Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992
NIGERIA
Nigeria continued to be ruled by the Federal Military Government of General
Ibramm Babangida, who came to nower in a 1985 coup. For almost all of 1992, a
19-member Armed Forces Ruling (^undl (AFRC) was Nigeria's main decisionmaking
oi^^an. The AFRC ruled by decree. The executive branch consisted of a 20-member
mixed military-civilian Cabinet, the Council of Ministers. On November 17,
Babangida announced the extension of the transition from January to August 27,
1993. He also dissolved the AFRC and the C!ouncil of Afinisters and created a National
Defense and Security Council (NDSC) to replace the AFRC, and a Civilian
Transition Council to manage the day-to-day affairs of govenmient ministries. The
NDSC and the Transition Council assumed office in the first week of 1993.
Nigeria's firmly controlled progress towwtl an elected civilian government was
dealt a setback in 1992. In response to substantial electoral malpractices in the August
presidential primaries, tke AFRC scheduled new primaries for September.
These primaries were also marred by widespread electoral abuses, including votebuying
and tampering with official returns. As a result, in October the Government
nullified all results ofthe September primaries. The local, state, and national executive
bodies of the two political parties were disbanded and replaced with government-
appointed caretaxer committees. In November P'resident Babangida announced
the banning of all 23 aspirants involved in the failed September primaries
from further participation in the transition program and delayed the presidential
election from December 5, 1992, to June 12, 1993. The inauguration scneduled for
January 2, 1993, is now to be held on August 27, 1993, the eighth anniversaiy of
President Babangida's accession.
Elections were held in July for members of the Senate and House of Representatives.
Members-elect were sworn in on December 5, 1992, and will be seated on January
2, 1993. However, AFRC Decree 53 excludes the legislators from power in fill
significant areas of national life until the inauguration of a civilian president. The
legislative and failed presidential primaiy elections were conducted by the controversial
open-ballot system, which requires voters to stand behind the pictures of
their candidates. Many private citizens, government officials and employees, members
of the clergy, and others who are unwilling to be seen openly supporting a
P'ven candidate or parly are effective^ disenfiranchised by the open-ballot system,
resident Babangida announced in November that this system would be modified
into an open-secret system for the presidential elections, whereby voters could cast
their ballots privately while the actual vote tabulation would continue to be conducted
in public.
The Government enforces its authority throu^ the federal security system (the
military, the State Security Service, and the national police) and through the courts.
Plans to create a new internal security force, the National Guard, were realized in
1992, when personnel were recruited from existing services, and training programs
were initiated. No National Guard units have yet been deployed. The Guard is intended
to relieve the armed forces of the internal security role in situations where
local police are incapable of maintaining public order. Total military expenditures
for 1989, the last year for which the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
conducted a detailed analysis, were $130 million. Despite participation in the regional
peacekeeping force m Liberia and humanitarian relief operations in Somalia,
ttie Grovemment continued its drastic force-level reduction inititated in 1991. However,
any associated savings wUl be negated by the establishment of the National
Guard.
Most of Nigeria's 90 million population is rural, engaging in small scale agriculture.
Nigeria depends on oil exports for over 90 percent of its foreign exchange
earnings and 80 percent of its budget revenues. In order to cope with reduced oil
revenues, Nigeria adopted an indigenous Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in
1986. The SAP was a success in many respects, but economic conditions for the average
Nigerian remain difficult. Large budget deficits financed by money creation
have pushed inflation into the 60-percent range. While Nigerian elites continue to
prosper, there is widespread unemployment, underemplojmient, and inflation. The
majority of the Ni^rian population is in poverty. Economic distress has fiieled episodic
civil unrest m urban areas and probably heightened interethnic violence in
some rural areas.
Human rights in Nigeria remained circumscribed; human ri^ts problems included
extrajudicial killings, police brutality, dangerous and unsanitaiy prison conditions,
arbitrary arrests, violence and discrimination against women, and infringements
on freedoms of speech, press, travel, and politicm and labor affiliation. Military
decrees regularly circumvent judicial review and key provisions of the 1989
Constitution. Decree Two of 1984, carrying broad powers of detention, remained in
force and in use, though several persons held under the decree were released in
1992. Human rights monitors stiU faced harassment in the form of arrests and restrictions
on travel. Various political associations and a labor union were proscribed
during the year, and several candidates were banned from seeking office. Communal
violence and rioting resulted in thousands of deaths in several major disturbances,
and unhealthfiil prison conditions led to hundreds of deaths by disease and
malnourishment. There were also reports of forced repatriation of Qiadians, many
of whom were allegedly executed upon their return.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
Extrajudicial killings and excessive
use of force by police and security services were again common occurrences in Nigeria
in 1992. Perhaps the most highly publicized instance was the September shooting
death at a Lagos police checkpoint of an army colonel, Domven Kindam. Within
3 days of the incident, three policemen were arraigned for murder, police and military
panels of inquiry were established, and police checkpoints throughout the country
were (Ussolved. Earlier, in February mobile police checkpoints had been temporarily
removed after a police sergeant shot and killed a bus driver in a Lagos suburb,
touching ofi" a minor riot. The sergeant was reportedly dismissed from the force
and is in detention awaiting trial. The police mobile force, nicknamed "kill-and-go,"
was manning checkpoints again before the end of the month. In June and July, two
gasoline tank truck drivers were shot and killed at police checkpoints, sparicing
strikes by sympathizing drivers which resulted in temporary fuel shortages in
Lagos. TTiat same month, mobile policemen were again removed from the streets.
