Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2794 (2025) [S/2026/241]

 United Nations S/2026/241

 

Security Council 

Distr.: General 
27 March 2026 

 

Original: English 

 

26-03344 (E)    080426     
 *2603344* 

 

 Letter dated 27 March 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti 
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) 
addressed to the President of the Security Council 

 

 

 The members of the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 2653 (2022) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim 
report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 2794 (2025).  
 The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti on 16 March 2026 and was 
considered by the Committee on 27 March 2026. 
 The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were 
brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a 
document of the Council. 

 

 

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) 

 

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 Interim report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted 
pursuant to resolution 2794 (2025) 

 

 

 

 Summary 

 In the lead-up to the end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council 
on 7 February 2026, political divisions within the executive intensified, driven by the 
absence of agreement on post-mandate governance arrangements and political 
manoeuvring aimed at preserving influence. Significant concerns were raised by 
Haitian and international stakeholders about the risk of popular mobilization and 
possible violence, particularly given uncertainty over how gangs might seek to exploit 
the situation. 
 Despite these tensions, major destabilization scenarios were avoided, partly due 
to pressure from international partners. On 7 February, full executive power was 
transferred to the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, Didier Fils-Aimé. 
On 23 February, a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was 
adopted to strengthen cohesion among Haitian stakeholders and support efforts 
towards the establishment of the security and governance conditions necessary for 
elections. Following the adoption of the Pact, the Prime Minister formed a ministerial 
Cabinet in early March. 
 The security situation continued to deteriorate in the country for most of the 
transitional period (April 2024 to February 2026), particularly in the West, Centre and 
Artibonite Departments. In the weeks preceding 7 February, security operations 
intensified as authorities sought to demonstrate progress and to capitalize on 
infighting within the Viv Ansanm coalition. Operations benefited from improved 
coordination within the Haitian security apparatus, new equipment for the Haitian 
police, and assistance from international private contractors. While security 
operations disrupted several gangs and slowed their expansion in Port-au-Prince, 
these gains remain fragile without a sustained security presence. Concerns persist 
about the risk of renewed gang violence, particularly as further deployment of the 
Gang Suppression Force is still awaited. 
 During the reporting period (October 2025 to February 2026), human rights 
violations remained widespread across Haiti, particularly in Port-au-Prince and the 
Artibonite and Centre Departments. Gangs continued to carry out indiscriminate 
attacks against civilians, with sexual violence notably prevalent and some victims 
raped by groups of 10 or more perpetrators. Gang leaders also continued to recruit 
children, who often have no alternative means of survival, using them in combat and 
to shield themselves from law enforcement operations. These operations, including 
the increased use of drone strikes, resulted in significant casualties, prompting 
concerns from human rights organizations about the use of lethal force in Haiti. 
 Gangs and other armed actors are actively seeking to acquire weapons and, more 
urgently, ammunition. Seizures at ports of exit in the United States of America and 
ports of entry during the reporting period indicate that the arms embargo continues to 
be violated. Ammunition diverted from stockpiles in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic also represents a notable portion of the materiel used by gangs. The 400 
Mawozo gang remains one of the primary illicit importers of arms and ammunition in 
the country and one of the better armed gangs, taking advantage of its position near 
the land border. 
 Regarding illicit financial flows, gangs have adapted their revenue collection 
methods in response to security operations targeting checkpoints. They have tightened 
their control over remittance houses, disguised themselves as officers of the Haitian 

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National Police and carried out extortion activities, including kidnapping for ransom 
and the use of hidden checkpoints. 
 Elvers (baby eels) remain one of the most lucrative natural resources in Haiti, 
though their trade remains poorly regulated. The sector is marked by secrecy and 
corruption. A network of actors has maintained influence over the industry by 
controlling who receives licences from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources 
and Rural Development, while bribery and smuggling are widespread. These actions 
deprive the country of the much-needed revenue for development. 

 

 

 

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Contents 

 Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
C. Evolution of the political and security context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Evolution of gang dynamics amid intensified security operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Destabilization of gangs in the northern downtown area and areas surrounding the 
National Port Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Resilience of Viv Ansanm amid security pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
C. Other armed actors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that constitute human rights abuses . 10 
A. Sexual and gender-based violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
B. Recruitment of children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
C. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
D. Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
IV. Arms embargo violations and domestic diversions of arms, ammunition and related materiel 13 
A. Seizures in Haiti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
B. Seizures at United States ports of exit and Haitian ports of entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
V. Illicit financial flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
A. Gang revenue dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
B. Trends in the elvers sector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
C. Other trends in illicit financial flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

 

 

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 I. Introduction 

 

 

 A. Mandate 

 

 

1. On 17 October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2794 (2025), by 
which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti, consisting of an arms embargo as 
well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated 
by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) 
concerning Haiti as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly 
or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Through 
this resolution, the Council also designated two additional individuals: Dimitri Herard 
(HTi.008), the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit, for his 
support to gangs, and Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), the leader of Les Argentins gang 
located in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince (see sect. II.A and annex 3). Currently, the 
sanctions list includes the names of nine individuals and two entities.1 
2. The Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of 
resolution 2794 (2025), the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Haiti, as specified in 
paragraph 21 of resolution 2653 (2022), and further decided that this mandate shall 
also apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 2794 (2025).  
3. The present interim report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 
2794 (2025) and covers investigations conducted up to 1 March 2026.  

 

 

 B. Methodology 

 

 

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, 
adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. 
The Panel’s working methods are in full conformity with the best practices, as 
recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General 
Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997). The Panel placed particular emphasis on 
transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, 
independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see S/2024/704, annex 1). 
The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in 
order to protect sources given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.  
5. In the course of its investigations, the Panel conducted fact-finding missions in 
Haiti (Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien), the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) 
and the United States of America (Miami), in October 2025 and February 2026, and 
is grateful for the support that it received from the respective national authorities, as 
well as from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United 
Nations country teams and non-governmental actors on the ground.  
6. During its visits to Haiti in October 2025 and February 2026, the Panel met with 
representatives of Haitian State institutions, including the leadership of the Haitian 
National Police and the General Customs Administration, the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Justice, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, political and 
private sector actors as well as representatives of civil society organizations, 
individuals living in gang-controlled areas and other victims of gang-related violence, 
including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel also met with representatives 
of BINUH, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations 
humanitarian agencies and diplomats from various missions, as well as the Force 
__________________ 
 1 See Security Council, narrative summaries of reasons for listing. Available at 
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries.  

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Commander of the Gang Suppression Force. The Panel visited two sites for internally 
displaced persons.  
7. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. The 
Panel would like to thank those Members States, including Brazil and the Dominican 
Republic, as well as other entities, that have responded to the Panel’s requests and 
further emphasizes the critical importance of this information in supporting its work.  

 

 

 C. Evolution of the political and security context 

 

 

8. The period leading up to the end of the mandated of the Transitional Presidential 
Council mandate on 7 February 2026 was marked by deepening political divisions, 
driven by the absence of any agreement on post-mandate governance arrangements 
and political manoeuvring among certain Council members in an attempt to preserve 
their influence and the advantages associated with office.  
9. Growing polarization within the executive generated significant concerns 
among national and international stakeholders regarding potential popular 
mobilization and the possible outbreak of violence. These concerns were further 
compounded by uncertainty as to how gangs might seek to exploit this situation. 
Despite these tensions, major destabilizing scenarios were averted, in part due to the 
pressure by international partners.2  
10. On 7 February 2026, full executive power was transferred to the Council of 
Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, Didier Fils-Aimé. The same day the Council of 
Ministers adopted a decree stipulating that its objectives are: (a) the restauration of 
public security and of state control across the country; (b) the organization of free and 
fair elections; and (c) the functioning of institutions and public services. Pursuant to 
the decree, the executive authority of the Council of Ministers will end with the 
inauguration of an elected President. 3 Since then, consultations with a range of 
stakeholders resulted in the signing of the National Pact for Stability and the 
Organization of Elections on 21 February as a frame to support efforts towards 
creating the security conditions for the organization of the elections, according to the 
calendar established by the Provisional Electoral Council.4 Under the Pact, it is also 
specified that the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and 
Reintegration is to be re-established. Following the signature of the Pact, the Prime 
Minister formed a ministerial Cabinet in early March 2026.5  
11. The overall security situation continued to deteriorate for most of the 
transitional period (April 2024 to February 2026), including in the West, Centre and 
Artibonite Departments. However, in the lead-up to 7 February, the imperative to 
demonstrate progress on security objectives led to an intensification of security 
__________________ 
 2 Juhakenson Blaise, “US Embassy confirms warships in Haiti’s water amid political deadline and 
gang violence”, The Haitian Times, 4 February 2026, available at https://haitiantimes.com/ 
2026/02/04/us-military-ships-haiti-waters/; and United States of America, Department of State, 
“Visa Restrictions for Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) Members for supporting gangs” 
press statement, 25 January 2026, available at https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-
spokesperson/2026/01/visa-restrictions-for-transitional-presidential-council-tpc-members-for-
supporting-gangs.  
 3 Haiti, Decree transferring executive power to the Council of Ministers in view of the vacancy in 
the presidency of the Republic, Le Moniteur, 9 February 2026. 
 4 Haiti, National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections, Le Moniteur, 23 February 
2026. 
 5 Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti Prime Minister overhauls cabinet as he pushes toward year-end 
elections”, Miami Herald, 4 March 2026; and St. Kitts and Nevis Observer, “Haiti-PM names 
new cabinet”, 4 March 2026, available at www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/haiti-pm-names-
new-cabinet/.  

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operations, bolstered by greater cohesion within the Haitian national security 
apparatus, new equipment for the Haitian National Police and the support of private 
contractors. Drone strikes facilitated by these contractors have particularly unsettled 
gang members, who have become more cautious and changed some of their tactics 
(see sects. II and V). Police operations, including strikes, have caused a significant 
number of casualties, including among non-gang members (see sect. III.D). Gang 
activity has become less visible in the capital, particularly downtown, where several 
groups have been disrupted, resulting in some local gains that remain fragile (see 
sect. II.A).  
12. Six months after the transition of the Multinational Security Support Mission 
into the Gang Suppression Force (see Security Council resolution 2793 (2025)), the 
force composition has remained unchanged. The full deployment of the Gang 
Suppression Force remains essential to restore security and support political 
stabilization and the implementation of the electoral process.  

