a-4855 (ACC-LBN-4855)
Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Vereinigung Gund Alsham (Jund al-Sham)
In der Terrorismus-Datenbank des US-amerikanischen National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) wird die Gruppe Jund al-Sham als religiöse Terrororganisation klassifiziert. Ursprünglich sei die Gruppe im Jahr 1999 mit Geldmitteln, die Usama bin Laden dem Jordanier Zarqawi zur Verfügung gestellt habe, finanziert worden. Neue Gruppen seien 2004 und 2005 aufgetaucht. Die Gruppe habe weniger als 30 Mitglieder, ihr bisher letzter Anschlag sei am 15. September 2005 erfolgt:
“Date Formed: Original group established in 1999; new groups surfaced in 2004 and 2005
Strength: Less than 30 members; Classification: Religious; Last Attack:
Sept. 15, 2005; Financial Sources: Originally started with funds provided to Zarqawi by Usama bin Laden; current means unknown.” (MIPT, Group profile: Jund al-Sham, ohne Datum)
Als Anführer der Gruppe wird von MIPT Ghandi al-Sahmarani, als früherer Führer Muhammad Sharqiyah, AKA Abu Yusef, angeführt. Erwähnt wird auch, dass die libanesischen Behörden und palästinesische Gruppierungen im Lager Ayn al-Hilwah versucht hätten, Jund al-Sham im Jahr 2005 zu zerschlagen:
“Ghandi al-Sahmarani filled the leadership role for the Palestinian Jund al-Sham after several key figures stepped down in late 2004 and early 2005. These resignations followed increasing efforts by Lebanese authorities to crack down on the group's activities, as well as by Palestinian factions within the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp itself.” (MIPT, key leader profile: al-Sahmarani, Ghandi ohne Datum)
“Muhammad Sharqiyah, AKA Abu Yusef, was the leader of the mostly Palestinian Jund al-Sham operating in Lebanon's Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp. He served as its leader from its inception in early 2004 until October of that year, when he resigned due to his inability to safely leave his fortified area.” (MIPT, key leader profile: Sharqiyah, Muhammad, ohne Datum)
In einem Bericht der libanesischen Zeitung Daily Star vom Jänner 2005 wird ebenfalls erwähnt, dass sich die Jund al-Sham unter starkem Druck durch die Behörden und die Fatah befinde. Mitglieder der Jund al-Sham seien mit ihrem militärischem Führer Imad Yassin an einen Ort westlich von Ain al-Hilweh geflohen. Die Fatah werfe der Gruppe vor, Bomben im Lager gezündet zu haben, es habe auch eine Schießerei im September 2004 zwischen der Fatah und der Jund al-Sham gegeben:
“SIDON: The extreme anti-Fatah Palestinian faction Jund al-Sham may soon collapse due to pressure from Fatah and Lebanese authorities, sources in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp said. Sources said the organization is on its way toward dismantlement, as disputes emerge between its members over plans for bombings and assassinations. They stressed that some of its members, both Palestinians and Lebanese, are already wanted by Lebanese authorities. "The refugee camp can no longer be a haven for criminals who claim to follow their religion to the extent of fanaticism," they added. According to the sources, the number of the organization members exceeds 20. The group is allegedly armed with bombs, missiles and hand grenades, as well as automatic weapons. They said organization members have taken refuge west of Ain al-Hilweh with their military leader Imad Yassin. Recent confrontations prodded Abu Youssif Sharqieh to announce his relinquishing of authority over Jund al-Sham. The organization was created last year in Ain al-Hilweh's neighborhood of Safsaf from among the ruins of the Isbat al-Nour group, which was eradicated upon the death of its leader Abdullah Shreidi, a fervent opponent of the Palestinian Fatah movement. Fatah accused Jund al-Sham of several bombings in the streets of the camp, which led to several clashes that were eventually settled by the mediation of religious figures in Sidon. The Dinnieh Group, another extremist group that clashed with the Lebanese Army, had allied with Jund al-Sham, adding to the group's problems with the authorities. Jund al-Sham later alienated itself further by issuing statements against Fatah and Hizbullah. Problems culminated in September 2004, when a shooting broke out between members of Fatah and Jund al-Sham that killed a member of the organization and injured Yassin. Jund al-Sham's information officer, Osama al-Shehabi, has also announced his resignation.” (Daily Star, 5. Jänner 2005)
In einem Artikel von BBC vom Oktober 2004 wird über den angekündigten Rücktritt von Muhammad Sharqiya als Anführer der Jund al-Sham berichtet. In den Wochen zuvor sei es zu Zusammenstößen mit rivalisierenden Gruppen wie der Fatah gekommen:
“Muhammad Sharqiya, also known as Abu Yousef, of the Sunni extremist Jund al-Sham group is quoted as saying that he is sick and house-bound. The small clandestine group was formed in Ein al-Helweh camp outside Sidon and has clashed with rival factions such as the mainstream Fatah faction. He said group members would decide what happened to the group without him. At least two people have been killed and several wounded in clashes in the crowded Ein al-Helweh camp in the past week. Correspondents quote Palestinian officials who said that Fatah was threatening to liquidate Jund al-Sham, and that was the reason for Mr Sharqiya's resignation. Ein al-Helweh is the largest of 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, which together house about 350,000 Palestinians.” (BBC News, 6. Oktober 2004)