Some checkpoints have since been restored, peiiiaps partly in response to public
calls for their return.
Human rights groups and the press reported other instances of police killings, including
a commercial motorcyclist beaten to death on May 7 in Imo State, a student
shot during an otherwise peaceful student protest at Lagos State University, a college
student shot in the back during a secondary school soccer match in Port Harcourt,
a suspect arrested during May riots in Lagos who died in custody at Dcojri
Prison in July, and a Taraba State House of Assembly legislator murdered in June.
In the latter case, two policemen were arrested and are believed to be in detention
awaiting trial.
The Civil Liberties Oi^ganization (CLO) reported that nearly 400 bodies had been
delivered by police to the Dceja General Hospital mortuary in the first 9 months of
1992. While tne CLO contends that the majority of the victims were killed at checkpoints
or in detention facilities, this remains unsubstantiated, since the cause and
place of death of the victims were not included in the information provided. The po197
lice claim that the bodies were primarily those of accident and murder victims. Nevertheless,
the high number of reported extrajudicial killings by security agents have
led many, including President Paschal Bafyau of the Nigeria Labour Congress, to
allege that more persons are killed in Nigeria by the police thaui by armed robbers.
Police use of deadly force has been amply illustrated. Between January and July,
the Delta state Commissioner of Police announced a total of 53 armed robbery suspects
had been killed by police, while over the same period only 41 had been arrested.
Similarly, police in Benin City announced they had killed 17 robbery suspects
over a 2-weeK period in April.
There have been some efforts to make police officials more accountable. A High
Court judge in Delta State ordered five policemen to appear in June to answer questions
concerning the deaths of two students in police custodv in November 1991. The
National Association of Democratic Lawyers pursued a civil action against police officials
implicated in the alleged torture death of Segun Fakayode in December 1991
(see Section I.e.). A Lagos Ifigh Court justice ordered the arrest of two police officers
in August for questioning in the death of Bassey Ekong, who had been held without
trial lOT 2 years. A police corporal, found guilty of killing a middle-aged man in Imo
state in 1987, was sentenced to death by a court in Jiily, but the sentence, which
may be appealed and must be confirmed by the Governor, had not been carried out
by year's end. Two policemen were dismissed from the force and arraigned in the
November beating death of the wife of a businessman whose home they were
searching without a valid warrant. The two men have been remanded to prison.
Nevertheless, many policemen guilty of extrajudicial killings go unpunished and
unquestioned. Despite the 1990 recommendation by a judicial commission of inquiry
(into the massacre of approximately 25 villagers in Umuechem, Rivers state) that
122 policemen be prosecuted for their involvement in the incident, there is no evidence
that any of the accused policemen have been arrested or tried. In fact, the
report listing the names of the policemen involved has never been released. There
is no evidence of legal action being taken against the officers involved in the murder
of a family of seven at a police checkpoint at Oka-Oba in March 1991, or against
officers implicated in the 1991 deaths of Nwogu Okere, Anthony Nnaemeka, Larry
Igwe, or Segun Fakayode. While senior police officials occasionally remind officers
of the stiff penalties they may face for excessive force, murder, illegal discharge of
weapons, or extortion, few police are ever arrested or even disciplined for such offenses.
b. Disappearance.
^No politically motivated disappearances were reported. Several
policemen were reported missing after the September murder of Colonel
Rindam. Government detention practices have the effect of causing many detainees
to be "missing" for extended periods (see Section l.d).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Nigerian law prohibits torture and mistreatment of prisoners, and provides criminal
sanctions for such excesses. Nevertheless, detainees fi«quently die while in police
custody (see Section l.a.), and there are credible reports that suspects are regularly
beaten and tortured by police seeking to extract confessions. For example, Segun
Fakayode was arrested in good health in Ondo on December 5, 1991, and held by
police until December 11, when they delivered him to a state hospital, where he
died. His body purportedly showed evidence of severe torture, including numerous
bruises and a swollen head. In another case, Anthony Nnaemeka was arrested on
January 23, 1992, in Lagos for alleged theft. He died the same day, reportedly after
being beaten while hanging naked from an iron rod. Mistreatment of both male and
female prisoners by guards and fellow inmates, at the behest or with the consent
of guards, reportemy occurs often. Citizens are oft«n beaten and harassed at police
checkpoints, usually in connection with a demand for a bribe by the police, who remain
poorly paid and poorly disciplined.
Conditions in Nigeria's prisons remain life-threatening. Lack of potable water and
sewage facilities, medical supplies, and transportation contribute to deplorable sanitary
conditions. Disease runs rampant in the cramped, poorly ventilated, and filthy
facilities. There were various reports of epidemics in prisons. In the fourth quarter
of 1991, approximately 30 prisoners died of diseases in Niger State prisons alone.
A shortage of drugs and equipment was cited as contributing to the problem. The
diseases mcluded typhoid ana kwashiokor (malnutrition). The CLO documented 20
deaths from tuberculosis and diarrhea between July 1991 and February 1992 in
Makurdi. Overcrowding is still a serious problem despite ongoing projects to expand
or rehabilitate prisons. The 40-year-old prison in Enugu (with a recommended capacity
of 500) currently houses 3,000 prisoners, one-third of whom are still awaiting
trial. Despite the CLO's estimate in 1991 that some 2,000 inmates die yearly in the
nation's prisons, the Minister of the Interior told a news conference that the 1991
figure was closer to 5,000—about 8 percent of the prison population.