 

 

 II. Evolution of gang dynamics amid intensified 
security operations  

 

 

13. In 2026, gangs continued to control large swathes of the West, Centre and 
Artibonite Departments, where they hold neighbourhoods, key economic corridors 
and agricultural regions. The Viv Ansanm alliance has demonstrated sustained 
resilience and adaptability despite some internal fighting and ongoing security 
pressure.6 
14. Intensified security efforts by Haitian authorities, alongside nearly a year of 
drone strikes enabled by international private contractors, and the actions of self-
defence groups, have slowed the advance of gangs in the capital. 7 Security gains 
remain, however, fragile and risk reversal without sustained pressure. No gang-
controlled territory has been fully retaken by security forces, kidnappings have 
notably risen in the Delmas area of the capital, and key gang leaders remain at large.  
15. Regardless of the apparent calm observed after the transition deadline on 
7 February, concerns persist that Viv Ansanm may be consolidating its forces for 
potential attacks ahead of further deployments of the Gang Suppression Force. 8 

 

 

 A. Destabilization of gangs in the northern downtown area and areas 
surrounding the National Port Authority 

 

 

16. From late 2025, large-scale security operations were launched, notably to 
establish a buffer zone around the National Port Authority in order to secure truck 
flows and reopen logistical corridors to the city centre and main roads leading to the 
north and the south of the country (see annex 2).9 
17. Closer alignment between the Haitian National Police – bolstered by increased 
operational capacity and backed by the Gang Suppression Force – and the Task Force 
__________________ 
 6 United Nations Police Division report, 31 October–6 November 2025. 
 7 Interviews with gang analysts, an international security officer and an individual working in 
gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026; and BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human 
rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”, available at https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/ 
binuh/document-library/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-october-december-2025.  
 8 Interviews with gang analysts and individuals working in gang -controlled areas, February 2026. 
 9 Interviews with gang analysts and a former government official working with anti -gang 
operations, February 2026. 

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(consisting of police and army officers, as well as international private contractors)10 
enabled them to exploit the weakening of Les Argentins gang, which operated in the 
Bel-Air neighbourhood (Port-au-Prince commune), following internal clashes within 
Viv Ansanm (see annex 3). In Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes, security forces 
then launched operations against bastions of the Krache Dife, La Saline, Delmas 6 
and Tokyo gangs (see annex 2). These gangs were significantly destabilized by the 
killing of gang members, the destruction of several of their houses and checkpoints, 
and seizures of arms and ammunition (see sect. IV.A). 11 This, however, did not 
amount to their dismantlement, which would entail neutralizing key leaders and 
disrupting supply lines.12  
18. While the objective of these operations was to weaken gangs’ networks rather 
than target their leadership,13 the fact that all top gang leaders remain at large has 
been perceived by many Haitian stakeholders as a shortcoming of security operations 
and linked with broader political dynamics, including tacit arrangements with gangs, 
ahead of elections. 14 While the logistical and operational capacity of the above-
mentioned gangs have been undermined, many members relocated to reinforce other 
gangs.15 Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque”, HTi.001) met with other gang leaders in 
Carrefour commune, the stronghold of the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery 
(alias “Chrisla”), a few days after operations in Delmas 6 in January 2026. 16 Gang 
leaders have become more cautious in response to drone threats, avoiding public 
appearances and social media; consequently, they feel more secure in Carrefour, one 
of the most populous communes in the metropolitan region, which has become a hub 
for gang activities17 (see S/2025/597, annex 5).  
19. Due to their collusion and infiltration within some police and government 
institutions, gang leaders are often tipped off in advance of impending operations, 
with some receiving financial incentives to leave their bastions. 18 They escape 
alongside their most trusted gang members, leaving lower-level members behind.19 
While operations have brought a relative sense of safety to the northern part of 
downtown Port-au-Prince, insufficient consolidation of newly reclaimed areas has 
allowed gangs to continue incursions, however with less freedom.20  

 

 

 B. Resilience of Viv Ansanm amid security pressure 

 

 

20. Security pressure has hindered gang expansion across parts of the capital, 
although gangs continue to hold sway over their strongholds. They have leveraged 
collateral damage from drone strikes (see annex 10) to strengthen their local control.21 
__________________ 
 10 Interview with a senior government official, 2025. 
 11 Interviews with gang analysts and a former government official working with anti -gang 
operations, January and February 2026. 
 12 Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and 
February 2026. 
 13 Interview with a security provider, February 2026. 
 14 Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. 
 15 Interviews with gang analysts and former government official working with anti -gang 
operations, January and February 2026. 
 16 Interview with an individual working in a gang-controlled area, January 2026. 
 17 Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang -controlled areas, 2026. 
 18 Interviews with a former government official, police officers, an individual working in gang -
controlled areas and an individual with a direct link to gangs, January and February 2026. 
 19 Interviews with gang analysts and an individual working in a gang-controlled area, January 
2026. 
 20 Interviews with gang and human right analysts, an individual working in a gang -controlled area 
and a former government official working with anti-gang operations, February 2026. 
 21 Interview with an individual working in a gang-controlled area, February 2026. 

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Amid gaps in State service provision, certain gangs have offered funeral assistance 
and financed medical care for residents injured during security operations. 22 
However, they continue to use the population as human shields 23 and to rely on 
violence as a social control mechanism. In retaliation for large-scale security 
operations in mid-November 2026 in Croix-des-Bouquets (see annex 4), the 400 
Mawozo gang, led by Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo San Jou”, HTi.004), killed 22 
residents suspected of collaborating with the police (S/2026/31, para. 17). Moreover, 
losses in gangs’ ranks have triggered further recruitment of children, as illustrated in 
a video released by Lanmo San Jou (see annex 5). Children and women have been 
increasingly mobilized to participate in combat (see sect. III).24  
21. Intensified operations have driven gangs into remote and semi-urban areas, 
where they have enjoyed relative freedom in their criminal operations.25 Over a year 
since the first attack against Kenscoff (see S/2025/597, annex 6), the hillside and 
agricultural commune of the West Department has been under constant pressure from 
5 Segond, led by the group of Didi, Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti 
Lapli”, HTi.003), Canaan, headed by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), and Ti Bwa gangs.26 
While security interventions have been focused on central parts of Port-au-Prince, 
gangs have used a corridor between Carrefour and Kenscoff to move into the 
commune and regroup in several areas. The assaults, counting numerous kidnappings 
and killings – including of a newborn child (see annex 6)27 – are aimed at, among 
other objectives, opening a new criminal front and compelling security forces to 
redeploy, undermining their ability to hold recaptured territory in other areas. 28 
22. In the Centre Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs have maintained 
control over Mirebalais and Saut-d’Eau. In late March 2025, they seized these 
strategic communes to control key routes to the Dominican border in order to impose 
illicit taxation and enable trafficking flows (see S/2025/597). They have persistently 
attempted to seize Lascahobas, lying near the Belladère border town, to scale up 
trafficking activities, but have been prevented by local security forces supported by 
Mirebalais Back-Up Feray self-defence group.29  
23. Security gains remain fragile while Viv Ansanm functions as a large criminal 
structure that is embedded into transnational networks that sustain arms supplies and 
financial resources.30 400 Mawozo has benefited from its geographical advantage, 
close to the eastern border, to maintain substantial firepower within the alliance and 
sustain the supply of weapons and ammunition within it (see sect. IV.A.2). As with 
other gangs, such as 5 Segond, the Canaan gang leverages its coastal base near ports 
to replenish supplies and increase illicit revenues, including from drug trafficking 
(see S/2024/704, sect. II.B.2, and S/2025/597, sect. II.D).31  

__________________ 
 22 Interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026. 
 23 Interview with a human rights analyst, January 2026. 
 24 Interviews with human rights analysts, police officers and a security provider, 2025 and 2026; 
and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and BINUH, 
“Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses”, Februar y 2026. 
 25 Interviews with local authorities, security officers and residents of rural areas, January 2026. 
 26 Ibid. 
 27 Interview with a resident of the affected area, 30 January 2026. 
 28 Interview with a resident of the affected area, 5 February 2026. 
 29 Interviews with a government official, security officers and gang analysts, January and February 
2026. 
 30 See S/2025/597, S/2024/704 and S/2023/674, see also S/2026/32; and interviews with a 
representative of a Member State and analysts, 2026. 
 31 Interviews with gang analysts, an individual working in a gang -controlled area and police 
officers, 2025 and 2026. 

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24. In the Artibonite Department, the level of gang violence remained high in late 
2025.32 Over a year since the Pont Sondé massacre by the Gran Grif gang (HTe.001) 
(see S/2025/356), led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007), the gang killed at least 34 residents, 
during attacks against Pont Sondé town (Saint-Marc commune) between 
29 November and 6 December 2025.33 In other communes (Liancourt, Petite Rivière 
de l’Artibonite, Montrouis, L’Estère and Verrettes), the Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras, 
Raboteau, Délugé and Canaan gangs spread violence through kidnapping, rape and 
indiscriminate attacks against residents, 34 despite the relative decline in violence 
since early 2026.35  

 

 

 C. Other armed actors 

 

 

25. The proliferation of self-defence groups is worrisome, as they risk turning to 
criminal activities and being used to further political objectives, perpetuating the 
historical cycle of gangs. If their activities remain financially rewarding, they will be 
reluctant to lay down their arms, most of which are illicitly sourced. Certain groups 
operating in Port-au-Prince receive payments for protection from private individuals 
and large businesses.36  
26. In the North Department, small local gangs and certain agents of the Protected 
Areas Security Brigade (S/2024/704, paras. 83–85 and annex 26), under the 
leadership of Alex Jean-Pierre, have largely specialized in land spoliation. 37 They 
seize land, often from owners living abroad, divide it into plots and sell it, using the 
proceeds to purchase weapons and uniforms, and build houses and hotels. 38 Land 
spoliation schemes have also been put in place by former politicians in Kenscoff. 39 

 

 

 III. Acts that violate international human rights law or acts that 
constitute human rights abuses 

 

 

27. During the reporting period, widespread human rights violations persisted 
throughout Haiti,40 concentrated primarily in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 
but also affecting the Artibonite and Centre Departments. In 2025, the number of 
people killed came to a total of 5,915, whereas the number of people injured was 
2,708.41  
28. In 2025, a total of 1,606, out of 18,241, schools remained closed across Haiti as 
a result of ongoing insecurity, depriving an estimated 243,000 students of access to 
education.42 As at January 2026, there were only 37 fully operational health facilities 
__________________ 
 32 BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”. 
 33 Ibid. 
 34 United Nations confidential report, 26 December 2026. 
 35 BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”. 
 36 Interviews with gang and political analysts, and an individual working in a gang -affected area, 
2026. 
 37 Interviews with gang analysts, residents of gang-affected areas, victims of spoliation and police 
officers, 2025 and 2026. 
 38 Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. 
 39 Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. 
 40 See also annex 7 on other human rights violations. 
 41 BINUH, “Quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025”. 
 42 See OHCHR and BINUH, “Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses”. See 
also John Smith Justin, “MENFP shares key data from the 2024 –2025 national school census”, 
Le Nouvelliste, 16 December 2025, available at https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/262491/le-
menfp-devoile-les-resultats-du-recensement-scolaire-2024-2025.  

