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Letter dated 25 September 2025 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti on 20 August 2025 and was considered by the Committee on 15 September 2025.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)



Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2752 (2024)

Summary

Eighteen months after the establishment of the transitional governance framework and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, the security situation in Haiti has significantly worsened, and political consensus has been severely eroded. The reporting period (18 October 2024–10 August 2025) was marked by successive stages of deteriorating security, characterized by increased brutality and significant expansions of gang-controlled territory in Port-au-Prince, as well as in the Centre and Artibonite departments.

The effectiveness of the transitional authorities has been undermined by internal divisions, corruption and escalating tensions among the Transitional Presidential Council members and their political bases. Given the delays in the constitutional review process and electoral preparations, the current timeline for the transition appears overly ambitious, with the mandate of the transitional government due to end on 7 February 2026.

During the reporting period, despite sporadic infighting, the *Viv Ansanm* (living together) gang alliance (HTe.002) has maintained unity and taken advantage of the political instability to launch coordinated attacks against the last free bastions of the capital. In November 2024, gunfire targeting international commercial aircraft led to the suspension of flights in and out of the Port-au-Prince international airport, where international flights had still not resumed at the time of writing. This, coupled with the significant slowdown of activity in the capital's maritime ports, has severely disrupted economic activity in the country.

Violence has escalated to unprecedented levels, making the country's homicide rate one of the highest in the world. Over the reporting period, at least four massacres were reported to have taken place in the West and the Artibonite departments, alongside many other brutal attacks. Gangs deliberately use indiscriminate violence and forced displacement to expand their territory, create buffer zones from security forces and erode State presence. This strategy also serves to instil fear and to assert dominance and criminal control over entire communities. The number of internally displaced persons has reached a record high, with 11 per cent of the Haitian population currently displaced and living in dire conditions. Sexual violence remains widespread in most gang-controlled areas, with victims as young as six. Children continue to be recruited by gangs and are increasingly used in combat.

On the security governance front, the Haitian National Police, with the support of the Multinational Security Support mission and occasionally from the Haitian Armed Forces, launched a large number of operations to halt the advancement of the gangs and recover territory. The multiplication of fronts, along with the lack of an integrated security strategy, inadequate staffing and insufficient resources, have stretched the Police and the mission further beyond capacity. The security vacuum is being increasingly filled by non-State armed actors – including self-defence groups, Haitian private security companies, some units of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées, as well as international security and private military companies – further complicating the security landscape and raising concerns among human rights organizations.

In March 2025, the Prime Minister created a task force that, with the support of foreign private military contractors, has launched loitering munitions (explosive drones) to target gangs. Many interlocutors described a lack of coordination between the task force and police operations, reflecting the tensions between the Haitian National Police leadership and the Prime Minister that have marked the reporting period. Those tensions peaked with the replacement of the head of the Police on 9 August 2025, following the arrest of a former senator of the Nippes department on 2 August, and the appointment of the new head of the Transitional Presidential Council on 7 August 2025.

Since March 2025, police ground operations, coupled with drone attacks by the task force and the growing capabilities of self-defence groups, have helped to slow down gang offensives within the capital. However, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance has made significant gains outside Port-au-Prince, in the West and Centre departments. The alliance has also joined forces with gangs in the Artibonite, including Gran Grif (HTe.001), with the objective to seize full control of the lower Artibonite region. The influence of gangs is increasingly being felt in the outlying regions of the country; their growing relationship with some local criminal groups represents a serious concern for authorities. The fall of major provincial cities during the reporting period has opened avenues for further arms trafficking and other criminal activities. Communities are increasingly arming and organizing themselves, fearing they may be next.

The capacity of gangs to engage simultaneously on multiple battle fronts indicates that they have established steady supply chains for weapons and ammunition and that the arms embargo has little impact on their ability to acquire materiel. Demand for arms and ammunition remains very high among gangs, self-defence groups, private security companies, agents of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées and civilians, with prices staying elevated, making Haiti an attractive market for transnational criminal networks.

During the reporting period, the Dominican Republic and the United States of America both conducted multiple interceptions and opened prosecutions of a number of traffickers. However, enforcement of the arms embargo remains limited. While “ant trafficking” networks continue to move materiel from the United States and the Dominican Republic to Haiti, investigations conducted under the reporting period have shed light on certain networks operating with a higher level of sophistication, including the capacity to transfer large quantities of materiel efficiently across several jurisdictions.

The implementation of the arms embargo in Haiti remains weak due to the limited access to ports of entry, the lack of enforcement capacity and the significant levels of corruption in certain institutions and locations. In addition, despite some efforts by the Haitian National Police to address the issue, several diversions of arms and ammunition from national stockpiles were reported during the reporting period.

Recent record-breaking drug seizures – over one ton of cocaine in the north-west region of the country and nearly 2.7 tons of cannabis at the border with the Dominican Republic – have exposed a long-suspected but previously underdocumented criminal dynamic. The largely unmonitored northern and southern coasts of Haiti serve as routes for drug trafficking networks moving cocaine from Jamaica and South America onward to The Bahamas and the United States. Cannabis, primarily from Jamaica, is smuggled through Haiti to the Dominican Republic. This illicit activity boosts gang revenues, fuelling their broader criminal operations, and empowers corrupt civil servants and other actors.

Beyond arms and drugs trafficking, the country continues to be vulnerable to illicit financial flows, including the diversion of public resources and the transfer of undeclared cash. In addition, Haiti continues to experience the unregulated exploitation of and trade in natural resources. For instance, a restricted group of exporters of elvers (baby eels), a very lucrative resource, controls the supply chain with minimum regulations and State oversight. The significant illicit financial flows emanating from this trade are both harming the economy and contributing to the further destabilization of the country.

Given the current context and the significant challenges to the country's peace and stability, Haitian stakeholders have expressed an urgent need for comprehensive support that involves a robust security response, as well as the sanctioning of individuals that are supporting, enabling and perpetuating armed violence and undermining the political transition.

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I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 18 October 2024, the Security Council adopted resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), in which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti consisting of an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Council and/or the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of seven individuals and two entities.
2. The Council also extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), and further decided that the mandate shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed under Council resolutions [2700 \(2023\)](#) and [2752 \(2024\)](#).
3. The present final report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#) and includes investigations conducted by the Panel up to early August 2025. Owing to word count limitations, the Panel has detailed some of its findings in the annexes to the report.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel's methods were in full conformity with the best practices and methods, as recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see [S/2006/997](#)). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources, given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. Following the publication of its previous final report, in September 2024 ([S/2024/704](#)), the Panel and the Chair of the Committee received information volunteered by an individual cited in the report. The Panel reviewed the document and transmitted it to the Committee along with the Panel's own observations.
6. During the reporting period, the Panel conducted investigations in Haiti as well as fact-finding missions in The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo, Dajabon, Jimani and Pedernales) and the United States of America and is grateful for the support it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from non-governmental actors. Despite the dire security situation in Haiti and related challenges, the Panel visited Haiti in October 2024 (Port-au-Prince), April 2025 (Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes and Ouanaminthe), June 2025 (Cap-Haïtien and Jacmel) and July 2025 (Cap-Haïtien and Port-au-Prince).
7. The Panel welcomes the continuous collaboration it has received from Haitian authorities. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Panel has met with representatives of Haitian State institutions, including representatives of the Government, the Haitian National Police, the General Customs Administration, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, as well as with politicians and private sector actors, including private security companies. During the reporting period the Panel interviewed representatives of civil society organizations, individuals living in gang-controlled areas and other

victims and witnesses of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel has visited one internally displaced persons site. The Panel has also met with representatives of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) and agencies of the United Nations country team, as well as diplomats from various missions. In addition, the Panel has conducted numerous virtual meetings with a range of stakeholders in Haiti and abroad.

8. The Panel has sent a range of requests for information to Member States. The Panel would like to thank those Member States that have responded to the Panel's requests and further emphasizes the critical importance of that information in supporting its work (see annex 2 for a table of correspondence).

Cooperation with other entities

9. In line with resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the Panel has continued to cooperate positively with a range of United Nations and regional entities. The Panel would like to thank BINUH in particular for its continued support. The Panel has also engaged with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations country teams in the region and the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security of the Caribbean Community, as well as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and International Civil Aviation Organization.

C. Development of the United Nations sanctions regime on Haiti

10. Following the additional designations by the Committee on 27 September 2024 and 8 July 2025, the sanctions list is now composed of seven individuals and two entities. With the exception of one individual, Prophane Victor (HTi.006), who is a businessman and a politician, all entries concern gangs or their leaders that continue to operate unaffected (see sect. II.A).

11. On the basis of the Panel's recommendation in its previous final report, the Security Council expanded, by paragraph 1 of its resolution [2752 \(2024\)](#), the sanctions designation criteria set out in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), by adding the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources. The Panel has therefore conducted investigations into the trade of elvers (baby eels), a very lucrative business where poorly regulated exploitation and trade in Haiti provides an ideal environment for criminals to launder money and evade taxes and for gangs to increase revenues by extortion and kidnapping (see sect. II.E).

D. Implementation of the United Nations sanctions regime

1. Implementation of the measures by Haiti

12. Despite some efforts by Haitian authorities, the Panel is concerned about the slow progress in the implementation of the sanctions regime in Haiti. The weak implementation is due not only to the lack of awareness, but in most part to the limited capacity of State institutions and political will of certain actors. During its visits to Haiti, the Panel conducted outreach efforts, particularly among representatives of the police, customs and justice system.

Asset freeze

13. During the reporting period, Haitians continued to call upon the authorities to act against the individuals sanctioned by the United Nations as well as those sanctioned unilaterally by Member States and a regional organization.

14. In response, on 28 April 2025, the Transitional Presidential Council issued a note reminding judicial authorities to take up cases involving individuals sanctioned by the United Nations, and sent a letter to the Prime Minister requesting that urgent measures be taken to mobilize the judiciary to act on such cases.

15. Following the designation of major Haitian gangs, including *Viv Ansanm* and *Gran Grif*, as terrorist organizations by the Dominican Republic¹ and as foreign terrorist organizations by the United States,² the Haitian Minister of Justice instructed the Prosecutor (Commissaire du gouvernement) of Port-au-Prince to take action. On 12 May 2025, the Minister requested that accounts belonging to individuals sanctioned under the United Nations sanctions regime, as well as those belonging to their accomplices, be frozen.

16. In early June 2025, the Prosecutor's office instructed national financial institutions to freeze the accounts of designated individuals and requested the Unité centrale de renseignements financiers (central financial intelligence unit) and the Unité de lutte contre la corruption (anti-corruption unit) to launch financial investigations into those individuals.³ Following requests from the Panel, in July 2025, the Minister of Justice informed the Panel that the instructions had been sent out and that the authorities would provide information on whether any accounts in the names of the sanctioned individuals had been identified and frozen.

Arms embargo

17. The Haitian authorities did not report any seizures of arms or ammunition at ports of entry during the reporting period, and embargoed materiel continues to flow into the country undetected (see sect. II.C). Field visits by the Panel indicate that law enforcement agencies continue to have limited access to most ports of entry, which hampers effective efforts to implement the embargo, due to gang violence in Port-au-Prince and local criminal groups operating near the land border. Furthermore, a handful of powerful businesspeople control some ports, including in the south of Haiti, turning them into quasi-private entities where State agents have little access or are in collusion with criminal networks. As a result, goods are able to flow in and out of the country uncontrolled.

18. On 25 March 2025, following two large seizures at a Dominican sea port of weapons destined to Haiti, the Haitian Ministry of Finance and Economy decided to ban goods transiting through the Dominican Republic from entering the country (see annex 39). However, the ban is not being enforced, and transit containers continue to arrive in Haiti.⁴

2. Monitoring of the implementation of measures by other countries in the region

19. Although arms flows continue to reach Haiti in violation of the arms embargo, the United States and the Dominican Republic – two countries used regularly by trafficking networks to transfer illicit firearms to Haiti (see S/2024/704, paras. 55–64 and table 1) – have undertaken efforts to enforce the embargo measures. Several judicial cases are ongoing, and a number of seizures have been made of materiel heading to Haiti (see sect. II.C).

¹ See <https://www.presidencia.gob.do/noticias/presidente-abinader-declara-las-bandas-criminales-haitianas-como-organizaciones>.

² See <https://www.state.gov/designation-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif/>.

³ Interview with a representative of the Haitian judiciary, June 2025. See also <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=3201713276661346>.

⁴ Interviews with representatives of Dominican and Haitian Customs and a shipping company, June and July 2025.

20. The Panel has sent multiple requests to the United States for information in relation to the implementation of the arms embargo, asset freeze and travel ban. In August 2025, in a written correspondence, the United States authorities confirmed that all properties and interests in property in the United States or in the possession or control of United States persons, as well as entities that are owned directly or indirectly (by more than 50 per cent) by the seven designated individuals, are blocked. With regard to the arms embargo, the authorities stated that they continued to work closely with Haitian authorities and international partners to address firearms trafficking. Those efforts included capacity-building initiatives for Haitian law enforcement and information-sharing. United States agencies had utilized intelligence-sharing mechanisms and advanced screening technologies to detect and intercept firearms shipments (see paras. 87–90 below). The United States also informed the Panel that it had begun proceedings to remove certain aliens with lawful permanent resident status in the United States who had supported or collaborated with Haitian gang leaders connected to *Viv Ansanm*.

21. In response to similar enquiries, the Dominican authorities told the Panel that, to date, they had not identified any assets belonging to individuals sanctioned by the United Nations or breaches of the travel ban. The Dominican Republic shared information regarding the seizures of arms and ammunition they had made as part of their efforts to implement the arms embargo.

E. Political and security context

1. Political transition

22. More than a year after the establishment of the transitional governance framework and the deployment of the Multinational Security Support mission, the inability to restore security, coupled with a severely eroded political consensus, continue to stall meaningful progress in the transition.

23. The effectiveness of the transitional authorities has been seriously undermined by internal divisions, corruption and escalating tensions among members of the Transitional Presidential Council and their respective political bases. In response, some political and civil society actors have repeatedly called for alternative transitional arrangements.⁵

24. Although there has been some limited progress on the constitutional review process and the launch of some of the electoral preparations,⁶ the current transition timeline appears overly ambitious, with the mandate of the transitional authorities set to expire on 7 February 2026. Many stakeholders have expressed concern about likely heightened tensions if an elected president is not in place by then.

2. Evolution of the security situation

25. The reporting period was marked by successive stages of deteriorating security, characterized by increased brutality and the significant expansion of territory controlled by gangs (see sect. II.A). Although the Haitian National Police launched numerous operations, the institution continues to be understaffed and underequipped, resulting in its inability to respond effectively to the multiple fronts opened by gangs or to maintain control over recovered areas. The support of the Multinational Security Support mission remains very limited due to the lack of funding and its slow deployment.

⁵ See (S/2025/418).

⁶ Ibid.

26. The security vacuum is increasingly being filled by non-State armed actors, which further complicates the security landscape. These include self-defence groups, Haitian private security companies (see [S/2024/704](#), paras. 72–76), international private security and private military companies and the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées.

27. The Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées comprises multiple units operating across the country, mostly outside of State control (see [S/2024/704](#), annex 26). Its activities have continued to underscore the ambiguity between its role as an informal local security provider and the criminal activities in which many agents of the Brigade are involved.⁷ The manner in which the authorities intend to implement the 3 April 2025 decree calling for the Brigade to join with national security forces in the fight against gangs remains unclear.

28. In March 2025, a task force created by the Prime Minister launched its first operations in Port-au-Prince with the support of a foreign private military company, reportedly contracted with Erik Prince, a well-known actor in the private military sector.⁸ The Panel has previously mentioned the various lines of negotiation between the authorities and private military companies since 2024 and the presence of foreign companies in the country. Since March 2025, the use of private contractors has been more visible, with the use of loitering munitions (explosive drones) against gangs and of helicopters in operations.⁹ The numbers of drone attacks and casualties remain difficult to estimate since there are no official reports (see sect. II.B).¹⁰ In addition, the engagement of private security contractors in ground operations has been reported.

29. Resorting to private military companies currently constitutes a key pillar of the Government's security strategy, raising the concerns of human rights organizations (see sect. II.B). During the reporting period, the lack of coordination between the task force and police operations was criticized by several security sources and local authorities, highlighting the tensions between the Prime Minister's office and the leadership of the Police, which seriously hampered the fight against gangs.

30. Since March 2025, Police operations coupled with drone attacks by the task force and the growing capabilities of self-defence groups, have contributed to a slowdown in gang offensives in certain areas of the capital. However, the failure to consolidate the gains achieved by security operations has enabled gang members to regain control of territory. In addition, gang members continue to abuse residents in their strongholds.

31. Meanwhile, *Viv Ansanm* (HTe.002) has made significant gains outside Port-au-Prince, capturing key cities in the West and Centre departments. *Viv Ansanm* has forged an alliance with Artibonite gangs to seize control of the lower Artibonite region, including with Gran Grif (HTe.001).

⁷ For instance, members of the Brigade de surveillance des aires protégées have been actively involved in the fight against gangs in Lascahobas, while criminal activities such as land spoliation and arms trafficking have been regularly reported to the Panel. Interviews with local authorities in the Centre and North departments, and with Brigade agents, 2025.

⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025. See also <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article311704944.html>.

⁹ Interview with a senior security official, July 2025.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, and United Nations Police Division report, 2025.

II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions [2653 \(2022\)](#) and [2700 \(2023\)](#) and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti

A. Gang dynamics

32. Haiti continues to experience a dramatic consolidation of gang power, with gangs estimated to exert control or influence over approximately 85 per cent of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (see annex 3).¹¹ During the reporting period, *Viv Ansanm* (HTe.002) extended its grip, particularly beyond the West department, in the Artibonite and Centre departments. The impacts of gang violence have also been felt across southern and northern Haiti.¹²

33. Amid a growing sense of abandonment, communities have increasingly set up self-defence groups, fuelling a rise in arbitrary violence and acts of banditry. Simultaneously, gangs continue to exercise criminal parallel governance in areas under their control, imposing informal rulemaking and extortion and providing basic services in the absence of the State.