In einem Artikel von Lebanonwire vom August 2004 wird über die Gründung der Jund al-Sham im Lager Ein el-Hilweh berichtet, die meisten Mitglieder seien Dissidenten der Usbat al-Ansar. Die Gruppe habe angeblich Verbindungen zum Al-Qaida-Führer Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi:
“The two Muslim groups that emerged recently are the Islamic Liberation Party, previously an underground organization, and Jund al-Sham, a splinter Palestinian group based in Ein el-Hilweh refugee camp near the city of Sidon. The camp is under close watch by the Lebanese military and movement in and out is restricted. [...] Since Jund al-Sham announced its first communiques in Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el-Hilweh, east of the southern port city of Sidon, and started deploying armed men in the camp's alleys, several reports, including many that are closer to rumors, were published about the Sunni fundamentalist group. Jund al-Sham is actually a group of young Muslim men who adhere to a methodology considered by many as extremist because it is close to Salafism (adherence to the ways of al-Salaf, or ancestors) and is brandished by people like Osama bin Laden and Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi. [...] Most of its members are dissidents of Usbat al-Ansar (Band of Supporters), which is close to the Sunni fundamentalist Islamic Group, itself a splinter of the Muslim Brothers. [...] Jund al-Sham is led by Abu Youssef Sharqieh, a former official with Fatah-the Revolutionary Council, which was headed by Sabri Banna. [...] Some of Jund al-Sham's leaders fought the Lebanese Army during a rebellion that broke out on New Year's Eve in 1999 in the predominantly Sunni Dinnieh area in northern Lebanon. The group broke away from Usbat al-Ansar in protest of the mother group's decision to stop bullying people who do not obey Islamic teachings in their daily lives and in protest of Usbat al-Ansar's handing over of one of its leading members to the Lebanese authorities to be tried on charges of killing Lebanese soldiers. Their alleged link to Zarqawi, a leader of bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network who is believed to reside and operate in Iraq, stems from reports that he has arranged training for terrorists at al-Qaeda camps. While he was in Pakistan, Zarqawi made contact with al-Qaeda to train Jordanians. His operatives (called "Jund al-Sham") began to arrive in Afghanistan in large numbers in l999. Some of these operatives trained at al-Qaeda's al-Faruq Camp, where they received full support from al-Qaeda.” (Lebanonwire, 7. August 2004)
Aktivitäten der Jund al-Sham: Anschläge in mehreren Ländern
In einem BBC-Artikel vom 19. Juli 2004 wird erwähnt, dass die Jund al-Sham sich zum Mord an dem Hizbollah-Führer Ghaleb Awali bekannt hätte, einen Tag später habe die Gruppe jedoch dementiert, dass sie hinter dem Anschlag stehe:
“Hezbollah sources said Ghaleb Awali was killed as he started his car outside his home on Monday morning. The blast happened in Beirut's southern suburb of Harat Hreik - a stronghold of the Shia Muslim Hezbollah group. Hezbollah said the attack was the work of Israel, which has accused Hezbollah of fuelling Palestinian militancy. [...] The AFP news agency has reported that a little-known Sunni Muslim militant group, Jund al-Sham, claimed it carried out Monday's attack. The claim has not been confirmed.” (BBC, 19. Juli 2004)
“A statement from shadowy Sunni Muslim extremist group, Jund al-Sham - reportedly formed a few weeks ago in a Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon - had initially claimed responsibility. However, a leader of the group later said the statement was a fabrication, adding that the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad was most probably to blame.” (BBC, 20. Juli 2004)
Auch Defense Update behandelt den Mord an Awwali in einem Kommentar vom Februar 2005 und geht dabei auf die Rolle der Jund al-Sham ein:
“Jund al-Sham: Last July, Ghaleb Awwali a leading Hezbolla activist was assassinated in Beirut. Hezbollah immediately claimed, as usual, that Israel's Mossad was behind the killing. The attack took place as Awwali was leaving his home on Moawad street, one of the main commercial areas of the relatively impoverished southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital which remain a key Hezbollah stronghold. Jund Ash Sham, which had announced its formation a few weeks before in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, issued a statement claiming responsiblity. "We have executed one of the symbols of treachery, the Shi'ite Ghaleb Awwali," said Jund Ash-Sham spokesman. Jund Ash-Sham is a splinter group of Osbat al-Nour (aka Esbat al-Nour), a highly militant group that sought refuge in the Palestinian refugee camp in Ain al-Hilweh after deadly armed clashes with the Lebanese army at Dinnieh in northern Lebanon in January 2000. Eleven troops, including an officer, were