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out of 100 in Port-au-Prince. Nationwide, no more than 26% of 268 inpatient facilities 
were fully functional, severely impeding access to health services.43  

 

 

 A. Sexual and gender-based violence44 

 

 

29. Sexual violence continues to be one of the main human rights violations in Haiti. 
According to a report under the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, 
during 2025, 1,772 incidents were recorded: about 77% of all the incidents were 
collective rapes and 18% were rapes.45 The main perpetrators of sexual violence were 
gang members belonging to Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (HTi.003), Les 
Argentins, led by Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), 5 Segond, led by Johnson Andre (alias 
“Izo”, HTi.002), Canaan, led by Jeff Larose, Delmas 6, led by Jimmy Chérizier 
(HTi.001), 400 Mawozo, led by Wilson Joseph (HTi.004), and the Viv Ansanm 
alliance.46  
30. According to Médecins sans frontières, about 57% of victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence assisted were attacked by gang members. The average number 
of perpetrators per incident is three. There have been over 100 victims who were 
attacked by 10 or more perpetrators at a time and nearly 20% of survivors have 
experienced sexual and gender-based violence multiple times.47  
31. Timely access to healthcare following sexual and gender-based violence is 
critical to ensuring effective medical support, particularly given the limited time 
frames for life-saving interventions, including post-exposure prophylaxis for HIV 
(within 72 hours) and emergency contraception (within 120 hours). Since 2022, 
Médecins sans frontières has recorded that about 67% of survivors arrive too late to 
receive HIV post-exposure prophylaxis and 59% of survivors missed the window for 
emergency contraception.48  
32. During the Panel’s visits to sites for internally displaced persons (see annex 9), 
women reported significant gaps in access to specialized healthcare. In particular, 
routine gynaecological services were generally unavailable, except in cases where a 
referral to a specialist was made due to a specific medical condition. Many women 
interviewed were unable to recall their most recent consultation with a gynaecologist, 
some of them had never had one. The Panel considers that the absence of regular and 
preventive women’s health services reflects a broader gap in addressing women’s 
specific health needs and underscores the importance of strengthening access to 
comprehensive and routine healthcare. 
33. The Panel further notes that responses to sexual and gender-based violence 
appear to place a disproportionate emphasis on women as the primary subjects of 
intervention, without sufficiently engaging men and boys in prevention and response 
efforts. While gang-related violence remains a significant driver of sexual and gender-
__________________ 
 43 World Health Organization, “Haiti: WHO health emergency appeal 2026”, 3 February 2026. 
Available at https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/haiti--who-health-emergency-appeal-
2026.  
 44 Crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence remain largely underreported owing, inter 
alia, to stigma, fear of retaliation, mistrust in prosecutorial instances and limited access to 
essential services. 
 45 The victims were: 1,668 women, 187 girls, 2 men and 6 boys; 27 victims were killed following 
their rape. Report under the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements, January 2026. 
 46 Interview with a humanitarian specialist, February 2026. 
 47 Médecins sans frontières, “Report: Sexual and gender-based violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti”, 
28 January 2026. Available at https://www.msf.org/report-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-
port-au-prince.  
 48 Ibid. 

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based violence in Haiti, the phenomenon is rooted in broader and deeply entrenched 
cultural and social norms. In the Panel’s opinion, addressing sexual and gender-based 
violence therefore requires a more comprehensive approach that includes the active 
participation of men in prevention strategies, community-based dialogue and 
accountability mechanisms, in order to tackle underlying structural and societal 
factors contributing to such violence. 

 

 

 B. Recruitment of children and children’s rights 

 

 

34. About 45% of the population of Haiti is under 18 years old.49 The number of 
children recruited and used by gangs in Haiti increased by an estimated 200% in 
2025.50 Children are often compelled to join gangs due to economic hardship, direct 
threats or family separation, with some perceiving association with gang members as 
a means of survival or protection.51  
35. On 15 January 2026, in Montrouis, Artibonite Department, members of the 
Canaan gang abducted a 17-year-old student from his home. The assailants mutilated 
the victim and subsequently dragged his remains through the streets of the 
community.52  

 

 

 C. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance 

 

 

36. The obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance in Haiti continues to pose 
a grave challenge to addressing the escalating crisis. The Panel remains deeply 
concerned by persistent threats and attacks perpetrated against humanitarian actors, 
which severely undermine the delivery of life-saving aid to affected populations.53  
37. On 6 January 2026, the Médecins sans frontières facility in Bel-Air was caught 
in the midst of a security operation against gangs, resulting in at least three deaths 
and eight injuries from gunfire, including a woman who was shot while holding her 
one-year-old infant.54 Between 29 December 2025 and 12 January 2026, Médecins 
sans frontières treated 101 violence-related injuries at its Drouillard hospital – 
exceeding the monthly average for 2025 of 54 gunshot admissions – with 66 gunshot 
wounds; 30% of the victims were women and 9% were children under the age of 15.55  
38. Intensified clashes between security forces and gangs in densely populated areas 
have trapped civilians under constant fire and drone strikes. Patients face blocked 
__________________ 
 49 Daniel Dickinson, “‘Alarming increase’ in recruitment of children into gangs in Haiti”, United 
Nations News, 20 February 2026. Available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/ 
1166954?utm_content=buffer16f81&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_camp 
aign=buffer.  
 50 United Nations Children’s Fund, “Child recruitment in Haiti surges threefold in just one year”, 
12 February 2026. Available at https://www.unicef.org/haiti/en/press-releases/child-recruitment-
haiti-surges-threefold-just-one-year.  
 51 See OHCHR and BINUH, “Children trafficked by gangs in Haiti: rethinking the responses”. 
 52 Interview with a civil society representative, February 2026. 
 53 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Haiti - Aperçu des 
contraintes d’accès humanitaire de décembre 2025 à février 2026”, 6 March 2026. Available at 
https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-apercu-des-contraintes-dacces-humanitaire-de-decembre-
2025-fevrier-2026.  
 54 Médecins sans frontières, “Haiti: escalating violence in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince”, 8 January 
2026. Available at www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-escalating-violence-bel-air-port-
au-prince.  
 55 Médecins sans frontières, “Port-au-Prince: MSF treats over 100 patients for violence injuries in 
two weeks”, 22 January 2022. Available at www.msf.org/port-au-prince-msf-treats-over-100-
patients-violence-injuries-two-weeks.  

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roads and must traverse active conflict zones to reach care, and it has been over a year 
since Médecins sans frontières suspended its ambulance service due to repeated 
attacks. 
39. Humanitarian actors 56 informed the Panel that, during the reporting period, 
non-governmental organizations and humanitarian personnel were, on several 
occasions, caught in security forces operations against gangs. Despite attempts by 
humanitarian organizations to alert the Haitian National Police of the humanitarians’ 
presence, the lack of coordination among the various security forces involved in such 
operations resulted in explosive drones strikes near humanitarian personnel, exposing 
them to grave risk. 57 Some humanitarian organizations have shared their GPS 
coordinates with the Haitian National Police as a preventive measure. 

 

 

 D. Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection 

 

 

40. The rule of law and the effective protection of human rights are fundamental 
prerequisites for sustainable peace, democratic governance, and the fight against 
impunity. During the reporting period, the Panel identified three distinct yet 
interrelated areas of concern that collectively undermine these principles in Haiti: 
(a) the adoption of a decree establishing a High Court of Justice with exclusive 
jurisdiction over senior State officials, which, by creating a complex mechanism, 
renders prosecution of high State officials virtually impossible; (b) the promulgation 
of a decree regulating freedom of expression, which jeopardizes the right of Haitian 
people to receive and disseminate information and ideas without fear of prosecution; 
and, lastly, (c) the conduct of security operations involving the use of lethal force, 
which raises concerns regarding compliance with international human rights 
standards (see annex 12). 

 

 

 IV. Arms embargo violations and domestic diversions of arms, 
ammunition and related materiel  

 

 

41. With the intensification of security operations in the West Department, gangs 
are actively seeking to procure weapons and, more urgently, ammunition. Seizures 
conducted at ports of exit in the United States and ports of entry in Haiti during the 
reporting period indicate that trafficking from the United States continues. 
Ammunition diverted from both Haitian and Dominican stockpiles also account for a 
significant portion of the materiel being used by non-State armed actors, underscoring 
the critical need for both countries to develop their capacity to prevent, identify and 
investigate diversions.  

 

 

 A. Seizures in Haiti 

 

 

 1. Analysis of ammunition used by Viv Ansamn to better understand the sources of 
its materiel  

 

42. Over the last three years, the Panel has documented several thousand rounds of 
ammunition, casings and packaging in the West, North and North-West Departments 

__________________ 
 56 Due to security reasons the Panel has decided that unless the humanitarian organization has 
publicly reported the incident, it will keep information concerning such organization 
confidential. 
 57 Confidential sources, February 2026. 