In other efforts to deal with the problem, the Government released over 500 prisoners
from custody and agreed to separate children living in prison with their mothers
from serious offenders; others are calling on the Government to remove the children
from prison completely and put them in foster care. A national committee on
prison reform continues its study of ways to improve prison conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Nigerian criminal justice procedures call
for trial Mdthin 3 months of arraignment for most categories of criminals. Ineflicient
administrative procedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic inertia, poor communication
between police and prison officials, and inadequate transportation result La considerable
delays, often stretching several years, in bringing suspects to trial. The Minister
of the Interior estimated that approximately 20,000 of Nigeria's 60,000 prisoners
were awaiting trial; credible estimates from nongovernmental organizations
put the figure much higher.
Police (rfiicers are empowered to make arrests without weirrants if there is reasonable
suspicion of an oftense, or if they witness the commission of an offense. These
provisions ^ve police wide and often abused powers to arrest. Under the law, the
arresting ofiicer must inform the accused of charges at the time of arrest and take
the person to the station for processing within a reasonable time. The suspect must
be given the opportunity to engage counsel and obtain bail. Credible reports indicate
that the police do not general^' adhere to these safeguards. Suspects are often held
incommunicado under narsh conditions for extended periods without charge. Arbitrary
detention, particularly at police checkpoints, occurs frecjuently. Relatives and
friends of wanted suspects are also commonly put in detention without charge in
an effort to induce an accused to present himseli or herself to the police.
Tlie State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984 (Decree Two) provides
that the Government may detain without chai^ge persons suspected of acts prejudicial
to state security or harmful to the economic well-being of the country. When
invoked by the Vice Aesident, the Decree suspends the detainee's civU liberties and
forbids judicial review of actions taken within its provisions. The high courts have
nevertheless attempted to extend their jurisdiction in Decree Two cases by determining
whether procedures outlined under Decree Two were properly observed.
The Grovemment established a review panel which periodically would submit recommendations
to the Vice President on the continuea incarceration of Decree Two
detainees. Detentions under this Decree are supposed to be reviewed every 6 weeks,
though this provision is believed to be regularly ignored. Neither meetings of the
review panel nor its membership are publicly reported, though the Federal Attorney
General is known to sit on the panel. The panel reportedly met at least 3 times in
1992. Many Nigerians still consider Decree Two the main threat to their basic freedoms
because the judicial ouster clause encourages arbitrary detention by allowing
officers to make arrests with impunity. Also the definition of what constitutes acts
prejudicial to state security or the nation's economic well-being can be very broadly
interpreted. Human rights groups continue to charge that detentions are regularly
renewed without review. They also contend that persons are sometimes detained
under Decree Two without a prior order signed by the Vice President. In July a
Lagos High Court declared illegal the arrest of human rights monitor Beko
Ransome-Kuti under Decree Two because the detention order was made after his
arrest.
Decree Two was used in 1992 to detain and silence persons for antigovemment
activities or statements. In the aftermath of riots in several Nigerian cities in May,
four human rirfits monitors and a student union leader were arrested and detained
under Decree Two. Beko Ransome-Kuti, Femi Falana, and Baba Omojola, all leading
members of "Campaign for Democracy" (CD), an umbrella human rights organization
which is openly critical of the Government's closely directed political transition
program, were arrested in Lagos on May 19. Yet another prominent human
rights monitor and legal counsel to two of the detainees, Gani Fawehinmi, was arrested
on May 30. Still another human rights monitor. Dr. Osagie Obayuwana, was
arrested at a police checkpoint in Lagos on May 24, reportedly for being in possession
of CD literature. He was released after a few days and was never charged before
a court. The president of the proscribed National Association of Nigerian Students
(NANS) ana fellow CD member, Olusegun Maiyegun, was arrested on June
11. The Government disobeyed several Lagos High Cfourt orders in June that the
detainees be presented in court to verify their health and whereabouts and to resolve
issues concerning their arrests and continued detentions. A court order to release
Femi Falana on June 8 also went unheeded. The five detainees, who were
being held incommunicado at Kuje Prison, near Abuja, were subsequently arraigned
before a magistrate court there on June 15 on charges of "treasonable felony" and
released on bail on June 29. In October the trial of the five was adjourned to March
1993. The men remain free on bond.
Although the CLO estimates that 26 people remain in custody under Decree Two,
Vice President Aikhomu announced in March that there were no longer any detainees
under that Decree. He made the announcement shortly after the release from
custody of 11 relatives of persons suspected of involvement in a coup attempt in
April 1990. All had been held without charge, some for nearly 2 years. Among those
released was Gloria Mowarin, whose detention was reoorted last year. Aiother
prominent Decree Two detainee, Jennifer Madike, who nad been implicated in a
government corruption scandal in 1991, was released in August.
There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (Modiiication
and Suspension) Decree, was the first decree promulgated by the military
ofiicers who overthrew the civilian regime of former President Shehu Shagari on December
31, 1983. It left the institutional framework of the judicial^ branch relatively
intact, but established a parallel system of militaiy tribunals which were given sole
jurisdiction over certain offenses, such as coup plotting, corruption, armed robbery,
illegal sale of petroleum, or tramcking in narcotics. A decree m 1991 subsequently
amended Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian judges be allowed
to preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases. The special tribunals and
the promulgation of decrees that prohibit judicial intervention have weakened judicial
independence in Nigeria.
