, the Communication and Information Technology Ministry announced the creation of a central filtering site that would block access to unauthorized websites, identify internet users, and keep a record of sites visited. The ministry also announced the launch of a “national” internet later that year. Many internet sites of student groups and civil society organizations were shut down in 2006.

Religious freedom is limited in Iran, which is largely Shiite Muslim with minorities of Sunni Muslims, Baha’is, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. Shiite clerics who dissent from the ruling establishment are frequently harassed. Sunnis enjoy equal rights under the law, but there is discrimination in practice, such as the absence of a Sunni mosque in Tehran and the paucity of Sunnis in senior government offices. The constitution recognizes Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as religious minorities and generally allows them to worship without interference so long as they do not proselytize. Conversion by Muslims to a non-Muslim religion is punishable by death. The non-Muslim minorities are barred from election to representative bodies (though a set number of parliamentary seats are reserved for them), cannot hold senior government or military positions, and face restrictions in employment, education, and property ownership. Some 300,000 Baha’is, Iran’s largest non-Muslim minority, are not recognized in the constitution, enjoy virtually no rights under the law and are banned from practicing their faith. Hundreds of Baha’is have been executed since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Discrimination and harassment against Sufi Muslims has increased. In February 2006, security forces in Qom attacked and detained hundreds of Sufis gathered in front of their house of worship to prevent its destruction. Following the election of Ahmadinejad, negative campaigns against religious minorities in Iran have increased through the state-controlled media. In March 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 60/171, expressing serious concern about the continued discrimination against religious minorities in Iran.

Academic freedom in Iran is limited. Scholars are frequently detained for expressing political views, and students involved in organizing protests often face suspension or expulsion by university disciplinary committees. In the months following his election, Ahmadinejad replaced the heads of at least a dozen major universities. In April 2006, Ramin Jahanbegloo, a prominent intellectual and head of the Cultural Research Bureau, a think tank in Iran, was arrested at Tehran airport and taken to Evin prison, a notorious torture center. There the authorities forced him to confess that he had conspired to overthrow the Islamic Republic, but he was subsequently released. Student political activists have also been targeted by the regime. In September 2006, over 50 liberal student-rights activists were ejected from their universities. The government has also prevented liberal student activists from registering for the new academic year, and has begun a campaign targeting liberal student organizations. Authorities bugged and monitored the movements and communications of student activists, even arresting some on vague charges. In July 2006, Ahmad Batebi, a well-known former student activist, was re-arrested and returned to Evin prison.

The 1979 constitution prohibits public demonstrations that “violate the principles of Islam,” a vague provision used to justify the heavy-handed dispersal of assemblies and marches. Hard-line vigilante organizations unofficially sanctioned by the conservative establishment—most notably the Basij and Ansar-i Hezbollah—play a major role in breaking up public demonstrations.

The Iranian government frequently disrupts peaceful protests and arrests participants. Even former officials are not immune. Former member of Parliament Mousavi Khoini was detained in June 2005 while attending a peaceful public protest. He has been held without charge, and has claimed that prison officials tortured him in order to force him to renounce past criticism of the government. As a member of Parliament, Khoini had repeatedly challenged the judiciary and intelligence services for human rights abuses. In July 2006, Iranian security services violently dispersed a peaceful assembly of women’s rights activists marking International Women’s Day. Police beat and arrested a number of demonstrators. Freedom of assembly was heavily restricted in 2006, as many more peaceful protests were violently dispersed by security forces.

The constitution permits the establishment of political parties, professional syndicates, and other civic organizations, provided they do not violate the principles of “freedom, sovereignty, and national unity” or question the Islamic basis of the republic. Human rights discourse and grassroots activism are integral parts of Iranian society. However, human rights and civil society activists face many challenges. The security services routinely arrest and harass secular activists. In August 2006, the Interior Ministry announced the closure of the Center for the Defense of Human Rights, founded by Nobel peace laureate Shirin Ebadi, for failure to obtain a permit. The action was part of the ministry’s wider effort to control and regulate the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Although permits are not required by law, the ministry has been imposing them and shutting down organizations that do not seek or qualify for them.