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from seizures at ports of entry, as well as materiel identified as being used by or seized 
from a range of armed actors, which constitute hard evidence of trafficking trends. 
43. During the reporting period, the Panel documented 1,158 rounds of ammunition 
seized between October 2025 and February 2026 from gangs operating in Kenscoff, 
Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas 2 and Bel-Air. These included 5.56 x 45 mm (58%), 
.223 Remington (3.6%), 7.62 x 39 mm (5%), 7.62 x 51 mm (29%), .308 Winchester 
(1.8%), and 12.7 x 99 mm/.50-calibre (3%). The ammunition was produced by more 
than 30 different manufacturers across 20 countries, including in Europe, Asia and 
the Americas, often exporting for a wide commercial and military or law enforcement 
market. The Panel contacted several Member States to determine the point at which 
ammunition was diverted from the licit chains of custody and better understand 
trafficking patterns. Its preliminary findings are presented below.  
44. Of the 510 rounds of 5.56 x 45 mm ammunition that indicate a year of 
production, more than 80% were produced between 2022 and 2024, indicating a very 
short “time to crime”, 58 regular violations of the arms embargo and continuous 
diversion cycles.  
45. A comparison of 5.56 x 45-mm ammunition used by Viv Ansanm gangs indicated 
that gangs operating in Kenscoff (mostly members of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine), 
Bel-Air (Jamesley’s group) and Delmas 2 (Krache Dife) share around 50% of the same 
ammunition types (headstamps), suggesting that groups are exchanging ammunition 
and/or drawing from similar sources of supply. In contrast, 400 Mawozo has an 
ammunition profile that is quite different from these groups (see paras. 48–51). 
46. While all gangs have some components of Haitian National Police ammunition 
in their stockpiles, diversions are particularly pronounced for 7.62 x 51-mm rounds. 
As previously reported by the Panel, diversions from the Haitian National Police have 
historically constituted a real concern (see S/2025/597, annex 25). Although the 
Haitian National Police has made arrests of several corrupt officers within its ranks 
(see S/2025/597, annex 26), diversions continue, including by officers collecting 
unused ammunition and reselling it illicitly to self-defence groups, gangs, private 
security companies or individuals looking to protect themselves. Some ammunition 
donated by international partners to the Haitian National Police was also retrieved 
from a trafficker in the Artibonite Department in 2025.59 
47. The Panel documented several boxes and rounds of 5.56 x 45-mm ammunition 
produced in 2024 being used by gangs in Bel-Air and Kenscoff, as well as by the 400 
Mawozo gang, which are consistent with lot numbers of materiel recently procured 
by the Haitian Armed Forces from the Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) in 
Brazil. Following a tracing request sent by the Panel, the Brazilian authorities 
confirmed that the ammunition was consistent with those produced by CBC and that 
the Haitian Armed Forces had signed a contract with the company in July 2023 to 
import 1.5 million rounds of this type of ammunition.  

 

 2. The 400 Mawozo gang and arms trafficking 

 

48. The 400 Mawozo gang, led by Wilson Joseph (HTi.004), remains one of the 
primary illicit importers of arms and ammunition in the country and one of the more 
heavily armed gangs. Since its establishment, the Panel has investigated arms 
trafficking cases involving the 400 Mawozo leadership, including flows from the 
United States to Haiti, both directly and via the Dominican Republic, as well as 
sourcing from the illicit market in the Dominican Republic (S/2023/674, annex 32, 
and S/2025/597, para. 99). The gang takes advantage of its position and its control of 
__________________ 
 58 The time between legal manufacture and/or transfer and recovery from illicit use. 
 59 Interviews with national and international security officers, 2026. 

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access to the Malpasse and Belladère border crossings, as well as the Étang Saumâtre 
lake near the border, enabling it to import materiel easily across the land border.  
49. Of a sample of 89 rounds of 5.56-mm ammunition recovered from the gang in 
2025 and documented by the Panel, 25 were marked “ERD” (Ejército República 
Dominicana – Army of the Dominican Republic) and had been produced in 2022,60 
and 16 bear markings consistent with the ammunition diverted from the Dominican 
police, which the Panel had investigated and reported on in 2025 (see S/2025/597, 
annex 25). The Panel sent a tracing request to the Dominican authorities who 
responded that the ammunition marked “ERD” had been procured in 2022 from a 
producer in Colombia. Furthermore, they explained that, in December 2025, an 
officer from the Army had been arrested in San Juan de la Maguana Province, 
Dominican Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1,516 rounds 
of ammunition on a motorbike.61 The prosecution case is ongoing.  
50. Through its networks, the leader of 400 Mawozo has obtained several 
.50-calibre anti-materiel rifles exported from the United States. While one such 
weapon was seized in the Dominican port of Haina on 25 February 2025 as part of 
materiel destined to the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs, another was retrieved by the 
Haitian National Police in an operation in Croix-des-Bouquets in November 2025. 
Both weapons were Barrett 82A1 rifles and had been trafficked by the same network 
from the United States (S/2025/597, para. 99).  
51. Wilson Joseph has posted videos on social media with distinctive surplus 
.50-calibre ammunition that the Panel had identified as having been produced in the 
Dominican Republic in the 1950s (see annex 14). Analysis of rounds retrieved from 
the gang during seizures has further confirmed this, with at least 15 of 32 rounds 
documented by the Panel produced in the Dominican Republic. However, the precise 
chain of custody of this surplus ammunition remains unclear, with quantities of these 
items having been imported for the United States civilian market in the past and still 
available for purchase on collectors’ sites.62 The Panel sent two tracing requests to the 
Dominican authorities. The authorities provided photographs of ammunition 
manufactured by the arms factory in San Cristóbal throughout the 1950s up until 
1960, and explained that the surplus ammunition was in the process of being 
destroyed and that they had not detected any diversions.  

 

 

 B. Seizures at United States ports of exit and Haitian ports of entry 

 

 

52. Several seizures took place at ports of exit in the United States and at ports of 
entry in Haiti during the reporting period. The typical modus operandi continued to 
involve maritime trafficking through the concealment of materiel in second-hand 
goods coming from the United States (see S/2023/674). Between September 2025 and 
March 2026, there was an increase in seizures from air freight at airports in the United 
States and in Haiti. Furthermore, counterfeit police and customs uniforms and other 
items, such as badges and lanyards, have been seized on multiple occasions in Haitian 
ports (see paras. 55 and 56). Investigations are ongoing and detailed conclusions will 
be provided in due course (see annex 13 for additional information). 

 

__________________ 
 60 The Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic apply the good practice of marking their 
ammunition, which allows for better management of their stockpile and helps to prevent, 
identify and investigate diversions. 
 61 Official communication from the Dominican Republic authorities, March 2026. 
 62 See, for instance, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U60j2JwJ_2Q. 

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Seizures of materiel coming from the United States at Haitian ports of entry, September 2025 to 
February 2026  

 

 

Date Location Materiel Mode of transport 
23 September 2025 Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport  

.40 handgun 
5.56 x 45-mm rifle 

Air  

24 October 2025 Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport  

245 magazines for handguns  
4,000 rounds of inert ammunition  

Air  

October 2025 Toussaint Louverture 
International Airport  

Rifle Air 

29 December 2025 Cap-Haïtien container 
terminal 

Two 9-mm handguns and two magazines  
One 7.62 x 39-mm rifle and four magazines  
1,800 rounds of 9-mm luger ammunition  

Sea 

6 January 2026 Cap-Haïtien container 
terminal 

Nine 9-mm handguns and nine magazines 
5,500 rounds of 7.62 x 39-mm ammunition 

Sea  

23 January 2026 Cap-Haïtien container 
terminal  

Two 5.56 x 45-mm rifles 
Three 9-mm handguns 
Magazines: three 9-mm and 12 5.56 x 45-mm 
3,400 rounds of ammunition  

Sea  

26 January 2026 Cap-Haïtien container 
terminal  

Ammunition: 2,490 9-mm, 40 7.62 x 39-mm, 
40 .30-06 SPRG 

Sea 

 

Source: Interviews with Haitian police and customs officials, and confidential reports, 2025 and 2026. 

 

 

 

 V. Illicit financial flows 

 

 

 A. Gang revenue dynamics 

 

 

53. Gangs are adopting new ways of collecting revenues in a bid to avoid Haitian 
National Police operations that tend to target illegal checkpoints. They have 
intensified their control on remittance houses; they camouflage themselves in Haitian 
National Police regalia and conduct “operations” aimed at extorting the public, 
including kidnapping for ransom and maintaining “concealed” checkpoints. 63 

 

 1. Extorting of remittances 

 

54. The economy of Haiti is traditionally cash-based due to its large informal sector. 
However, with the growing trend in digital money transfer, digital payments solutions 
are being adopted as a form of formality and improved efficiency and security. Most 
Haitian households receive remittances from their kin in the diaspora, with more than 
__________________ 
 63 At such checkpoints, instead of blocking the road, the extortioner hides (conceals himself) in 
nearby buildings and watches over the road to note those passing and then follows them to 
demand an extortion fee. That way, the checkpoint is “concealed”. Interviews with a Haitian 
National Police officer, a victim of extortion from Delmas and two civil society activists. 
Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 

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70% coming from the United States,64 largely through these digital platforms, and this 
helps communities and households to cope, in addition to being an important source 
of capital for economic growth. Nonetheless, the remittance sector has become a 
major target for gangs because it is one of the few functioning financial lifelines in 
the country (see also annex 15). 

 

 2. Impersonation of Haitian National Police personnel by gang elements 

 

55. Gangs are increasingly using various tactics that emulate police operations in 
order to conceal their identity. They impersonate Haitian National Police officers by 
wearing uniforms, bullet-proof vests and tactical equipment and using Police-branded 
patrol cars with fake plate numbers, enabling them to move freely. They are able to 
access even the green zone of Pétion-Ville to conduct surveillance and commit crimes. 
This can jeopardize police operations, as it can be difficult to differentiate the genuine 
police from gang impersonators.  
56. This practice has been evolving for a while, and in 2022 the Haitian National 
Police issued a public statement warning people against this issue. 65 According to 
sources, this strategy is becoming more prevalent in cases of kidnapping for ransom, 
especially in high-end residential areas or restricted zones.66  

 

 3. “Concealed” checkpoints 

 

57. The apparent “reduced” visibility of gang activities does not necessarily mean 
that they are less operational in terms of revenue collection. 67 Despite police 
operations aiding in the reopening of some of the critical road networks, gangs still 
maintain control over road users, particularly cargo transporters of basic commodities 
(see annex 16). 

 

 

 B. Trends in the elvers68 sector 

 

 

 1. Controlling the trade 

 

58. Elvers remain one of the most lucrative and yet not well-regulated natural 
sources in Haiti (S/2025/597, paras. 122 and 123). The fishing season for American 
eel species (Anguilla rostrata) runs from 15 September to 14 March of the following 
year.69  
59. The elvers sector is fraught with secrecy, cartelism and high-handedness. Some 
politicians maintain control over the elvers sector by deciding who receives licences 
from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, which, 
prior to the naming of the new Cabinet in March 2026, was headed by an appointee 
of one particular political actor’s party. Bribery is a common feature of the licensing 

__________________ 
 64 Haiti Libre, “Haiti - News: zapping...”, 6 January 2026. Available at www.haitilibre.com/en/ 
news-46579-haiti-news-zapping.html.  
 65 Haiti Libre, “Haiti - Insecurity: new measures of the PNH against fake police”, 4 March 2026. 
Available at www.haitilibre.com/en/news-36093-haiti-insecurity-new-measures-of-the-pnh-
against-fake-police.html.  
 66 Interviews with a Haitian National Police official, a gang analyst and a civil society member. 
Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 
 67 Interview with a fuel tank operator in Pétion-Ville, January 2026. 
 68 “Elvers” are young eels, also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels, or as “ zangi” or 
“tizangi” in Haitian Creole. These are baby eels undergoing mass migration upriver from the 
sea. See https://eeldepot.com/elver/.  
 69 Interviews with national authorities and actors involved in the elvers sector in the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti during the Panel’s visit, 15–24 October 2025. 

