Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1987
AFGHANISTAN
In December 1979, Soviet military forces invaded
Afghanistan—called the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
(DRA) until the end of 1987, and installed Babrak Karmal as
new state and party leader. The Soviet invasion came in the
wake of growing popular opposition to the regime, generated by
its brutal policies. In May 1986, the Soviets replaced Karmal
with a new leader, former secret police chief Najibullah, in
apparent frustration over Karmal's failure to subdue armed
opposition to his regime, notwithstanding the support of some
120,000 Soviet troops and large amounts of Soviet aid.
Fighting has increased since Najibullah's assumption of power,
despite a putative cease-fire declared by the regime. Party
factionalism has also increased, and civil administration
remains ineffective. In an attempt to convince the world that
it was not a Communist regime, the name of the country was
changed to the "Republic of Afghanistan" (RA) in December.
The war has generated over 5 million refugees, one-third of
the population of Afghanistan before the invasion, who now
live in camps in Pakistan and Iran, and the number is
increasing. International observers estimate that about 1
million Afghans have died as a direct consequence of the
Soviet invasion and occupation.
Moscow has pursued a policy of Sovietization of those areas
under Soviet/DRA control. In addition to placing thousands of
advisers in the regime structure, the Soviet Union has taken
thousands of Afghan chi ldren--many of them against their
parents' wishes or without their knowledge--to the Soviet
Union for political indoctrination in values that are alien to
the Afghan people's Islamic heritage.
During 1987 Soviet and DRA forces, under pressure of attacks
by an increasingly effective Afghan resistance, abandoned some
areas and ceased offensive operations in others. Some Afghan
refugees have begun to repopulate a few of these areas,
reconstituting farmland under mujahidin protection.
Afghanistan's economic potential, including much of its
agricultural infrastructure, has been shattered by the war.
During 1987 in particular, Soviet reprisal raids and
depopulation campaigns, some of them against the few areas
which had previously escaped large-scale devastation, led to
damage that will require a long time to repair.
In 1987 there was no independent judiciary or any legal code
according rights to the individual. The most feared and
consistent violator of human rights within the regime remains
the secret police, formerly known as KHAD but renamed the
Ministry of State Security (WAD). More than 25,000 Afghans
work for the Ministry, supervised by KGB advisers. The
regime's principal tools of control and manipulation are
surveillance, imprisonment, interrogation, torture, and
execution.
The human rights situation in 1987 deteriorated further under
the Najibullah regime, punctuated by intensified Soviet/DRA
military pressure on civilians and increased factional
fighting. Improvement of the human rights environment in
Afghanistan depends fundamentally on a total withdrawal of
Soviet forces. Only when the occupying force is removed can
Afghanistan's sovereignty be restored and the Afghan people
permitted to exercise true self-determination.
On November 30, a Loya Jirgah (or Grand Council), controlled
by the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
adopted and enacted a new Constitution. Articles in it accord
Afghan citizens basic rights and freedoms, including the
freedoms of worship, assembly, and expression. The
Constitution also outlaws torture and "punishment incompatible
with human dignity." There is no reason to believe that these
rights and freedoms will be implemented in practice.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political Killing
Arbitrary killing and other acts of violence against suspected
regime opponents continued to be commonplace in 1987^ Reports
from prison inmates released in 1987 and Afghan staff members
at prison facilities tell of executions in DRA prisons,
including Pul-i-Charkhi , Shashdarak, and a WAD prison in the
Darulaman section of Kabul. A mullah from Kandahar was said
to have been executed on June 8 in Kabul's Shashdarak prison.
The mullah reportedly had been posing as a friend of the regime
but, in fact, was working secretly with the mujahidin in the
Kandahar area. According to many reports many prisoners died
as a result of inadeguate diet, corporal punishment, and
torture. Of eight foreign national prisoners released in 1987,
four were diagnosed as insane by competent medical authorities,
and one died within days of his release. Their condition was
attributed to torture and inadeguate diet. There have been
reports that Soviet and DRA forces as well as mujahidin have
occasionally executed prisoners in the field. On February 1,
Soviet troops executed eight mujahidin prisoners in the
Panjshir Valley. In January DRA troops reportedly executed
captured mujahidin in Logar province. The mujahidin generally
interrogate and release captured Kabul regime enlisted men and
hold some captured Soviet personnel as prisoners; however,
some killings of captured Soviets have been reported.