In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have the ri^t to legal counsel,
bail (in many cases), and appeal, though some tribunals substitute a presumption
of guilt for the presumption of innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunal reportedJv
exceed conviction rates in the regular courts. Sentences are generally severe.
Free legal counsel is available through the Legal Aid Council for jpersons
charged with capital crimes, but the Council is inadequately funded to provi^ counsel
for all persons charged with lesser offenses.
Convictions for armed robbeiy by the Special Robbery and Firearms Tribunals, as
well as convictions under the Treason ana Other Offenses Tribunal, carry the death
penalty with no right of judicial appeal. In the case of armed robbery, death sentences
were confirmed by the state governor, while treason convictions had to be
confirmed by the NDSC. Convictions before the Miscellaneous Offenses Tribuned
and the Recoveiy of Public Property Tribunal may not be appealed in the regular
courts, though there is provision for appeal before the Special Appeals Tribunal.
The regular court system is composed of both federal and state trial courts, state
appeals courts, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Federal Supreme Court. Courts
of first instance under the 1989 Constitution include magistrate or district courts,
customary or area courts, religious or Shari'a (Islamic) courts, and, for some specified
cases, the state hi^ courts. The nature of the case usually determines wnich
court has jurisdiction. In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have jurisdiction
only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it, though in practice fear of legal costs,
delay, and distance to alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these
courts. Under the 1989 Constitution, the effective date of which has once again been
postponed, this time to August 1993, Shari'a courts are limited to followers of Islam
and to only those states that estabUsh them.
Trials in the regular court system are public and generally respect constitutionally
guaranteed individual rights. These include a presumption of innocence, the
right to be present, to confix>nt witnesses, to present evidence, and to be represented
by legal counsel. There is legal provision for bail, but the Nigerian Bar Association
and human rights groups charge that bail is underutilized. As a result, many accused
persons remain in jail while awaiting trial for petty offenses. Bail is denied
to those charged with murder, armed robbery, and drug offenses.
Nigeria's courts have estabUshed legal traditions which a number of judges have
sought to observe and uphold despite encroachments on their legal powers by successive
military regimes, the existence of numerous military decrees bearing judicial
ouster clauses and establishing parallel tribunals, and perennial underfiinding. All
of these cut to the heart of the judiciary's independence. Noted jurists have decried
the poor funding of the judiciary as a leading factor in judicial corruption, which
continued to be an area of public criticism in 1992. Human rights groups claim that
the Government exerts implicit pressure in certain cases.
Judges nevertheless demonstrated independence during the detention of the five
human rights monitors in May and June, demanding that the Government produce
the detainees in person and guarantee visitation rights by family, legal counsel, and
doctors. Damages were also awarded to some of uie detainees when judges ruled
that their detentions had been illegal, null, and void. TTiree justices of the Lagos
Court of Appeal described as contemptuous the Government's failure to release Gloria
Mowarm in February in accordance with a hi^ court ruling and refused to consider
the Government's appeal of the decision until it had first complied with the
high court order and released the detainee (see Section l.d.)- An Dceja hi^ court
ordered pohce and security agents to leave the premises of the Concord F*ress.—Limited
on April 16 after it had been shut down and surrounded by government security
agents 8 days earlier. The Government did not, however, comply with that order,
nor with any of the other court orders mentioned above.
It is diflicult to disting^iish political prisoners from political detainees being held
without charge, for which there are no firm statistics. The detentions of the five
human rights monitors in May and June were political in nature. The exact number
of political prisoners and detainees cannot be determined. The Government claims
no one is held under Decree Two, while the CLO maintains that 25 persons are detained
under that decree.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
Nigerian
law stipulates that a search warrant be issued by a magistrate or senior police
official before law enforcement agents may search private premises. Human rights
groups report that security officers routinely ignore this reqrairement. Shortly after
the May and June arrests of human rights monitors, the omces of the Committee
for the Defense of Human Rights (CDHR) and the CLO in Lagos, and that of the
CLO in Kaduna, were reportedly searched and ransacked by security agents. The
organizations state that no warrant was presented before the search. Omce equipment
and files were seized during the operations and never returned. Nigerian society
otherwise is largely free of arbitrary interference by the State in the conduct
of their private lives. Provisions of the 1989 Constitution guarantee the rights of privacy
in the home, in correspondence, and in oral electronic communications. The
State does not carry out general surveillance of the population.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the 1989 Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, serious constraints remain. There are no restrictions
on ownership of print media; newspapers and journals remain very lively and
often outspoken, despite considerable fear of government retribution for articles
deemed too offensive or inflammatory. Private daily newspapers compete with the
various state and federally owned newspapers. Officials regularly caution journalists
fmbUcly and privately on their responsibilities and the limits of press freedom. In
ate 1992, the Government licensed nine commercial television broadcasters, some
of whom are expected to begin operations in early 1993. It is not known whether
religious and poutical oi-ganizations will be issued broadcast licenses.
^though there are no constitutional or other published guidelines or decrees directly
limiting freedom of speech and the press. Decree Two prohibitions against
acts prejudicial to state security or to economic stability cast an ominous shadow
over journalists considering wmch stories they may safely investigate and write.
Among the issues considered most sensitive by the Government are: identifying top
government officials with criminal activity and corruption; writing on subjects the
Government claims to be incitement to riot or ethnoreligious disturbances; and
touching on subjects the Government sees as "disrupting the transition to civilian
rule program." These well-known sensitivities and the Government's proven willingness
to t^e action against offending journalists and journals commonly result in
self-censorship.