killed in cave-to-cave combat at the snow-covered Dinniyeh mountain peaks in the heaviest casualty toll the army suffered since the end of the civil war in 1990. Thirty-nine insurrectionists were also killed, including their leader Bassam Kanj, code-named Abu Aisha, who fought alongside Osama bin Laden against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Forty other mutineers were captured. Some 15 terrorists managed to flee by boat to the Ain al-Hilweh camp in the outskirts of Sidon, provincial capital of south Lebanon, where they found refuge. Their presence soon developed into an unendurable burden for the Palestinians and survivors of the "Dinniyeh group" fought two days of sporadic battles with automatic rifles and hand grenades against Yasser Arafat's Fatah militia in the camp, in which four gunmen were killed on both sides. The camp remains virtually "out of bounds" to Lebanese army troops and can be regarded as an ex-territorial haven to Palestinian terrorist elements. Until lately the undisputed leader in the camp was the anti-Fatah dissident Colonel Munir Makdah. Arafat tried to negotiate with him during the early stages of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, by sending his relative, in March 2001 the late Faisal al Husseini to call on Muneir Makdakh, then head of Fatah militia of south Lebanon to discuss burying the hatchet and recruiting his militiamen into the Intifada. The meeting ended in fiasco and only deepend the rift between the Lebanese Fatah dissidents and Ramallah. These groups, which do not accept any PNA compromise, including Arafat' Olso Agreement, could become dangerous opponents to Abu Mazen, if given adequate support from Arab rejectionist nations, such as Iran, through its proxy Hezbollah. Although sofar, the Ain al -Hilweh groups had disassociated themselves from Shi'ite support, this could change, if an all-out active opposition against a future ongoing peace process will emerge from the present cease-fire.” (Defense Update, 17. Februar 2005)
Im Mai 2005 berichtet das SITE Institute, dass sich die Jund al-Sham zu einem Anschlag außerhalb des britischen Konsulats in New York bekannt habe. Es habe keine Verletzten gegeben. Seit März habe sich die Gruppe zu mehreren Anschlägen, darunter in Qatar und im Libanon bekannt:
“Today, May 5, 2005, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of Levant) claimed responsibility for the small explosions outside of the British consulate in New York City, claiming that the attack was “the beginning of war inside and outside of America.” No one was hurt in the blast. Since late March, Jund al-Sham has claimed responsibility for random attacks across the globe, including in Qatar and Lebanon. In addition, the group claimed responsibility for an explosion at a Texasoil refinery. The group argues that the United States overlooked the Texas refinery explosion, and that more attacks will ensue. “We will not hesitate,” the communiqué states, “to hit the parties and coffee shops, the hotels and the churches, with the help of Allah.” To complete its task, Jund al-Sham calls for “our cells in America to start battles in the streets.” (SITE Institute, 5. Mai 2005)
ABC News veröffentlichte im Mai 2005 eine Analyse der Bombenanschläge in Doha (Qatar) vom 19. März 2005. Geheimdienstmitarbeiter seien überrascht gewesen, dass sich eine Gruppe namens Jund al-Sham zu dem Anschlag bekannt hätte. Dies könnte ein Zeichen dafür sein, dass der jordanische Terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi beginne, Ziele außerhalb des Irak zu attackieren und als globaler Anführer des globalisierten Jihad Osama bin Laden ersetzen könnte:
“Just five days before the March 19 blast, which killed a British teacher and wounded 12 others, the State Department issued a general warning to all Americans travelling in the Gulf that "extremists may be planning to carry out attacks against Westerners and oil workers" in the region. What did surprise intelligence officials was the name of the group which claimed responsibility for the bombing: Jund al-Sham ("Soldiers of the Levant"). Although the group said that this was its first statement, Jund al-Sham is the same name as a group started by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Intelligence officials believe it may be a sign that Zarqawi is beginning to attack targets outside Iraq, and may, in fact, be emerging as a replacement to Osama bin Laden as the operational leader of the global jihad. Analysts are concerned that Zarqawi may now begin to redeploy his cadre of militants who, having gained important combat experience in Iraq, are capable of carrying out deadly missions elsewhere. According to Jordanian government sources and European intelligence documents, Zarqawi first set up Jund al-Sham in Afghanistan in late 1999 with $200,000 in startup money from bin Laden. The group's objective was to operate in a geographical area known as the "Levant," which encompasses Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan where al Qaeda's presence was deemed too weak. Headed by Zarqawi, Jund al-Sham federated about 150 jihadis, including Jordanian Islamic militants exiled by the Jordanian government earlier that year, as well as various recruits