18. November 2013

 

Im Zuge der Recherche wurden folgende alternative Bezeichnungen beziehungsweise Abkürzungen für die Democratic Party of Kurdistan Iran gefunden: Kurdische Demokratische Partei Iran, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Kordestan Democratic Party of Iran; Abkürzungen DPKI, KDPI, PDKI, KDP-I. Die Bezeichnung auf der Webseite der Partei (http://www.pdki.org) lautet Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan mit der Abkürzung PDKI. Im Folgenden wird die häufig verwendete Bezeichnung Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan und die gängige Abkürzung KDPI verwendet.

Lage von Mitgliedern der Democratic Party of Kurdistan Iran

Nach Angaben von Freedom House würden kurdische Oppositionsgruppen, die separatistischer Bestrebungen verdächtigt würden, wie die Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), brutal unterdrückt. Mindestens 28 kurdische Gefangene, die aus Gründen der nationalen Sicherheit verurteilt worden seien, hätten sich Ende 2012 in der Todeszelle befunden:

„Kurdish opposition groups suspected of separatist aspirations, such as the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), are brutally suppressed. At least 28 Kurdish prisoners convicted of national security charges remained on death row at the end of 2012.” (Freedom House, Jänner 2013)

Amnesty International (AI) schreibt in einem Bericht vom Februar 2012, dass die KDPI und die marxistische Komala jahrelang einen bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Islamische Republik Iran geführt hätten, dies jedoch derzeit nicht der Fall sei. Angehörige der kurdischen Minderheit, die irgendeine Form von friedlichem Dissens äußern würden, seien gefährdet, der Teilnahme an verbotenen politischen Gruppen wie der KDPI und anderen beschuldigt zu werden. Solche Beschuldigungen würden ihr Risiko vergrößern, ernsthaften Menschenrechtsverletzungen einschließlich Folter und Todesstrafe ausgesetzt zu werden:

„For many years, Kurdish organizations such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Marxist group Komala conducted armed struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran, although neither currently does so. […] Members of the Kurdish minority who express any form of peaceful dissent are vulnerable to accusations of participation in banned Kurdish political groups such as KDPI, Komala and PJAK [Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê - Partei für ein Freies Leben in Kurdistan]. Such accusations put them at even greater risk of serious human rights violations including torture and the death penalty.” (AI, 28. Februar 2012, S. 50)

Im Bericht zu einer gemeinsamen Fact-Finding-Mission (FFM) der dänischen Einwanderungsbehörde (Danish Immigration Service, DIS), des dänischen Flüchtlingsrats (Danish Refugee Council, DRC) und des norwegischen Herkunftsländerinformationszentrums Landinfo vom Februar 2013 wird ein Vertreter einer westlichen Botschaft zitiert. Demnach würde man mehr und mehr über gewöhnliche Personen hören, die von den Behörden verfolgt würden, weil Familienangehörige Mitglieder der PJAK, der Komala oder KDPI seien. Die Regierung sei „nicht glücklich“ mit der Komala und der KDPI, so die Quelle weiter. Es sei unmöglich zu sagen, wo die Reizschwelle der Regierung gegenüber kurdischen Aktivitäten liege. Es gebe keine klare Logik und keine klare rote Linie. Es könne sich täglich ändern und könne von den Kontakten abhängen, über die jemand verfüge. Eine internationale Organisation in Ankara wird mit der Aussage zitiert, dass in den Kurdengebieten Personen, die verdächtigt würden, Verbindungen zur KDPI, zur Komala oder zu Khabat zu haben, von den Sicherheitsdiensten vorgeladen werden könnten. Dies sei eine Form, wie die Behörden Druck auf Personen ausüben würden, indem sie ihnen zeigen, dass sie unter Beobachtung stünden. Das internationale Sekretariat von Amnesty International (AI) in London habe angegeben, dass nicht zuletzt wegen der Situation in Syrien sich das Risiko für Kurden vergrößert habe, von den Behörden ins Visier genommen zu werden. Eine Mitarbeiterin der US-Botschaft in London habe gemeint, dass viele Kurden zu nervös seien, um an politischen Aktivitäten im Iran teilzunehmen. Nur ein kleiner Prozentsatz der KurdInnen im Iran seien aktive Mitglieder einer der kurdischen Parteien:

„Asked about the situation in the Kurdish area, a Western embassy (2) said it is difficult to obtain information on the ground. During the Khatami period, a dialogue started up between the central government and the Kurdish areas. However, nowadays, one hears more and more of ordinary persons being pursued by the authorities because of family members being members of PJAK, Komala or KDPI. It is considered that opposition is gradually increasing, but it is not possible to say anything about what kind of activity is going on. However, it is difficult to say what kind of activities are going on in the border areas in Orumiyeh on the Iran-Turkey border. […] Regarding Komala and KDPI, the source said that the government is not ‘happy’ with them. If the Kurdish people are organizing cultural activities and a number of people gather, the authorities will fear that it is a cover for political activities for which reason they are also suppressing cultural activities and expression.

[…] It is impossible to say anything about the authorities’ threshold vis à vis Kurdish activities. According to the source, there is no clear logic and no clear red line. It may change from day to day and depend on the contacts you may have.

An international organization in Ankara said that in the Kurdish areas, individuals who are suspected of connections to KDPI, Komala and Khabat may be called in by the security agencies. Individuals who organize cultural activities may also be called in for questioning. It was added that this is not a standard security control, but a way in which the authorities set pressure on such individuals by showing them that they are under surveillance.

AIIS [Amnesty International’s International Secretariat] considered that the situation for Kurds is worsening with regards to risks of being targeted by the authorities, not in the least due to the situation in Syria. […]

Regarding Kurdish political activities inside Iran, the Iran Watcher [Amy Wilson], US Embassy, London found that organized meetings would not take place in Iran and assessed that many Kurds are too nervous to participate in political activities inside Iran. She also emphasized that it should be considered that after all, only a small percentage of the Kurds in Iran are active members of one of the Kurdish political parties.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Februar 2013, S. 40)

Ein Vertreter einer anderen westlichen Botschaft habe der FFM-Delegation mitgeteilt, dass es bezüglich kurdischer Parteien im Allgemeinen und der KDPI im Besonderen relativ ruhig sei. KurdInnen seien vorsichtiger, da sich die Beziehungen zwischen der iranischen Regierung und der Regierung im Nordirak verbessert hätten. Die Botschaft habe betont, dass die iranischen Behörden Separatismus im Allgemeinen nicht toleriere. Laut Angaben von Vertretern von zwei Menschenrechtsorganisationen in der Türkei seien Aktivitäten der KDPI im Iran wegen des Drucks auf ein Minimum reduziert worden, im Nordirak sei die KDPI jedoch aktiver. Die Interviewten seien nicht sicher, was die KDPI im Iran mache, laut ihrem Wissensstand seien die Aktivitäten mehr oder weniger gestoppt worden:

„Regarding the Kurdish parties in general and KDPI in particular, a Western embassy (1) informed that things seemed relatively quiet these days. The source considered that Kurds are more careful now due to recent improvements in the relations between the Iranian government and the government of Northern Iraq. The embassy stated that recently, it had not heard much news regarding the Iranian Kurdish population.

The embassy stressed that in general, separatism is not tolerated by Iranian authorities. A case that had been reported recently from the Kurdish areas concerned two brothers who face death sentences allegedly for activities for Komala. 

According to representatives from two Human Rights Organizations in Turkey, KDPI activities in Iran had minimized due to pressure, whereas KDPI was more active in Northern Iraq. The representatives emphasized that they were not certain of what KDPI was doing in Iran, but to their knowledge activities had more or less stopped. Regarding Komala, the representatives stated that Komala had ended military activities, but added that they had no recent information regarding activities.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Feburar 2013, S. 40-41)

Azad Zamani, ein kurdischer Menschenrechtsaktivist in London, habe der FFM-Delegation erläutert, dass Parteien wie die KDPI Druck von Seiten der Behörden ausgesetzt seien. Es werde davon ausgegangen, dass das System gezielt gegen registrierte Mitglieder dieser Gruppen vorgehen würde. Ein registriertes Mitglied der KDPI oder bestimmter anderer Parteien würde im Untergrund und nicht offen arbeiten. Das System im Iran sei so kompliziert, dass man nicht vorhersagen könne, welche Gruppe am meisten gefährdet sei, dies ändere sich auch ständig:

„Azad Zamani, a human rights activist of Kurdish origin in London explained that organizations that deal with issues related to children's and women's rights as well as political parties, are very much under pressure by the system in Iran and their working conditions are very difficult. Individuals active for these sorts of organizations from time to time experience that their family members are put under pressure from the authorities as well. Parties such as KDPI and Komala as well as Hekmatist party, that have some activities are facing pressures from the authorities. Also students’ groups such as DAB (Daneshjooyane Azadikhah va Barabaritalab, Students for Freedom and Equality) are under pressure as well as persons considered to be PJAK members.

It was considered that the system targeted members of these groups, that is those who were documented members, and considered that in these cases, their family members, including women and children, may be pressured by the authorities as well. It was explained that the authorities, in order to target those individuals, may go directly to the family members of the active persons of those groups in search of these individuals as well as a means of putting pressure on them and their families. […]

It was further explained that generally, the Kurdish areas is an area with political activities, especially the province of Kordestan in the west of Iran. The main Kurdish parties exist outside of Iran. However, many are oppositional to the Iranian regime in the area. However, if a person is a documented member of Komala or KDPI, Hekmatist party, for example, he would be an underground member and not be active out in the open. It was added that the Kurdish areas have been home to many oppositional groups and after the Islamic revolution in 1979, many groups moved there to work to set up their activities.

In general, it is difficult to distinguish between groups as to which is most at risk of being targeted by the Iranian authorities – be it political or religious groups or human rights groups. It was considered that the behavior of the system in Iran is so complicated and it is impossible to say anything clear cut on what group is most vulnerable and it changes all the time. Everything and anything can be perceived as political by the system if it serves a purpose for the authorities. Reference was made to the fact that even organizing events around environmental issues can put you at risk of being targeted by the authorities.

When asked if there are activities in the Kurdish areas that could be perceived as political, Azad Zamani, a human rights activist of Kurdish origin in London said that not only underground members of Kurdish parties may carry out activities. Other groups may also publish for example leaflets on different issues related to human rights and arrange some events that could be perceived as critical or oppositional to the system. The activist further explained that the majority of Kurds in Kordestan tend to be oppositional to the regime and some of these are active as well.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Februar 2013, S. 41-42)

Die bereits genannte Mitarbeiterin der US-Botschaft in London habe die Delegation informiert, dass sich ihrem Eindruck nach die iranischen kurdischen Parteien ihre Aktivitäten verstärken wollten. Beim Parteitag der KDPI im Oktober 2012 in ihrem Sitz im Nordirak sei eine Vereinbarung getroffen worden, „Splittergruppen“ zu einer Diskussion über mögliche Kooperationen einzuladen:

„The Iran Watcher, US Embassy, London informed the delegation that it was her impression, based on information from exiled Kurdish activists that Iranian Kurdish parties feel that now is the time to be more active. During the latest KDPI Congress in October 2012 at KDPI headquarters in Northern Iraq an agreement was made to continue to reach out to ‘splinter groups’ to initiate discussions about potential cooperation. In August 2012, KDPI signed a memorandum of agreement with Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan to discuss and analyze regional matters and discuss cooperation and coordination on matters pertaining to Iran and Kurdistan. PJAK, however, is not part of any agreements, according to the source.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Februar 2013, S. 43)

In einem FFM-Bericht von DIS und DRC vom September 2013 wird ein westlicher Diplomat und Iran-Experte in Erbil im Nordirak zitiert, wonach es keine Toleranz des iranischen Regimes für irgendwelche Aktivitäten in Verbindung mit kurdischen politischen Parteien gebe. Jegliche Verbindung mit einer dieser Parteien würde einen Grund für eine Verhaftung darstellen. Die Hinrichtungsrate unter Kurden im Iran sei hoch, ein großer Teil dieser Hinrichtungen basiere auf Anklagen wegen Drogenschmuggels. Manchmal würden politische Aktivisten unter dem Vorwand hingerichtet, Drogenschmuggler zu sein. Die Schwierigkeiten für KurdInnen würden beginnen, sobald sich die Personen politisch betätigen würden. Der Experte Ziryan Roj Helaty vom Magazin Tanupo wird mit der Aussage zitiert, dass alles, was mit der KDPI zusammenhänge, selbst ein Gespräch über das kurdische Volk und seine Rechte, zu Schwierigkeiten führen könnte. Jemand, der direkt über die KDPI spreche, sei in den Augen des Regimes mit der Partei verbunden, und eine Person, die über die Rechte der Kurden spreche, werde als generelle Gefahr gesehen:

„A Western diplomat and expert on Iran in Erbil explained that there is no tolerance on the Iranian regime’s side for any kind of activities with connection to the Kurdish political parties and any affiliation with one of these parties would be reason for arrest. The main reason for this is that these parties’ ultimate goal, despite their non-violent opposition, is a change in the regime of Iran which is much worse than support for the Green Movement which aims for reforms within the existing system. The Western diplomat and expert on Iran in Erbil informed the delegation that the execution rate is high among Kurds in Iran. A large part of these executions are based on accusation of drug smuggling. The source pointed out that sometimes political activists are executed under the pretext of being drug smugglers. However, the Western diplomat and expert on Iran in Erbil emphasized that being a Kurd in Iran does not necessarily mean getting into trouble with the authorities as has been the case in Syria. Troubles will start as soon as a person gets involved in political activities. With regard to PJAK, UNHCR Erbil said that the Iranian regime treats members and supporters of the organization in the same harsh way as members and supporters of Komala. According to Ziryan Roj Helaty (Tanupo Magazine), the Iranian regime is highly sensitive to the Kurdish population in Iran, and the regime always reacts disproportionately towards activities conducted by Kurds. As a result, if the Iranian regime for instance catches a sympathizer carrying out an activity against the government, the consequences for him and his family will be serious. Analyst Ziryan Roj Helaty (Tanupo Magazine) stated that anything related to KDPI, even talking about the Kurdish people and their rights could create a problem. Someone who talks directly about KDPI is, in the eyes of the regime, affiliated with KDPI, and a person speaking about Kurdish rights is seen as a general threat.” (DIS/DRC, September 2013, S. 15)

UNHCR in Erbil habe der FFM-Delegation gesagt, dass Mitgliedern der KDPI zwei bis zehn Jahren Haft drohen würde, wenn sie von den iranischen Behörden festgenommen würden. Basierend auf Aussagen von Asylwerbern habe UNHCR Erbil festgestellt, dass KDPI-Mitglieder in Untersuchungshaft gefoltert würden, um sie dazu zu bringen, zu gestehen und Namen von anderen Mitgliedern preiszugeben:

„1.3.1. Consequences for party members

According to UNHCR in Erbil, persons with a high political profile as well as human rights activists are targeted. UNHCR Erbil explained that their knowledge on the situation in the Kurdish region of Iran basically stems from the general feedback from the Iranian Kurdish asylum seekers.

UNHCR said that members of KDPI will get approximately two to ten years of prison if they are arrested by the Iranian authorities. Based on information from asylum seekers, UNHCR Erbil stated that KDPI members will be tortured during pre-trial detention in order to confess and disclose names of other KDPI members. The duration of the detention will typically be from one to six months depending on the level of the detainee’s engagement. The sentence which is imprisonment will depend on the level of the engagement of the person and the evidence that are presented against him.” (DIS/DRC, September 2013, S. 16)

Sympathisanten der KDPI müssten laut UNHCR Erbil mit ernsthaften Schwierigkeiten rechnen, wenn sie die KDPI aktiv unterstützten und von den Behörden festgenommen würden. Unauffällige („low-profile“) UnterstüzterInnen der KDPI würden für ein paar Tage festgenommen und manchmal während der Befragung gefoltert. Später würden sie einem Gericht vorgeführt und müssten eine Erklärung unterzeichnen, wonach sie sich in Zukunft bei keinen politischen Parteien engagieren würden. Laut Mohemed Sahebi, Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der KDPI, mache es keinen Unterschied, ob eine Person ein Sympathisant oder ein Mitglied der Partei sei, die Konsequenz könne Festnahme und Folter sein:

„1.3.2. Consequences for party sympathizers

Regarding the sympathizers, UNHCR added that if a person who actively assists and supports KDPI is arrested by the authorities, the person will face serious difficulties. UNHCR Erbil further stated that low profile supporters of KDPI will be taken to detention and be kept there for few days. Sometimes, they are tortured during the interrogation to confess. Later on they will be taken to court and they sign a statement indicating that they will not be involved in any political parties in the future. […]

Asked to elaborate about the typical consequences for sympathizers caught while for instance distributing leaflets Mohemed Sahebi, Member of Central Committee (KDPI) told the delegation that it does not make any difference whether a person is a sympathizer or a member, the consequences can be imprisonment and torture. If a person believes in freedom and performs activities in this regard he or she will be under pressure and the consequences can be harsh. Mohemmed Sahabi (KDPI) added that many prisons in the Kurdish areas of Iran are hidden and humanitarian organisations have no access and are thus not able to monitor these facilities.” (DIS/DRC, September 2013, S. 17)

Laut FFM-Bericht vom Februar 2013 hätten zwei kurdische Menschenrechtsaktivisten in London mitgeteilt, dass Mitglieder von politischen Parteien, darunter die KDPI, in der Nacht Informationsmaterialien verteilen würden. Es sei sehr gefährlich, wenn eine Person von den Behörden mit Flugblättern erwischt würde. Höchstwahrscheinlich würde die Person festgenommen und gefoltert werden und nach einem fünf Minuten dauernden Gerichtsverfahren zu einer mehrjährigen Haftstrafe oder einer milden Strafe verurteilt werden, dies könne unmöglich vorausgesagt werden:

„Regarding the prevalence of use of written Kurdish political materials in the Kurdish area in Iran, the Iran Watcher, US Embassy, London said that she was not aware if such written materials were used. However, there are a lot of websites with such content and it was considered that political messages would be broadcasted by a Kurdish radio station in Northern Iraq as well as through TV and through the internet. When asked whether political written materials were distributed in the Kurdish areas in Iran, two human rights activists of Kurdish origin in London stated that members of political parties, such as KDPI, Komala, Hekmatist, distribute materials at night. It would be very dangerous if such a person is disclosed by the authorities with a leaflet. […] If an individual were caught with a leaflet, he would most likely be arrested and tortured as well as forced to confess to being a member of whatever group could have been behind such a publication. He or she would go through a five minute trial and the outcome such a trial could vary from many years imprisonment to a mild sentence. It is impossible to say.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Februar 2013, S. 45)

Verfolgung von KDPI-Mitgliedern durch iranische Behörden im Nordirak

Das internationale Sekretariat von Amnesty International (AI) in London habe laut FFM-Bericht von DIS, DRC und Landinfo vom Februar 2013 erwähnt, dass der iranische Geheimdienst eine starke Präsenz im Nordirak unterhalte:

„Regarding Kurds who have lived in Northern Iraq for many years, who have had links to the now-closed Al Tash camp, AIIS considered it very difficult for such individuals to return to Iran. It was added that no one, to the best of AIIS’ knowledge, has tried to repatriate this group to Iran. If the rule of law was adhered to in Iran, it could perhaps have been an option for some, however it was considered that such an individual would come under enormous suspicion in the event of return. Besides, the Iranian intelligence has a strong presence in Northern Iraq. If such a person wished to return and they had a family member who had been a Kurdish activist at some point, it could become an issue with the Iranian authorities.” (DIS/Landinfo/DRC, Februar 2013, S. 46)

Im FFM-Bericht von DIS und DRC vom September 2013 wird ein kurdischer Journalist und Blogger zitiert, wonach die iranischen Behörden Personen heimlich aus dem Nordirak über die Grenze in den Iran bringen könnten. Eine Nichtregierungsorganisation, die mit Asylwerbern und Flüchtlingen im Irak arbeitet, habe angegeben, dass Kräfte des iranischen Geheimdienstes in der kurdischen Region im Nordirak präsent seien und dass sie gute Beziehungen zu einigen der irakischen kurdischen politischen Parteien im Nordirak hätten. Der iranische Geheimdienst habe bis 2009 gezielt Iraner im Nordirak getötet, seither sei das nicht mehr vorgekommen. Auch zwei Mitarbeiter der Zeitung Awene hätten angegeben, dass der iranische Geheimdienst im Nordirak präsent sei. Seit 1992 seien 400 bis 500 Personen durch Attentate des iranischen Geheimdiensts getötet worden, diese seien aber selten geworden. Iraner würden durch den Geheimdienst beobachtet, manche würden Drohungen erhalten:

„Fazel Hawramy, a Kurdish journalist and blogger informed the delegation that if the activists who flee to KRI [Kurdistan Region of Iraq] are low profile, it is very unlikely that they are secretly taken back to Iran because the authorities in KRI would not appreciate such an act given that the opposition media in KRI will use this as a political tool to bash the government. However, what is important to state is that the authorities in Iran can take people back across the border secretly. They have that ability and power to do that. But it is difficult to assess who is low profile or high profile because it is very difficult if not impossible for anyone to know the mindset of the authorities running Iran. An NGO working with asylum seekers and refugees in Iraq stated that the Iranian intelligence agents are present in KRI, and they have good relations with some of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties in KRI. Formerly, the Iranian intelligence service assassinated Iranians living in KRI but since 2009 this has no longer taken place. Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) said that the Iranian intelligence service is present in KRI. The source further informed the delegation that between 400 and 500 persons have been assassinated in KRI/Sulaimania by Iranian secret service since 1992. Assassinations took place in different cities of KRI, especially Sulaimania, Erbil and towns around them. The source personally know people from Iran, for instance from Seqqiz who have been killed by Iranian intelligence services in Sulaimaniyah. It was added that assassinations are rare now. According to the source, Iranians are monitored in KRI; some have received threats by text messages and some have been spied on. Sardar Mohammad and Asos Hardi (Awene Newspaper) pointed to the strong presence of the Iranian intelligence in KRI and their ability to monitor Iranian nationals and their activities in the area. The source added that many Iranians residing in KRI have received threats from the Iranian intelligence service or have had their telephones tapped.” (DIS/DRC, September 2013, S. 56)

Das Congressional Research Service (CRS) schreibt in seinem zuletzt im August 2013 aktualisierten Bericht, dass der Iran regelmäßig gegen Oppositionsgruppen im Irak, darunter auch die KDP-I vorgegangen sei:

„Iran has periodically acted against other Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq. The Free Life Party (PJAK) consists of Iranian Kurds, and it is allied with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that opposes the government of Turkey. Iran has shelled purported camps of the group on several occasions. Iran is also reportedly attempting to pressure the bases and offices in Iraq of such Iranian Kurdish parties as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) and Komaleh.” (CRS, 22. August 2013, S. 31)

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 18. November 2013)

·      AI – Amnesty International: ‘We are ordered to crush you’. Expanding repressIon of dissent in Iran, Februar 2012

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/002/2012/en/2b228705-dfba-4408-a04b-8ab887988881/mde130022012en.pdf

·      CRS - Congressional Research Service: Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights, 22. August 2013

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/213992.pdf

·      DIS/DRC - Danish Immigration Service/Danish Refugee Council: Iranian Kurds; On Conditions for Iranian Kurdish Parties in Iran and KRI, Activities in the Kurdish Area of Iran, Conditions in Border Area and Situation of Returnees from KRI to Iran; 30 May to 9 June 2013, September 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1380796700_fact-finding-iranian-kurds-2013.pdf

·      DIS/DRC/Landinfo - Danish Immigration Service/Danish Refugee Council/LandInfo: Iran; On Conversion to Christianity, Issues concerning Kurds and Post-2009 Election Protestors as well as Legal Issues and Exit Procedures; Joint report from the Danish Immigration Service, the Norwegian LANDINFO and Danish Refugee Council’s fact-finding mission to Tehran, Iran, Ankara, Turkey and London, United Kingdom; 9 November to 20 November 2012 and 8 January to 9 January 2013, Februar 2013

http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/A8C2C897-1CA9-49D1-BA32-EC3E599D646D/0/Iranendeligudgave.pdf

·      Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2013 - Iran, Januar 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/243877/367278_de.html