1. *Viv Ansanm* manoeuvring the political transition

34. After the replacement of former Prime Minister Garry Conille and several public calls for dialogue by Jimmy Chérizier (alias “Barbeque” – HTi.001), the arrival of Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as Prime Minister in November 2024 coincided with a new wave of gang violence, with simultaneous attacks over several locations in Port-au-Prince, signalling a direct challenge to the transitional government.¹³ Particularly, from mid-November 2024 to April 2025, in collusion with former governmental officers such as Guy Philippe and Dimitri Hérard, gangs aggressively attempted to penetrate the remaining gang-free zones of Port-au-Prince, including the Pétion-Ville commune, aiming to seize the offices of the Transitional Presidential Council and the Prime Minister (see [S/2025/356](#)). This goal was publicly acknowledged by Barbeque, who acts as the spokesperson for the alliance (see annex 4).

35. These attacks stood in sharp contrast with the self-declaration of *Viv Ansanm* as a political platform, in January 2025, and Barbeque’s statement demanding the inclusion of *Viv Ansanm* in national dialogue processes. This dual strategy – combining violence with “patriotic” narratives – underscores how *Viv Ansanm* is seeking to assert influence, evade accountability and secure resources, rather than making a traditional move into political engagement.

36. *Viv Ansanm* also sought to exploit popular discontent over insecurity to advance its agenda of government overthrow. For instance, Dimitri Hérard and Barbeque tried to leverage the public support for the leader of the Canapé-Vert self-defence group to reportedly incite him to march against the transitional government seat, while *Viv Ansanm* carry out simultaneous attacks to divert police resources.¹⁴ Notably, in mid-April 2025, a mass protest organized by the leader of Canapé-Vert to march on government offices and denounce insecurity was abruptly called off due to allegations

¹¹ Interviews with a gang analyst, Haitian National Police officers and security officers, July 2025.

¹² Interviews with government officials and representatives of civil society in northern and southern Haiti, 2025.

¹³ See [S/2025/28](#).

¹⁴ Interview with confidential sources, 2025.

that armed individuals had been mobilized to infiltrate the crowd.¹⁵ However, confidential sources indicated that backchannel discussions between key actors, including Guy Phillipe and the leader of Canapé-Vert, had temporarily de-escalated pressure over Pétion-Ville.¹⁶ As a result, Canapé-Vert continues to act as a buffer, preventing gangs from taking control of Pétion-Ville.¹⁷

37. The designation of *Viv Ansanm* as a terrorist organization by two Member States also helped to deter its key backers, as they fear consequences of being associated with a terrorist organization.¹⁸

38. On 7 August 2025, with the incoming of the new President of the Transitional Presidential Council, shots were heard in several parts of the capital, as Barbeque threatened again to disrupt the transition.¹⁹ Aimed at sending a clear signal to the authorities, gang members set fire to two armoured vehicles of the Multinational Security Support mission in Kenscoff commune and attempted to storm the National Palace in downtown Port-au-Prince, amid other attacks in various parts of the capital.²⁰

2. Evolution of gang dynamics in the West department

(a) Adaptability of *Viv Ansanm* and reactions to security interventions

39. Despite multiple security operations, *Viv Ansanm* has been able to adapt, reorganize and deploy members to different areas. The alliance has maintained unity despite occasional gang infighting and has even strengthened over time. Gangs have shared criminal expertise, received training and advice – including from Dimitri Hérard, a former officer of the National Palace General Security Unit (see S/2024/704) – and preserved a certain level of mutual support, transferring weapons and fighters as needed.

40. For instance, without reinforcements by the Canaan and 400 Mawozo gangs – respectively headed by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”) and Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo San Jou” – HTi. 004) – the Kraze Barye gang would likely have been dismantled. Its leader, Vitelhomme Innocent (Hti.005), was a primary target of police operations during the reporting period, which weakened the gang. He was wounded in June 2025.²¹

41. The use of explosive drones since March 2025 has instilled a new dynamic in the capital. Gangs such as Delmas 6, Grand Ravine and 5 Segond have withdrawn from certain areas but have continued to abuse residents in their strongholds.²² The gangs have become more cautious, diminishing their social media exposure and circulating discretely.²³ Meanwhile, the leader of the 5 Segond gang, Johnson André

¹⁵ Confidential report, April 2025.

¹⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, May and July 2025.

¹⁷ Interviews with gang analysts, Haitian national police officers and civil society representatives, 2025.

¹⁸ Interviews with confidential sources, July 2025.

¹⁹ Video on file with the Panel.

²⁰ Multinational Security Support mission press release, interviews with gang analysts and residents, and United Nations Police Division report, August 2025.

²¹ Interviews with an individual from a gang-controlled area, an international security specialist and a gang analyst, June and July 2025.

²² BINUH quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, April–June 2025. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti.pdf.

²³ Interviews with a gang analyst, a political analyst, an international humanitarian officer, an international security officer and an individual working in a gang-controlled area, May and July 2025.

(alias “Izo” – HTi.002), has been trying to procure armed drones with night vision (see section II.C.1).²⁴

42. At the time of writing, no gang leader had fallen victim to the drone attacks. There is a risk that, even if gang leaders are eliminated, they may be swiftly replaced, highlighting the fact that gangs’ operations are not dependent on one individual. This stresses the pressing need to dismantle their structure. For instance, when Ferden Titus (alias “Meyer”), the leader of the Kokorat San Ras gang, was killed on 19 July 2025 by a self-defence group, he was immediately replaced by his younger brother, Benji,²⁵ with security forces losing momentum to dismantle the gang. Despite drones and Haitian National Police operations hitting several gang members,²⁶ *Viv Ansanm* continues to replenish its ranks.²⁷

43. Amid drone operations, gang members have sought refuge in the Carrefour commune, under the de facto control of Christ-Roi Chery (alias “Chrisla”), the leader of the Ti Bwa gang.²⁸ Despite the apparent normalcy in the commune, a parallel system of gang governance operates, while public authority has collapsed (see annex 5).²⁹

(b) Volatile stability in Pétion-Ville and persistent attacks over the Kenscoff commune

44. The use of explosive drones over *Viv Ansanm* positions, including over Pacot and Carrefour Feuilles in the Port-au-Prince commune, forced gang members to retreat to their strongholds or to the Carrefour commune.³⁰ Until April 2025, those neighbourhoods had been heavily targeted by gangs aiming to infiltrate Pétion-Ville, an upscale residential area housing the offices of BINUH, United Nations agencies, embassies, businesses and State institutions (see [S/2025/356](#)). Although Pétion-Ville remains one of the last areas not under gang control within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, alongside Haut Delmas, the situation there remains tenuous.

45. Isolated drone strikes and Haitian National Police operations without territorial consolidation have allowed gangs to reoccupy areas or return temporarily for criminal incursions.³¹ For instance, in late April 2025, a security offensive in Pacot dislodged *Viv Ansanm* elements, preventing their advance into Pétion-Ville via Canapé-Vert. However, in mid-July 2025, the Grand Ravine gang, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”– HTi.003) returned there to set up units.³² If the Canapé-Vert self-defence group withdrew its resistance to gang entry, there would be drastic implications for the broader security dynamics of the capital.³³

46. Meanwhile, gangs continued to mount incursions against the neighbouring Kenscoff commune (see annex 6), which offers a vantage point over Pétion-Ville and a route to southern Haiti (see [S/2025/356](#)). In the seven months since the first major attack, on 27 January 2025, the security situation in the commune has deteriorated sharply, notably due to the lack of a common strategy among the Haitian National

²⁴ Interviews with confidential sources, July 2025.

²⁵ United Nations Police Division report, July 2025.

²⁶ Interview with a senior government official, July 2025.

²⁷ Interview with a gang analyst, an individual living in a gang-controlled area and an international security officer, July 2025.

²⁸ Interviews with a gang analysts and an individual working in gang-controlled area, May and July 2025.

²⁹ Interviews with a government official working in a gang-controlled area and gang analysts, July 2025.

³⁰ Interview with a gang analyst, July 2025.

³¹ Interviews with a gang analyst and a security official, May and July 2025.

³² Interview with a gang analyst, July 2025.

³³ Interviews with gang and international analysts and a senior government official, May and July 2025.

Police, the Haitian Armed Forces, the Multinational Security Support mission and the task force.³⁴

47. The first joint response mobilizing these forces was finally launched on 24 July 2025. Drones were dropped and a helicopter landed in Bois d'Avril, Kenscoff commune, with reinforcements deployed to fight gangs in several localities, forcing the gangs to retreat to their base in Clemenceau, Carrefour commune. However, the gangs replied by simultaneously counterattacking the Viard locality and the Téléco base, in the Sourçailles communal section of Kenscoff. After burning two Multinational Security Support mission vehicles on 7 August 2025, gang members set ablaze another Haitian National Police vehicle a few days later. Two police officers were killed and weapons and ammunition stolen, which "Izo 2", a leader of the 5 Segond gang in Kenscoff, later displayed in a video.³⁵

48. The low number of Haitian National Police personnel and the shortage of resources, coupled with the limited involvement of the Haitian Armed Forces, have hampered the territorial consolidation of the areas liberated by security operations.³⁶ In addition, gangs have used the access route to the bordering Carrefour commune, which emerged as a safe zone for gangs, to attack Kenscoff.

49. In Kenscoff and elsewhere, gangs have used a "scorched-earth" strategy – destroying key infrastructure, instilling fear by killing residents, raping women, systematically burning homes and causing mass displacements – to confiscate land for the benefit of politicians and businesspeople. Part of this scheme involves corrupting police officers to hamper security operations and allow gangs to set up bases in the commune.³⁷ These attacks, which have already resulted in hundreds of victims,³⁸ were reportedly instigated by politicians willing to expose the police's inability to protect one of the capital's most residential areas; the Central Directorate of Judicial Police has made several arrests in this connection.³⁹

50. At the epicentre of instability in the West department, the violence in Kenscoff has already extended to parts of Thomassin, a few kilometres from central Pétienville. It also threatens to spread south-east, via the Kenscoff road leading to the Seguin commune. In early June 2025, a member of a 5 Segond group operating in Kenscoff was arrested by the South-East department police. The authorities are working to prevent any establishment of gang units in the area.⁴⁰

3. Exponential territorial control over the Centre and Artibonite departments

51. While drone operations have helped to repel *Viv Ansanm*'s progression in parts of the capital, gangs have extended their grip over the Centre and Artibonite departments, where they have captured key roads connecting the capital with northern and eastern Haiti, including to secure smuggling routes. The situation has further deteriorated as groups of criminals, including members of self-defence groups, have attacked and taken control of the main border points at various times over the reporting period, including in Malpasse and Belladère. On such occasions, they have extorted drivers and fuelled illicit trafficking, in collusion with *Viv Ansanm* gangs.

³⁴ Interview with a local authority, on-ground sources and security officers, and an official document, 2025.

³⁵ Video on file with the Panel.

³⁶ Interviews with a gang analyst, an individual living in a gang-controlled area, an international humanitarian officer and a local authority, July 2025.

³⁷ Interview with confidential sources, July 2025.

³⁸ Interview with a local authority and a gang analyst, July 2025.

³⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.

⁴⁰ Interviews with confidential sources and senior Haitian national police officers in the South-East department, April and July 2025.

52. After taking control of strategic towns in the Centre department, the apparent goal of *Viv Ansanm* – now comprising Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras, the main gangs of the Artibonite department – is to take full control of the lower part of the Artibonite department.

53. On 21 March 2025, the Canaan and 400 Mawozo gangs attacked Trianon before progressing into Terre Rouge and launching a major offensive on downtown Mirebalais on 31 March 2025, with the objectives of reopening the RN3 road that had been blocked by a self-defence group and facilitating the trafficking of weapons and drugs from the border town of Belladère (see annex 7).⁴¹ The locality of Saut-d'Eau, west of Mirebalais, fell shortly after. Gang members then continued to advance northwards and entered the lower region of the Artibonite department. Between late April and July 2025, communes such as La Chapelle and Verrettes experienced violent attacks. In early July 2025, gangs also attacked eastern localities of the Centre department, such as Desvarieux, Chambrun and Sarrazins, bordering Lascahobas commune, near Belladère.⁴² With the institutional vacuum, Barbeque (HTi.001), Jeff and Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004) gathered in Saut-d'Eau to enjoy local festivities, in July 2025. In a social media video, they bragged about their popular support and control of the capital, indicating an alarming consolidation of criminal influence in the area.⁴³

54. After the massacre in Pont-Sondé in the Artibonite department on 3 October 2024 (see S/2025/356, para. 36), Gran Grif continued its attacks in the commune of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite. On 17 July 2025, the gang attacked the Dieuthel Toussaint neighbourhood of the Liancourt commune, while Kokorat San Ras stormed the commune of Marchand Dessalines, setting fire to the police station.⁴⁴ At the time of drafting, Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras were expanding their control over the southern part of the Artibonite department, while Canaan and 400 Mawozo were pushing north of the Centre department towards lower Artibonite.

55. The risk of violence spillover has prompted heightened security measures in northern Haiti. Notably, the takeover of Mirebalais represented a significant breach in the barrier that the Centre department had long posed against the violence emanating from the capital. Rising vigilance in the North department, for instance, led to the arrest on 10 May 2025 of an active member of the Kraze Barye gang, in Cap-Haïtien. His brother, who had been waiting for his arrival, is an associate of a gang leader operating in the commune of Limonade, North department.⁴⁵

56. The presence of gang members from the Artibonite and West departments has been occasionally reported in northern Haiti, particularly involving weapons trafficking or attempts to use the Cap-Haïtien international airport. On 12 March 2025, a gang member was apprehended at the airport while attempting to transport a girlfriend of a gang leader operating in the Cité Soleil commune of Port-au-Prince and her child out of Haiti.⁴⁶

57. Given the significant expansion of *Viv Ansanm* outside the West department and its unification with brutal gangs of the Artibonite department, the primary concern is

⁴¹ Interview with a representative of Mirebalais local authorities who had just fled the area, April 2025; and BINUH quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, January-March 2025, available at https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_jan_-_march_2025.pdf.

⁴² Interview with gang analyst. See also <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/intensification-criminal-violence-lower-artibonite-centre-department-and>.

⁴³ Video on file with the Panel.

⁴⁴ Interview with gang analyst. See also <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/intensification-criminal-violence-lower-artibonite-centre-department-and>.

⁴⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, June 2025.

⁴⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, and a confidential document, March 2025.

that the alliance might join forces with the various criminal groups operating in northern Haiti – currently specialized in land dispossession, murders and robberies – to carry out attacks, thereby gaining control over larger portions of the country.⁴⁷

B. Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses

1. General information on human rights violations⁴⁸

58. Widespread human rights violations persist throughout Haiti, particularly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, but rapidly spreading to other regions, including wider areas of the Artibonite and Centre departments. Between January and June 2025, violence led to the deaths of 4,754 individuals (4,216 men, 76 boys, 433 women, 29 girls), a 20.78 per cent increase compared with the 3,936 homicides reported in the previous semester. Violence also led to the injuries of 3,426 individuals (3,085 men, 53 boys, 261 women, 27 girls), a 33.52 per cent increase from the previous semester. However, there were 619 persons kidnapped (390 men, 26 boys, 186 women, 17 girls), a 30.76 per cent decrease compared with 894 in the previous six months (see annex 9).⁴⁹

59. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification about half the Haitian population (5.7 million people) is experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity. About 3.6 million people are at Phase 3 (Crisis) level food insecurity, while 2.1 million people are at Phase 4 (Emergency) level. As of June 2025, more than 8,400 people living in internally displaced persons sites were facing famine-like conditions, or Phase 5 (Catastrophe) level.⁵⁰

60. The Panel is particularly concerned about the 21-day kidnapping of six humanitarian workers by *Viv Ansanm* gang members in the Port-au-Prince area in early July 2025.⁵¹ They were later released.

2. Indiscriminate attacks and forced displacement: gangs' weapons of choice against the population

61. Two of the most widespread human rights violations committed by gangs are indiscriminate attacks and the forced displacement of the population (see [S/2023/674](#) and [S/2024/704](#)). In the Panel's opinion, these crimes are in many instances part of deliberate tactics employed by gangs to achieve multiple objectives, including the creation of buffer zones between themselves and State security forces or rival gangs; the expansion of territorial control to facilitate criminal activities such as illegal road taxation, looting, land spoliation and drug trafficking; and the destruction of police and government infrastructure to weaken the State presence. These actions are also used to instil fear and assert social dominance and criminal governance over communities.⁵²

⁴⁷ Interview with a government authority, July 2025, and with Haitian national police officers, March 2025.

⁴⁸ See also annex 8 on other human rights violations.

⁴⁹ United Nations Police Division data, January–June 2025.

⁵⁰ See annex 8, and <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159571/?iso3=HTI>.

⁵¹ Interviews with humanitarian actors, human rights defenders and civil society representatives, July 2025.

⁵² One example is gang leader Chrisla in Carrefour, Port-au-Prince, who has established a system of criminal governance within his area of control. Interviews with residents and human rights defenders and civil society activists, March–July 2025.

62. Accordingly, in the Panel's opinion, these violations should not be viewed merely as isolated or sequential events, such as attacks followed by displacement, but rather as interconnected elements of a broader criminal strategy deliberately aimed at consolidating power and enabling illicit operations.⁵³ This aligns with the Panel's comprehensive approach to human rights violations in Haiti.

63. During the reporting period, several communities saw gang attacks, including in the West department (in particular the communes of Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Gressier, Kenscoff, Pétionville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre), the Artibonite department (in particular the communes of Petite Rivière, Liancourt, Verrettes, L'Estère, Saint-Marc, La Chapelle and Désarmes) and the Centre department (including the communes of Mirebalais, Saut d'Eau and Lascahobas), causing hundreds of deaths and injuries, the destruction of public and private property and a historic number of internally displaced persons (see annexes 10–15).⁵⁴

64. The number of internally displaced persons reached a record high of nearly 1.3 million people (see annex 16). This represents about 11 per cent of the Haitian population and a 24 per cent increase since December 2024.⁵⁵ During the reporting period, the highest increase in internally displaced persons was in the Centre department, where the increase was from 67,608 to 147,230 (118 per cent), while in the North department the increase was from 64,621 to 115,657 (79 per cent). The municipalities that saw the highest displacement outside the capital were Gressier (West), Mirebalais (Centre) and Petite Rivière (Artibonite).⁵⁶

3. Sexual and gender-based violence⁵⁷

65. Sexual violence continues to be widespread in Haiti, with numerous incidents left unreported. Between January and June 2025, there were 4,852 cases of sexual and gender-based violence incidents reported, including 1,048 in June alone.⁵⁸ Nearly 1,000 cases were rapes, of which about half were collective rapes. The majority of gender-based violence survivors were women (78 per cent) and girls (14 per cent), with men accounting for approximately 6 per cent and boys 1 per cent of reported cases. Gang members committed 76 per cent of all cases of sexual and gender-based violence. In 63 per cent of reported cases of sexual and gender-based violence, the victims were internally displaced persons, making them the most affected group.⁵⁹

66. During the reporting period, the Panel received information about 25 girls and women (9 aged 15 to 18 years, and 16 aged 19 to 25 years) who were either raped,

⁵³ See A/HRC/59/46. See also <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the-weaponization-of-displacement-by-gangs-in-haiti/>.