Allegations of mujahidin assassinations of Soviet personnel
and DRA officials continue. Many of the political killings
reported in Kabul in 1987 appeared to result from factional
in-fighting within the ruling PDPA.
b. Disappearance
Disappearances continued to be common in areas under regime
control throughout 1987. In typical cases, family members
learn eventually through informal means of the fate of
relatives who disappear. In 1987 the regime released some
prisoners and detainees who, in some cases, were able to
provide information to families on their missing relatives.
In October several hundred supporters of former president
Babrak Karmal were arrested in the course of a purge; their
fate is not known. In some cases, unexplained disappearance
of young males is due to impressment into military service
(see Section l.d.). In other cases, Afghans are arrested and
imprisoned or summarily executed for political offenses or
because they are relatives of mujahidin. Early in 1987, a
group of nonpartisan Afghans, with whom the regime had sought
to develop a dialog, called on it to release political
prisoners, which the group estimated to number 40,000. Some
persons disappear as a result of the action of mujahidin, who
frequently abduct or capture regime military and civilian
cadre and suspected regime collaborators.
c. Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Regime authorities frequently employ torture to punish or to
extract information or confessions. The policy is widespread,
indicating that it has official sanction. Victims often claim
that Soviet officials monitor and indirectly control the
torture sessions. Torture techniques include both physical
and psychological abuse. Use of electric shock to sensitive
parts of the body, immersion in water, and beatings are common
forms of physical abuse reported by victims and witnesses.
Threats or abuse against family members and prolonged sleep
deprivation are typical forms of psychological abuse.
Persistent reports describe cases of mental disturbances
induced by torture in regime prisons. On July 13 a foreign
diplomat witnessed the torture of a man at the Kabul residence
of a major regime military commander. The victim was suspended
from a tree and beaten for over an hour until he became
unconscious
.
Political prisoners are usually not segregated from criminal
or mentally ill prisoners. Medical care is commonly described
as minimal at Pul-i-Charkhi where prisoners are generally
required to wait at least a month before being allowed access
to the medical staff.
In its 1987 Report, Amnesty International (AI) reported that
it had written in September 1986 to the President of the
Revolutionary Council to express its concern about persistent
allegations of torture in Afghanistan, allegations which were
described in detail in an AI special report, "Afghanistan:
Torture of Political Prisoners," published on November 19,
1986. The report contained testimony from former political
prisoners who stated that they had been tortured by KHAD
agents, and quoted some former prisoners who said that Soviet
personnel had been present when they were tortured. AI also
noted that it had written to DRA regime leaders in 1986,
urging the authorities to implement recommendations for the
prevention of torture. The DRA did not reply. AI said it had
also written to the President of the Soviet Union in 1986,
urging the Soviet Government to investigate the allegations of
involvement of Soviet personnel in torture in Afghanistan.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, Exile or Forced Labor
There are no legal safeguards to prevent arbitrary arrest or
detention. Afghans in areas controlled by the regime face
unwarranted seizure by security personnel. Often, detainees
are either not told of the charges against them before trial
or are simply not brought to trial. Arrest warrants are not
issued, nor is the right to judicial determination of the
legality of detention respected. Detainees typically are held
incommunicado, sometimes for years. Although bail is sometimes
granted, it is not a standard feature of the regime's legal
procedures. Formal charges may come only after months of
interrogation.
Instances of arbitrary detention increased markedly in 1987,
principally as a result of the impressment of civilians into
military service in Kabul and, to a lesser extent, in other
regime-controlled cities, notably Mazar-i-Sharif . Kabul
regime military and secret police cadre continue to impress
large numbers of underage boys into the military, taking them
from the street and sometimes from classrooms and homes.
Regime authorities do not inform the parents of the young men
of their impressment. In 1987 the regime impressed into
military service some of the few refugees who returned to
Afghanistan in response to the regime's so-called national
reconciliation appeal. Relatives of soldiers who desert are
often arrested by the regime to punish the deserters and to
deter others from deserting.
Arrests of regime adversaries, especially those who oppose
party leader Najibullah, were common in 1987. Approximately
200 Karmal supporters were arrested in Kabul in October, many
of them university students. The regime also imprisoned a
number of critics of its "national reconciliation" policy,
including some PDPA members.
Mujahidin occasionally kidnaped regime civilian and military
cadre. There were reliable reports that the mujahidin
kidnaped coal miners in one incident, requiring them to help
build tunnel complexes in the mountains. Another report
claimed that the mujahidin kidnaped a physician in Kunduz and
later executed him, apparently as a consequence of his refusal
to treat wounded mujahidin.