from Syria (some holdouts of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood), and Lebanon (mostly Palestinian refugees of the movement "Asbat al Ansar"). These militants were trained in explosive, guerrilla warfare and chemical weapons techniques at a training facility ("Al Matar Training Camp") operated by Zarqawi near the Afghan city of Herat, close to the Iranian border. [...]Last week's bombing in Doha may signal the beginning of that phase. Even though very little is known at this point about the Egyptian computer expert who exploded his car next to the Doha English Speaking School, Jund as Sham's comeback on the global terrorist scene in a country so remote from its initial area of operation seems to validate a number of developments recently picked up by U.S. and Iraqi intelligence services. This information is increasingly interpreted as indicating that Zarqawi, has emerged as the most important operational leader of the global jihad and even a possible replacement to bin Laden as the figurehead of the movement.” (ABC News, 28. Mai 2005)
Das Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) berichtet im September 2005 unter Berufung auf Daily Star von einem Attentatsversuch auf einen Journalisten in Mazboud im Libanon, eine Gruppe namens Jund al-Sham habe den Journalisten mit dem Tode bedroht:
“Ten days ago, Ali Ramez Tohme, a journalist who had just published a book about Hariri, escaped a similar assassination attempt. A bomb exploded under the driver's seat of his car, but he was not in the vehicle. The Daily Star, citing an explosives expert, said 200 grams of dynamite were used. Tohme found a statement threatening to kill him outside his parent's house in Mazboud from the "Jund Ash-Sham," a previously unknown terrorist group that claimed responsibility for Hariri's murder, The Daily Star reported.” (CPJ, 26. September 2005; vgl. Daily Star, 16. September 2005)
Daily Star berichtet im Februar 2006 von Beinahe-Zusammenstößen zwischen der Jund al-Sham und der libanesischen Armee in Taamir außerhalb des Lagers Ain al-Hilweh:
Clashes almost broke out between the Jund al-Sham militia and the Lebanese Army in Taamir area, outside the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon on Friday over rumors that a Lebanese national, Mohammad Shmandour, was beaten to death by authorities. Shmandour was arrested three days ago on rumors that he possessed weapons and ammunition and is being held by the Lebanese Army. His family told The Daily Star that he "is not a member in the Jund al-Sham but he sympathizes with them." After the rumors of Shmandour's death circulated, several family members and around 50 armed and masked Jund al-Sham members took to the streets of Taamir, blocking the roads and setting car tires on fire. They demanded that officials allow them to contact Shmandour to check on him.” (Daily Star, 18. Februar 2006)
Lager Ain al Helwa; Lager im Südlibanon
Das UN-Flüchtlingshilfswerk für Palästina-Flüchtlinge (UNRWA) gibt auf seiner Website die folgenden 12 Palästinenser-Flüchtlingslager mit den entsprechenden Einwohnerzahlen an. Auf der Website befindet sich auch eine Karte mit der Lage der Lager (siehe Quellenverzeichnis; UNRWA, Zahlen vom 31. Dezember 2003):
Ein el-Hilweh 45,337
Nahr el-Bared 31,023
Rashidieh 25,580
Burj el-Barajneh 20,405
Burj el-Shemali 18,659
Beddawi 16,198
Shatila 12,235
El-Buss 10,107
Wavel 7,553
Mieh Mieh 5,037
Dbayeh 4,211
Mar Elias 1,411
Dikwaneh & Nabatieh (destroyed camps) 16,108
Auch die Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe (SFH) zählt in ihrer Lageanalyse vom Dezember 2001 (publiziert im März 2002) 12 Lager mit (veralteten) Einwohnerzahlen und der nächstgelegenen Stadt auf (SFH, März 2002, S. 16):
Palästinensische Flüchtlingslager im Libanon
Nach Angaben des U.K. Home Office vom Oktober 2001 bestehen zur Zeit die folgenden
zwölf Flüchtlingslager im Libanon:
Lager Ort Flüchtlinge*
Mar Elias Beirut 1‘542
Burj el-Baraineh Beirut 16‘923
Dbayeh Beirut 4‘062
Shatila/Sabra Beirut 9‘788
Ein el-Hilweh Saidon (südlich von Beirut) 40‘896
Mieh Mieh Saidon 5‘120
El-Buss Tyre (im Süden des Libanon) 8‘673
Rashidieh Tyre 23‘283
Burj el-Shamali Tyre 16‘982
Nahr el-Bared Tripoli (im Norden) 26‘061
Beddawi Tripoli 14‘447
Wavell Baalbek (im Osten) 6‘890
BBC News berichtet im August 2002 von Kämpfen zwischen verschiedenen Fraktionen im größten libanesischen Palästinenser-Flüchtlingslager Ayn al-Hilweh. Dabei seien ein lokales Fatah-Hauptquartier sowie ein Fatah-Checkpoint von Islamisten angegriffen worden. Die Auseinandersetzungen im Lager seien laut libanesischen Behörden die schlimmsten seit mehr als zehn Jahren gewesen. In dem Artikel wird auch erwähnt, dass das Lager mit 75.000 Einwohnern (diese Zahl weicht von den Angaben der UNRWA ab) von verschiedenen palästinensischen Gruppierungen kontrolliert werde. Die libanesischen Behörden würden zwar die Tore des Lagers kontrollieren, jedoch selten das Lager selbst betreten. Einige von der Polizei gesuchte Führer würden sich wahrscheinlich im Lager verstecken, darunter Abu Mohjen von der Asbat al-Ansar, die auf einer US-amerikanischen Liste von Terrororganisationen vertreten sei:
„Two people have been killed and at least six others injured in factional fighting at Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp. Sources at the Ayn al-Hilweh camp, south of Beirut, said the local headquarters of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement and a Fatah checkpoint were attacked by Islamic militants. Correspondents say tension has been high at the camp since last month, when Fatah and other groups helped the Lebanese army to arrest a wanted Islamic militant, Badih Hamade, who is accused of killing three army intelligence officers. In the past two weeks alone, there have been four bomb attacks against Fatah targets in Lebanon. Violent skirmishes are commonplace in the camp, but according to Lebanese officials Tuesday's clashes were the worst in more than a decade.
[...] Ayn al-Hilweh, home to some 75,000 refugees, is largely controlled by the various Palestinian factions inside. Although the Lebanese authorities guard the gates, they rarely enter the camp. Several leaders wanted by police are thought to be hiding in the camp. One of them, Abu Mohjen, the leader of the Asbat al-Ansar group, is on a US list of terror organisations.” (BBC News, 13. August 2002)
Der zwar schon etwas veraltete Bericht der CIREA-Delegation geht auch detailliert auf die Machtstrukturen innerhalb der libanesischen Palästinenserlager ein:
„Lebanese influence in most camps is very weak. Although Palestinian camps are under Lebanese jurisdiction, in various camps the Lebanese police are in practice unable to enforce the law. Despite arrangements in the Taif agreement, Lebanese troops have not been able to disarm Palestinian militia inside the camps. Palestinians can therefore almost entirely elude the control of the Lebanese authorities inside the camps. The Lebanese authorities do not intervene in conflicts and problems between Palestinians in the camps either. The Lebanese authorities are very keen to maintain law and order in the immediate vicinity of some camps. For instance, the Lebanese military presence near the Ein El-Hilweh camp, which is known as unsafe, is relatively heavy. There are Lebanese checkpoints near the entrances of a number of camps. In some cases (criminal offences etc.) Palestinians have been known to be handed over to the Lebanese authorities by the camp authorities. [...] Most camps have a Palestinian camp committee which forms the political administration and leadership of the camp. They also have their own legal system and prisons. A person can be a member of one of the other factions without any problem as long as the authority of the camp leadership is not undermined. A council of camp elders also operates in a number of camps alongside the committees.
Camp inhabitants who have problems with Palestinian factions or parties can – depending on the circumstances – call for protection by the party or faction to which they belong or to which they are affiliated. In many cases they cannot turn to the Lebanese authorities with any results if they experience problems inside the camps. There are Palestinian checkpoints at the entrances to some camps. A sort of Palestinian police operates in a few camps. Some inhabitants carry their weapons openly inside the camp. This is the case in Ein El-Hilweh camp, for instance. The administration of justice within the Palestinian camps is an almost entirely Palestinian affair. There are cases in which disputes are settled according to traditional customs or people take the law into their own hands. [...] Although the internal security situation varies from camp to camp, it can generally be termed poor. Fighting between followers of various religious and political groups is a regular occurrence in Ein El-Hilweh camp which, as the largest Palestinian camp, is regarded as something of a "Palestinian capital" of Lebanon, and is thus accorded great symbolic significance. The nearby smaller camp of Mieh Mieh is a mirror image of Ein El-Hilweh. The presence of Arafat supporters and opponents is one of the reasons why tension runs higher in these camps than in others. The situation in Rashidieh camp is generally calmer. With the possible exceptions of Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi, there is a great "conflict potential" and a risk of escalation in most camps.” (Council of the European Union, 22. März 2002, S. 46-47)
Der neueste Menschenrechtsbericht des US Department of State (USDOS) vom März 2006 spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einem autonomen und willkürlichen Justizsystem, das palästinensische Gruppen in Flüchtlingslagern betreiben würden und das nicht unter staatlicher Kontrolle stehe:
“Palestinian groups in refugee camps operated an autonomous and arbitrary system of justice not under the control of the state. For example, local popular committees in the camps attempted to solve disputes using tribal methods of reconciliation. If the case involved a killing, the committees occasionally used their good offices to hand over the perpetrator to Lebanese authorities for trial.” (USDOS, 8. März 2006, Section 1.e)
[Passage entfernt]
Laut Bericht des Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) vom März 2006 hätten libanesische Führer sich darauf geeinigt, palästinensische Gruppierungen außerhalb der 12 Flüchtlingslager innerhalb von sechs Monaten zu entwaffnen:
“Lebanese leaders agreed earlier this week to disarm Palestinian factions outside the country’s refugee camps and establish diplomatic ties with Syria in the first national dialogue held by all the country’s political factions since 1990. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri told reporters after the meeting that the disparate leaders had agreed to disarm all Palestinian militants outside the country’s 12 refugee camps within six months. [...] The UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for implementation of UN Security Council(UNSC)Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen welcomed the accomplishments of the national dialogue, especially given that the UN has repeatedly called for both Syria-Lebanon diplomatic ties and the disarming of Palestinian militias in Lebanon. Adopted in September 2004, Resolution 1559 called on all armed militias in Lebanon to give up their weapons. "Such a consensus is an important foundation,” said Roed-Larsen. “The National Dialogue… should be guided by the principles of Security Resolution 1559, and I’m glad to say that today's agreement is in full accordance with the resolution.” (IRIN, 16. März 2006)
Die Palestine Press Agency veröffentlicht am 19. März 2006 einen AFP-Artikel, wonach der Anführer der Fatah im Libanon, Sultan Abul Aynain, angekündigt habe, Waffen der Fatah in den Lagern einzusammeln und innerhalb der Lager aufzubewahren:
“Fatah's chief in Lebanon said his Palestinian faction would round up weapons from refugee camps amid growing calls for militias in the country to be disbanded. "We have decided to collect all the weapons we possess, including individual arms, and put them in secure places (inside the camps), in accordance with the wishes of the inter-Lebanese dialogue conference," said Sultan Abul Aynain. Leaders from across the political and religious spectrum have been meeting in Beirut to solve such contentious issues as the presence of armed Palestinians outside refugee camps. There are believed to be 380,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon, many of them in dire conditions in 12 refugee camps. Parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri said Tuesday that participants in the inter-Lebanese talks supported disarming Palestinians outside the camps in six months and "the state re-establishing its authority on all Lebanese territory". A September 2004 UN Security Council Resolution calls on Lebanon to assert sovereignty on all its territory and disarm all militias, including armed Palestinian factions and the armed wing of Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah. Aynain also reasserted the authority of the Palestine Liberation Organisation -- of which Fatah is the largest faction -- as the only legitimate representative of Palestinians in Lebanon. The PLO does not include Palestinian Islamist groups such as Hamas, which trounced Fatah in January's elections, or pro-Syrian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command which has been involved in a number of shooting incidents outside Palestinian camps. The inter-Lebanese dialogue is due to resume on March 22.” (Palestine Press Agency, 19. März 2006)
Daily Star berichtet im März 2006, dass eine Ministerdelegation alle Lager außer Ain al-Hilweh besucht habe, da dieses wegen der bewaffneten Gruppen nicht sicher sei:
“SOUTH LEBANON: The visit on Friday of the ministerial delegation to the Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon instigated a wave of mixed reactions among the Palestinians, as some of whom welcoming the government's initiative while others voiced their concerns about the exclusion of Ain al-Hilweh camp from the tour. [...] While Lebanese and Palestinian figures criticized the exclusion of Lebanon's largest camp from the visit, Palestinian sources stressed that Ain al-Hilweh camp was not safe because of armed groups there. During its visit to the camps, the delegation received from the PLO a list of demands that included: Acknowledging the Palestinian passport given to the nationals by the Palestinian Authority; guaranteeing the Palestinians' civil and social rights; drafting new laws regulating the Palestinian situation, especially laws pertaining to the right to work; increasing the security measures taken by the Lebanese Army at the main entrances of the camps and several other demands to improve the refugees' situation.” (Daily Star, 27. März 2006)
Radikale islamistische Gruppen im Südlibanon
Die International Crisis Group (ICG) zitiert in einer Analyse vom Dezember 2005 einen palästinensischen Beobachter, der meinte, dass die radikalen Islamisten im Libanon zahlenmäßige scheinbar keine Bedrohung darstellten, sie hätten jedoch viel Macht, da sie um ihre Existenz kämpfen würden:
“Crisis Group interview with Fouad Makhoumi of the Democratic Dialogue Party, Beirut, 28 October 2005. The status of Islamist militant groups in Lebanon would merit a separate report. After Syrian-led attacks on armed Islamist groups in 2000, they reportedly regrouped inside and on the edges of Palestinian refugee camps, particularly near Badawi and Nahr al-Bared in the north and Ain al-Hilwe in the south. More recently, Sunni Islamists and Palestinian observers in Beirut claimed in interviews with Crisis Group that some jihadi groups – including Esbat al-Nour, Esbat al-Ansar and Jund al-Sham – have encouraged followers to join the Iraqi insurgency. Ahmad Moussalli, political science professor at the American University in Beirut, also claimed that Salafi groups in the Tripoli area had used an influx of local and regional funds to establish an institutional basis by rapidly constructing madrassas. Crisis Group interview, Beirut, October 2005. Numerically, Islamists do not appear to be a significant threat. Still, in the words of a Palestinian observer: “Esbat al-Ansar has only 200 members, but they are more powerful and more committed than 2,000 Fatah [Palestinian] fighters. Fatah’s fighters fight for their salary, the Islamists fight for their existence. They will fight to the end”. Crisis Group interview with Ghassan Abdullah, op. cit.” (ICG, 5. Dezember 2005, S. 13, Fußnote 95)
Die Jamestown Foundation veröffentlichte am 6. April 2006 eine Analyse, wonach salafitisch-dschihadistische Bewegungen (zu denen laut Quelle auch die Jund al-Sham gezählt wird) eine neue Kraft im Libanon darstellen würden. Die Gruppen würden vor allem junge Männer aus Flüchtlingslagern, aber auch sunnitische Libanesen aus ärmeren Bevölkerungsschichten rekrutieren und wachsenden Einfluss ausüben:
“In July 2005, French scholar Olivier Roy argued that Iraq and Palestine are not factors in the prevalence of the Salafi-Jihadist movement. He based his argument on the fact that there are no Iraqi or Palestinian members in the Salafi-Jihadist organizations. Now, however, this argument must be reconsidered. Afghan authorities have expressed their concern over the "hordes of Iraqi suicide bombers" following the arrest of Noman Eddin Majid, aged 35 years, from Diyala governorate as he was trying to sneak into Afghanistan (al-Hayat, 3 February). In addition, the perpetrators of the Amman bombing on 9 November 2005, and most of those in the recent disbanded terrorist cell in Amman as well, were Iraqis (Terrorism Focus, 7 March). As for the Palestinians, the attention is becoming increasingly focused on Lebanon with its Palestinian refugee camps, particularly Ain El-Hilweh, instead of the West Bank. (Approximately 400,000 Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon.) While the recruitment of Salafi-Jihadists in Lebanon is not restricted to Palestinians and includes some Lebanese nationals, young men from refugee camps are more fertile material for recruitment. Following the news of the arrest of Salafi-Jihadists in Lebanon and the announcement made by the movement of its responsibility for blowing up a location for the Lebanese army on February 1 (the movement delivered the threat through a phone call to the Sada al-Balad newspaper a day before, according to the paper), Lebanese authorities arrested 31 suspected jihadists. In light of this claim of responsibility and the arrests, it is important to examine the forms of recruitment that the Salafi-Jihadists use in Lebanon (al-Watan, 8 February). It seems that the activities of the Salafi-Jihadist movement focus on the poor Lebanese and Palestinian communities. The increasing connection with the Iraq factor is due to two reasons: the unattractiveness of the secular Palestinian organizations in the refugee camps compared to the increasing attraction of the Islamist groups, and the waning control of the Future/Hariri Party over the Sunni community.
Palestinian refugee camps
Ain El-Hilweh refugee camp was the base for Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the 1980s. The camp was a stronghold for the "Palestinian revolution" organizations, and it remains to this day under the power of Palestinians to the extent that the Lebanese army does not venture inside it (al-Hayat, 26 February). The power of the secular organizations, however, is moving to the Islamist organizations, especially since the secular organizations have been implicated in cases of corruption and have not met the demands of the Palestinians. The commander of Fatah's militias in Lebanon, Colonel Mounir Maqdah, proposed "forming a Lebanese-Palestinian military force to eradicate this fundamental group [from Ain El-Hilweh]." This clearly indicates the increase in the power of Islamist groups and the Palestinian organizations' fear of losing their control, especially when newspaper sources talk of "returnees from Iraq" who aim at declaring "Lebanon's loyalty" to the "Foundation of Jihad in Iraq" (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 4 February).
An indication of the spread of the influence of the Salafi-Jihadist movements amidst Palestinians in Lebanon, promoted by the "returnees from Iraq," is what Hazem Amin in al-Hayat calls the "al-Qaida terminology." The volunteers in Iraq are in touch with their parents in a way that connects the parents with information about jihad activities. This terminology is so widespread that Shiites are now described as "heretics" (al-Hayat, 25 January), which is a new feature in the Lebanese sectarian system. In addition, death threats were made by the al-Qaida organization in Bilad al-Sham to Shiite Lebanese figures (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 27 July 2005).