⁵⁴ Interviews with human rights defenders, human rights analysts and victims, February–July 2025. See also <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/intensification-criminal-violence-lower-artibonite-centre-department-and-regions-located-east-metropolitan-area-port-au-prince-major-risk-haiti-and-caribbean-subregion> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf.

⁵⁵ See <https://www.iom.int/news/haiti-sees-record-displacement-13-million-flee-violence>.

⁵⁶ See <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-displacement-situation-haiti-round-10-june-2025>.

⁵⁷ Crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence remain largely underreported owing to stigma, fear of retaliation, mistrust in prosecutorial instances and limited access to essential services.

⁵⁸ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-juin-2025>. The Panel also received information from health-care providers and human rights defenders about an increasing number of sexual violence cases, mainly in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Confidential sources, July 2025.

⁵⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-snapshot-sur-les-incidents-de-violences-basees-sur-la-genre-vbg-de-janvier-juin-2025>. Note that, between January and June 2025, the Haitian national police reported 642 cases of rape (253 women, 386 girls and 3 boys). United Nations Police Division data, January–June 2025.

beaten and/or killed by members of the Simon Pelé gang in Cité Soleil, under the command of Stevenson Albert (alias “Djouma”).⁶⁰ The incidents occurred between January and March 2025. The victims were targeted for having refused to join the gang or having disobeyed orders, such as to enter rival territory. At least three were forced to become “girlfriends” of gang members, while others were punished for non-compliance with the orders of the gang leader.⁶¹ The Panel collected several testimonies that confirm these violations.⁶²

67. On 3 May 2025, a six-year-old girl died from injuries after a sexual assault in an internally displaced persons site in Cité Soleil.⁶³

4. Recruitment of children

68. Children continue to be widely recruited by gangs. Some estimates indicate that between 30 and 50 per cent of gang members are minors.⁶⁴ According to information collected in 2024, there were 2,269 grave violations against 1,373 children (699 girls, 618 boys, and 56 of unknown sex), a 490 per cent increase compared with 2023. Among these cases, 351 children were killed or maimed, 566 were victims of sexual violence and 302 were recruited by gangs, 158 of whom were used in combat.⁶⁵

69. Information obtained by the Panel confirms the increasing involvement of minors in combat operations,⁶⁶ underscoring the urgent need for programmes aimed at preventing their recruitment, as well as initiatives to secure the release and reintegration of children formerly associated with gangs while reinforcing the State’s capacity to address these issues.⁶⁷

5. Use of explosive drones outside a regulatory human rights framework

70. As part of the Government’s security operations against gangs, loitering munitions (explosive drones) have been employed as a key tactical weapon since March 2025. Between March and June 2025, at least 400 alleged gang members were killed and 307 injured as a result of 49 drone attacks.⁶⁸ In addition, an undetermined number of individuals not affiliated with gangs were also reported killed and injured.⁶⁹

⁶⁰ Djouma uses extreme violence against residents in his territory who disobey his orders. Confidential source. July 2025.

⁶¹ Confidential source, April 2025.

⁶² Testimonies are on record with the Panel.

⁶³ See <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/united-nations-humanitarian-coordinator-haiti-deeply-disturbed-tragic-consequences-violence-affecting-children-and-displaced-people>.

⁶⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/enduring-hope-haitis-children-midst-chaos>.

⁶⁵ According to verified information, children were recruited by “the *Viv Ansanm* coalition (64), Wharf Jérémie (39), Baz Gran Grif de Savien (31), Ti Bois (24), Bout Ba (20), Grand Ravine (20), 103-Zombies (19), unidentified armed gangs (18), Boston (16), Vitelhomme (Kraze Barye) (9), Delmas 6 (8), Team Ascenseur (6), Village de Dieu “5 Segond” (5), Kokorat San Ras (4), Simon Pelé 6 (4), Canaan (4), so-called Taliban (4), unidentified self-defence group (3), 400 Mawozo (2) and Ti Gabriel (2)”. See [A/79/878-S/2025/247](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/united-nations-humanitarian-coordinator-haiti-deeply-disturbed-tragic-consequences-violence-affecting-children-and-displaced-people).

⁶⁶ Interviews with human rights defenders and humanitarian actors, June–July 2025. Testimonies (May–July 2025) from victims of indiscriminate attacks in the West and Centre department also confirmed the participation of minors in combat operations.

⁶⁷ Since the 2024 implementation of the protocol on the transfer, reception and care of children associated with armed gangs encountered during operations to secure the territory, signed by the Government of Haiti and the United Nations system, about 178 minors have been reintegrated. Interview humanitarian actors, July 2025.

⁶⁸ United Nations Police Division data. January–June 2025. It is important to note that the Haitian national police does not always provide official data concerning targeted individuals or casualties during drone attacks. The numbers could therefore be higher than reported.

⁶⁹ Confidential sources. July 2025.

71. The Panel was informed that, in June 2025, drone operations in Martissant led to the deaths of at least two women and seven men who were not gang-affiliated.⁷⁰ The Panel obtained the testimony of a non-gang-affiliated victim who was injured during a drone attack in early June 2025 in Cité Soleil. According to the victim, the casualties included several gang members and several non-gang members.⁷¹ The Panel received other information that multiple casualties were non-gang-affiliated persons, but was also informed that victims often conceal the circumstances of their injuries out of fear of being mistaken for gang members.⁷²

72. While the Panel does not take a position on the specific means employed to address criminal activity, it recalls that the use of force must be strictly regulated and exercised within a legal framework consistent with international human rights law and based on the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, precaution and accountability.⁷³ Non-compliance with international human rights standards may result in serious human rights violations, such as extrajudicial killings.

73. The Panel expresses concern regarding the high number of casualties – more than 700 in four months – and the unregulated use of lethal force, particularly in densely populated areas, where the risk of human rights violations is high.

C. Arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo

1. Trends in the type of materiel being trafficked

74. Since it was first appointed, the Panel has documented and requested support from six Member States in tracing more than 180 types of firearms, as well as ammunition, including grenades. Over 95 per cent of the requests were sent to the United States and remain pending.⁷⁴ These firearms had either been seized at ports of entry or exit, or from gang members and other criminals and armed actors in Haiti itself. The Panel's data indicates that an increasing number of rifles are in circulation. Rifles represent 71 per cent of the Panel's trace requests during the current mandate, compared with 33 per cent during the previous mandate, the majority of which take 7.62 x 39mm-calibre ammunition, a shift from previous reporting periods where the majority of rifles seized took 5.56 x 45mm-calibre ammunition. This confirms that gangs are seeking to procure higher-calibre materiel, particularly 7.62 x 39mm- and .50-calibre rifles. The Panel also documented an increase in the number of large-capacity magazines seized.

75. The Panel identified several privately made firearms, known as “ghost guns”, most likely built in the United States with parts purchased from online retailers or using 3D printers, thereby evading the control processes that apply to manufactured firearms (see S/2024/704). These are not serialized and are therefore untraceable. For example, in December 2024, the Haitian National Police seized a privately made firearm built with an 80 per cent lower receiver produced in the United States⁷⁵ in the

⁷⁰ Confidential source, July 2025.

⁷¹ Confidential source, June 2025.

⁷² Interviews with health-care providers, human rights defenders, civil society organizations, March–July 2025.

⁷³ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/haiti-un-human-rights-chief-alarmed-widening-violence-gangs-expand-reach?sub-site=HRC>.

⁷⁴ On 3 September 2024, the United States authorities informed the Panel that “unfortunately, due to the confidentiality of ongoing operations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) is unable to release specific information about individuals involved in the seizure of firearms”.

⁷⁵ The receiver is the lower part of a firearm that generally contains the hammer, bolt or breechblock and firing mechanism. In the United States, it is the main regulated part of a

Cité Soleil commune.⁷⁶ The Panel also identified a 3D printed 5.56 x 45mm-calibre firearm seized in July 2025 in the North department. While the levels of circulation of privately made firearms is difficult to assess, this development presents a significant challenge to arms control efforts in the region.⁷⁷

76. Demand remains very high in the country, with prices remaining high and mostly stable (see S/2024/704, table 2). In Port-au-Prince, an AR 15-type rifle can be sold for between \$4,000 and \$9,000, and an AK-type rifle for up to \$12,000.⁷⁸ A round of 5.56 x 45mm-calibre ammunition costs between \$3 and \$5, and a 7.62 x 39mm-calibre round between \$5 and \$8. Prices are lower outside of Port-au-Prince.

Uncrewed aerial vehicles

77. Gangs have continued to procure commercial drones (uncrewed aerial vehicles) for surveillance and the coordination of attacks, which has significantly enhanced their fighting capacity (see S/2024/704, annex 25). Although Haitian customs and police regularly intercept commercial drones (see annex 21), their dual-use nature make transfer controls over this commodity very challenging. In June 2025, Dominican authorities arrested three individuals as they were buying drones in the country.⁷⁹ The Panel was informed that the drones had been destined for Izo (Hti.002).⁸⁰ The three individuals were handed over to the Haitian authorities in June 2025 (see annex 21). Evidence provided to the Panel indicates that, in addition to simple commercial drones, which he is buying from several similar networks, Izo is actively trying to acquire night-vision drones, as well as devices that would enable drones to drop explosives such as grenades.

2. Role of intermediaries in gang procurement

78. The Panel has previously highlighted the crucial role played by intermediaries in enabling the relationship between gangs and political, security and economic actors. While these intermediaries may have initially served as messengers or fixers, over time some have profited greatly from the transactions they facilitate and have become increasingly embedded in criminal activities. The Panel is investigating several key individuals, including Magalie Habitant, a long-time intermediary, including in facilitating the acquisition of weapons for gangs.⁸¹

79. Ms. Habitant was particularly successful at developing her network of contacts under the presidencies of Michel Martelly and Jovenel Moïse, under whom she was appointed Director of the National Solid Waste Management Service (Service national de gestion des résidus solides). This was a critical role that required close collaboration with individuals responsible for managing territories, including the local authorities or gang leaders that controlled certain parts of the country. The political power and financial gains from which intermediaries can benefit have created competition between Ms. Habitant and other intermediaries, sometimes

firearm. In total, 80 per cent of receivers are unfinished and require additional work to be completed privately.

⁷⁶ See, for example, a post on the official Facebook page of the Haitian national police, 27 December 2025.

⁷⁷ See Y. Yarina and N. Florquin, “Dangerous Devices: Privately Made Firearms in the Caribbean” (2024), available at <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-Situation-Update-2024-Caribbean-PMFs-EN.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Interviews with security officers and representatives of private security companies, June and July 2025.

⁷⁹ Interview with a security officer in the Dominican Republic, June 2025.

⁸⁰ Interview with a confidential source in Haiti, July 2025.

⁸¹ Interviews with confidential sources, February 2025, and several former and current senior government officials, 2025. Confidential report, 2025 (on file with the Panel).

involving threats and violence in their attempts to maintain influence.⁸² For years, Ms. Habitant was able to preserve her role.

80. Ms. Habitant has been involved in a range of negotiations with gangs, from brokering meetings to facilitating the release of hostages and transferring money to gangs from sponsors.⁸³ She provided *Viv Ansanm* gangs with cash and facilitated logistical support, including to Jimmy Chérizier (Hti.001). She was involved in the sourcing of arms and ammunition for gangs. In one specific case, she contacted Prophane Victor (HTi.006) to ask him to find 20 boxes of ammunition for Kempes Sanon, the leader of Les Argentins gang (see annex 22).⁸⁴

3. Cases of illicit trafficking and violations of the arms embargo

81. While “ant trafficking” networks continue to be used to move materiel from the United States or the Dominican Republic to Haiti, investigations conducted under the current mandate has shed light on certain networks operating with a higher level of sophistication, including the capacity to transfer large quantities of materiel efficiently across multiple jurisdictions.

82. Despite the steady flow of arms and ammunition that continues to arrive in Haiti in violation of the arms embargo, the Panel notes some efforts by the United States and Dominican authorities to enforce it. Both countries had recently conducted several interceptions and had either initiated or completed the prosecution of some traffickers identified in previous reports.

(a) Haiti

83. Although arms and ammunition are regularly seized by law enforcement within Haiti, no seizure of materiel at ports of entry in Haiti have been reported to the Panel since June 2024 (see annex 23). This absence of interceptions is concerning and highlights the limited access of law enforcement and customs officers to several land and maritime ports of entry, as well as their weak detection capacity and the persistent corruption within certain segments of the rule-of-law apparatus. For instance, in its previous final report, the Panel reported the largest seizure of firearms made in Haiti since the imposition of the arms embargo, involving a senior Customs officer who was caught red-handed in Cap-Haïtien in April 2024 (see [S/2024/704](#), annex 23). Despite the reluctance of some local law enforcement officers to arrest the individual when caught, he was eventually detained several days later. Despite compelling evidence of his role in the trafficking network, the individual was released without trial in July 2025, reportedly due to pressure from some powerful figures.⁸⁵

⁸² Interview with a confidential source, 2025. Confidential report, 2025 (on file with the Panel).

⁸³ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025. Confidential report, 2025 (on file with the Panel).

⁸⁴ Confidential report, 2025 (on file with the Panel); and interview with a confidential source, 2025.

⁸⁵ Interviews with Haitian and foreign confidential sources, July and August 2025.

(b) United States of America

84. Seizures of arms and ammunition heading to Haiti have mostly been made in the state of Florida, United States, or from containers coming from Florida (see annex 23). Data released by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives shows that the vast majority of illicit firearms recovered in Haiti between 2015 and 2024 that were successfully traced had been purchased in four Florida counties.⁸⁶

(i) Seizures at ports of exit

85. A limited number of seizures were made in the United States during the reporting period. On 31 October 2024, in the port of Miami, four rifles (5.56 x 45mm and .22 long rifle) and two magazines were seized from a box being transported in a container onboard a commercial vessel heading to Haiti.⁸⁷

86. On 16 January 2025, in Miami, the United States authorities seized 10 firearms, as well as 18 magazines and a barrel extension for a handgun destined for Cap-Haïtien. The seizure also included 2,286 rounds of ammunition.⁸⁸ The investigation conducted by the United States authorities led to the arrest of Williamson Dossous, a freight forwarder based in Miami (see annex 24). The case highlights the typical modus operandi reported by the Panel in its previous reports (see [S/2023/674](#)), with the use of straw-buyers and the concealment of firearms in used household goods packed in containers prepared by a freight-forwarder.

(ii) Prosecutions of traffickers

*Jean Robert Casimir*⁸⁹

87. Based on the tracing results of rifles recovered from gangs in Haiti, on 7 August 2024, the United States authorities arrested Jean-Robert Casimir, a naturalized United States citizen and former Haitian National Police officer who operated a private security business in Haiti. Between 2020 and 2024, Mr. Casimir was found to have trafficked firearms regularly into Haiti. He ran a network composed of various providers, transporters and buyers in Haiti. Although estimates are difficult, he himself procured at least 87 firearms for which the records show they were bought from a federal firearms licensee. He also procured many firearms from private unregistered sales, as well as a number of firearms from an online Internet-based manufacturer. Mr. Casimir used various shipping lines to transfer materiel to Haiti and regularly concealed them in air compressors (see annex 24).

*Jean Wiltene Eugene*⁹⁰

88. On 23 July 2025, Jean Wiltene Eugene, a United States citizen residing in Florida who owned a fuel station in the Croix-des-Bouquets area of Port-au-Prince, was sentenced to 30 months in prison and fined \$20,000 for smuggling firearms to Haiti. Mr. Eugene was found to have illicitly transferred firearms, including handguns

⁸⁶ Caribbean traced firearms database, from www.stopusarmstomexico.org/iron-river, based on documents released by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.

⁸⁷ Data provided by the United States Customs and Border Protection agency, in response to a request by the Panel under the Freedom of Information Act.

⁸⁸ Ibid. See also *United States v. Williamson Dossous*. Affidavit in support of a criminal complaint. Case No 1:25-mj-03347-LMR, and information provided by the United States in response to an enquiry of the Panel, August 2025.

⁸⁹ See *United States v. Jean Robert Casimir*. Criminal complaint, case No 24-mj-6599-AOV.

⁹⁰ Information provided by the United States authorities in response to a Panel query, August 2025. See also *United States v. Jean Wiltene Eugene*. Affidavit, case No 1:24-mj-00151.

and semi-automatic rifles, to Haiti between 2020 and 2022. The investigation by the authorities indicates that he trafficked weapons for the 400 Mawozo gang and was in regular contact with Joly Germiné (see S/2023/674, annex 32) and Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004). Mr. Eugene admitted to hiding firearms in vehicles shipped from Florida to Haiti.

*Ricardo Fermin Sune Giron*⁹¹

89. On March 2025, Ricardo Fermin Sune Giron was sentenced to 14 years in prison for firearms trafficking. He had been part of a large-scale criminal operation that, between 2023 and April 2024, trafficked more than 1,000 firearms, including handguns and rifles. He used straw-buyers to purchase firearms that he and his accomplices smuggled overseas, including to Haiti.

*Network engineered by Ernesto Vasquez and Derick Yamir Perez Diaz*⁹²

90. On 18 April 2024, Ernesto Vasquez was arrested by the authorities. He, along with Derick Yamir Perez Diaz, had operated a trafficking network whereby firearms were obtained in Florida from various sellers, including from a federal firearms licensee dealer and from Michael Adrian Nieto, a law enforcement officer in Florida, who were aware that the firearms they sold would be smuggled out of the country. Over 100 firearms were trafficked to the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Puerto Rico, including handguns, AR-type rifles, AK-type rifles and machine gun conversion devices. Mr. Nieto purchased the firearms from pawnshops and from Florida Gun Trader, a leading online marketplace. All four men are currently being prosecuted.