During October the regime ordered 1,800 youths from various
educational institutions in Kabul to go to Kandahar to
participate in construction work. The regime media reported
that 2,100 Kabul youth were required to spend 45 days working
on construction projects in the Kabul area and at the Kokcha
irrigation project in the far north. According to parents of
the youths, the requirement amounted to virtual forced labor
as they were paid one-tenth of what laborers are normally paid.
Afghan children continue to be taken to the Soviet Union for
long-term training and indoctrination, sometimes without their
parents' consent or even knowledge. Some sources estimate
that at least 2,000 children a year since 1984 have been taken
to the Soviet Union under this arrangement.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
All courts are controlled by the PDPA. Laws governing their
organization and jurisdiction cited as a first priority the
protection of the "revolution." As a consequence, plaintiffs
may be denied their legal rights because of charges regarding
their political beliefs. Most persons accused of nonpolitical
crimes are tried in the civil court system under the norms of
preinvasion judicial codes. Those political detainees who are
charged and brought to trial are usually arraigned on
allegations of treason, espionage, or terrorism, and are tried
and sentenced in secret. As a rule, they must provide their
own defense without benefit of counsel. Death sentences
generally are carried out quickly after a perfunctory review
by the ruling Revolutionary Council, which also is controlled
by the PDPA. There was no mechanism to appeal a death
sentence endorsed by the Revolutionary Council. According to
the Constitution, death sentences are executed after the
approval of the President. In areas not controlled by the
regime, civil and criminal cases are tried by Islamic judges
(gazis) and community elders under Islamic, or "shari'a," law
and according to Afghan custom.
No estimate is available on the number of political prisoners
held by the Kabul regime; in its 1987 Report, AI referred to
the continued imprisonment of "thousands of political
prisoners," and said that some of them were imprisoned after
political trials that did not conform to international
standards. The mujahidin are not known to hold political
prisoners, although they do detain Soviet and regime personnel
for extended periods. In 1987 the DRA released some political
prisoners. Many were Communists jailed in factional disputes;
few prominent opponents of the regime were released. Most of
those released who were of military age were immediately
impressed into Kabul's army and sent into battle.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondencerary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
The Kabul regime and the Soviet occupation forces do not
recognize the right to privacy. Civilian areas are frequently
cordoned off and subject to search, often by Soviet troops.
Afghans complain that regime and Soviet forces routinely
confiscate property, including homes. House-to-house searches
frequently are carried out in predawn hours. Telephones are
routinely tapped and correspondence monitored. Citizens are
warned not to listen to foreign broadcasts except from states
friendly to the regime.
g. Violation of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts
Kabul regime and Soviet actions in Afghanistan have entailed
violations of international humanitarian law on a broad scale,
including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary
international law for the protection of civilians which
proscribe indiscriminate attacks, murder and execution,
mutilation, and attacks on civilians; the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Conventions; the
1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
during armed conflict; and prohibitions against torture and
other cruel treatment or punishment, including Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In 1987, as in the past, Soviet and DRA forces launched
numerous attacks against civilian targets, resulting in
massive destruction of homes, entire villages, croplands, and
infrastructure as well as death and injuries to uncounted
numbers of civilians. Throughout the year there were reprisal
attacks against civilian populations suspected of sympathizing
with the mujahidin. Many Afghans were maimed by antipersonnel
mines, grenades, and devices specifically designed to injure
but not kill, including explosive devices reportedly disguised
to look like toys. There were also civilian casualties
resulting from the deployment of a napalm-like substance
against the resistance. Care for the injured in understaffed,
ill-supplied, and unhygienic facilities was inadequate, and
many of the injured sought medical assistance in Pakistan.
The number of refugees from the countryside fleeing to Kabul
appeared to increase in 1987 in apparent response to greater
Soviet aerial and artillery bombardment.
A number of Afghan sources reported that Soviet and,
occasionally, DRA forces employed chemical and other
prohibited weapons in 1987. It was reported that Soviet
forces used lethal chemical weapons against resistance forces
lodged in caves in Paktia province in June, and a chemical or
toxic weapon against mujahidin in the Randza Valley in
August. Mujahidin casualties during the Paktia fighting in
June reportedly exhibited severe burns from a napalm-like
substance.