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process. Some licensees also offer other favours, such as incorporating the political 
actor’s elver exports into their own exports.70  
60. Ten export permits issued by the Ministry for the 2025/26 elvers export season 
were used for exports totalling 2,180 kg between 15 September and 28 February 
2026.71 This is down from about 20 licences recorded by the Panel in the 2024/25 
export season (S/2025/597, text box under para. 131).  
61. Most names on the permits are of wealthy influential individuals in Haitian 
society. Sources with inside knowledge of the licensing process informed the Panel 
that some of the 10 exporters who were denied licences resorted to smuggling of their 
stocks out of Haiti regardless. This was in addition to about 30 others who have never 
been licensed, and who regularly export clandestinely. 72 According to an 
environmentalist, the eels trade in Haiti is not organized and clear and reliable data 
are not recorded – whether at the level of the fishermen or the Government. It is more 
like a criminal network.73 Another source added that “in short, even exports that are 
accompanied by official documents are often fraudulent, since the taxes are rarely 
paid and the actual weight is sometimes concealed. The country is losing revenue on 
all sides. The fact that Haiti is not a Party to the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) makes it vulnerable”74  

 

 2. Smuggling of Haitian elvers 

 

62. In 2026, the approximate wholesale price range for live baby eels from Haiti 
that are later exported for aquaculture ponds was $0.34–1.70 per kilogram (see annex 
17), while the same goes for $3,000–5,000 per kilogram (composed of 700–1,000 
elvers) on the international markets.75  
63. The Panel noted that smugglers from countries in the region, operating in 
conjunction with Haitian nationals, hop from the shores of one island to another in 
the Caribbean region, including Haiti, to buy elvers from fishermen. Two fishermen 
from the Bas Limbé area and an elvers transporter from the Borgne area, both in the 
North Department of Haiti, described to the Panel how traders aboard unmarked boats 
approach them on the shorelines during fishing sessions at night, offering to pay 
double the price offered by local buyers.76  
64. Those denied licences in Haiti sometimes try to smuggle elvers out through 
neighbouring countries. The Panel documented several such cases (S/2025/356, 
para. 77).  
65. In one instance, the Dominican Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture, 77 the 
designated authority that licenses the fishing and export of elvers, explained to the 
Panel how two Dominican-registered companies had sought permission to transport 

__________________ 
 70 Confidential sources in the elvers supply chain. Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 
 71 Based on the export permits used between September and February 2026, and seen by the Panel. 
 72 Interviews with a customs official, a cargo logistics official and a former Minister of Finance. 
Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 
 73 Agence France-Presse, “Pictures: Haitian gangs are profiting from baby eels sold abroad”, 
NDTV World, 18 November 2025. Available at www.ndtv.com/world-news/pictures-haitian-
gangs-are-profiting-from-baby-eels-sold-abroad-9654090.   
 74 Interview with a senior customs official. Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 
 75 Yuan Wang, “Priced at thousands of dollars per kilogram, baby eels have set off a global 
frenzy”, The Walrus, 18 February 2026. Available at https://thewalrus.ca/priced-at-thousands-of-
dollars-per-kilogram-baby-eels-have-set-off-a-global-frenzy/.    
 76 Interviews with two fishermen and a transporter. Cap-Haïtien, 24 October 2025. 
 77 See https://codopesca.gob.do/todos-los-servicios/. 

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eels from Haiti, with transit through the Dominican Republic, to international markets 
for a period of five years (see annex 18). 
66. At the time of drafting, the Dominican Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
informed the Panel that the two companies had cancelled the deal and that it was not 
aware of any entity handling such transits. The Council concluded that it was an 
attempt to smuggle elvers out of Haitian territory.  

 

 

 C. Other trends in illicit financial flows 

 

 

67. The Panel is investigating other trends in illicit financial flows that contribute 
to the denial of the basic needs of the Haitian people. Some of these cases involve the 
financing of gang-related activities.  

 

 1. Diversion of public funds from critical sectors 

 

68. Further to the list of pending cases of diversion of public resources (S/2025/597, 
paras. 133–135 and annex 37), the Panel has continued to investigate more cases that 
have an impact on the critical sectors at the core of the peace, stability and livelihoods 
of Haitians. As at the time of drafting, the anti-corruption agency had submitted at 
least 63 investigation reports to the judiciary. The cases relate to embezzlement, 
mismanagement and corruption in various public sectors that are critical to the 
livelihoods of Haitians.78  

 

 2. Financing of gangs 

 

69. One of the 63 reports mentioned in the previous paragraph relates to a case 
involving a former mayor of l’Arcahaie, West Department, who was arrested on 
10 August 2025 in the Dominican Republic on charges of possessing undeclared 
foreign currency and cheques and is suspected of having links with gangs in Haiti.79 
Other reports seen by the Panel support information from interviews with several 
sources with knowledge of the matter, who described how close the suspect is to gang 
leaders, and the logistical support that she has been providing to gangs. 
 

__________________ 
 78 Darbouze Figaro, “Seven new ULCC reports expose widespread public fund embezzlement – 
from the Youth Ministry to State television”, Caribbean Television Network, 29 September 
2025. Available at https://ctninfo.com/seven-new-ulcc-reports-expose-widespread-public-fund-
embezzlement-from-the-youth-ministry-to-state-television/.   
 79 Edxon Francisque and Juhakenson Blaise, “Dominican Republic hands over former Arcahaie 
mayor in corruption probe”, 15 August 2025. Available at https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/15/ 
former-arcahaie-mayor-deported-from-dominican-republic/.   

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Annexes 

 

Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply .................................................................... 21 
Annex 2: Some security operations in Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes conducted from late 
2025.............................................................................................................................................. 22 
Annex 3: Severe weakening of Les Argentins due to Viv Ansanm infighting .......................... 26 
Annex 4: Large-scale security operations in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, West department28 
Annex 5: Public display of newly installed gang members, mostly children, by Lanmo San Jou30 
Annex 6: Kenscoff commune under persistent gang pressure .................................................. 31 
Annex 7: Other human rights violations .................................................................................... 33 
Annex 8.1 : Internally Displaced Persons from Pont Sondé in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025. 35 
Annex 8.2: Internally Displaced Persons from L'Estère in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025.36 
Annex 8.3: Internally Displaced Persons from Port-au-Prince as of 10 January, 2026. .......... 37 
Annex 8.4: Inhabitants of Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, forced to flee their homes due to 
attacks by the Gran Grif gang, 29 November 2025 ................................................................... 38 
Annex 9: Panel’s visit to IDP sites in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area ............................ 39 
Annex 10: Civilian victims of explosive drones in Bel-Air, 6 January 2026. ............................ 43 
Annex 11: Civilian casualties from police operation in Delmas 6, Port-au-Prince, 14 January 2026.
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 44 
Annex 12: Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection ..................................... 45 
Annex 13: Preliminary findings on recent arms embargo violations ........................................ 47 
Annex 14: 12.7x99mm ammunition (.50cal) illicitly acquired by 400 Mawozo ........................ 49 
Annex 15: The dynamics of gang revenue collection ................................................................. 50 
Annex 16: Extortion .................................................................................................................... 51 
Annex 17: A snapshot of the 2026 prices of elvers sourced from Haiti, as of March 2026. ..... 52 
Annex 18 : The two letters from CODOPESCA to the Customs. In both letters CODOPESCA 
explains how two Domican-registered companies are seeking to transit elvers  exports from Haiti 
through the Dominican Republic’s territory. In the letters, CODOPESCA is calling upon the 
Customs to oberve that the transiting elvers meets the set standard and have the correct 
documentation. ............................................................................................................................ 53 

 

  

 

 

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Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply 

 

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, 
findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, 
the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members. 

 

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be 
corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest 
achievable standard of proof. 

 

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals 
the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support. 

 

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows: 

 

1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm. 

 

2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there 
is a risk that by doing so it would: 

 

a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance 
notice of a possible recommendation for designation; 

 

b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources; 

 

c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members; 

 

d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other 
local or international organizations; or 

 

e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.  

 

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through 
the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.80 

 

 

 

 

__________________ 
80 See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines and see also 
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures -Delisting 

 

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Annex 2: Some security operations in Port-au-Prince and Delmas communes conducted from late 2025 

 

Since late 2025, intensified security operations have been aiming at establishing a buffer zone around the Autorité Portuaire 
Nationale (APN). This entailed the targeting of the La Saline, Tokyo, Krache Dife and Delmas 6 gangs (in Port-au-Prince 
commune and Delmas commune) to restore truck traffic and reopen key logistical corridors to the city center as well as 
national road 2 (RN2) leading to Haiti’s southern part.  

 

Source: Map elaborated based on UN data in 2023, modified by the Panel  

 

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 
by the United Nations. 
 

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According to the HNP, during these operations, several gang members were killed - although no consolidated number on 
casualties was provided - and weapons and rounds of ammunition were seized. According to some observers, areas such as 
Delmas 30 (Delmas commune), Nazon and Solino (Port-au-Prince commune), and Christ-Roy (bordering area between 
Delmas and Port-au-Prince communes) have slowly restarted their daily regular activities. Haitian authorities have also 
reestablished control over Carrefour Aéroport - an intersection lying along a key route connecting the city center to the area 
of the international airport, after nearly two years of gang control. The reopening of a police station in the area and the return 
of street vendors mark nascent signs of recovery. However, many homes and businesses in these areas remain in ruins and 
residents continue to fear for their safety. From around mid-January to mid-February 2026, there have been no documented 
cases by BINUH of people killed in Bas Delmas and Bel-Air, except for a few incidents in which gang members returned 
to carry out reprisals against residents, accusing them of collaborating with the police81.  

 

HNP operation in Bel-Air (Port-au-Prince commune) 

 

 

Source: Facebook page, 31 December 2025 

 

Operation in the house of gang leader Jamesley, in Bel-Air (Port-au-Prince commune) 

 

Source: Facebook page, 7 January 2026 
__________________ 
81 Interviews with gang and human right analysts, police officers and former government official working on anti -gang 
operations, February 2026.  