(c) Dominican Republic

91. Despite the efforts of the Dominican authorities to reinforce controls and prosecute illicit traffickers, the high demand for arms and ammunition in Haiti has fuelled trafficking networks in the Dominican Republic, where prices of ammunition have soared over the past three years near the border with Haiti.⁹³

92. The proximity of 400 Mawozo to the border facilitates its regular supply of ammunition from the Dominican Republic. The gang has recently launched major offensives in the Centre department (see sect. II.A) and consistently procured firearms and ammunition from the Dominican Republic, and its leader, Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004), plays a central role as a key reseller of arms and ammunition to other gangs.⁹⁴

93. Through its investigations, the Panel has identified two notable trends in trafficking from the Dominican Republic. The first involves Haitian non-State actors who procure materiel from the Dominican illicit market, typically facilitated by Dominican nationals. This includes primarily materiel that was originally transferred illicitly from the United States, as well as materiel diverted from Dominican national stockpiles. The second involves the territory of the Dominican Republic being used by traffickers to transit materiel directly from the United States to Haiti.

⁹¹ See <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/guatemalan-fugitive-living-united-states-illegally-under-fake-identity-sentenced-14>. See also <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article301845939.html>.

⁹² See <https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/florida-man-federally-licensed-firearms-dealer-pleads-guilty-weapons-trafficking>.

⁹³ For example, a round of 9x19mm ammunition was sold for less than \$0.50 cents in 2022 near the border, compared with almost \$3.00 now. Confidential source, 2025.

⁹⁴ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025. Interviews with security officers and border officers, 2025. See also S/2025/303, para. 28.

(i) *Acquisition of materiel from the Dominican illicit market*

94. Having already reported on several cases of materiel being acquired from the Dominican illicit market (see [S/2024/704](#)), the Panel investigated the cases below during the current mandate.

95. In July 2024, 5,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45mm-calibre ammunition were seized by the Haitian National Police in Mirebalais, Centre department, after a motorcycle rider was shot by a self-defence group⁹⁵ while transporting the illicit cargo.⁹⁶ The ammunition had been brought to Haiti from the Dominican Republic. The company that had produced the ammunition, Fiocchi Munizioni (Italy), confirmed to the Panel that the ammunition had been produced in 2022 and was part of a batch of 500,000 such ammunition delivered to the National Police of the Dominican Republic in 2022. The Dominican authorities opened an investigation that found that more than 900,000 items, mostly ammunition, had been diverted from its police stockpiles. The authorities conducted several arrests and provided the Panel with detailed information. The Panel appreciates the prompt and positive cooperation of Italy and the Dominican Republic during its investigation (see annex 25).

96. In March 2025, the Haitian National Police arrested a Haitian national living in Santo Domingo for trafficking ammunition to the Kraze Barye and Les Argentins gangs. The man crossed into Haiti through various border points to deliver materiel to the gangs.⁹⁷

97. The Dominican authorities also prosecuted several other individuals in connection with arms and ammunition trafficking. For instance, in August 2024, Placido Hernandez was sentenced to 10 years in prison for trafficking 5,700 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm-calibre ammunition in Elias Pina, on the border with Haiti, in 2022.⁹⁸

(ii) *Illicit transfers from the United States through the Dominican Republic*

98. On 22 January 2025, Dominican Customs intercepted a shipment of 37 firearms, including 30 rifles – mostly 7.62 x 39mm-calibre – and seven handguns, from a container coming from New York. At the time of the seizure, the Customs authorities did not find evidence that the shipment had been heading to Haiti. Investigators working on the case told the Panel that, given the identities of the individuals involved in the transfer and the type of materiel seized, the shipment was heading to Haiti.⁹⁹ The Panel sent a request to the United States to trace the shipment, for which a response is pending.

99. On 25 February 2025, at the Haina Port, the Dominican Customs authorities intercepted 23 firearms and 36,000 rounds of ammunition in a container transiting from Miami to Haiti.¹⁰⁰ This was the largest seizure of ammunition made since the adoption of the United Nations arms embargo (see annex 23). The firearms included 17 7.62 x 39mm-calibre rifles and 1 .50-calibre rifle. In Haiti, .50-calibre anti-materiel rifles and related ammunition have been increasingly seen in circulation, which would significantly bolster the firepower of gangs (see [S/2024/704](#)). The bill

⁹⁵ Interview with Mirebalais local authorities, August 2024.

⁹⁶ Similar boxes of ammunition were also visible in a video published by Lanmo San Jou, the leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, in which he brags about his stockpile of ammunition. See [S/2024/752](#), para. 18 and fig. 5.

⁹⁷ Post on the official Facebook page of the Haitian national police, 13 March 2025.

⁹⁸ Interview with Dominican law enforcement officer, 2025. See also <https://pgr.gob.do/fiscalia-de-elias-pina-obtiene-10-anos-de-prision-contra-hombre-arrestado-con-5700-municiones-para-fusiles-en-2022/>.

⁹⁹ Interviews with Dominican and foreign security officers, 2025.

¹⁰⁰ See <https://www.aduanas.gob.do/noticias/aduanas-detecta-36-000-capsulas-de-distintos-calibres-en-haina-con-destino-a-haiti/>.

of lading for the shipment indicated that the container had been loaded in Miami and had been destined to an individual named Guitho Senat in the border town of Belladère in Haiti. The materiel itself had been destined to several recipients, including Jeff Canaan. The Panel spoke with sources in Haiti, the United States and the Dominican Republic and provides an overview of the network and modus operandi. The Panel contacted the shipping company based in Miami, which did not respond.

(d) Diversions from national stockpiles

100. Despite the efforts of the Haitian National Police to address the theft of arms and ammunition, diversions from national stockpiles continued during the reporting period (see annex 26). Cases included diversions for onward selling or transfer to gangs, self-defence groups and civilians.

(e) Proliferation of firearms outside Haiti

101. The proliferation of firearms from Haiti is a major concern for regional Member States. According to the Panel's enquiries, there is little evidence to date about the proliferation of firearms from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and The Bahamas. However, the Jamaican authorities reported to the Panel that the drugs-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti continues (see annex 27).¹⁰¹

D. Drug trafficking

102. Historic drug raids – in which over one ton of cocaine was seized in the north-west region and nearly 2.7 tons of cannabis were seized in the Dominican town of Pedernales – revealed a long-reported driver of insecurity in Haiti that had been lacking evidence. The Panel had previously reported on how drug trafficking is a rising concern that is deeply interlinked with the current crisis in the country (see [S/2023/674](#) and [S/2024/704](#)). Drug trafficking sustains the economy of gangs, including 5 Segond, Grand Ravine, Canaan and Ti Bwa,¹⁰² fuelling the violence by allowing them to acquire weapons and expand territorial control. It empowers criminal networks of actors from various domains by providing illicit financial resources that reinforce their influence and impunity.

103. The Panel visited the country's northern (Cap-Haïtien and Ouanaminthe) and southern (Les Cayes and Jacmel) regions, as well as Dominican towns of Pedernales and Jimaní, and witnessed the high vulnerability of the country to drug trafficking due to a combination of geographic exposure; entrenched criminal networks composed of influential private actors, corrupt police officers and government officials; and low State oversight.

1. Drug trafficking in northern Haiti

104. Northern Haiti, which faces The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Florida, is a strategic corridor for drug traffickers. Prices are attractive, as the value of cocaine increases significantly at each stage as it is moved northwards, with 1 kg of cocaine costing around \$7,000 to 8,000 in Haiti, up to \$25,000 in The Bahamas and up to \$37,000 in the United States.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Response of Jamaican authorities to a written enquiry by the Panel, July 2025.

¹⁰² Interview with gang analysts, June 2025.

¹⁰³ Interview with Haitian national police officers, March 2025, and representatives of regional Member States, July 2025.

105. Traffickers, comprising Bahamians, Haitians, Colombians and Jamaicans, have used vessels mainly to reach poorly monitored beaches, bays and port areas across northern departments, including Port-de-Paix, Caracol, Limonade, Fort Liberté, Port Margot, Labadee, Limbé, Caracol and Borgne (see annex 28); as soon as they arrive, they are met by established networks, disembark quickly, collect payment and set off again.¹⁰⁴ For instance, on 13 February 2024, during an operation in the Fort Saint-Michel area, near Cap-Haïtien, the Haitian National Police anti-narcotics brigade (Brigade de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants) intercepted a vehicle carrying 192.5 kg of cannabis; on board were a Jamaican national, a Haitian driver and a minor, whose parents had paid \$2,000 for his illegal passage to the Dominican Republic.¹⁰⁵ The Jamaican national confessed that a boat with accomplices was waiting offshore to retrieve the drug shipment. In another case, four Bahamian nationals were arrested on 18 November 2024 in the Bande-du-Nord area of Cap-Haïtien with 5 kg of cocaine while they were travelling towards Labadee.¹⁰⁶

106. Drugs trafficked to The Bahamas – mainly cocaine on route to the United States – usually enter the Bahamians islands of Inagua and Mayaguana, originated from the northern coast of Haiti, including Port-de-Paix, Tortuga Island and Cap-Haïtien, and are transported by Haitian boats in hidden compartments. From South America, drugs are occasionally moved from island to island (“island-hopping”). In addition, the use of small private aircraft to smuggle cocaine from Haiti to The Bahamas has risen since 2021.¹⁰⁷ Local Haitian street gangs in The Bahamas, such as “Bush Life” and “Zoe”, engage in petty crime and small-scale drug distribution, using their links with Haitian gangs to bring firearms, drugs and persons into the country. Of note, the exchange of firearms for narcotics as part of cross-border barter system may occasionally occur. Over the past two years, The Bahamas has however recorded a decrease in trafficking between Haiti and The Bahamas. With the Haitian crisis, Bahamian-based traffickers have increasingly sourced cocaine directly from South America.¹⁰⁸

107. Notably, Tortuga Island, in the North-West department, is a well-known hub for regional drug trafficking, due to its remote location, weak oversight and access to international waters. Drugs arrive directly from Jamaica and Colombia and are dispatched to The Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands and Florida.¹⁰⁹ The Panel is investigating the seizure by Haitian National Police of 49 bags containing 959 packages of cocaine, in total weighing 1,045 kilograms. The drugs – packaged with different logos, suggesting they were intended for different customers – was intercepted on a vessel near the coast of Tortuga Island, on 13 July 2025. Four nationals from regional countries died, including from The Bahamas and Jamaica. This represented the largest drug seizure since the creation in 1995 of the Haitian National Police, indicating that Haiti remains a key transit hub in the Caribbean drug network.¹¹⁰

108. One technique used on Tortuga Island is the alteration of the appearance and the engines of stolen boats to avoid detection. In some cases, there is an overlap between drug trafficking and clandestine migration, with some vessels transporting both

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Haitian national police officers, March 2025.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with confidential sources, March 2025, and a confidential document dated February 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with confidential sources, March 2025, and a confidential document dated November 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Confidential document provided by regional Member State, July 2025.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with confidential sources, March and June 2025.

¹¹⁰ Interviews with confidential sources, July 2025.

people and narcotics along shared maritime routes.¹¹¹ On 5 April 2024, the Turks and Caicos Islands police arrested a Haitian national, Pharidson Jean Baptiste, while he attempted to enter the country on a stolen boat transporting irregular migrants.¹¹² The boat, the *Marauder*, had been stolen by Mr. Jean Baptiste in Providenciales in February 2024, and was found on Tortuga Island with two of the four engines removed. Mr. Jean Baptiste is the head of a group of Jamaican and Bahamians who specialize in stealing boats in the Turks and Caicos Islands and The Bahamas in order to transport drugs and firearms and organize clandestine trips.¹¹³ Another illustrative case is the seizure of over \$2 million worth of cannabis in Bird Rock and Jones Cay, in Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the detention of about 56 illegal migrants, in mid-August 2024.¹¹⁴ The Bahamas authorities have stated that the mixing of drugs and migrants is more frequent in non-traditional vessels using non-traditional migrant routes.¹¹⁵

109. The involvement of Haitian National Police officers in the trafficking network has contributed to stalled investigations and impunity. In August 2024, a major drug trafficking case unfolded in the Port-de-Paix region, North-West department, when authorities uncovered the movement by police officers of 130 kg of cocaine, part of an alleged shipment of around 250 kg of cocaine bound for Tortuga Island from a locality in Port-de-Paix, to be later transported to The Bahamas. Several police officers were implicated, according to the investigations. No clear progress in the investigation suggests the complicity of local authorities with trafficking networks.¹¹⁶

110. Underequipped and lacking operational capacity, the Haitian National Police struggles to respond effectively to the drug trafficking threat. At the time of writing, several vehicles belonging to the anti-narcotics brigade of the North department detachment were out of service. Despite many challenges, the unit has reported multiple drug seizures.¹¹⁷ Following the record cocaine seizure, the police seized 425.9 kg of cannabis and arrested three suspects in Madeline, Cap-Haïtien, on 28 July 2025. These reports, however, are likely to represent only a fraction of the actual volume of drugs trafficking across the region. While the maritime dimension of anti-narcotic operations underscores the need for a unified task force with the Haitian Coast Guard,¹¹⁸ only recently did the latter become operational, with two newly provided vessels. Previously, it had relied on a single low-capacity boat, severely limiting maritime surveillance.¹¹⁹

111. The porous and expansive border with Haiti, with informal crossings, further complicates enforcement. The Dominican province of Dajabón on the northwestern border with Haiti is a key entry point to smuggle cocaine and cannabis on commercial cargo vehicles. Prices on the Dominican domestic market are around \$6,500 per kilogram of cocaine and \$167 per pound of cannabis.¹²⁰ Multiple seizures by Dominican authorities suggest Haitian involvement in microtrafficking networks operating through Dajabón.

¹¹¹ Interview with confidential sources, March and June 2025.

¹¹² See <https://www.newslinetci.com/post/suspected-serial-boat-thief-charged>.

¹¹³ Interviews with coast guard officers, March, June and July 2025; and a confidential document, February and May 2024.

¹¹⁴ See <https://www.newslinetci.com/post/2m-marijuana-bust-56-migrants-held>.

¹¹⁵ Confidential document provided by a regional Member State, July 2025.

¹¹⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with confidential sources, and confidential documents, 2025.

¹¹⁸ Interview with confidential sources, March and June 2025.

¹¹⁹ Interviews with confidential sources, March and June 2025.

¹²⁰ Confidential document provided by a regional Member State, May 2025.

2. Drug trafficking in southern Haiti

112. Traffickers exploit the poorly monitored coastlines of the South, Grand'Anse, Nippes and South-East departments – close to South America and Jamaica – to move drugs towards Port-au-Prince, the Dominican Republic and northern routes leading to The Bahamas, the United States and Europe.

113. In April and June 2025, the Panel visited Les Cayes in the South department and Jacmel in the South-East department to follow up on the smuggling of cannabis, which is sustained by the close cooperation between Jamaican and Haitian trafficking networks, and of cocaine, which enters southern departments from South America.¹²¹

114. Traffickers use multiple methods to move and hide drugs. One involves concealing boats by submerging them near the shore. Another relies on dropping drug packages into the sea to be carried ashore by waves, and retrieving them later, minimizing detection. A third method uses small aircraft for aerial drops or landings in remote areas.¹²²

115. Regarding the drug-for-guns trade, Jamaican nationals arrive on small boats, mainly piloted by fishermen, and are received by local contacts in coastal towns, having formed strong connections with criminals in Haiti.¹²³ From January 2024 to July 2025, Jamaican authorities seized approximately 4,898.85 kg of cannabis on route to Haiti, equating to the value of about 308 firearms on the illicit Haitian market.¹²⁴ On 18 July 2025, a major drug raid in Toms River, St. Andrew Parish, Jamaica, in which over 1,360 kg of cannabis was seized, resulted in formal charges being brought against two Haitians in Jamaica. Jamaican authorities raised concerns about the potential entry into Jamaica of Haitian gang members, where they blend in with migrants and bring firearms to be exchanged for drugs.¹²⁵

116. The response to drug trafficking remains a challenge in southern Haiti. The Coast Guard – covering the South, Grand'Anse and South-East departments – is stationed directly opposite Île-à-Vache, which lies 10 km off the coast of Les Cayes and serves as a waypoint for the drug trafficking and drugs-for-guns trades. However, police officers lack maritime capacity, as patrol boats are non-operational.¹²⁶ Notwithstanding the multiple drug seizures reported, complicity has obstructed deeper police and judicial processes, allowing key actors to operate with impunity.

117. The Panel followed up on the aircraft seized at an informal airstrip in Ducis, les Cayes, on 19 October 2023 (see [S/2024/704](#)) and found that security personnel and government officials had had prior knowledge of the aircraft's landing and had allowed the drug operation to proceed unhindered.¹²⁷ On another note, findings from the Panel's visit to Jacmel raised further concerns over the growing influence of private actors controlling State ports.

118. The southern coasts of Haiti are also used as staging points for maritime shipments of cocaine from South America. Boats drop anchor near remote areas like Anse-à-Pitres in the South-East department, then once conditions are favourable (i.e. Dominican border patrols are reduced), the drugs are moved by sea to Dominican provinces, such as Pedernales. Dominican authorities have increased surveillance

¹²¹ Interview with a confidential source April 2025.

¹²² Interviews with confidential sources, April 2025.

¹²³ Interview with confidential sources, April 2025; and confidential report from a Member State, July 2025.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ See <https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/two-haitian-nationals-among-five-charged-in-9-3m-ganja-bust-in-jamaica/>.

¹²⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, March and April 2025.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

along the corridor between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales, and cannabis and cocaine have been intercepted in vehicles and on boats, as well as with individuals crossing the border by foot. The Panel is investigating the largest cannabis shipment, weighing nearly 2.7 tons, seized at the border in May 2025 in a truck coming from Haiti. In addition, a regional Member State has identified aircraft originating from Colombia using Haitian airspace.¹²⁸

E. Illicit financial flows

1. Economic outlook

119. The Haitian State is burdened by illicit financial flows, mismanagement and diversion of public funds critical for Haitian livelihoods. This has exacerbated the fragility of the economic system in a country still gripped by gang violence, thereby rendering the country more susceptible to instability.