There were various instances of government censorship in 1992. On April 9, police
and security agents closed down the Concord Group of newspapers, tne publisher
of a daily national newspaper, a weekly national magazine, and other publications.
Decree 14 of 1992 proscribed the publishing firm but was repealed 15 days later.
The Government cnarged the newspaper with undermining the national interest
and security and reopened it only after the chairman oi the company, M.K.O.
Abiola, publicly apologized to the President. Several senior members of the staff" of
the company refused to apologize and resigned in protest.
The editor of the Nigerian Tribune, Folu Olamiti, and his deputy were arrested
in March and arraigned for alleged incitement, defamation, and publication of false
news for an article entitled "Ibadan under Police Siege." Two journalists were arrested
in Kaduna on September 9 for writing articles offensive to the Government,
and two human rights monitors were arrested in Osogbo in February for carrying
a pamphlet critical of the Government. A printer was reportedly arrested in November
for printing pamphlets critical of the militauy Government's delay of the transition
to civilian rule.
The Government also announced measures which will limit certain press and artistic
freedoms. The Nigerian Film Corporation in May announced its intention to
implement new policies restricting foreigners' access to make movies in Nigeria and
to set standards for the type and content of films which may be exported. The Ministry
of Information and Cfulture accredits foreign journalists (both permanent resi201
dents and visiting journalists) and acts as a clearing house for all information
meant for publication in foreign media. Those seeking licenses to operate private television
and radio stations are required to promote the national interest, unity, and
cohesion; they may not offend religious sensibilities or promote ethnicity, sectionalism,
hatred, or disaffection among the nation's many ethnic groups.
Academic freedom is generally respected, although some groups allege that government
security agencies maintain an active undercover presence on the campuses,
and that university authorities sometimes act at the behest of the Government to
suspend or expel student activists. Furthermore, the Academic StafF of Universities
Union (ASUU) was banned on Julv 22 after striking over wage and autonomy issues.
Althou^ the strike was settled in September, the Government has not lifted
the ban on ASUU. The National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) remained
ofiiciallv banned in 1992. Its president and a former ofilcer were arrested and held
for a short period in June after the May student protests which sparked riots in
several cities and campuses throughout the countiy (see Section l.d.). The Government
banned or limited student union activities as a result of numerous student
protests and campus closures during the year, and all college campuses were closed
between July ana September during the ASUU strike. Student activists continued
to face harassment from university and security officials, while school officials also
sought to control the activities of violent criminal gangs popylarly known as "secret
cults." "Anticult" boards and other disciplinary homes continued to fiinction in 1992,
though civil courts overturned some oi their expulsion decisions upon appeal. The
universities generally complied with reinstatement orders. Human rights groups
had complained that innocent students were sometimes denounced by informants
out to settle a grudge.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Nigeria's 1989 Constitution
provides all citizens the right to assemble freely and to associate with other persons
in political parties, trade unions, or other special interest associations. Permits are
not normally required for public meetings indoors, and permit requirements for outdoor
public functions are often ignored. However, on the authority of Decree Five
the Grovemment has banned gatherings whose political, ethnic, or religious overtones
it feared might lead to unrest. Decree Five was used to prohibit the CLO's
November 27 "Vigil for Democracy." The CLO ignored the ban, however, and the
vigil was broken up by police and security service agents. Open air religious services
away from places of worship remain prohibited in most states due to religious tensions
in various parts of the country.
Nigerians form and participate in a wide variety of special interest organizations,
including religious groups, trade groups, women's organizations, and proiessional associations.
Organizations need not register with the Government and are generally
permitted free association with other national and foreign bodies. Religious groups
must nevertheless be sanctioned by either the Christian Association of Nigeria or
the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs. The Government still permits only two political
parties, which it oiganized and founded in 1989. In May the Government
banned several political oi^anizations which it contends were founded primarily
along ethnic, tribal, religious, or other parochial lines for the purpose of sponsoring
various political candidates. In May pohce and security agents in Jos unsuccessfully
attempted to prevent a summit meeting of CD members, and in June sought to prevent
a meeting of the Nigerian Bar Association, which was considering responses
to the Government's arrest of two prominent human rights lawyers.
After 5 human rights monitors were released from detention in June, security
agents attempted to prevent them from holding a press conference in offices belonging
to the Nigerian Union of Journalists. In July police used tear gas to disperse
a gathering oi former residents of a shantytown known as Moroko, which was destroyed
by the Lagos State Government in 1990. In the same month, security personnel
arrested the organizers of the National Seminar for Women Politicians. Following
postponement of the transition to civilian rule, the police prevented the CLO
from convening a conference on taxation and women's legal rights in Lagos and also
banned the convening of a conference in Benin City on Human Rights and the Third
Republic.
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1989 Constitution prohibits federtd and state governments
from adopting an official state religion. Constitutional provisions guaranteeing
freedom of belief, practice, and education in regard to religion are generally respected.
Ethnoreligious violence, particularly in northern Nigeria, often includes the
razing of churches and mosques by rival factions, as occurred during the bloody February
and May disturbances in Kaduna State.
Distribution of religious publications is generally unrestricted, but these are subject
to the same censorship considerations as the regular press. There were allegations
in 1992, by both Christian and Muslim organizations, that the Ministry of For202
eign Affairs and the Immigration Department were restricting the entry into the
country of certain reUgious practitioners, particularly persons suspected of proselytizing.