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HNP operation in Delmas 2 (Delmas commune), targeting the Krache Dife gang base 

 

 

Source: HNP Facebook page, 8 January 2026 

 

Joint security operation in Delmas 2 (Delmas commune) targeting the Tokyo gang 

 
Source: HNP Facebook page, 19 January 2026.  

 

 

 

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Joint operation at Delmas 6 (Delmas commune), stronghold of Barbeque  
with certain of his residences hit by drone strike  

 

 

 

Source: Facebook page, 14 January 2026 Stills from video shared on social media, 15 January 2026 

 

 

 

 

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Annex 3: Severe weakening of Les Argentins82 due to Viv Ansanm infighting 

 

Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” - HTi.001), the spokesperson for Viv Ansanm, has regularly depicted gangs as advancing 
a political cause, including announcing the launch of Viv Ansanm as a political party, in January 2025 (see paragraph 18 of 
S/2025/356). However, this did not result in any substantive follow-up action. Gang leaders - including Barbeque, Christ-
Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”) and Wilson Joseph (alias “Lanmo San Jou” - HTi. 004) - label their gangs as armed groups or 
nèg ak zam (‘men with weapons’ in Haitian Creole) to assert a degree of social legitimacy.  

 

To preserve their narrative that Viv Ansanm is acting in the interests of the population, Kempes Sanon (alias “Kempes”, 
HTi.009), the head of Les Argentins which controls the Bel-Air area (Port-au-Prince commune), was warned by some of 
the alliance’s main gang leaders to halt all kidnapping activity. Kempes ignored the warning and continued to conduct 
further kidnappings83 , which has typically constituted a significant portion of the gang’s revenues (see S/2025/597, 
S/2024/704, S/2023/674).  

 

Kempes first ignored Wilson Joseph’s call to release an elderly woman who could not pay the ransom, a decision that 
angered other Viv Ansanm leaders. Yet the decisive factor for the significant destabilization of Les Argentins came when 
the gang kidnapped two female relatives of a leader of Krache Dife in Delmas 31 (Delmas commune). This prompted the 
Krache Dife gang leader, Jean Gardy (alias “Pece Pim Pim”), to mobilise his gang and the Tokyo one, led by Wooddensley 
Saintilaire (alias “Chalè”) to attack Les Argentins84. Consequently, on 8 and 9 December 2025, at least 63 members of the 
Les Argentins gang were killed (including 42 men, 11 women and 10 boys) and 11 others (8 men and 3 boys)85 injured and 
their houses burned by the Krache Dife and Tokyo gangs. Dèdè, a senior figure within the gang was decapitated.  

 

A few days later, on 10 December 2025, Jimmy Chérizier appeared in a video with six people, including a 12-year-old girl 
and an 18-year-old man, that he claimed were former hostages of Kempes and were released by Viv Ansanm, which he said 
was “fighting for the country”86. 

 

Barbeque on video with former hostages released by Viv Ansanm 

 

Source: still from video posted on social media on 10 December 2025 

 

__________________ 
82 This annex is based on interviews with gang and human rights analysts, a senior police officer as well as with an individual 
living in gang-controlled area and a former government officer working on anti-gang operations, 2026. 
83 Interviews with gang analysts, former government officer working on anti -gang operations, individual working on gang-
controlled area. 2026.  
84 Interviews with gang analysts, January 2026.  
85 Interview with human rights analyst and BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: October -December 
2025. 
86 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGw5tyuB2N0 

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Kempes was taken to to be ‘judged’ by him. His life was spared to convey an image of fraternity among Viv Ansanm 
leaders87, however, around fifteen members of Les Argentins accompanying Kempes were executed88. Kempes has sought 
refuge with other gang leaders, first with Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), head of the Canaan gang, and later with Renel Destina 
(alias “Ti Lapli”– HTi.003), leader of the Grand Ravine gang89. Kempes was replaced by Jamesley, deployed by Barbeque 
to control the area. Security forces took advantage of this episode of infighting to make gains in the area (see Annex 2).  

 

‘Trial’ of Kempes by Lanmo San Jou, head of 400 Mawozo 

 

Kempes Sanon Lanmo San Jou (red t-shirt) judging Kempes 
(blue t-shirt) 
Source: still from video posted on social media on 10 December 2025 

 

Following the Les Argentins’s severe weakening, Bel-Air was under pressure from the 5 Segond gang, led by Johnson 
André (alias “Izo” – HTi.002), who placed members of his Unité Village de Dieu (UVD – see Annex 24 of the Panel’s final 
report S/2024/704) team in Bel-Air.  
 

__________________ 
87 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgaQRXeZySg 
88 Interview with gang analysts, January and February 2026, and BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti: 
October-December 2025 
89 Interviews with gang analysts, individual working in gang -controlled area and former government official working on anti-gang 
operations, February 2026.  

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Annex 4: Large-scale security operations in Croix-des-Bouquets commune, West department 

 

The year 2025 closed with a large-scale coordinated security operation - involving the HNP, the FAd’H, the GSF and private 
contractors - deployed mid-November 2025 in areas of the Croix-des-Bouquets commune, aiming at weakening the capacity 
of the 400 Mawozo gang. The gang had blocked several sections of the National Road 3 (RN3) and significantly expanded 
its influence over the Artibonite and Centre departments, since March 2025, alongside the Canaan gang (see section II.A.3 
of S/2025/597).  

 

Ground and aerial operations led to the seizure of weapons and ammunition, including a Barrett M82 rifle -  retrieved at the 
residence of Ti-Lion, a key 400 Mawozo gang member and close associate of its leader, Lanmo San Jou90 (see section IV.A)-  
and other material, such as a bulldozer used to erect road barricades and destroy State infrastructure. The UN reported at 
least 101 male gang members killed (including at least 12 children aged 15 to 17-years old) and 13 adult male gang members 
injured91. 

 

Security operation in Croix-des-Bouquets, on 14 November 2025 

 
Source: HNP Facebook page, 14 November 2025. 

 

The mid-November operations involving several specialized police units, many armoured vehicles, and aerial capacity, came 
few days after gang members from the 400 Mawozo gang stormed the premises of a prominent Haitian family, in Croix-
des-Bouquets92.  

 

Operations have continued in Croix-des-Bouquets commune aimed at including clearing strategic axes and weakening the 
Mawozo 400 gang, notably in Carrefour Marassa, Duval and Santo 25. According to police officers and individuals working 
on anti-gang operations93, extremely well-armed gangs have intensified their methods, currently using trenches, traps, and 
Molotov cocktails, particularly in the West and Artibonite departments.  
 

__________________ 
90 Interviews with police officer, gang analysts, former government official working on anti -gang operations, 2025 and 2026. 
91 UN confidential report, 21 November 2025.  
92 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VbY7JxEy6dE; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oggdTYV7MbA 
93 Interviews with police officers and individuals working in anti-gang operations, 2025 and 2026. 

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Trenches and road blockages in Croix-des-Bouquets prevent movement in the area 

 

 
 
Stills from drone images shared in February 2026 provided by the HNP 

 

Cocktails Molotov seized by the Police in Carrefour Marassa, late February 2026 

 

 

Source: HNP Facebook page, 27 February 2026. 

 

 

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Annex 5: Public display of newly installed gang members, mostly children, by Lanmo San Jou 

 

Video showing newly recruited gang members of the 400 Mawozo gang, 
underscoring their young age, being initiated through a ritual ceremony 

 

 

 

Source: Stills from video shared with the Panel on 30 January 2026 

 

 

 

 

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Annex 6: Kenscoff commune under persistent gang pressure  

 

The commune of Carrefour, under the control of the Ti Bwa gang, has been consistently used as a 
haven for gangs, from where gang members are notably advancing towards Kenscoff.  

 

Source: UN Global Service Centre, © OpenStreetMap contributors – modified by the Panel. Visited 
March 2026.  

 

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. 

 

After the first major attack against Kenscoff, on 27 January 2025 (see Annex 5 of S/2025/597), gangs such as 5 Second, 
Grand Ravine, Canaan and Ti Bwa still occupy areas across the communal sections of Bongars, Nouvelle-Touraine, 
Sourçailles and Grand Fond94.  
Children and weapons belonging to the 5 Segond gang in Kenscoff 
 

 

 
Stills from video and photos shared on social media on 26 January 2026 

__________________ 
94 Interview with local authority, 23 January 2026.  

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During the reporting period, several attacks occurred – including in Madeleine, Morne Tranchant, Tête-K-Jaques and 
Galette95. For instance, the locality of Tête K-Jaques in the Nouvelle-Touraine communal section was the scene of extreme 
violence. On 30 November 2025, gang members killed nine residents – including hacking some to death with machetes and 
burning their bodies – and set their homes on fire96. Another violent raid against the same area, in late January 2026, resulted 
in the killing of at least ten people – including a four-month child that was killed by a gang member from 5 Segond group 
led by Didi97.  
On 27 December 2025, in Galette, members of the same group deliberately opened fire on a group of farmers as they were 
heading to their fields, resulting in at least four casualties98. Moreover, the locality of Madeleine was attacked on 16 January 
2026. Several houses were burned, plantations destroyed and livestock stolen.  
Early February 2026, 80 additional members from the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”), arrived in 
the locality of Belot; with some heading to Viard, in the communal section of Sourçailles99. Later, during the night of 2 to 3 
February 2026, Viard was attacked, leading to casualties and the burning of properties100.  
Despite these and many other attacks that have killed a large number of individuals and led to kidnappings in the commune, 
no major security operation has been carried out since 24 August 2025. The security pressure over gangs in downtown area 
has pushed gang members into the remote areas of Kenscoff, which are hard for security forces to access, due to mountainous 
paths. Local authorities have been actively calling on central state authorities to provide more resources to combat gangs in 
the commune, particularly in areas like Belot, Godet, and Sourçailles (see Annex 6 of S/2025/597).  

 

Victims of 5 Segond attack against Tête K-Jaques, during the night of 29 to 30 January 2026 
Four-month-old boy killed by a gang member 
named Barak (His mother was injured) 

 

Graphic images with gruesome 
content 

 

 

 

Graphic images with gruesome content 

 

 

Graphic images with gruesome 
content 

 

 

Graphic images with gruesome content 

 

Source: Photos shared with the Panel on 31 January 2026 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________ 
95 Interview with local authority, November 2025. 
96 Interviews with local authority and UNPOL report, 28 November to 4 December 2025. 
97 Interview with resident of affected area, 30 January 2026. 
98 UNPOL report, 2 to 8 January 2026.  
99 Confidential sources, 4 February 2026.   
100 UNPOL report, 30 January to 5 February 2026. 