120. The approximately 1.3 million internally displaced persons out of a population of 11 million (see section II.B) has a severe impact on the economy. In addition, tax revenues decreased from 6.3 per cent in 2023 to 5.2 per cent in 2024 as the economy contracted.¹²⁹ Challenges to the economy also include tax evasion, the import of contraband and the diversion of public resources.¹³⁰ The Panel found that, in addition to gang violence, the unregulated trade in elvers¹³¹ and the continued diversion of other public resources were further issues that harm the economy.

121. The impact of these challenges is mirrored in the country's trade deficit. In 2022, the country's international trade accounted for only 36.53 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP). By 2023, the country's imports exceeded exports more than threefold. Imports totalled \$3.72 billion, while exports reached just \$1.03 billion, mostly from the textile industry.¹³²

2. Trends in the exploitation and trade in elvers

122. The strategic location of Hispaniola Island, comprising Haiti and the Dominican Republic, offers proximity to the breeding grounds of the American eel (*Anguilla rostrata*) in the Sargasso Sea (see annex 29 below; and S/2025/356, annex 10B). For Haiti, the elver trade has the potential to be a greater generator of foreign exchange due to the high demand on the global market.¹³³ The trade is a lucrative activity in which exporters make between \$4,000 and \$5,000 per kilogram at export, although at the fishing point it is as low as between \$0.50 to \$1.50 per kilogram.¹³⁴

123. The opacity of the elver sector in Haiti makes it difficult to establish the total quantities exported annually, although some reports have indicated that the country's

¹²⁸ Interviews with a Member State's authorities, 2025.

¹²⁹ See <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e408a7e21ba62d843bdd90dc37e61b57-0500032021/related/mpo-hti.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Interview with an anti-corruption official, a trade analyst and trader, May 2025.

¹³¹ "Elvers" are young eels, also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels, or as "zangi" or "tizangi" in Haitian Creole. These are baby eels undergoing mass migration upriver from the sea. See <https://eeldepot.com/elver/>.

¹³² See <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/hti>.

¹³³ Interview with a trade analyst, a customs official and a freight expert, April and June 2025. See also <https://www.sustainableeelgroup.org/eldinero-haiti-the-export-of-eel-has-the-potential-to-be-a-great-generator-of-foreign-exchange/>.

¹³⁴ Interview with three fishermen and intermediaries in Leogane Carrefour, Borgne, February 2025. For prices in Port-au-Prince, see <https://www.selinawamucii.com/insights/prices/haiti/live-eels/>.

export capacity could be about 800 metric tons per year.¹³⁵ Overfishing has contributed to a significant decline in eel populations, leading to the inclusion of the American eel on the Red List of Threatened Species of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.¹³⁶ The trade in elvers is legal¹³⁷ and is governed by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, a legally binding instrument (see annex 30) that calls on States Parties to report their trade data.¹³⁸ Since Haiti is not a State Party to the Convention, its elver sector is largely unregulated, with issues of traceability and documentation lacking.¹³⁹

Supply chain in the elver trade in Haiti

124. In 2022, import data from one of the major markets that distinguishes imports by origin and consignment reported that over 95,000 kg of elvers had been imported from Haiti within a three-month period (October to December 2022).¹⁴⁰ In 2024, the secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora observed that Haiti is one of the countries in the region that have emerged as key exporters of elvers in recent years, and raised the need for more detailed insight into the harvesting and export processes.¹⁴¹

125. The lack of monitoring and data collection in the elver trade in Haiti predisposes the country to four environmental, economic and criminal vulnerabilities. The first is tax evasion: without formal records, revenue from elver exports escapes national taxation, depriving Haiti of potential foreign exchange earnings that could have contributed to the provision of livelihoods to citizens.¹⁴² Second is money laundering: the informal nature of the trade masks accountability, thereby facilitating the flow of illicit funds that leave and enter the economy through elver transactions.¹⁴³ Third is extortion by gangs: gangs impose informal fees on fishermen and transporters, effectively taxing the trade and using it to fund their egregious activities. The fourth is illicit trafficking: the lack of State oversight over the exploitation and trade of elvers provides a potential environment for the trafficking of illicit goods.

126. The Panel found that one businessman and influential politician is a major beneficial owner of the country's elver trade,¹⁴⁴ exercising direct control over a network of about 20 holders of export permits. Some permit holders own several

¹³⁵ Interview with a customs official aware of eel exports in Port-au-Prince. See also <https://www.juno7.ht/haiti-exploitation-danguilles-de-riviere-le-marndr-ne-recoit-plus-de-dossiers/>.

¹³⁶ Interview with a fisheries expert and two trade analysts. See also www.iucnredlist.org/species/191108/129638652.

¹³⁷ See https://trendeconomy.com/data/commodity_h2/030192.

¹³⁸ See <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/common/resources/TradeDatabaseGuide.pdf>.

¹³⁹ Interview with a marine law expert and a customs official, June 2025. See also https://www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/Country_presentation__template_Haiti_1.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ See https://asmfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/AmEelBoardSupplemental2Materials_2024SpringMeeting.pdf.

¹⁴¹ See <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/E-AC33-40.pdf>.

¹⁴² Interview with two customs officials and a trade analyst, November 2024.

¹⁴³ Interview with an investigative journalist, an environmental law expert and two political analysts, May 2025. See also <https://fcnhaiti.com/exportation-illegale-des-anguilles-lanaepa-attire-lattention-des-autorites-sur-la-contrebande-dans-la-filiere-peche/>.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with seven suppliers of elvers, three customs officials, a coast guard officer and two fishermen, February and June 2025.

companies, including shell companies used to conceal the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner.¹⁴⁵

127. Those involved in the individual's network employ a range of tactics to safeguard their monopoly in the sector and prevent State scrutiny. Chief among these is to ensure influence over individuals working under the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (Ministère de l'agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement rural), including sometimes by bribery.¹⁴⁶ Ministry officials play a critical role in protecting and advancing the individual's trade operations, including the issuance of elver export permits. The network of permit holders is coordinated by connections between exclusive elver exporters, through which the beneficial owner exercises control (see annex 31).¹⁴⁷

128. This network uses permits stating that the document is in conformity with the regulations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, however, the document does not include key information such as the country's export quota or the monetary value of the commodity (see annex 33).

Cases of exports of elvers

129. In addition to witness interviews, the evidence collected by the Panel includes two airfreight shipment documents dated January and February 2024, detailing the export of elvers from Port-au-Prince by some of the exclusive permit holders, whose cargo of elvers transited through Miami.¹⁴⁸ One shipment weighed 9,023 kg and the other totalled 10,575 lbs (about 4,796.7 kg). The two consignments were exported just five days apart (see annex 32). The Panel contacted the two airlines that ferried the two consignments. While one responded, the other had yet to respond by the time of drafting.

130. The airline that responded shared five export permits issued to one of the individuals in the elvers export network. Each permit was for the export of 50 kg (net) of elvers, totalling 250 kg (for the five permits). The airline also shared copies of the weigh bill and an invoice from its handling agent in Port-au-Prince, showing that the permit holder had paid \$53,788.75 (see annex 34) for the exports from the five export permits (see box below).

131. In 2025, export prices for elvers remained consistent with 2024, ranging from \$3.60 to \$4.50 per gram (see annex 35). One gram contains approximately 7 to 10 elvers, depending on their size.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁵ Concealment of identity is a common phenomenon used in money laundering and the financing of criminal activities. According to the Financial Action Task Force, beneficial ownership includes any natural persons on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted, even where that person does not have actual or legal ownership or control over the customer. See <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Guidance-transparency-beneficial-ownership.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, February and May 2025.

¹⁴⁷ Two confidential sources and a government trade and finance official, May 2025.

¹⁴⁸ Information triangulated through six confidential sources, including an eyewitness and one of the airlines that provided freight services, November and July 2025.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with two suppliers and a customs officer in Cap-Haitien, February 2025.

Profit margin from 250 kg of elvers

Based on the invoice in see annex 34 and the known price of \$4.50 per gram of elvers at export, the Panel was able to estimate the profit made by the permit holder from the net 250 kg exported using the five permits.

Gross profit: 250,000 grams (250 kg) x \$4.50 per gram = \$1,125,000

Net profit: This is calculated by taking the gross profit (\$1,125,000), minus freight costs (\$53,788.75) and other miscellaneous expenses (\$3,875), as follows:

$$1,125,000 - (53,788.75 + 3,875) = \$1,067,336.25^{150}$$

The permit holder therefore effectively evaded taxes and made a profit of about \$1,067,336.25 from the export of 250 kg of elvers.

The above represents a single export operation by one of the approximately 20 individuals who hold export licenses.

132. According to two eyewitness accounts and one customs official, shipments of elvers with similar quantities are exported through the Port-au-Prince airport two to three times a week during the elvers season (September to October).¹⁵¹ The major players in the Haiti elver trade operate with secrecy to avoid oversight and taxation (see annex 36).

3. Other forms of illicit financial flows

(a) Diversion of public funds

133. The continued financial crimes within State institutions and money-laundering in Haiti are among the major threats to the country's socioeconomic stability and the rule of law.¹⁵² In the past 20 years, only two high profile cases have been successfully prosecuted in Haiti, the latest being that of an inspector at the Directorate General of Taxes, who in November 2024 was sentenced by the Criminal Court of Hinche (Centre department) to four years in prison for embezzlement of public funds. The Court also ordered the restitution of the embezzled funds.¹⁵³

134. Despite the consistency of the anti-corruption unit in its investigations, several cases remain unprosecuted involving large amounts of money and implicating very influential figures from the business and economic elite. Some of the funds in question relate to critical sectors at the core of the peace, stability and livelihoods of Haitians. For instance, the former Director General of the Office for the Monetization of Development Assistance Programmes (Bureau de monétisation des programmes d'aide au développement), Patrick Noramé (see S/2023/674) and his colleagues were accused of embezzling G124,355,146 (\$2 million),¹⁵⁴ the proceeds of sales of rice that had been donated to Haiti by another State to combat hunger.

135. Several other cases that have had an impact on the stability of the country relate to Romel Bell, who from from 2018 to 2022 was the Director General of Customs at

¹⁵⁰ An intermediary involved in the trade stated that the price per kilo at fishing points was about \$1.50. The cost of transporting 250 kg to a freight agent was about \$1000, and wages and equipment cost about \$2,500.

¹⁵¹ Interview with a member of Haiti Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a customs officer and two confidential sources, June 2025. See also https://www.cipc.co.za/?page_id=16055.

¹⁵² Interview with two trade analysts and an anti-corruption officer, April 2025. See also S/2025/418.

¹⁵³ See S/PV.9844.

¹⁵⁴ The average exchange rate in 2016 was G63.0213 to the dollar.

the National Airport Authority, which is vital for airspace operations (see [S/2023/674](#)). Diversion of funds from these institutions is tantamount to sabotaging the security of strategic installations.¹⁵⁵ The Panel considers the diversion of public resources, particularly relating to sectors that provide basic livelihoods and public safety, as a threat to the country's stability (see also annex 37).

(b) Undeclared movements of cash to Haiti

136. Remittances from the Haitian diaspora play a significant role in the economy, often transmitted in bulk cash. This is due in part to Haitian society being largely cash-based owing to the country's informal economy, which represents about 48 per cent of its GDP, making it the world's eleventh biggest informal economy,¹⁵⁶ with limited bank account holders.

137. Despite these challenges, the livelihoods of Haitians has been supported in part by growing remittances from Haitians living abroad.¹⁵⁷ In the Dominican Republic and The Bahamas, migrant Haitians were the leading nationality in cases of seized cash due to a failure to declare at points of exit, or due to suspicious cash transfer activities, including "smurfing".¹⁵⁸ The Bahamian authorities informed the Panel that, following the seizure of \$100,000 at a Haitian airport that had been smuggled from The Bahamas in March 2025,¹⁵⁹ both countries collaborated in the investigations, and enhanced their monitoring mechanisms.

138. The United States recorded the highest number of interceptions of undeclared or illicit currency between Haiti and the United States, totalling \$3,473,988 (January 2022 to June 2025). Out of 109 seizures, only three cases (totalling \$58,192) were inbound (see annex 38).

(c) Disruption of commodity supply chains

139. The ongoing gang violence and cross-border trafficking continue to disrupt the supply of basic goods and services in across the country. The Panel highlights two of the several ways that this has affected the economy.

Cross-border trafficking

140. In an effort to combat cross-border trafficking networks, stop illicit trade (see [S/2024/704](#)) and maximize tax collection, the Ministry of Economy and Finance issued a circular dated 25 March 2025 directing Customs not to allow merchandise transiting via the Dominican Republic to enter Haiti, and rather to use Haitian seaports. The Panel found that this move had hardly any impact (see annex 39).

Throttling of the Port-au-Prince – Mirebalais – Cap-Haïtien route

141. The attacks on the Mirebalais social infrastructure, including a police station, a hospital, a prison and businesses, demonstrated the intensity of gang violence on

¹⁵⁵ Interview with a senior customs official, July 2025.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with an investment analyst and two bankers, April 2025. See also <https://www.worldeconomics.com/National-Statistics/Informal-Economy/Haiti.aspx>.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with a finance analyst from the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, June 2025. Also see, <https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/CR/2025/English/Ihtiea2025002-print-pdf.ashx>.

¹⁵⁸ Panel discussions with authorities in both countries, February and June 2025. In both countries, one is simply required to declare on exit any amount exceeding \$10,000.

¹⁵⁹ See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/03/04/flight-attendant-escapes-from-cap-haitien-airport/>.

social and economic hubs.¹⁶⁰ Since Mirebalais is on the route that connects Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien and Belladère, most activities were disrupted when gangs attacked the city in March and June 2025.¹⁶¹

142. Since March 2025, most trucking companies ferrying commodities between Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien either ceased operations or opted to use the sea route to gain access to the North and neighbouring departments. Notably, petroleum trucking companies transporting fuel to Cap-Haïtien became a major target and were left with only two options: pay heavy extortion fees to gangs in Mirebalais, or pay heavy costs to ferry fuel by sea.¹⁶² In either case, those costs cascaded to the consumer, resulting in higher fuel costs (see also annex 40).

III. Recommendations

143. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Security Council:

(a) Request the Haitian authorities to report annually to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) on the implementation of the sanctions regime on Haiti;

(b) In line with paragraph 13 of resolution 2699 (2023), request the Multinational Security Support mission to support the national authorities in enforcing the United Nations arms embargo;

(c) Urge Member States to provide the Multinational Security Support mission with the necessary resources to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police and customs in implementing the United Nations arms embargo, particularly in securing their access to ports of entry and in detecting and intercepting illicit arms and ammunition entering and exiting Haiti;

(d) Urge Member States to contribute financially to the Multinational Security Support mission and strengthen its capabilities, to enable the further expansion of its deployment in the West, Artibonite and Centre departments.

144. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022):

(a) Continue to consider the statements of cases and additional related information submitted by the Panel in 2023, 2024 and 2025 and update the entry lists and narrative summaries of individuals and entities designated pursuant to Security Council resolution 2653 (2022), as necessary;

(b) Call upon the Haitian authorities to identify a focal point for the coordination of the implementation of the United Nations sanctions regime in Haiti, and invite the focal point to meet with the Committee to share an assessment of the progress made and challenges encountered;

(c) Encourage Member States to build the capacity of the Haitian National Police and Haitian Armed Forces with adequate resources to combat gangs, including

¹⁶⁰ Interview with a Haitian national police officer and a business analyst, May 2025. See also <https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20250404-gangs-tighten-grip-on-key-towns-in-haiti-as-violence-and-protests-escalate>.

¹⁶¹ Interview with a petroleum dealer, July 2025. See also <https://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article31809>.

¹⁶² Interview with a member of L'Association nationale des distributeurs de produits pétroliers and a former member of the Chamber of Commerce, June 2025.

equipment and related training for operations, air assets such as helicopters, boats for the Coast Guard and all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles;

(d) Call upon the Government of Haiti to work with relevant humanitarian agencies, to improve the legal and regulatory framework governing the use of force, including the use of loitering munitions (explosive drones), in full compliance with international human rights law;

(e) Encourage the Government of Haiti, with the support of relevant regional organizations and other partners, to establish formal channels of communication and information-sharing with regional Member States to enhance collaboration in tackling transnational organized crime and other security threats;

(f) Call upon the Government of Haiti, with the support of national and international partners, to fully operationalize the two specialized judicial units established in 2025 – one dedicated to addressing mass crimes, including sexual violence, and the other dedicated to addressing financial crimes – by ensuring they are staffed with properly vetted personnel and granted the necessary autonomy and adequate funding to function effectively;

(g) Call upon the Government of Haiti, with the support of relevant humanitarian agencies, to design and implement an effective strategy for the protection and durable solutions for internally displaced persons;

(h) Encourage Haiti to accede to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and subsequently enact appropriate laws and regulatory structures in line with its protocols that govern the exploitation of and trade in elvers.

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Annex 1: Methodology

Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:

1. Providing an individual with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
 - a) Result in the individual destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
 - c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
 - e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines> and see also <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting>

Annex 2: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from October 2024 to August 2025

Member State	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA/visit accepted
Bahamas	1	1				1
Brazil	1	1				
Chile	1				1	
Dominican Republic	4	3				1
Jamaica	1	1				
Haiti	1				1	
Panama	1		1			
United States	3		1	2		
Company	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA
Freight company 1	1	1				
Freight company 2	1				1	

Annex 3 – Areas under gang control and influence in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments



The boundaries and names shown, and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Expansion of gang control in the Centre and Artibonite departments



Source: OHCHR Report - Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, Centre Department and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”, July 2025
 Esri, Maxar, Earthstar Geographics, and the GIS User Community
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff> - accessed date 2025/08

The boundaries and names shown, and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 4 - Profiles of main gangs within the *Viv Ansanm* alliance¹⁶⁴ - as of July 2025

Viv Ansanm has no single leader or structured chain of command. Each gang composing the alliance maintains its own chain of command and interests as shown in the table below. Jimmy Chérizier's (alias "Barbeque" – HTi.001) is not the leader but rather its spokesperson.

The number of members composing each gang is difficult to estimate, since there is no clear data on gang casualties or members recruited. Assessments on manpower across sources are also widely diverse.