Religious practitioners operating schools, institutions, or medical facilities
generalfy were not affected, nor were those seeking a renewal of existing residence
permits.
In February and May there were outbreaks of violence between largely Christian
and Muslim ethnic groups in Kaduna State, originally around the town of Zangon-
Kataf, and later spreading to Kaduna and other cities. Casualty estimates range
from several hundred to a few thousand. Dozens of churches and mosques were destroved
before security forces could reimpose order.
The Government instituted a ban in 1987 (which is still in effect) on religious ortanizations
on campuses of schools above the primary level, though individual stuents
retain the right to practice their religion in recognized places of worship.
There is a lightly enforced ban on published religious advertisements, and religious
Programming on television and radio remains closely controlled by the Government,
he ban on uie Maitatsine Muslim "sect" has not been repealed, but there were no
efforts during 1992 to enforce it.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Nigeria's Constitution entitles its citizens to move freely throughout the
country and to reside where they wish. The Constitution also prohibits expulsion or
the denial of exit or entry to any Nigerian citizen. Nigerians travel abroad in large
numbers, and thousands are engaged overseas in work and study. Exit visas are not
required. The Government occasionally prevents travel for political reasons. It
seized the passports of two prominent members of the CLO in January and April.
In March tne Government released the passport seized in January, along with the
?assports of three other human rights monitors seized at various times since 1990.
he Government retains custody of the passport seized in April, and legal proceedings
are underway to secure its release.
Under Nigerian law, wives—including foreigners—must have their husband's permission
to take their children out of Nigeria. Security officials in the past have prevented
some wives from leaving with children, but there were no known instances
of such interference in 1992. Citizens leaving Nigeria have the right to reenter, and
citizenship may not be revoked for any reason.
Nigerian law and practice permit temporary refuge and asylum in Nigeria for political
refugees from other countries. Nigeria supports and cooperates with the Lagos
ofdce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). A Liberian
refiigee camp continued to operate in Ogun State. Its population varied between 700
and 1,500 persons, depending on the level of conflict in Liberia. There is also an
undetermined number of Chadian refugees residing primarily in the northern border
region. Human rights groups in Chad and Nigeria have alleged that up to 300
Chadian refugees were arrested by Bomo State police authorities in March and forcibly
repatriated to Chad, where they were allegedly executed by forces of the Government
of Chad. The National Commission for Refugees investigated these allegations
in May and reported they could find no substantiation. The UNHCR in Lagos
reported that no Chadian refugees registered with it had been forcibly repatriated.
Many of the Chadian refugees who fled into northern Nigeria during the heavy
fighting in the Lake Chad region in January, however, were not registered with the
UNHCR, and no refugee camps were established for them. Some of the Chadians
residing in northern Nigeria were alleged by the Chadian Government to be members
of rebellious armed factions.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
Citizens did not have this right at the national level during 1992. In 1992 the
19-member AFRC headed by President Babangida was the highest political authority
in the land. Until late 1992, the Government continued its closely controlled program
of political transition to civilian government. Elected civilians were inaugurated
as state governors, members of state houses of assembly, and members of the
national legislature. The Government conducted elections for the Senate and House
of Representatives, and oversaw presidential primaries bv the two official political
parties. After dictating the creation of the only two legal parties, the Government
provided their constitutions, manifestos, platforms and the majority of their financing,
and gave them the exclusive right to contest for public office. The two parties
are the National Republic Convention (NRC), which is "slightly to the right," and
the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which is "slightly to the left." The two parties
conducted primaries in June for the national legislative elections held on July 4.
The National Electoral Commission (NEC), a governmental body, in late June
disqualifed 19 House and Senate SDP candidates and 13 NRC candidates from con203
testing the July 4 elections. While the candidates were reportedly banned for security
reasons or for offenses conunitted during previous government service, no ofli-i,
citd explanation was provided to the public, and the banned candidates had no recourse
for appeal.
The Government initially planned for the two parties to hold their presidential
primaries in six rounds of five states each, on six successive Saturdays in August
and September. The first round, conducted August 1, was marred by widespread
fraud and electoral malpractices and, at the behest of both parties, the NEC annulled
the announced results and rescheduled the primaries for 3 rounds of 10
states each, to be held on successive Saturdays in September. The primaries were
again marred by widespread allegations of voter accreditation fraud, vote buying,
and fraudulent election returns. Numerous candidates called for the cancelation of
results in various states, and 10 of the 12 SDP presidential aspirants conducted a
boycott of the third and final round of primaries on September 26.
On October 16, President Babangida announced that the AFRC had canceled the
remaining round of presidential primaries, dissolved the executive committees of
both parties at the national, state, and local level, named caretaker conunittees to
run the parties, and said that the NEC would propose to the AFRC a new selection
process for presidential candidates. On November 17, President Babangida announced
the banning of all 23 presidential aspirants who participated in the annulled
September primaries and laid out a new schedule for completing the transition
to civilian rule by August 27, 1993. The presidential election is now scheduled
for June 12, 1993. The President also announced that the open bidlot, which effectively
disenfranchised those persons not willing to be seen openly supporting a candidate
or party, would be replaced by the open-secret ballot (see Introduction).
AFRC Decree 53 of December 2, 1992, precludes the National Assembly from legislating
in any significant area of national life until the inauguration of a civilian
president.