While this is the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, the influence of the Salafi-Jihadist movement is not restricted to them. There are Sunni Lebanese nationals who have headed to Iraq to volunteer in fighting the Americans (al-Hayat, 26 January). Likewise, there was a transformation in the village of Majdal Anjar, which used to be the stronghold of "traditional Salafism," since the arrival of Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani, who later became a close companion of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi after he reached Iraq with his 16-year-old son, and where they both later died. Abu Muhammad al-Lubnani was Mustafa Ramadan. He began to spread his jihadist ideas since his return from Denmark around 2003 (al-Hayat, 26 January), and was able to form a nucleus for the jihadist movement. The influence of those ideas applies to the Sunnis in Lebanon - not just to the Palestinians.
Sunni Lebanese
Lebanon-based Addiyar newspaper indicated on 7 February, following the burning of the Danish Embassy and the riots in Beirut, that Saad Hariri is losing control over the Sunni scene by eliminating the subsidies for the poor among the Sunnis and making the al-Mustaqbal movement exclusive for the rich and powerful. As a result, Salafi-Jihadist movements (al-Qaida, Usbat al-Ansar, Jund al-Sham) and the Islamic Liberation Party are, according to Addiyar, now controlling 90 percent of the Sunni scene (Addiyar, 7 February).
Despite the reliability of the 90 per cent figure, the Salafi-Jihadist movement is attracting a host of poor Sunnis who were badly affected after the death of Rafiq Hariri. The media always spoke of the role Hariri played in restoring the balance between the Sunnis and the other sects in Lebanon. This becomes evident if we review the backgrounds of the people who volunteered in or returned from Iraq; they were mostly poor who did odd jobs like selling coffee and steamed beans in the street, or were unemployed in the first place.
Hezbollah's role
The developments related to the Salafi-Jihadist presence in Lebanon show that those influenced by the ideology will begin to move out of the Palestinian refugee camps and into southern Lebanon. This development means that Hezbollah will be threatened in its historically-controlled region. For Hezbollah, this development comes at a time when the party is under pressure to disarm and to end ties with Syria. This means that Hezbollah will not allow the Salafi-Jihadists to extend into their influenced region. While Salafi-Jihadists consider Shiites as infidels, on 23 February Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah listed, for the first time, the "Jama'at al-Takfeer" (Excommunication Groups, which is how officials in Arab governments describe Salafi-Jihadists), as one of the three beneficiaries of the bombings of Shiite shrines in Iraq, along with the United States and Israel.
Conclusion
The above factors show that the Salafi-Jihadist presence and movement into Lebanon is facing many obstacles, but is also becoming a new force in the country. At the same time, however, the socio-political developments in Lebanon are creating the conditions for that presence.
While Sunnis in Lebanon were historically led by old families like al-Huss, Karami and al-Sulh, from the 1990s until his assassination in 2005, Rafiq al-Hariri became the most prominent leader of Sunnis and enjoyed their support. That is why he was described as the "most Sunni personality" (al-Jazeera, 13 February). One of the most important factors in the popularity of Hariri among Sunnis was his concentration on the grassroots level by helping poor Lebanese.
Among the implications of the assassination was that Sunnis have become prone to polarization by different ideologies, among which is the Salafi-Jihadist ideology. Due to the positions of the above-mentioned political forces - such as the Palestinian organizations and Hezbollah - there will be conflict between them and Salafi-Jihadists. The result will be that the spread of the Salafi-Jihadist ideology in Lebanon will become a destabilizing factor in the country.” (Jamestown Foundation, 6. April 2006)
Bitte beachten Sie auch den Überblick des Deutschen Orient-Instituts (DOI) über die Entwicklungen im Libanon seit dem Mord an Rafiq Hariri (DOI, Dezember 2005).
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Die Antwort stellt keine abschließende Meinung zur Glaubwürdigkeit eines bestimmten Asylansuchens dar.
Quellen:
Vereinigung Gund Alsham (Jund al-Sham)
-
-
-
-
-
MIPT - National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism: Terrorism Knowledge Base: key leader profile: al-Sahmarani, Ghandi, ohne Datum
http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6342 (Zugriff am 20. April 2006)
-
MIPT - National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism: Terrorism Knowledge Base: key leader profile: Sharqiyah, Muhammad, ohne Datum
http://www.tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6341 (Zugriff am 20. April 2006)
Aktivitäten der Jund al-Sham: Anschläge in mehreren Ländern
Lager Ain al Helwa; Lager im Südlibanon
Radikale islamistische Gruppen im Südlibanon