Iranian law does not allow independent labor unions to exist, though workers’ councils are represented in the government-sanctioned Workers’ House, the country’s only legal labor federation. In the past year, there were more than 800 protests and demonstrations in Iran, many of which were labor related. In December 2006, a bus strike over the preemptive arrest of 14 bus driver association leaders and wage disputes caused traffic chaos in the capital. Security forces attacked and arrested hundreds of the striking drivers.

The judicial system is not independent, as the supreme leader directly appoints the head of the judiciary, who in turn appoints senior judges. General Courts ostensibly safeguard the rights of defendants, but in practice, suspects are frequently tried in closed sessions without access to legal counsel. Political and other sensitive cases are tried before Revolutionary Courts, where due process protections are routinely disregarded and trials are often summary, lasting as little as five minutes. Dissident clerics are tried before the Special Court for the Clergy. The country’s penal code is based on Sharia and provides for flogging, stoning, amputation, and death for a range of social and political offenses; these punishments are carried out in practice.

Although the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, these practices are increasingly routine. Suspected dissidents are often held in unofficial, illegal detention centers run by a security apparatus consisting of the intelligence services, the Revolutionary Guard, judicial officials, and the police. Allegations of torture are common in such centers and in the notorious Evin prison. Although legislation banning the use of torture in interrogations was promulgated in 2004, allegations of torture persisted in 2006.

Prison conditions are notoriously poor in Iran, and allegations of torture and death in captivity are common. Political prisoners are held under deplorable conditions, and supporters who protest their detention or defend their cause are also prosecuted. Two student activists died in Evin prison in 2006 following mistreatment and hunger strikes. Valiollah Feyz Mahdavi died on September 7, 2006, following the death of Akbar Mohammadi on July 30. Khalil Bahramian, a lawyer defending Akbar Mohammadi, was charged with insulting the system after he commented on the questionable death.

Iran is a world leader in juvenile executions. Even though it has ratified two treaties on children’s rights, it has executed more juveniles in the last five years than any other country. Overall, execution of prisoners has risen since Ahmadinejad’s election. In 2006 alone, the authorities executed 10 prisoners and condemned 21 to death. Women are again being sentenced to death by stoning.

The constitution and laws call for equal rights for all ethnic groups, allowing considerable cultural and linguistic freedom, but in practice these rights are restricted by the authorities. Ethnic Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Azeris complain of political and economic discrimination, as do religious minorities. Kurdish opposition groups suspected of separatist aspirations, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), are brutally suppressed.

Ethnic tensions and dissent among minorities have been on the rise for the past two years. In March 2006, Baluchis attacked a police motorcade, and clashes erupted in May between Azeris and government forces over an offensive cartoon published in a state-run newspaper. There have also been a number of attacks against the government by ethnic Arabs living in southwestern Iran. However, the most pressing ethnic issue is the “Kurdish question.” Approximately 5 million Kurds live in Iran, concentrated in some of the least developed areas of the country. The autonomy of Kurds in neighboring Iraq has inspired Iranian Kurds to agitate for greater independence. KDPI conducted a number of military operations against the government in 2006.

Women are widely educated; 94 percent of secondary school aged girls attend school, compared to only 80 percent of boys, and a majority of university students are female. Although Iranian women currently hold seats in Parliament, they do not enjoy the same political rights as men. Women are barred from serving as judges and are routinely excluded from running for public office. Women also face systematic discrimination in legal and social matters. A woman cannot obtain a passport without the permission of a male relative or her husband, and women do not enjoy equal rights under Sharia statutes governing divorce, inheritance, and child custody. A woman’s testimony in court is given only half the weight of a man’s. Women must conform to strict dress codes and are segregated from men in most public places. Bowing to popular pressure, Ahmadinejad issued a ruling in May 2006 that allowed women to attend soccer matches, but it was promptly overturned by religious authorities.