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Annex 7: Other human rights violations 

 

In accordance with its mandate, the Panel has adopted a comprehensive approach to investigating human rights violations in 
Haiti. While gangs remain the primary perpetrators of such violations, the Panel has also documented the role of certain 
public officials, former politicians, and economic actors who either directly support gangs or contribute to the weakening of 
State institutions mandated to counter them. 

 

As Haiti continues to face a critical multidimensional crisis, the Panel remains committed to investigating all parties involved 
in these violations. In addition to the violations documented in the present report, including sexual and gender-based violence, 
the recruitment of children, obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance, and the use of lethal force, the Panel is closely 
monitoring the following human rights concerns: 
1. Food insecurity 
From September 2025 to February 2026, 5.7 million people faced acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 
1.9 million in emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) and 3.8 million in crisis (IPC Phase 3). A deterioration of the situation is 
projected for March-June 2026.101 As of January 2026, more than 130,000 children under five were affected by acute 
malnutrition.102 
Gang violence in Haiti has severely disrupted local economies through multiple interrelated mechanisms. Gangs control 
strategic zones—including access to ports, commercial routes, and urban business districts—impose systematic extortion on 
merchants, small businesses, and market vendors. On key transport corridors, gangs operate illegal checkpoints where they 
tax buses, trucks, and public vehicles, effectively controlling access to markets and paralyzing the flow of goods between 
departments. Agricultural production has also been directly targeted, with attacks on farmers and rural communities in the 
Artibonite and Centre departments destroying crops, livestock, and livelihoods as well as conducting land spoliation. These 
are some of factors that contribute to the food insecurity in Haiti. 
2. IDPs, returnees and deportees 

 

a) IDP’s 

 

According to the IOM, as of 6 January 2026, a total of 1,450,254 are internally displaced across Haiti, 103 representing a 39 
per cent increase since the end of 2024. This surge is directly linked to the deteriorating security situation, particularly in 
the Artibonite and Centre departments, where intensified gang violence has forced thousands to flee their homes. The 
Artibonite department recorded the highest increase during the reporting period (23 per cent), while the most pronounced 
spikes since late 2024 were observed in the Centre (140 per cent), Great North (98 per cent), and Artibonite (77 per cent) 
regions. 104 See Annex 8. 

 

About 32 per cent of IDPs have been forced to move multiple times, with repeated displacement more acutely affecting 
households residing in sites (40 per cent) compared to those living with host families (29 per cent). The capital remains the 
sole region where site-based accommodation predominates, hosting 68 per cent of its IDP population in 95 spontaneous 
sites, with an average density of 2,078 persons per site. In contrast, only 2 per cent of IDPs in the provinces reside in sites, 
spread across 134 sites averaging just 149 persons each. 105  

 

Since November 2025, the number of active spontaneous sites has increased from 219 to 229. The metropolitan area of Port-
au-Prince continues to host 91 per cent of all site-based IDPs. During its visit to IDP sites, the Panel observed overcrowding 
and appalling living conditions and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. The Panel also noted that spontaneous sites, 
although intended as temporary, have become increasingly permanent, generating friction 106 with property owners 

__________________ 
101 See https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159760/ 
102 See https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/unicef-haiti-humanitarian-situation-report-no-8-31-december-2025 
103 See https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true  
104 See https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-internal-displacement-situation-round-12-december-2025?close=true  
105 Idem. 
106 See https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-rapport-danalyse-cohabitation-personnes-deplacees-internes-communautes-
hotes-impacts-socio-economiques-historique-de-deplacement-et-intentions-de-retour-septembre-2025  

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(including schools, private residences, and churches) and straining already fragile social services, leading to tensions with 
neighboring communities.  

 

Many IDPs interviewed by the Panel expressed concerns regarding the lack of personal identification documents (birth 
certificates and identity cards (carte d’identification nationale). The absence of such documentation undermines their rights 
to legal personality and to identity, as recognized under articles 6 and 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
articles 16 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, this situation may constitute a 
significant impediment to the exercise of their right to vote in the upcoming elections, thereby threatening their broader 
participation in public life. 

 

b) Deportees and returnees 

 

The commune of Belladère, Centre department, is the main point of entry for returnees from the Dominican Republic, being 
the destination for more than half of all arrivals in 2025.107 Between 800 to 1,000 deportees arrive daily in Belladère, and 
approximately 110,241 IDPs fleeing violence reside there.108  Most of the deportees become IDPs as they entered Haiti. 
Since they are unable to return to their communities of origin or to move to a safer place. 

 

The Dominican General Directorate of Migration reported that during 2025, a total of 379,553 Haitian nationals in an 
irregular immigration situation were deported from the Dominican Republic to Haiti. This figure represents an 84 per cent 
increase compared to the cumulative number of deportations recorded between 2021 and 2025, and is ten times higher than 
the number of deportations documented in 2016.109 

 

On 6 February 2026, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) raised concerns over Dominican Republic 
migration measures affecting people in human mobility, including healthcare access and detention conditions. It noted the 
expulsion of 310,499 Haitians in the first ten months of 2025 and urged compliance with international human rights 
standards.110 
 

__________________ 
107 See https://fscluster.org/haiti/document/haiti-secteur-securite-alimentaire-28  
108 See https://erccportal.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ECHO-Products/Echo-Flash#/echo-flash-items/30231 Regarding the number of 
Haitian nationals deported from the Dominican Republic, it is important to note that many individuals return to the 
Dominican Republic shortly after being deported, resulting in a circular pattern of movement. Consequently, the figu res 
reflect the total number of deportation events recorded during the reporting period, rather than the number of unique 
individuals, as a single person may be subject to multiple deportations over time. 
109 https://migracion.gob.do/dgm-deporto-379553-extranjeros-irregulares-en-2025-y-proceso-20-4-millones-de-documentos-de-
viajeros/  
110 See https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2026/023.asp 

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Annex 8.1: Internally Displaced Persons from Pont Sondé in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025. 

 

Following gang attacks that occurred on 29 and 30 November 2025 in Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, approximately 
5,351 people (1,292 households) were displaced, in addition to the loss of life and the destruction of homes by fire. 

 

 

 

 

“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Dec 02 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 80 — 
Displacement following armed attacks in Pont Sondé in Artibonite (29 November - 1 December 2025). IOM, Haiti.” 
Available at https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-80-displacement-following-armed-attacks-pont-
sonde-artibonite?close=true visited January 2026  

 

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Annex 8.2: Internally Displaced Persons from L'Estère in Artibonite as of 2 December 2025. 

 

Following gang attacks that occurred on 1 December 2025 in L'Estère, Artibonite department, approximately 6,342 people 
(1,512 households) were displaced. 

 

 

 

“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Dec 02, 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 81 — 
Displacement following armed attacks in L'Estère in Artibonite (1 - 2 December 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at 
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-81-displacement-following-armed-attacks-lestere-artibonite-1 
visited January 2026. 

 

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 

 

 

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Annex 8.3: Internally Displaced Persons from Port-au-Prince as of 10 January 2026. 

 

Following various clashes between State security forces and gangs on 8 January 2026 in the localities of Bel-Air, Wharf de 
la Saline, and Delmas 2 – Saint-Martin – Tokyo, in the municipality of Port-au-Prince, approximately 5,836 individuals 
(1,635 households) were displaced. 

 

 

 

“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jan 10, 2026. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 83 — 
Displacement following armed violences in Port-au-Prince (8 - 9 January 2026). IOM, Haiti.” Available at 
https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-83-displacement-following-armed-violences-port-au-prince-8-
9?close=true Visited February 2026. 

 

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or 
acceptance by the United Nations. 

 

 

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Annex 8.4: Inhabitants of Pont Sondé, Artibonite department, forced to flee their homes due to attacks by the 
Gran Grif gang, 29 November 2025 

 

 

 

 

 

Confidential Source. 

 

 

 

 

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Annex 9: Panel’s visit to IDP sites in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area 

 

On 18 February 2026, the Panel visited two sites hosting internally displaced persons as well as a community resource center 
providing social programs to displaced populations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. 

 

For security and confidentiality reasons, the Panel has decided not to disclose the names or specific locations of the sites 
visited. 

 

Site 1 

 

 

 

 

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Source: Photos taken by the Panel, February 2026. 

 

IDP site 1 has a population of about 6765 persons. Note: at the time of the Panel’s visit the IDP site had not received any 
food since December 2025. 

 

 

 

 

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Site 2 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Source: Photos taken by the Panel, February 2026. 

 

IDP site 2 has a population of about 1531 persons. The population at this site was suffering from severe overcrowding and 
lack of basic services. 
  
 

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Annex 10: Civilian victims of explosive drones in Bel-Air, 6 January 2026 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Graphic images with gruesome content 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Confidential source. 

 

 

 

 

 

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Annex 11: Civilian casualties from police operation in Delmas 6, Port-au-Prince, 14 January 2026 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

Graphic images with gruesome content 
 

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Annex 12: Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection 

 

The Panel finds that the following actions jeopardizes the rule of law and human rights protection in Haiti. 

 

1. Decree on the Organization and Functioning of the High Court of Justice 

 

On 17 December 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council adopted a decree establishing the High Court of Justice as the 
exclusive judicial body with jurisdiction to prosecute current or former high-ranking State officials for crimes and 
misdemeanours committed in the exercise of their functions.111 The decree establishes a complex procedural mechanism 
requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate for any decision, and removes the jurisdiction of ordinary courts over such 
cases. Reports from anti-corruption and financial intelligence institutions must undergo multiple layers of validation, 
including review by the Council of Ministers, before transmission to the Chamber of Deputies.  

 

The decree was adopted by the TPC a few weeks before the end of its mandate. According to most Haitian stakeholders the 
Panel spoke to, the  aim of the decree might have been that the TPC was trying to shield high ranking public officials 
implicated in corruption from effective prosecution. It is important to recall that before the adoption of this decree, corruption 
charges had been filed against three out of nine members of the then TPC (see para 79 of S/2025/356).  