Nigerian politics continue to be male-dominated. However, there are no legal impediments
to political participation or voting by women, and the Government actively
encouraged their involvement. Several women contested national office in
1992, though only 1 woman won a seat in the 91-member Senate, and 6 women obtained
places in the 589-member House of Representatives.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation
(^Alleged Violations ofHuman Rights
Human rights groups across a broad spectrum are engaged in the vocal and public
campaign for the promotion of human rights in Nigeria, and their number increases
yearly. Among the most active Nigerian human rights organizations are: the Civil
Liberties Organization (CLO); the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CDHR); the Constitutional Rights Project (CRP); the National Association of Democratic
Lawyers (NADL); Human Ri^ts Africa (HRA); the Legal Research and Resource
Development Centre (LRRDC); the National Association of University
Women (NAUW); the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA); and the
Human Rights Committees of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) and its state and
local chapters. A number of prominent authors, artists, educators, and jurists, in addition
to professional and labor organizations, have spoken out frequently on human
rifi^ts issues as well.
There were several incidents of government interference and harassment of
human rights monitors throughout the year. These increased following the postponement
of national elections. For instance, the police and security agents disbanded
a prodemocracy vigil and prevented other events from taking place (see Section
2.b.), raided CLO offices in Kaduna, arrested CLO members, searched the home
of Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, and confiscated prodemocracy literature. High-level government
officials denounced the activities of some members of the human ri^ts
community during the year as being politically motivated, dishonest, destabilizing,
and treasonous. In a December 28 statement, the Inspector (Jeneral of Police announced
that "security agencies (were) monitoring the activities of the human rights
activists." On January 1, 1993, President Babangida warned that the Government
would deal forcefiilly with individuals and organizations seen to be destabilizing Nigeria.
The same day. Dr. Ransome-Kuti was taken into custody; he was released on
January 4. Both events seem to have been linked to opposition calls for mass protests
on January 2, the date the transition to civilian government was originally to
have taken place.
Foreign human rights groups are permitted to visit Nigeria. The Government has
upon occasion responded to domestic human rights groups' charges.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
There is no oflicial policy of discrimination against any of Nigeria's 250 ethnic
groups, and laws do not favor one group over another, fhe 1989 Constitution reauires
that government employment ana the provision of government services reiect
"federalcharacter," i.e., apportioning public employment and ^vemment services
to reflect the ethnic and regional distribution of the population. The Government
generally makes a conscious effort to strike a balance {imong different groups
in its decisionmaking and in appointments to key government positions. Ethnic and
regional hiring quotas are observed in most public sector employment. However, Nigeria
has a long history of tension among its diverse ethnic groups. Bloodshed between
rival ethnic groups in Kaduna, Benue, Taraba, Enugu and Akwa-Ibom States
in 1992 were responsible for thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of displaced
persons. Tradition continues to impose considerable pressure on individual government
officials to favor their own etnnic or religious group, and religious an
favoritism or harassment persists. Persons not indigenous to their state of residence
frequently experience difiiculty, e.g., in flnding employment and enrolling their children
in the schools of their choice.
Women have always had some economic power and have exerted influence in Nigerian
society through women's councils, family connections, and to a much lesser
extent, mainstream social, economic, or political organizations. As primary school
enrollment increases, rirls and young women are gaining greater access to education.
However, females receive less than a third of the education that males receive,
according to U.N. estimates.
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of women obtaining university
degrees and becoming professionals, including teachers, lawyers, doctors, judges,
senior government officials, media figures, and business executives. Women nevertheless
suffer discrimination in employment as well as social prejudice. The pattern
of discrimination against women varies according to the ethmc and religious diversity
of Nigeria's large and heterogeneous population. As noted in Section 2.d., in
some states, husbanas can prevent their wives from obtaining employment or passports.
In many states a woman cannot own property in her own right and, as a
widow, cannot inherit her husband's property, which in the absence of children, usually
reverts to the husband's family. Women do not receive equal pay for equal work
in many instances, and male professionals receive fringe benefits not extended to
their female counterparts.
Women often find it extremely difficult to acquire commercial credit or obtaia tax
deductions or rebates as the heads of households. Single mothers face added discrimination.
The sale of young girls for marriage is still fairly common. While violence
against women exists, there are no statistical data to help determine the extent
of the problem. Police do not normally intervene in domestic disputes. Wife
beating is common, particularly in rural areas where women are poorly educated
and ignorant of the law. In the more traditional areas, it is questionable whether
the courts and police actively intervene to protect women who formally accuse their
husbands if the level of alleged abuse does not exceed customary norms.
The Government publicly opposes female genital mutilation (circumcision). According
to an independent expert in the field, the percentage of Nigerian women
who have undergone this procedure may be as high as 50 percent. The most dangerous
form, infioulation, is still practiced in some areas. Nongovernmental oi^anizations
and the Federal Ministry of Health sponsored public awareness and education
projects to inform communities of the health hazards associated with female
genital mutilation, but the practice has not been criminalized.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Nigerian workers, except members of the armed
forces and employees designated essential by the Government, may join trade
unions. While firefighters and police were always considered essential services, since
1990 employees of the central bank, the security printers, and the customs and excise
staff have been added to that category and their union dissolved. Utilities, the
national airline, public sector enterprises, and the post office, however, are not considered
essential services and are unionized. The Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC),
Nigeria's umbrella labor federation, has repeatedly called on the Government to reinstate
unions in all sectors of the economy except for the armed forces, firefighters,
and police. Although the Government promised to examine this issue, it did not do
so until late in the transition, leaving the issue for the incoming civilian government.