<i>Viv Ansanm</i> - HTe.002			
Gang / Leader(s)	Locality	Criminal activity¹⁶⁵	
Delmas 6 Jimmy Chérizier alias Barbeque (HTi.001) <i>Viv Ansanm</i> 's spokesperson	Delmas (4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 30, airport crossroad)	Murder, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, arson, arms and ammunition trafficking.	
Belekou Following the killing of Iskar Andrice in 2023, Bendy Verdado is the current leader	Belekou, Cité Soleil commune	Murder, robbery, extortion, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion on trucks in/out Varreux terminal, arms and ammunition trafficking.	
Ti Bwa Christ-Roi Chery alias Chrisla	Ti Bois, Fontamara and Carrefour (excluding Mariani). Ti Bwa has about 13 cells in Carrefour	Murder, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, targeted assassinations, rape ¹⁶⁶ , drug trafficking, arms and ammunition trafficking.	
La Saline	Krache Dife Jean Gardy alias Pece Pim Pim	Downtown Port-au-Prince, Rues (St-Martin, Tiremasse, des Fronts Fort, des Remparts, Monseigneur Guilloux, du Quai, Pétion, du Peuple, du Centre, Montalais, St Laurent, Houille, Bonne Foi, Dr Aubry, Pavée, Macajou, Borgella, des Césars, des Miracles, des Caserne), St-Joseph, Bas Bel-Air, Delmas 2	Robbery, rape, kidnapping (in Delmas 19, 31, airport crossroads), murder, destruction of property, extortion, hijacking of trucks and goods, arson, arms and ammunition trafficking.
	Gang de La Saline Junior Bonheur alias Bout Janjan (escaped from prison on 2 March 2024)	La Saline, Aviation, Nan Charbon, part of Grand Rue	Robbery, murder, hijacking of trucks and goods, extortion, rape, arms and ammunition trafficking.

¹⁶⁴ This Annex is based on interviews conducted from 2023 to 2025 with people living in gang-controlled areas, gang and political analysts, representatives of foreign intelligence agencies, HNP officers and analysts, government representatives and confidential reports.

¹⁶⁵ This column includes main criminal activities that each gang has committed over the years.


¹⁶⁶ Although Chrisla prohibits his gang members to rape, acts of sexual violence are reported.

Gang de Pierre VI alias Obama	Duvivier, Cité Soleil, Pierre VI	Robbery, ransoming, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Simon Pelé Stevenson Albert alias Djouma (escaped from prison on 2 March 2024)	Simon Pelé, Cité Soleil commune	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Boston Mathias Saintil	Boston and Carrefour Drouillard	Murder, arson, rape, robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Baz Pilate Ezechiel Alexandre alias Ze (escaped from prison on 2 March 2024)	1st and 2 nd Avenues, Bolosse to Cité Eternel, 2 nd and 3 rd ruelle Cité-Plus (in 3 rd Circonscription), and part of Carrefour-Feuilles	Murder, robbery, rape, hijacking of goods and trucks, ransoming, targeted assassinations, drug trafficking, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Chen Mechan Claudy Célestin alias Stevenson Pierre alias Chen Mechan Claudy Célestin is a dismissed civil servant of the Ministry of the Interior	Santo 1 to Santo 19, Marin, and Shadda districts in the commune of Croix-de-Mission and Butte Boyer in the commune of Tabarre. Control parts of RN1	Murder, robberies, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Fort Dimanche After Mesidye was killed, Resan is the current leader	Fort Dimanche	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Gang de Tokyo Wooddensley Saintilaire alias Chalè	Tokyo, Delmas 2	Hijacking, robbery, rape, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Terre Noire Jonel Catel (escaped from prison on 2 March 2024)	Terre Noire, Cité Soleil et Carrefour Drouillard	Robbery, hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, rape, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Les Argentins Kempes Sanon	Haut Bel-Air, Fort National, Solino, and attacks in Nazon, Christ-Roy and Delmas 30	Kidnapping (from airport crossroads, Delmas 19, 33, 41, 47, 75), extortion, hijacking of goods and trucks, robbery, rape, murder, arson, arms and ammunition trafficking.
Kraze Barye Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005)	Tabarre commune (Torcel, Pernier and Haut Tabarre)	Murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, rape, robbery, spoliation of land, theft and sale of houses, hijacking of vehicles, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.

<p style="text-align: center;">5 Segond</p> <p>Johnson André alias Izo (HTi.002)</p> <p>Emmanuel Solomon alias Manno</p>	<p>Bicentenaire, the area from Rue Champs de Mars up to Village-de-Dieu, and part of Martissant (from 2B, in front of the police sub-station up to Martissant 4, until the coast), and zone Bas Peu de Chose (Rues Nicholas, Cameau, Alerte, Chavannes) and Rue Saint-Honore (downtown Port-au-Prince)</p> <p>The bay of Port-au-Prince (port Lafito, Cimenterie and les Moulins d'Haiti, including Source Matelas and Titanyen).</p> <p>Checkpoints in Downtown Port-au-Prince (Rue des Casernes, Rue Pavée, Route de la République, Bicentenaire, Portail Leogane, Route Dehoux, Rue de la Réunion, Rue Monseigneur Guilloux)</p>	<p>Murder, drug trafficking, kidnapping, vehicle theft, rape, robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods, arson, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Grand Ravine</p> <p>Bougoy</p> <p>Killik</p> <p>Tigriss</p> <p>Renel Destina alias Ti Lapli (HTi.003)</p>	<p>From 5th Avenue Bolosse via Martissant (1, 3, 5, 7,9,11,13,15,17,19, 21,23), habitation Le Clerc, Fort-St Clair, Route des Dalles, until Grand Ravine, RN2; Mariani 2 until entry of Leogane, (Carrefour commune); Gressier commune, part of Carrefour Feuilles.</p> <p>Checkpoints in DOWTOWN Port-au-Prince (Cemetery, Carrefour-Feuille, Rue Magloire Ambroise, Rue Edmond Paul, Rue Alerte, Avenue Christophe, Rue Capois, Place Jeremie), Pacot</p>	<p>Murder, kidnapping, rape, robbery, spoliation, hijacking of trucks and goods, drug trafficking, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">400 Mawozo</p> <p>Wilson Joseph alias Lanmo San Jou (HTi.004)</p> <p>Germine Joly alias Yonyon (sentenced to 35 years imprisonment in the United States)</p>	<p>Croix-des-Bouquets (except Canaan), La Tremblay, Dargout, Cottard, Papaye, Meyer, Thomazeau, Lilavois (access to Meyer), Ganthier, Mirebalais, Saut d'Eau, La Chapelle</p> <p>Also operates along the RN8 that connects Port-au-Prince with the border point of Jimaní.</p>	<p>Kidnapping, trafficking of drugs and weapons, spoliation, murder, rape, armed robbery, vehicle theft, hijacking of goods, summary executions, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Canaan (also known as Taliban)</p> <p>Jeff Larose alias Jeff</p>	<p>Canaan, Onaville, Jerusalem, Corail, Rosemberg, Lilavois, Bon Repos, Mirebalais, Saut d'Eau, La Chapelle</p>	<p>Kidnapping, land appropriation, rape, home burglary, hijacking of goods and vehicles, ransoming, murder, drug trafficking, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Wharf Jérémie</p> <p>Micanor Altès alias Monel Felix</p>	<p>Wharf Jérémie, La Saline, Fort Dimanche</p>	<p>Murder, robbery hijacking of goods and trucks, extortion, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Gran Grif (also known as Savien gang - HTe.001)</p> <p>Luckson Elan alias General Luckson</p>	<p>Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Savien, Liancourt, Pont Sondé, Carrefour Paye, Moreau Drouet, Hatte, Patchwal Controls part of RN1, and the secondary road 11, from Pont Sondé to Mirebalais, on Morne Pierre Paul and Chandelle, Liancourt commune</p>	<p>Murder, rape, robbery, destruction of property, hijacking of trucks and goods, violence against civilian population, kidnapping land spoliation, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>

<p>Kokorat San Ras</p> <p>Benji (brother of Ferdens Tilus alias Meyer, killed on 19 July 2025)</p>	<p>La Croix Périsse, Commune de l'Estère, Ti Bwadam, Gros Morne</p> <p>Controls parts of the RN1 and of the RN5, linking the Bassin-Bleu and Gros-Morne communes</p>	<p>Murder, robbery, rape kidnapping, hijacking of trucks and goods, arms and ammunition trafficking.</p>
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Annex 5 – Parallel system of governance in Carrefour commune by Ti Bwa gang



Since February 2024, the Ti Bwa gang, headed by Christ-Roi Chery (alias « Chrisla »), controls the commune of Carrefour (see Panel's final report S/2024/704).

Persistent armed confrontations between gang members and police officers since late May 2023, and attacks on two police stations, mid-May 2024, deprived the commune of police presence (see S/2024/704). Confidential sources stated that Chrisla holds a list of police officers whom he intends to kill, after having already executed many¹⁶⁷.

At least two armed gang members are placed in the entry of each neighborhood of the commune of Carrefour. Ti Bwa possesses sophisticated weapons including 5.56x45mm, 7.62x39mm and 50. caliber rifles, as well as drones. Several children are also part of the gang¹⁶⁸.

The area has not been attacked by Task Force drones and the commune remains a safe haven for *Viv Ansanm* gangs. Gang leaders, such as Izo, Barbeque and Ti Lapli, move freely and occasionally lodge in the commune, while wounded gang members search for medical assistance at a hospital in one of its neighborhoods. 5 Segond, Grand Ravine and Ti Bwa gangs even organized Carnival festivities in the commune, on 3 March 2025 in a clear sign of defiance and total control.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with confidential source, July 2025.

¹⁶⁸ *Idem*.



In December 2024, as part of the celebrations for the anniversary of Charlemagne Dorin (alias “Ti Bèbé Bougòy”), leader of the 103 Zombie group of the Grand Ravine gang (see S/2024/704), Ti Lapli, Izo, Lanmo San Jou and Barbeque staged a show of force with over thirty vehicles in Carrefour¹⁶⁹. Although Carrefour is seen as a refuge, by many IDPs from areas like Solino, Carrefour-Feuilles, Bas Delmas, and Cité Soleil¹⁷⁰, several witnesses that had recently fled Carrefour told the Panel about the increased gang violence imposed by Chrisla and his men over the neighbourhoods.

Behind an apparent normalcy in the commune lies a parallel system of gang governance which replaced public authority. For instance, in Carrefour, the economy is heavily reliant on the informal sector, in which owners of informal businesses and traders are forced to pay taxes to Chrisla. In addition, he owns a gas station, from which local traders regularly buy fuel¹⁷¹.

He also significantly impacts the education sector. On 30 June 2025, national exams were held under his gang oversight with the tacit acceptance of education authorities. An alleged agreement involved paying Chrisla for the holding of the exams, on the condition that his armed men participate in their surveillance. Public schools are also obliged to pay taxes to gang members¹⁷². Additionally, as other gang leaders (see Panel’s final report S/2023/674), Chrisla runs a parallel justice system, imposing rules and punishments, that can involve torture, arrests in “his prison” and death.

In late April 2025, a reported agreement with a commission lifted the full three-day shutdown - that paralyzed schools, public services, and businesses - imposed by Chrisla across the commune, as he was trying to impose a relative as the mayor

¹⁶⁹ Interview with confidential sources, 2025.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with confidential sources, 2025.

¹⁷¹ *Idem*.

¹⁷² *Idem*. See also: <https://gplmedialibre.com/2025/06/30/examens-officiels-a-carrefour-quand-letat-compose-sous-la-protection-des-gangs-armes/>

of the commune¹⁷³. Further, on 20 June 2025, Chrisla led a public demonstration, where residents and armed men marched together, ironically calling for peace, while condemning the use of explosive drones against gangs and calling for the TPC to step down¹⁷⁴.

Chrisla's de facto control of Carrefour is reportedly backed by several political and economic actors to suppress the rise of people's movements, notably in view of elections, and control the movement of goods throughout the area – including drugs, fuel and eels – as Carrefour is strategically located in the southern gateway out of Port-au-Prince¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷³ UNPOL report, April-May 2025, Interviews with confidential sources and interview with gang analyst, May 2025.

¹⁷⁴ See also:

<https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-securite-a-carrefour-les-gangs-mobilisent-ironiquement-la-population-pour-reclamer-la-paix/>

¹⁷⁵ Confidential sources, April and July 2025.

Annex 6: *Viv Ansanm* assaults against Kenscoff commune

The rural and mountainous commune of Kenscoff remains an important source of agricultural produce in Haiti and holds strategic significance as a critical alternative route linking the West department and the southeast of the country, bypassing the gang-controlled National Road 2 (RN#2) (see [S/2025/356](#)). It has five communal sections and borders the communes of Pétion-Ville (to the North and South); Carrefour (to the North and West); Belle-Anse and Marigot (South); Croix-des-Bouquets (East), and Jacmel (West)¹⁷⁶.

From January until April 2025 at least five major attacks were recorded by the authorities of Kenscoff as follows:¹⁷⁷

First major attack

On 27 January 2025, gangs from *Viv Ansanm* (Grand Ravine, 5 Segond and Ti Bwa¹⁷⁸) launched a major assault against Kenscoff. Aiming to taking over the city centre, gang members first arrived in Carrefour Berthe, then crossed over to the bushes to reach Berly, before entering Godet, about 5 km from Belot, where they looted and burnt houses and vehicles and murdered farmers. Dispatched to the scene, the police slowed their advance, and gang members returned to Carrefour Berthe and surrounding areas, including Quiquoit, Bois Major, Ti Place, Tête Morne, Prévite, Saint Antoine, Débauché, Boucanbou, Kay Bèt, Lafontan, Tet Bawèt, La Source and other localities. Gang members massacred peasants, burned their houses and kidnapped people. They stole local crops and livestock, and made incursions to new places, leaving behind bodies and wounded people as they retreated¹⁷⁹.

According to a UN report on the attacks, between 28 January and 4 February 2025, renewed fighting occurred in Belot between security forces and members of the Ti Bwa gang, originating from Beli. While police operations forced gang members to retreat towards Bois Major, on 3 February 2025, the 400 Mawozo gang deployed a hundred men in support of Grand Ravine, Ti Bwa, and 5 Segond gangs¹⁸⁰.

Second attack

Passing through Nan Panyol, gang members from 400 Mawozo, Grand Ravine, Ti Bwa, and 5 Segond invaded the Teleco site, in the locality of Obléon - housing telecommunications antennas and infrastructure – in the early hours of 16 February 2025. The location also serves as a base for the Haitian (FAd'H) and the Protected Areas Security Brigade (BSAP). One FAd'H officer and two BSAP agents were killed, as well as a mother and her young son, who were burned on the spot. Several people were kidnapped. In several areas, homes were ransacked and set ablaze, and residents and livestock killed. The police arrived at the scene, driving off the attackers and freeing the hostages.

Third attack

On 3 March 2025, gang members advanced, attacking the population of Carrefour Badio, where they set up a base, not far from Furcy, on the road leading to the southeast of the country. Two residents were kidnapped. From there, they used motorbikes for back-and-forth travels between Kafou Badio and Nan Fleurant, in the Nouvelle Touraine communal section. On 20 March 2025, they set fire to equipment belonging to the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications that had been made available to the town hall for the development of the road leading to the southeast of the country.

Fourth attack

On 24 March 2025, the localities of Boukan and Depanse – opposite Thomassin 48, a neighborhood on the mountainside south of Pétion-Ville – were awakened by shootings. Gang members killed, kidnapped and injured residents and looted and burned houses.


¹⁷⁶ Confidential document, April 2025.

¹⁷⁷ Interviews with local authority, July 2025 and confidential document, April 2025.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with gang analyst, 2025.

¹⁷⁹ Interviews with gang analyst and local authority, 2025 and confidential document, April 2025.

¹⁸⁰ OHCHR/BINUH Flash report on the events in Kenscoff, April 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff>.



OHCHR Report - Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, Centre Department and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”, July 2025

Fifth attack

On 11 April 2025, at around 3 a.m., three vehicles belonging to the HNP were set on fire by gang members based in Belot, who had already set fire to part of the Hotel Le Montcel during the previous week, and a luxury residence in the area. Several people were injured, one police officer went missing, while three vehicles were set on fire and weapons and ammunition seized by gang members. While police operations were at standstill, gangs took control of the communal sections of Bongard (including Kafoubet, Quicroit, Belot, Nan Koupi, Depanse), Sourçailles (Kafou Badjo, Mon Kavri, Mòn Zonbi, Ti Riyobe), and of the road leading to the southeast, in the Timisca-Kajak section of the Nouvelle Touraine communal section. As they move along, they continued to kill farmers and burn houses. Occasional reports of kidnapping have surfaced, with ransom demands reaching significant amount.

In Belot, they looted and burned the homes of several residents and set fire to one of the country's ecological and tourist heritage sites called Montcel. Localities such as Toujo, Anba Jaden, Lazontière, Viard, which are very close to the city centre were attacked.

Persistent attacks and estimated 60% of Kenscoff under gang control

On 9 May 2025, gangs attacked the Furcy police station, which was later retaken by security officers, but finally burnt by gang members, mid-July 2025¹⁸¹; which highlights the urgent need of consolidating any gains with security operations.

During the night of 2 to 3 August 2025, armed men broke into an orphanage in Tèt Bwapen locality, kidnapping eight people, including a three-year-old child and a caregiver for people with reduced mobility. At the time of writing, they had not been released¹⁸².

The security situation deteriorated further on the morning of 7 August 2025, while gang members ambushed an MSS/HNP patrol in Kenscoff, setting on fire two MSS armoured vehicles and wounding three MSS officers. A few days later, in the night of 12 to 13 August 2025, an HNP armoured vehicle was immobilized in a trench created by gang members and was later set ablaze. Consequently, two police officers were killed and four rifles, two handguns, several magazines, ammunition, bulletproof vests, and other items were stolen, which Izo 2 – a leader of the 5 Segond gang in Kenscoff – displayed in a video¹⁸³.

While attacks persist at the time of the drafting, estimations suggest at least 60% of Kenscoff is under gang control. As of July 2025, the gangs created a stranglehold on the town of Kenscoff by controlling the roads leading to Kenscoff from Carrefour to Clemenceau, Belot, Bongard, Depense, Nan Croupi and Godet, up to Viard, which is still held by the HNP. The gangs also control Carrefour Badio on the road leading to Seguin, Furcy and Obleon¹⁸⁴.