 

Civil society organizations112 and legal experts113 have raised concerns that the decree introduces procedural obstacles that 
may render prosecution of senior officials virtually impossible, effectively shielding them from accountability. The Panel 
recalls that Haiti is bound by its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees 
the right to a fair trial before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 

 

 

2. Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom 

 

On 18 December 2025, the TPC adopted a decree regulating the exercise of freedom of expression, establishing a legal 
framework for the prevention and repression of defamation and press-related offenses. The decree introduces broadly 
formulated categories of prohibited speech, including dissemination of false information that may alter public order, 
incitement to violence or hatred, cyber-bullying, and attacks on dignity. 114  

 

The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has expressed 
concern regarding the scope and potential negative effects of the decree. Human rights defenders indicate that certain 
formulations may expand the scope of criminal liability and executive discretion in regulating media activity, raising 
questions regarding legal certainty and foreseeability.115 In the context of Haiti’s ongoing political transition and security 
crisis, such measures may have implications for independent journalism and public debate.116  

 

The Panel recalls Haiti's obligations under Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression subject only to 
restrictions that are provided by law and are necessary and proportionate to legitimate aims. 

 

 

 

 
__________________ 
111 Decree on file with the Panel. 
112 Letter from Nègès Mawon, Nou Pap Dòmi, POHDH and RNDDH addressed to the Prime Minister requesting him to repeal the 
17 December 2025 decree creating the High Court of Justice, 16 January 2026. On file with the Panel. 
113 Interviews with civil society members, state officials and international specialists, February, 2026. 
114 Decree on file with the Panel. 
115 https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/expression/media_center/preleases/2026/019.asp The Special Rapporteur 
indicates that he reiterated these conclusions and recommendations during the public hearing on "Haiti: Arms trafficking and its 
impact on human rights", held in November 2025 at the 194th Regular Period of Sessions of the Inter -American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR), however, the State did not send representatives to the hearing. 
116 See for instance:  https://ayibopost.com/reynold-deeb-seeks-to-have-negative-articles-mentioning-him-removed/ and 
https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264925/preoccupe-le-cpj-appelle-le-pm-fils-aime-a-abroger-le-decret-sur-la-liberte-dexpression-
et-la-diffamation  

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3. Use of lethal force 

 

As previously underscored by the Panel (S/2025/597), the use of force must be strictly regulated and exercised within a legal 
framework consistent with international human rights law, grounded in the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, 
non-discrimination, precaution, and accountability. In that same report, the Panel expressed concern regarding the use of 
lethal force through drones in Haiti, particularly in densely populated areas.  

 

The Haitian State, as well as any other entities acting on its behalf or with its authorization, must respect the right to life as 
protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Basic Principles on the Use 
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Force must be used only as a last resort, and lethal force only when 
strictly unavoidable to protect life. 

 

Based on a comprehensive review of United Nations data for 2025117, as well as testimonies obtained from victims and 
interviews conducted with human rights defenders and representatives of non-governmental organizations, the Panel finds 
that the number of civilians killed in security operations consistently exceeds the number of civilians injured. This pattern 
raises serious concerns regarding compliance with international human rights standards governing the use of lethal force. 118 
 

__________________ 
117 See https://binuh.unmissions.org/fr/binuh/rapports-sur-la-situation-des-droits-de-lhomme  
118 See  https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk  

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Annex 13: Preliminary findings on recent arms embargo violations  

 

1) On 23 September 2025, two firearms – a .40 caliber handgun and a 5.56x45mm semi-automatic AR 15 pattern rifle 
– were seized in the cargo area of Port-au-Prince International Airport (PAP)119. A 78-year-old woman was arrested 
but quickly released.  

 

2) On 24 October 2025, 245 magazines for handguns and 4,000 rounds of inert ammunition, as well as police 
uniforms, were seized by Customs at PAP Airport from unclaimed parcels delivered by Amerijet.  

 

 

 

Seizure of 24 October 2025 
Source: Haitian National Customs, 2025 

 

 

 

 

 

3) In December 2025 and January 2026, a series of seizures were conducted in Cap-Haitien. Clement Mary Junior 
Thelusma was arrested in Cap-Haitien on 29 December 2025, following the seizure of two handguns, an AK-type 
rifle and 1800 rounds of ammunition from a container shipped from the United States. On 23 January 2026, a 
second parcel belonging to Mr. Thelusma was seized in another container in Cap-Haitien. The parcel contained 
two 5.56x45mm rifles, three 9mm handguns, twelve 5.56x45mm magazines, three 9mm magazines, as well as 3400 
rounds of ammunition of various calibers. On 26 January 2026, a third seizure recovered 1,850 rounds of 
ammunition and two expired passports belonging to Mr. Thelusma.  

 

While the Panel is still investigating the case, preliminary findings indicate that Mr. Thelusma is a US citizen who 
travels back and forth between the United States and Cap-Haitien, and regularly smuggles small quantities of 
materiel into the country in containers.  

 

 

 

 

Seizure of 29 December 2025 
Source: confidential  

 

 

 

__________________ 
119 Information provided by Haitian Customs, October 2025.  

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Seizure of 23 January 2026 
Source : HNP Facebook page, 25 January 2026 

 

 

 

 

Seizure of 26 January 2026 
Source : confidential 

 

 

 

 

 

4) On 7 January 2026, the Haitian police arrested Joseph Cedernier as he arrived at a container terminal in Cap-Haitien to 
pick up a parcel that contained nine handguns and 5,500 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition.  

 

 

 

 

Seizure of 6 January 2026 
Source: confidential   

 

 

 

 

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Annex 14: 12.7x99mm ammunition (.50cal) illicitly acquired by 400 Mawozo  

 

The images below are stills from videos posted on social media by Wilson Joseph, alias “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), 
leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, showing 50. Cal ammunition with a distinctive yellow tip. 

 
Source: Video shared on social media, 2024  
Ammunition seized from 400 Mawozo in 2025 and documented by the Panel: 

 

50 cal. Ammunition produced in 1958 in the Dominican Republic  

 

 

 

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Annex 15: The dynamics of gang revenue collection 

 

The ongoing security operations, particularly the use of drone attacks have sent fear among some gangs. Gangs have 
adapted to the situation by adopting new ways in which they collect revenue, and/or by concealing the way they do it. 
Notable among the many ways they do this include:  
1. Extortion of remittances 

 

According to four victims of gang extortion,120 gangs have recruited agents working in some of those remittance houses as 
informants. In other cases, they deploy “watchers”. These individuals identify recipients of significant amounts of cash and 
communicate the information to gang members who then waylay the targeted persons along the way, at a distance from 
points of remittance collection. One victim whose $1,700USD was robbed from him in Delmas 6, and a mother of four 
whose $800USD for subsistence were robbed from her in Tabarre, narrated to the Panel the circumstances leading to their 
losses in January and February 2026 respectfully.  

 

Another victim from Kenscoff stated that on 15 February 2025, he went to withdraw $1,200USD sent by his brother in the 
diaspora to his digital account, only for the agent to deduct a mandatory “facilitation” fee of $30USD. The victim was 
compelled to sign two registers, one being an official one and another, which had no title, belonged to a gang that controlled 
the area, and on it the $30USD was indicated against the recipient’s name and signature. “Practically the $30USD was gang 
fee, and all money houses are obliged to deduct and remit to the gang at the end of the day or two days. When in doubt, 
gangs may ask to compare their register against the official one. If the figures do not tally then the agency may be forced to 
close its operations in the area…,” stated the victim, adding that in his locality there were 11 such remittance houses.   

 

Gangs also compel some remittance outlets to pay “protection” fees as a safeguard against vandalism. Dealerships that fail 
to pay are usually ransacked and the cash looted. Because the outlets have to pay out cash to their clients, they are bound to 
transport cash from main town centres, particularly Port-au-Prince. For those located outside Pétion-Ville, payment of 
extortion fees to gangs is unavoidable. These costs are often added onto their client’s costs.121 Some local authorities in 
gang-controlled areas are exploiting the situation to also erect tolling booths along road networks to extort the public122. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__________________ 
120 Interviews with two victims of gang extortion from Tabarre, a remittance shop owner from Delmas 6 and a civil society leader. 
Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 
121 Interviews with a remittance house owner in Kenscoff, a banker and two civil society activities, January and March 2026. 
122 UNPOL report, January 2026 and interviews with gang analysts and individual working in a gang -controlled area, 2026. 

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Annex 16: Extortion  

 

Seaports and their surroundings have been prone to gang extortion for a long time.123 The main targets have been cargo 
trucks leading in and out of the Port of Varreux the country’s main fuel terminal (see para 80 of S/2023/674) and the 
Autorité Portuaire Nationale – APN (see Annex 38 of S/2024/704). The dismantling of some checkpoints in areas 
surroundings ports – notably Varreux and APN - triggered gangs to find new ways to extort cargo trucks and other vehicles. 
To avoid being a target for drone strikes, gangs keep records of their main targets, and so they send instructions as to how 
the extortion fees should be paid offsite (away from the road). Often gangs deploy watchers on targeted roads to record 
notable commercial users and then approach their business premises later to collect the “taxes.”124 “…This approach has 
created a bond-like relationship between gangs and major businesses in every suburb of West Department. It’s a form of 
racketeering where gangs in return “protect” the merchandise and interests of the enterprises they extort…it’s a kind of Viv 
Ansanm phenomenon.”125 Although some studies have found that extortion alone generates between US$60 million and 
US$75 million annually for gangs targeting container transport126, the total revenue generated from extorting the public 
transport sector, retail petrol stations, ransom paid to rescue kidnapped victims and tokenism from economic actors and/or 
political actors, is several times higher.127  

 

 

__________________ 
123 Terminal Varreux contrôlé par des gangs, l’APPE tire la sonnette d’alarme 
https://endijenenfo.com/terminal-varreux-controle-par-des-gangs-lappe-tire-la-sonnette-dalarme/  
124 Interviews with a Supermarket owner based in Kenscoff, a retail petrol dealer and a cargo agent. Port -au-Prince, February 
2026. 
125 Interviews with a logistics operator based in West Department, January 2026. 
126 From criminal governance to community fragmentation: Addressing Haiti’s escalating crisis | Global Initiative 
127 Interview with a customs officer and three logistics experts. Port-au-Prince, February 2026. 

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Annex 17: A snapshot of the 2026 prices of elvers sourced from Haiti, as of March 2026.  

 

Also see:  https://www.selinawamucii.com/insights/prices/haiti/live-eels/#google_vignette  

 

 

 

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Annex 18: The two letters from CODOPESCA to the Customs. In both letters CODOPESCA explains how two 
Dominican-registered companies are seeking to transit elvers exports from Haiti through the Dominican 
Republic’s territory. In the letters, CODOPESCA is calling upon the Customs to observe that the transiting 
elvers meets the set standard and have the correct documentation. 

 

Letter 1:  

 

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Letter 2: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Associated documents