Under Nigerian labor law, any nonagricultural enterprise which employs more
than 50 employees is obliged to recognize trade unions and must pay or deduct a
dues checkoff for the employees who are members. The Government works closely
with the NLC to enforce this provision. Most of the agricultural sector, the informal
sector, and practically all small industries and businesses remain nonunionized,
however. The NLC has complained that some employers deliberately break up their
industries into multiple units employing less than 50 workers to avoid unionization.
The right to strike is recognized by law, except in the case of essential services
as deflned by the Government. During 1992 strikes were relatively few and of short
duration and focused primarily on pay and benefits. The Labor Ministry, as a matter
of policy, effectively exerts pressure to prevent or force settlement of most disputes.
The NLC claims 3 million members out of a total worit force of 30 million, but
this figure is diflicult to verify. Although the available work force has increased as
the population has grown, trade union membership has probably declined somewhat
due to low economic growth. With unemployment at high levels, many workers remain
more interested in securing employment than in lahor union activity.
While the trade union movement has had, within limits, considerable latitude for
action, it remains subject to government oversight. Despite provisions in the 1989
Constitution and Nigeria's ratification of 29 International Labor Organization (ILO)
conventions, government decrees and policy continue to restrict labor freedoms. A
1978 decree established the NLC as a single central labor body, created 42 (now 41)
industrial unions through forced mergers, and deregistered all other unions.
In recent vears the Government and the NLC have agreed that further consolidation
of the labor movement would increase its effectiveness. The Government presented
a plan that would merge the present 41 unions into 19, while the NLC has
its own merger plan, which would reportedly result in 21 unions. Both the Government
and the NLC have become deeply involved with the transition and economic
restructuring, however, and the merger schemes have been set aside until the transition
is complete and a new government is in place.
The ILO continues to criticize the Nigerian Labor Code, which it asserts is not
fuUy in compliance with ILO conventions. Held up for criticism is the single trade
union system, the ban on organizing for certain categories of workers, the broad
powers of the Government to supervise union accounts at any time, and restrictions
on the right to strike through compulsory arbitration.
In August 1991, Decree 35 amended a policy in force since 1975 which permitted
international labor affiliation only with the Organization of African Trade Union
Unity and affiliated pan-African labor federations. The old policy provided for criminal
fines and imprisonment of individuals and proscription of unions for violating
the ban. Decree 35 of 1991 partially repealed the ban by allowing affiliation with
non-African international labor organizations, but only for training and educational
assistance. In 1992 the ILO praised Nigeria for issuing Decree 35.
NLC president Paschal Baiyau has publicly endorsed the Social Democratic Party
(SDP). Although the Government warned Bafyau that under the transition to civil
rule program it is illegal for organized bodies, such as the NLC, to engage in partisan
politics, neither Bafyau nor the NLC have been sanctioned.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The labor laws of Nigeria permit
both the right to organize and the ri^t to bargain collectively between management
and trade unions. Collective bargaining is, in fact, common in many sectors
of the economy.
Nigerian law further protects workers against retaliation by employers for labor
activity through an independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian Industrial Court,
which handles complaints of antiunion discrimination.
The Government, however, retains broad authority over labor matters. In many
areas of contention, the unions often take their demands directly to the Government
rather than to the employers. At the same time, the Government can intervene
forcefully to end debate on issues which it feels contravene its essential political or
economic programs.
In January 1991, the Government abolished the uniform wage structure for all
government entities. Now each tier of government—federal, state, local, and stateowned
firms—is free to negotiate its own level of wages, benefits and conditions of
employment. As a result, negotiations previously conducted on a nationwide basis
under the direct supervision of the Labor Ministry are now conducted on a local,
often plantwide, basis with less government involvement. The Labor Ministry has
tried to restrict its role to enforcement of minimum wage and freedom of association
laws.
President Babangida laid the cornerstone for an export processing zone on November
8, 1991, but there has been little action since, and a date for commencement
of operations has not been announced. The Government has thus yet to address the
shape of labor law and regulations within the zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Nigeria's 1989 Constitution prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and no violations were reported in 1992.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree prohibits
employment of children under 15 years of age in commerce and industry and
restricts other child labor to home-based agricultural or domestic work. The Labor
Decree does allow the apprenticeship of youths aged 13 to 15, but only under specific
conditions. Apprenticeship exists in a wide range of crafts, trades, and state
enterprises. With respect to apprentices over the age of 15, their activity is not specifically
regulated by the Government. According to the NLC, child labor is not a
serious problem in Nigeria and is largely confined to the informal sector, where it
is often difficult to enforce the law. However, casual observation reveals many children
employed in the informal sector in urban areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Nigeria's 1974 Labor Decree also establishes
a 40-hour workweek, prescribes 2 to 4 weeks of annual leave, and sets a minimum
wage for commerce and industry. While this wage may be adequate for some, it is
insufllcient to support a family in major urban areas. The wages of many workers
have not kept pace with inflation, and this has led to calls for large wage increases
and increasingly frequent strikes. The 1974 Decree also contains general health and
safety rovisions, some aimed specifically at youth and female workers, and all enforceable
by the Ministry of Labor.
Employers must compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of those
killed in industrial accidents. The ineffectiveness of the Ministry in enforcing these
laws in the workplace is regularly criticized by labor unions.
In 1991 Nigeria invited an ILO tripartite team to evaluate the country's labor inspection
system. The team determined that Nigeria is not yet fully in compliance
with the relevant ILO conventions, as it does not maintain adequate statistics on
its inspection program.
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