Gang strategies

In preparation for the assaults, gang members received information from residents in the area (antennas), who served as guides during field recognition visits for each group of about a dozen gang members. Gang cells were set up every few meters, for one cell to support another. Weapons and ammunition were transported in rucksacks or hidden in water and fuel cans, moved through the hills on the backs of donkeys or motorcycles, and hidden in abandoned houses, close to the targeted locations¹⁸⁵.

Gang members started infiltrating Kenscoff through nearby areas. According to residents, within a few days, their numbers had risen from just a few dozen to a thousand individuals. Gang members have proven to be well-prepared and well-advised. They are encouraged to fight using local drugs and through financial compensation. After combats, they must bring back their weapons; otherwise, they are killed. In each gang unit, one or two individuals are equipped with gasoline and Molotov cocktails to destroy and burn properties¹⁸⁶.

In July 2025, two gang hideouts have been dismantled in Kenscoff, including one nearby the police station, where gang members had dug several internal walls to communicate with the exterior. These houses were run by women who bring in gang members at night¹⁸⁷. Gang members mostly attack during nighttime¹⁸⁸.

Delayed government response and HNP operations hindered by limited means

According to local authorities and residents, the commune is bearing the cost of institutional inaction. Since 2021, a Council Commission has continuously raised security concerns to relevant authorities, besides proposing a security plan, comprising the establishment of police stations, the deployment of police units and the enhancement of police operational capacity – yet with limited response¹⁸⁹.

¹⁸¹ UNPOL reports and interview with gang analyst, 2025.

¹⁸² Interviews with local authority and on-ground source, August 2025.

¹⁸³ Interviews with local authority, gang analyst, on-the-ground source, August 2025. Video on file with the Panel.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews with local authority and on-ground source, July 2025 and confidential document, April 2025.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with confidential source, 2025.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.


¹⁸⁷ Interview with confidential source, July 2025.




¹⁸⁸ Interview with local authority, July 2025.

¹⁸⁹ *Idem*.

Facing the threat of the attack, municipal authorities introduced a series of precautionary actions, including imposing a curfew¹⁹⁰. Despite prior alerts to the government authorities about the planned attacks, the Police only deployed five hours after the attacks began, when 24 residents were already dead, and approximately 70 residences burnt¹⁹¹.

Law enforcement operations have been hampered by the lack of tactical security equipment and personnel - to make things worse, about a dozen vehicles were lost in Kenscoff. In a video broadcasted on 7 August 2025, gang members filmed two vehicles of the MSS burning, after they again invaded de Teleco site¹⁹². Between 27 January and 27 March 2025, eight police officers were killed¹⁹³. Moreover, many communal sections are inaccessible by the HNP, while gang members move between areas either riding motorbikes or on foot.



	road accessible by car
	road accessible by motorbike and under gang control
	trails accessible by foot, used by gang members to move between areas

Source: confidential source, 2025.

Map data: Google @2023 Airbus, Imagery Date: 5/7/2023

"Google Earth" map annotated by the Panel

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Gangs have dug trenches, destroyed parts of the road and erected blockades to prevent movements¹⁹⁴. Besides, security forces lack helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, motorbikes, drones and tactical equipment, including for undertaking operations during nighttime, when gangs mainly attack.

¹⁹⁰ Interviews with local authority and residents, February and July 2025.

¹⁹¹ OHCHR/BINUH Flash report on the events in Kenscoff, April 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff>

¹⁹² Video on file with the Panel. Interviews with local authority, gang analyst and on-ground source, July 2025.

¹⁹³ Interview with international security officer, local authority and OHCHR/BINUH Flash report on the events in Kenscoff, April 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff>.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with HNP officers and local authority, July 2025.



Photograph provided by local source in July 2025 showing parts of the road destroyed by gang



Photograph provided by local source in July 2025 showing police officers and residents filling in sections of the road damaged by gangs

Casualties and impact

Between 27 January and the end of March 2025, BINUH reported at least 115 victims during the several attacks launched against different localities in Kenscoff¹⁹⁵, with 700 houses burned, more than 28 people kidnapped, and about ten women raped, in the same period¹⁹⁶. Additional 28 people were killed during new attacks undertaken between April and June 2025 in the localities of Belot, Godet, Furcy, Kenscoff 77, Platon Café and Viard¹⁹⁷.

Municipal authority however estimated over 500 civilians killed, from January to July 2025. The Panel received even higher estimates, informing that families of residents reported 813 deaths in the same period (31 children, 782 adults, 589 men, and 193 women), across several localities of the commune¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁵ OHCHR/BINUH Flash report on the events in Kenscoff, April 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff> and BINUH Quarterly Report in the Human Rights situation in Haiti, April-June 2025. See: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

¹⁹⁶ Confidential document, May 2025.

¹⁹⁷ OHCHR/BINUH Flash report on the events in Kenscoff, April 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ohchrbinuh-flash-report-events-kenscoff> and BINUH Quarterly Report in the Human Rights situation in Haiti, April-June 2025. See: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

¹⁹⁸ Interview with municipal authority and on the ground source, July 2025.

The seizure of Kenscoff would afford gangs with influence over the capital's food supply. The control over Kenscoff route leading to southern Haiti has greatly hindered the capital's food distribution and the aid delivery. During the Panel's visit to southern Haiti, in April and June 2025, sources emphasized the scarcity or complete absence of medical supplies, along with a significant increase in food and fuel prices¹⁹⁹. Farmers have been completely deprived of their livelihoods following the theft of their livestock and agricultural goods by gang members. Thousands of people have been displaced²⁰⁰.

Kenscoff continues to be the epicenter of violence in Port-au-Prince and a key objective for gangs who are aiming to conquer Pétion-Ville. Gang attacks on Kenscoff have reportedly been backed by influential individuals which had created internal strife within the Haitian governing structures.

¹⁹⁹ Interviews with civil society representatives, April 2025.

²⁰⁰ Interviews with on-the-ground source, July 2025.

Annex 7: *Viv Ansanm*'s attacks in the Centre department

The control of roads crossing the Centre department (RN3, RD11, and RD305) as well as border points such as Belladère is key to gangs as they seek to gain revenue by extorting road users and to ensure the flow of weapons and drugs. Located about 50 km northeast of the capital, Mirebalais strategically lies at the crossroad connecting the east, center, north and west of the country. It is roughly 35-40 km distant from Belladère, at the border with the Dominican Republic. Mirebalais is also a major commercial hub in Haiti, since many people have relocated their businesses to Mirebalais, due to the violence in the capital²⁰¹.

For instance, in late September 2023, the Canaan gang, led by Jeff Larose (alias “Jeff”), was mobilized by 5 Segond gang, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo” – HTi.002), to attack Saut-d’Eau commune, Centre department, as Izo wanted to recover a substantial shipment of drugs and firearms²⁰². This incident, marking the first incursions of gangs of the capital into Central Plateau, sparked violence in Mirebalais and Saut d’Eau towns (see S/2024/253) and prompted self-defense groups to set up roadblocks along the RN3, therefore hindering circulation of weapons into Haiti and reducing criminal income along the road²⁰³.

Attacks against Mirebalais and Saut-d’Eau communes

From late March to early April 2025, about 200 armed members belonging to the gangs of Canaan and 400 Mawozo, led by Joseph Wilson (alias “Lanmo San Jou” – HTi 004), launched repeated attacks against two major communes of the Centre department, namely Mirebalais and Saut-d’Eau. These areas are now under gang control. The taking over of Mirebalais and Saut-d’Eau represents a turning point in the spreading of gang violence by *Viv Ansanm* gangs outside of the West department. In April 2025, Jeff warned that his next objective was to attack Hinche, the main city of the Centre department, located about 70km north from Mirebalais²⁰⁴.

In retaliation for the placement of a roadblock by a self-defense group in the town of Trianon (2nd communal section of Grand Boucan), the Canaan and the 400 Mawozo gangs, launched several attacks. On 21 March 2025, they first burst into Trianon town, before advancing towards Terre Rouge (Mirebalais commune), where they destroyed police stations and homes of residents²⁰⁵.

They further progressed to downtown Mirebalais, where, on the eve of 31 March 2025, these gangs launched a major attack²⁰⁶. In downtown Mirebalais, they set fire to residences, private buildings and vehicles as well as to the Mirebalais market and the Police station. Gang members also released over 500 inmates from the Mirebalais prison and set fire to it²⁰⁷. Many escapees joined the gangs of *Viv Ansanm*²⁰⁸. According to a UN report, at least 15 people were killed, while inside their homes or in the streets²⁰⁹. Among the victims were two Catholic nuns from the Sainte-Thérèse congregation who taught

²⁰¹ Interview with gang analyst, July 2025.

²⁰² Interviews with national and international gang analysts, government officials, HNP officers, civil society representatives and health staff, 2023 and January, February 2024.

²⁰³ Interview with gang analyst, April 2025, and OCHR report “Intensification of criminal violence in Lower Artibonite, the Centre Department and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”. See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/intensification-criminal-violence-lower-artibonite-centre-department-and>

²⁰⁴ Video on file with the Panel.

²⁰⁵ Interview with a representative of Mirebalais local authorities who had just fled the area, April 2025, and BINUH : Rapport trimestriel sur la situation des Droits de l’Homme en Haiti, Janvier-Mars 2025. See : https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_trimestriel_sur_la_situation_des_droits_de_lhomme_en_haiti_janvier_-_mars_2025.pdf

²⁰⁶ *Idem*.

²⁰⁷ See also: <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article303164291.html> and <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn05ek5gw0wo>

²⁰⁸ Interview with gang analyst, July 2025.

²⁰⁹ OHCHR Report - Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, Centre Department and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”, July 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>

at the École Nationale in Mirebalais. A national human rights organization reported that, from the eve of 31 March to 8 April 2025, more than sixty individuals were killed, including civilians, gang members and escaped prisoners²¹⁰.

Fearing armed attacks, on the same day, staff and patients evacuated the University Hospital in Mirebalais, which is a 350-bed teaching hospital, and one of the few facilities in the country providing treatment for cancer, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. Of note, the hospital had already been attacked by members of the Canaan gang on 26 September 2023, when more than 350 patients were present, of which many in intensive care. The hospital's neonatal intensive care unit had also been targeted by gunfire²¹¹. Since 31 March 2025, armed bandits have occupied the town, keeping the population of Mirebalais in a state of terror.

After seizing Mirebalais, Canaan and 400 Mawozo gangs extensively looted the many local businesses but lacked storage capacity. Therefore, they called in more gangs from the capital to help with the looting, that lasted about one month and a half²¹².

The nearby Saut-d'Eau commune, situated about 15 km west of Mirebalais, was also targeted by the Canaan gang, on 31 March 2025. The following day, a government-contracted helicopter operating over Saut-d'Eau was hit by at least one projectile, and one passenger was slightly injured. On 3 April 2025, more than 600 gang members took control of Saut-d'Eau, triggering police officers and residents to flee²¹³. The attacks led to massive displacements.

With the institutional vacuum, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs have entrenched control in Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau. They have been managing access points and promoted activities framed as public services, such as the organization of cleaning campaigns. Simultaneously, they terrorize the population. On 8 June 2025, gang members burnt the Mirebalais public market. Local frustration led residents of Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau to occupy the Péligre hydroelectric plant on two occasions in mid-May and mid-June 2025, to denounce state inaction, which triggered major power outages in the Centre and West departments. At the time of writing, both communes remain under gang control²¹⁴.

In a video posted on social media²¹⁵, Lanmo Sanjou, Jeff and Barbeque gathered in Saut-d'Eau to enjoy the festivities of the Vyèj Mirak (miracle of the Virgin Mary) festival, in July 2025. They joke about their popular support and control of the capital.

Arms trafficking and the attacks on Mirebalais

➤ Mirebalais, key point for illicit arms trafficking from the Dominican Republic

Located at the point at which the RD305 bifurcates from the RN3 and heads east towards the Dominican border, Mirebalais is a key transit town for arms and ammunition trafficking between the Dominican Republic – via the border town of Belladère – and the Haitian capital, Port au Prince²¹⁶.

Several seizures of illicit arms and ammunition have been made in the last year, either by local self-defence groups or the Haitian authorities. For instance, the Panel reported the seizure in July 2024 by a self-defence group near Mirebalais of 5000

²¹⁰ RNDDH report, April 2025. See: <https://web.rnddh.org/fall-of-two-communes-in-the-centre-department-into-the-hands-of-armed-gangs-transitional-authorities-worsen-the-countrys-security-crisis/?lang=en>.

²¹¹ Interview with the Hospital Director, January 2024. See also: <https://www.pih.org/article/statement-armed-attack-hopital-universitaire-de-mirebalais-haiti>.

²¹² Interviews with gang and security analysts, July 2025.

²¹³ Interview with gang analyst and BINUH : Rapport trimestriel sur la situation des droits de l'homme en Haïti, Janvier-Mars 2025. See : https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/rapport_trimestriel_sur_la_situation_des_droits_de_lhomme_en_haiti_janvier_-_mars_2025.pdf

²¹⁴ Interviews with gang and security analysts, 2025, and OHCHR Report - Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, Centre Department and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince”, July 2025. See: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>

²¹⁵ Video on file with the Panel.

²¹⁶ Interviews with local authorities and gang analyst, February 2024 and June 2025.

rounds of 5.56 ammunition that had been diverted from Dominican Police stockpiles (see Annex 25). More recently, in March 2025, more than 10 000 rounds of ammunition and three firearms were seized by the self-defence group of Trianon²¹⁷.

The increased number of barricades set up by self-defence groups, particularly in Trianon – around 12km to the south of Mirebalais – have partially frustrated the efforts of gangs in Port-au-Prince to procure arms and ammunition or conduct extortion operations along the road. These barricades were among the factors that prompted the attacks by 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs in March²¹⁸.

Finally, the prison of Mirebalais was attacked and more than 500 prisoners set free²¹⁹, including several arms traffickers²²⁰.

➤ **Firearms used by 400 Mawozo and Canaan during the attacks**

The Panel spoke to several individuals who witnessed the attacks first hand and described gang members as having been equipped mostly with assault rifles, as well as hand guns and shotguns²²¹. A confidential intelligence report, as well as security sources in Haiti, indicate that Jeff Canaan received weapons and ammunition for the Mirebalais assault from individuals plotting to overthrow the transitional government²²².

The Panel obtained detailed information about seven firearms seized by local authorities in Mirebalais in March 2025 from 400 Mawozo and Canaan gang members. Five out of the seven firearms are 7.62x39mm rifles, confirming the trend that the Panel highlighted in its previous final report (S/2024/704) that this caliber of ammunition is increasingly used by gangs. Based on its analysis, the Panel concludes that at least four of these firearms were either manufactured or imported from manufacturing countries into the United States prior to their illicit transfer onwards to Haiti. The Panel believes that some of these firearms were recently transferred to Haiti. The Panel sent tracing requests to the United States authorities in July 2025, they were still pending at the time of writing this report.

²¹⁷ Joram Moncher. Mirebalais: deux individus lynchés, trois armes à feu et 10,460 cartouches saisies. 9 March 2025. Le Nouvelliste. [Mirebalais: deux individus lynchés, trois armes à feu et 10 460 cartouches saisies](#)

²¹⁸ Interview with gang analyst, April 2025. See also BINUH and OHCHR. 2025. Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, the centre department, and regions located east of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. July. [Artibonite et Mirebalais_EN_V3](#)

²¹⁹ See also Jacqueline Charles. Gangs attack police station, prison in central Haiti town, more than 500 inmates escape. 31 March 2025. Miami Herald. [Armed gangs attack prison, police station in rural Haiti | Miami Herald](#)

²²⁰ Confidential document on file with the Panel

²²¹ Interview with local authority, April 2025.

²²² Confidential intelligence report and interviews with a security officer and a gang analyst, April 2025.



Barbeque, Lanmo Sanjou and Jeff in Saut-d'Eau to enjoy the festivities of a local festival.

Still from video shared on social media, July 2025.



Barbeque moving comfortably in Saut d'Eau, and making contact with children and elderly people
Stills from video shared on social media, on 15 July 2025

Several *Viv Ansanm* gangs employed heavy trucks to loot several businesses in Mirebalais



Photographs shared with the Panel in April 2025

Annex 8: Other human rights violations

In line with Security Council resolution 2653 (2022), the Panel has adopted a comprehensive investigative approach to human rights violations in Haiti. While gangs remain the primary perpetrators, the Panel has also identified the role of certain public officials, former politicians and economic actors who either support these groups directly or contribute to the erosion of state institutions intended to counter them.

The Panel is committed to investigating all parties involved in these violations as Haiti continues to face a critical security and human rights crisis, with escalating gang violence not only in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area but rapidly expanding in the Artibonite and Center departments. In addition to the violations documented in this report - such as sexual and gender-based violence, child recruitment, indiscriminate attacks against the population, forced displacement - the Panel is also closely monitoring the following human rights violations.

1. Indiscriminate attacks

During the reporting period, gangs committed multiple indiscriminate attacks that resulted in large number of people killed, injured and displaced as well as in widespread looting and destruction of public and private property (see Annexes 18-20).

Some localities such as Kenscoff, suffered repeated assaults—including five major attacks between late January and April 2025.²²³ The incidents in Kenscoff left at least 262 people dead (115 civilians and 147 gang members) and 66 injured (59 civilians and 7 gang members), while four security personnel were also killed and four wounded. At least seven women and girls were subjected to sexual violence, over 190 homes were looted or burned, and thousands were forcibly displaced.²²⁴

The Panel is deeply concerned about the Kenscoff incidents, where residents had warned authorities well in advance of the attacks. However, no action was taken by the Haitian security forces.²²⁵

The following table gives a glimpse of gang violence as it compiles information about several gangs' attacks with the highest number of victims during the reporting period.