Mujahidin actions in 1987 also resulted in loss of life and
injuries among civilians. The mujahidin were believed
responsible for bomb attacks in Jalalabad and Kabul which
resulted in significant civilian casualties. Mujahidin rocket
attacks against Kabul and other regime-controlled cities
inevitably took a toll among civilians.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Presso
The regime tolerates no criticism of the Soviet Union in the
public media, and private criticism can result in detention
and arrest. There is no academic freedom. All media are
owned and controlled by the regime and tightly supervised by
Soviet officials. The press, radio, and television are used
exclusively to convey regime policy and the Soviet
interpretation of world events. Soviet publications, films
and television are widely available in local languages to
reinforce those views. In the latter half of 1987, in an
unusual departure, the regime media published divergent views
and proposals by various Afghans with regard to the draft
constitution in an attempt to suggest a consensual drafting
process. Unlicensed import and sale of non-Soviet video and
audio tapes, magazines, books, and posters are forbidden
though this ban is generally ineffective. Western radio
broadcasts in local languages are freguently jammed, although
some programs do get through to Afghan listeners.
Afghans are guarded in their conversations lest antiregime or
anti-Soviet comments be reported to the secret police. In
early September, citizens in Herat city demonstrated at the
PDPA committee headquarters, shouting antiregime and anti-
Soviet slogans in protest over the regime killing of the son
of a prominent Herat resident. Many of the group were
arrested and taken to Kabul where, according to a relative,
they underwent WAD interrogation.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
There is no freedom of peaceful assembly or association in
areas controlled by the regime. A party decree passed by the
Revolutionary Council in 1987 supposedly provided a framework
for expression of political views at variance with the views
of the ruling PDPA, but the party continues to set the bounds
for acceptable dissent. The regime regularly stages so-called
"spontaneous" gatherings to convey the impression of popular
support, including mass demonstrations at diplomatic missions.
Unauthorized peaceful assemblies are dealt with forcefully.
Parents demonstrating for the release of their sons impressed
into the DRA military were dispersed with gunfire in an
incident in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul in the
summer of 1987.
Workers have been threatened with loss of jobs or imprisonment
for refusal to join party organizations. In Shebergan in Balkh
province, factory workers were arrested after they selected
ousted state and party leader Babrak Karmal as their delegate
to a national PDPA conference. Parents have been warned that
their children would be forced out of school if they refused
to join official youth organizations. Large numbers of people
from the upper and middle classes fled the country because of
severe restrictions on political and social activity.
Labor has no right to organize in any meaningful fashion.
State-sponsored trade associations and unions of workers and
peasants are closely modeled after those in the Soviet Union.
\
The few remaining prerevolutionary labor and trade
organizations are under strong pressure to merge with the
ruling PDPA. The Central Committee of Afghan Trade Unions,
with a claimed membership of 150,000 workers, is an affiliate
of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions.
c. Freedom of Religion
Afghanistan is an Islamic nation. Sunnis predominate, though
there is an important Shi 'a minority primarily concentrated in
the Hazarajat region in central Afghanistan. Small enclaves
of Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews traditionally have lived peacefully
alongside their Muslim neighbors.
Since the 1978 coup, the regime has sought, with marginal
success, to supervise strictly all religious organizations.
Regime policy pronouncements are routinely given the sanction
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The regime has taken a
series of steps to try to win support from Muslims. In 1987,
for example, the DRA announced that the State would provide
assistance to mosque construction, establish an Islamic
research center, provide monthly stipends to selected mullahs,
and sponsor an "international Koranic reading competition."
Afghans distinguish sharply between traditional mullahs and
"regime mullahs." Kandahar residents report that most of the
city's remaining residents send their children to local
mosques where they receive education not directed by the
regime. Costs are met by the parents and the community, with
no assistance from the regime. Kabul regime and Soviet
forces, particularly in the course of reprisal raids against
towns and villages, have caused extensive damage to mosques.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Domestic travel remains severely restricted by the war.
Soviet and DRA forces attempted to block the movement of
refugees out of areas of combat during Soviet military
operations in March in Kunduz and Takhar provinces, and in
August in northern Kabul province. Travelers are at risk of
being caught in Soviet-muj ahidin clashes. Buses and other
vehicles are sometimes attacked by Soviet and DRA helicopter
gunships. Traffic on the Bamiyan road reportedly moves only
at night due to the Soviet practice of regarding any daytime
traffic on the road as mujahidin and attacking it. At
Khovoshi in Logar province, a Soviet helicopter attacked a
civilian bus on September 22, killing 16 and wounding 17.
Civilian travelers also encounter frequent checkpoints or
roadblocks manned by Soviet troops, regime forces, mujahidin
or, occasionally, by bandits. Travelers regularly recount
having to bribe Soviet checkpoint personnel with cash or
drugs. Mujahidin often exact "taxes" from travelers.
The regime severely curtails foreign travel by Afghans under
its control. A passport typically must be purchased with
bribes sometimes ranging as high as $1,000. The regime seizes
the property of anyone who fails to return after 1 year.
Pilgrims to Mecca and holy places in Iraq are carefully
screened and issued travel documents valid only for those
destinations
.
Overland emigration is extremely dangerous because of
indiscriminate Soviet and regime attacks. In October a column
of nomads making a traditional seasonal migration from western
Kabul province to Nangarhar came under fire from Soviet
positions near Paghman. Extensive Soviet and regime mining of
principal overland routes and passes imposes even greater risks
to refugees. Despite these hazards, Afghans continue to flee
to Pakistan and Iran, swelling the refugee populations in those
two countries to over 5 million. These outflows continued
throughout 1987 as a result of scorched earth tactics and
deliberate attacks on populated areas by Soviet and DRA forces.
The regime estimates that over 100,000 Afghans have returned to
Afghanistan in response to its appeal to repatriate. No
international organization regards this figure as credible.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Gonvernment
Under the current regime, citizens have no right to change
their government. Afghanistan is a totalitarian state under
the control of the PDPA, which is kept in power by the Soviet
Union. The ruling PDPA is modeled closely on the Soviet
Communist Party. Soviet military and civilian advisors sit in
virtually all regime offices and make or approve all
significant decisions.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The regime has continued to resist efforts by international
humanitarian organizations to investigate human rights
practices in Afghanistan. In apparent reaction to the
international outcry regarding human rights abuses, the regime
has sought to manipulate respected institutions and foreign
journalists. In January the DRA Prime Minister granted the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) permission to
visit all persons detained in Afghanistan. At the same time,
the ICRC also launched a major program of medical assistance
in Kabul. Negotiations on the terms for ICRC registration of,
and visits to, prisoners at Pul-i-Charkhi prison, however,
broke down in May, when the ICRC was unable to continue the
visits according to its traditional criteria. As of late
1987, the authorities continued to block ICRC access to
prisoners, while claiming in international forums that they
were cooperating with international organizations.
The regime invited the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan
to visit in August. Although the Special Rapporteur portrayed
regime authorities as cooperative, critics point out that
during a 10-day visit he was able to interview only four
prisoners, leading to charges of manipulation by authorities.
In addition, he was denied permission to go to Kandahar, an
area where Soviet reprisal strikes against civilian settlements
have been particularly numerous. Beginning in late 1986 and
continuing through 1987, the regime was host to over 100
foreign journalists. For the most part, the journalists were
confined to tightly planned itineraries; few, if any, were
permitted to interview prisoners or view detainees, though
many pressed for permission.
Regime and Soviet actions in regard to journalists who sought
to report independently on developments in Afghanistan
continued to be severe. In April a West German team narrowly
escaped injury or death when Soviet forces ambushed them and
their mujahidin escorts in Logar. Two American journalists
were killed in an ambush by Soviet/regime forces in early
October, according to an eyewitness report. At the end of
1987, at least two West European journalists were being held
by the regime.
Mujahidin periodically have permitted the ICRC and journalists
to visit prisoners under their control, particularly Soviet
prisoners. Recently, some mujahidin commanders have offered
to allow the ICRC access to prisoners in their custody in
return for ICRC access to prisoners held by the regime.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
The participation of Afghan women in activities beyond the home
and field is limited by traditional beliefs, customs, and
religious practices. In areas under resistance control, the
role of women follows traditional lines. The social position
of some women, generally those associated with the PDPA, has
improved somewhat in Kabul and other regime-controlled cities.
Access of young women to higher education has increased in
Kabul in the wake of the loss of large numbers of young men to
conscription into the DRA military, joining up with the
mujahidin, or refugee flight. For similar reasons, the role
of women in some nontradi tional occupations such as banking,
television, and radio, and the civil service has increased.
Few women, however, hold responsible, decision-making
positions. The only woman in the ruling PDPA politburo and
Revolutionary Council was removed in 1987.
The regime in some cases mirrored and in other instances
sought to exploit traditional ethnic rivalries for its
purposes. Several thousand Uzbek troops from northern
Afghanistan were sent to Kandahar in late summer to garrison
the largely Pushtun and proresistance city. The troops,
according to Kandahar residents, have behaved aggressively
against their traditional ethnic rivals. Ethnic Turkmen and
Hazaras in Kabul complain that they are not trusted by the
regime and are subjected to strict surveillance in their
business dealings, particularly with foreign firms.
CONDITIONS OF LABOR
Due to the current situation in Afghanistan, information on
the conditions of labor is not available