Gang or Gang alliance	Place	Number of victims ²²⁶	Date
Wharf Jérémie gang	Wharf Jérémie – Port-au-Prince (West department)	a) 207 people killed b) 15 persons killed	a) 6-11 December 2024 ²²⁷ b) 28 May 2025 ²²⁸
<i>Viv Ansanm</i>	Kenscoff area ²²⁹ (West department)	262 people killed and 66 injured	27 January - 27 March 2025 ²³⁰
<i>Viv Ansanm</i>	Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau (Center department)	60 people killed	From late March to early April 2025. ²³¹
<i>Viv Ansanm</i>	Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite (Artibonite department)	a) 52 killed (45 men and seven women) and 20 injured (all men). b) 116 dead (82 men, 24 women and ten children) and 62 wounded (50 men and 12 women)	a) January – March 2025 b) Late April – May 2025 ²³²
<i>Viv Ansanm</i>	Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (Cité soleil including Grand Ravine, Martissant and Village-de-Dieu areas)	66 people killed	Mid-April to June 2025 ²³³

²²³ See Annex 6.

²²⁴ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²²⁵ Interviews with Kenscoff's residents and representatives. July 2025.

²²⁶ These figures are estimates, as insecurity hinders the collection of definitive data. The Panel relies primarily on available UN sources.

²²⁷ See Panel's confidential flash report. See also

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/flash_report_20241223_wharf_jeremie_en.pdf

²²⁸ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²²⁹ The area of Kenscoff includes the localities of Carrefour Badio, Carrefour Tête Belot, Bois Major, Bongard, Boucan, Depanse, Furcy, Gramot, Godet and Viard.

²³⁰ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²³¹ Interviews with residents and human rights defenders. May-July 2025. See: <https://web.rnddh.org/fall-of-two-communes-in-the-centre-department-into-the-hands-of-armed-gangs-transitional-authorities-worsen-the-countrys-security-crisis/?lang=en>. See also: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/2025-july-artibonite-and-mirebalais-EN.pdf>

²³² See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²³³ Interviews with residents and human rights defenders. May – June 2025. See

https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

2. Smuggling of migrants

Smuggling of Haitian migrants continues in Haiti although the dynamics of large groups of migrants (S/2024/704) moving out of Haiti to the region have been reduced. According to the Panel's findings, migrant smugglers are actively seeking new routes to facilitate departures.²³⁴ The lack of passports and visas for Haitian nationals has significantly reduced the number of people able to migrate by air, pushing many to undertake dangerous journeys in makeshift boats.²³⁵

Regardless of the deteriorating security situation in Haiti, deportation of Haitian nationals continues²³⁶ (see Annex 16). Back in October 2024, the Dominican Republic government announced it would expel 10,000 immigrants per week. Shortly after, a 60% increase in deportations compared to the previous month was reported, equivalent to more than 30,000 Haitians in less than a month.²³⁷ On 1 July 2025, the Dominican Republic's General Directorate of Migration reported the repatriation of a total of 30,757 Haitian nationals with irregular migration status during June, and that this has added up to 184,001 deported migrants in 2025, with an estimate of more than 1,000 migrants being deported per day.²³⁸ Concerns about the treatment received by Haitians during the deportation process have been raised by different humanitarian actors.²³⁹

3. Obstructions of humanitarian access and assistance²⁴⁰

Obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance in Haiti remains a critical impediment to addressing the ongoing crisis. The Panel is concerned about attacks against humanitarian organizations.

Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reported that on 15 March 2025, gang violence near its Turgeau Emergency Center forced the organization to suspend hospital operations and evacuate its teams as a precautionary measure. During one of the evacuation efforts, a clearly marked MSF convoy of four vehicles traveling between the Turgeau Emergency Center and the Carrefour trauma hospital was deliberately targeted by gunfire.²⁴¹ Although no fatalities were reported, several staff members sustained minor injuries. This resulted in MSF suspending its activities.²⁴²

In early July 2025, members of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance in the Port-au-Prince area kidnapped six humanitarian workers for 21 days.²⁴³

In another incident, also in July 2025, members of a BSAP unit and a self-defense group stole a vehicle from a humanitarian organization. The perpetrators claimed the car was needed to support operations against gangs.²⁴⁴

4. Violations to the right to health

²³⁴ Confidential sources January - June 2025.

²³⁵ Several factors influence the cost of securing a place on a boat used for smuggling (see also S/2024/704). One key factor is availability, as most of the vessels used are makeshift and not always ready for travel which limits the frequency of departures. The point of departure also plays a significant role. Port-de-Paix, Turtle Island, and Cap-Haitien are the main departure locations, with Cap-Haitien becoming the primary international exit point for Haitian nationals. As a result, prices from Cap-Haitien can reach up to \$5,000 USD per person, compared to around \$2,000 USD in other regions. Confidential sources, February, April and July 2025.

²³⁶ UN Human Rights Council. States should not return anyone to Haiti, UN expert Bill O'Neill. 4 July 2025. Available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/07/states-should-not-return-anyone-haiti-un-expert-bill-oneill?sub-site=HRC>

²³⁷ See <https://www.wfp.org/publications/annual-country-reports-haiti>

²³⁸ See <https://migracion.gob.do/en/the-dgm-deported-more-than-30700-haitians-in-june-and-is-averaging-more-than-1000-repatriations-daily-by-2025/>

²³⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-humanitarian-country-team-deeply-concerned-about-deportation-pregnant-and-breastfeeding-women-dominican-republic>

²⁴⁰ Due to security reasons, the Panel has decided that unless the humanitarian organization has publicly reported the incident, it will hold information concerning such organization. However, the Panel's investigations will continue.

²⁴¹ See <https://www.msf.fr/communiqués-presse/haiti-des-vehicules-msf-attaques-lors-d-une-evacuation-dans-un-contexte-de-violence-accrue-a-port-au-prince>. Also confidential source, July 2025.

²⁴² See <https://www.msf.fr/communiqués-presse/haiti-msf-suspend-ses-activites-a-turgeau-et-carrefour-dans-un-contexte-de-violence-intense-et-generalisee> Also confidential source, July 2025.

²⁴³ Confidential sources. July 2025.

²⁴⁴ Confidential sources. July 2025.

The humanitarian crisis in Haiti continues to worsen, significantly affecting not only the number of casualties but also the population's access to basic health services. Since 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) has classified Haiti as a Grade 3 emergency²⁴⁵, the highest level of the organization.²⁴⁶

Chronic public health challenges, such as underfunding and insufficient human resources, have been further exacerbated by the ongoing security crisis. The obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance hindering the transport of essential supplies like vaccines and medical goods, has increased the country's vulnerability to disease outbreaks and weakening its ability to respond.²⁴⁷

During the reporting period, the Panel conducted visits to Cap-Haitien (North Department), Les Cayes, (South department) and Jacmel (Southeast Department), where it observed the worsening living conditions and mounting socioeconomic pressures affecting much of the country due to the impact of gang violence on the economy and the rapid increase of IDPs. Residents in all three cities described an almost total collapse of basic public services. The arrival of displaced populations and deteriorating economic conditions are placing severe strain on already fragile communities, a situation further aggravated by Haiti's highly centralized political and economic systems, which depend heavily on access to Port-au-Prince.

On 13 February 2025, the *Viv Ansanm* alliance once again set fire to Haiti's General Hospital in Port-au-Prince destroying key areas and looting medical equipment.²⁴⁸

As of 1 March 2025, only 41% of health facilities with beds in Port-au-Prince were fully operational.²⁴⁹ An example of a health care institution attacked by gangs is the destruction of the Bernard Mevs Hospital, Port-au-Prince in December 2024 (see Annex 17).

In early April 2025, the University Hospital of Mirebalais, Centre department, was forced to suspend its activities due to gang violence. It was the only hospital in the country to trained emergency doctors.²⁵⁰

5. Obstruction to children's right to education

"The school system is in ruins," declared Haiti's Education Minister on 15 July 2025.²⁵¹ The impact of gang violence on Haiti's education sector is at all levels.²⁵² There are 1,606 schools closed, (1,087 are fully closed while 519 are partially closed), affecting about 250,000 students and 7,500 teachers. The West department is the most affected, with 1,089 schools closed, followed by the Centre department with 384 closures, and Artibonite with 133. Additionally, 25 schools are occupied by gangs all located in Tabarre, West department. 84 schools in the Centre, West, Artibonite and North are being used as shelters hosting about 80,000 IDP's. The continued closure, destruction, occupation, and use of schools as IDP shelters reflect a deepening educational and humanitarian crisis that is severely impacting children, educators, and communities.²⁵³

According to some human rights defenders and children's advocates the impact of ongoing violence on children's education in recent years is expected to have long-term generational consequences for Haiti.²⁵⁴

6. Rule of law

On 16 April 2025, the Haitian Government created two Pôles judiciaires (specialized judicial units) with the intention to strengthen the judicial system. One judicial unit will have jurisdiction on mass crimes and sexual violence on the one hand,

²⁴⁵ For WHO's grading system see <https://www.who.int/emergencies/grading>

²⁴⁶ See <https://www.paho.org/en/haiti-humanitarian-crisis-grade-3>

²⁴⁷ Meetings with UN agencies, health care specialists. March -July 2025.

²⁴⁸ See also <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025>.

²⁴⁹ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/crise-en-haiti-alima-soigne-plus-de-15000-personnes-dans-les-camps-de-deplacés>

²⁵⁰ See <https://ayibopost.com/haiti-face-a-leffondrement-sanitaire-apres-la-fermeture-de-mirebalais/>

²⁵¹ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/258101/the-school-system-is-in-ruins-declares-education-minister>

²⁵² See <https://ayibopost.com/lueh-confrontee-a-la-crise-du-depart-de-ses-professeurs/> Interview with a humanitarian actor. January 2025.

²⁵³ See at <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/rapport-ndeg2-sur-la-situation-des-ecoles-affectees-par-la-crise-securitaire-en-haiti-la-date-du-30-avril-2025> visited May 2025.

²⁵⁴ Confidential sources, May – July 2025.

while the other will deal with complex financial crimes. At the moment of writing this report the selection process for judges and prosecutors have started as well as the identification for the seat of these two new judicial units.²⁵⁵

The two Judicial Poles are to be established within the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince, with jurisdiction limited to the territorial scope of that Court.²⁵⁶

On 21 May 2025, Haiti's National Steering Committee presented a draft Constitution proposing, among other changes, the decentralization of political power traditionally held in Port-au-Prince. While seen by some as a step toward inclusive governance, others have raised concerns about the legitimacy of the whole process.²⁵⁷ At the time of writing no date or framework for a constitutional referendum has been announced.

7. Deficiencies of the prison system

As of 30 June 2025, Haiti's penitentiary system held 7,163 inmates nearly triple the official capacity of 2,419. These are held in 13 prisons nationwide resulting in an average occupancy rate of 296.1%, or approximately 0.33 square meters per person. Of the total prison population, 5,857 individuals (81.8%) were in pretrial detention. The inmate population included 6,484 men, 416 women, 240 boys, and 23 girls.²⁵⁸

Severe overcrowding persists, with some prisons reporting extremely high occupancy rates: Les Cayes (770.27%), Anse à Veau (707.69%), Saint Marc (675.9%), Fort Liberté I (614.28%), Jérémie (602.94%), CERMICOL (595.69%), Jacmel (585.61%), and Port-de-Paix (433.33%).²⁵⁹

Prisons continue to suffer insufficient budget allocations, food shortages and limited medical supplies. As a result, there were 57 inmates' deaths recorded in the first half of 2025.²⁶⁰ On 2 April 2025 the Panel visited the prison of Les Cayes and witnessed the appalling living conditions of the inmates.

The attack on the Mirebalais prison (Centre department) on 31 March 2025 resulted in the mass escape of 515 inmates.²⁶¹

8. Human rights violations by law enforcement and justice officials

During the reporting period, the Panel documented human rights violations committed by law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities, including indiscriminate use of deadly force and extrajudicial killings.

The Panel is aware of the important role of law enforcement officers such as the HNP plays in tackling insecurity as well as the existing challenges (including insufficient equipment, inadequate training, critical shortage of personnel, etc.), some of these historical and systemic. However, concerns regarding HNP's excessive use of force, including extrajudicial killings, have started since its first report (S/2023/674).

As of 30 June 2025, the HNP workforce comprised 13,519 officers, including 1,776 women (13.14%), with a national ratio of 1.14 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. Between January and June 2025, there were 24 officers killed and 39 injured. Out of the 13,519 officers, only 936 have been registered for the vetting process. Among them, just 6 have undergone partial investigations, and none have completed the full vetting procedure.²⁶²

Of the 412 police facilities nationwide, 78 (18.9%) are currently non-operational, up from 67 in the previous semester. Between January and June 2025, there were 16 police facilities attacked, including six police stations and one civil prison which were set on fire. Gangs also burned 19 vehicles, 17 belonging to the HNP and 2 to the MSS, along with 15 Mine-

²⁵⁵ Interviews with UN specialists and Haitian lawyers. April- June 2025. See also UNODC report S/2023/303.

²⁵⁶ See https://cardh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Po%CC%82les-Judiciaires-Spe%CC%81cialise%CC%81s_CARDH_Recommandations_24-Avril-2025.pdf visited May 2025.

²⁵⁷ Interviews with Haitian lawyers. May- June 2025. See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/256403/vers-la-fin-de-la-republique-dhaiti-telle-quelle-etait-connue-depuis-1804> visited May 2025.

²⁵⁸ UNPOL data. January – June 2025.

²⁵⁹ UNPOL data. January – June 2025.

²⁶⁰ UNPOL January – June 2025, But compare data https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²⁶¹ UNPOL data. April 2025.

²⁶² United Nations Police data. January – June 2025.

Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (13 HNP, 2 MSS) and three HNP backhoe loaders.²⁶³

Between January and June 2025, the HNP's General Inspectorate registered 75 complaints (30 related to alleged human rights violations and 45 to police misconduct). Twenty out of the 30 human rights complaints resulted in investigations, which led to 17 sanctions, however only five were implemented and none of them resulted in judicial proceedings.²⁶⁴

Between January and June 2025, more than 1,600 persons were killed by security forces.²⁶⁵ About 240 victims were non gang associated persons which represents a high number according to human rights specialists.²⁶⁶ Moreover, during the same period, there were nearly 100 extrajudicial executions committed by the HNP.²⁶⁷

During the reporting period, the Panel received multiple reports of victims and witnesses of HNP's abuses.²⁶⁸

Concerning justice officials, the Prosecutor of Miragoâne, Nippes department,²⁶⁹ continues committing human rights, including abuse of power, threats against human rights defenders, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. Despite allegations of at least 74 extrajudicial killings²⁷⁰ attributed to him between 2022 and June 2025, no investigations have been launched.

The Panel obtained several testimonies of victims and witnesses of Muscadin's crimes.²⁷¹

9. Attacks against clerics, worshipers and places of worship

During the attacks in Mirebalais on 30 and 31 March 2025, the community of the Little Sisters of Saint Theresa was specifically targeted and two nuns were killed.²⁷²

On 20 May 2025, the Jean Denis coalition, a self-defense group turned gang (see S/2023/674) carried out a retaliatory attack in Petite-Rivière de L'Artibonite, killing over 10 people, including an 86-year-old Protestant pastor. Some victims were targeted inside a church, while others were killed in surrounding areas. The attack followed the murder of one of the group's members by the Grand Grif gang.²⁷³

On 22 May 2025, *Viv Ansanm* alliance members kidnapped a Catholic nun in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.²⁷⁴ She was freed in early June 2025.²⁷⁵

10. Misappropriation of public funds and its impact on human rights²⁷⁶

²⁶³ United Nations Police data. January – June 2025.

²⁶⁴ United Nations Police data. January – June 2025.

²⁶⁵ During the first quarter 2025 there were 804 people killed while for the second quarter 2025 there were 814. See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²⁶⁶ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²⁶⁷ There were 50 extrajudicial executions between January and March and 46 extrajudicial executions between April and June 2025. See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²⁶⁸ Interviews with human rights defenders, civil society representatives, witnesses and victims. Confidential sources. January - June 2025. Testimonies are on record with the Panel.

²⁶⁹ Many of Muscadin's crimes have been committed outside his designated jurisdiction of Miragoâne in the Nippes department, extending into areas such as Les Cayes, South department.

²⁷⁰ See <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/quarterly-report-human-rights-situation-haiti-january-march-2025> and https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²⁷¹ Testimonies are on record with the Panel.

²⁷² See <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article303346116.html>

²⁷³ UNPOL data. May 2025.

²⁷⁴ UNPOL data. May 2025.

²⁷⁵ Confidential source. August 2025.

²⁷⁶ For more information see Section II.E

As indicated by the Panel the misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds by state officials in Haiti (S/2024/704) has had severe implications for the protection and fulfilment of human rights (S/2025/356). When public resources intended for essential services such as healthcare and education are diverted, it deepens social inequality, perpetuates poverty²⁷⁷ and weakens public institutions.²⁷⁸

During the reporting period, Haiti's anticorruption unit (ULCC) made public several investigations that may also constitute human rights violations. For example, on 31 January 2025, the former coordinator of the National School Canteen Program (PNCS), was arrested for allegedly embezzling over 250 million gourdes. Investigations revealed that 90% of listed food suppliers were fictitious, undermining children's right to food. Similarly, on 7 February 2025, former director of the National Old Age Insurance Office (ONA), was arrested for issuing fraudulent mortgage loans.²⁷⁹ This case has further eroded public trust in the social security system, directly affecting the rights of elderly citizens.

Additional findings from the ULCC in May 2025, revealed that the Office for the Protection of Citizens (OPC) - Ombudsperson office-, under former Director General, was implicated in fraudulent travel expenses estimated losses of \$127,000 USD. Finally, the ULCC also found that the former Director of Immigration, authorized the issuance of 556 passports without proper tax payments, resulting in a \$28,120 USD loss for the Haitian State. This fraudulent activity not only reflects financial misconduct but also has serious implications for migration governance, potentially enabling migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.²⁸⁰

These examples underscore how the diversion of public funds is not merely a governance issue but a profound human rights concern that obstructs access to basic services and exposes already vulnerable populations to further harm.

²⁷⁷ See 2024 Global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Poverty amid conflict available at <https://hdr.undp.org/content/2024-global-multidimensional-poverty-index-mpi#/indicies/MPI>


²⁷⁸ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/02/haiti-immediate-action-needed-address-human-rights-crisis>

²⁷⁹ On file with the Panel.

²⁸⁰ See <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/05/12/ulcc-targets-three-former-government-officials-for-corruption/> visited May 2025. See also <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/255988/corruption-lulcc-recommande-des-poursuites-judiciaires-a-lencontre-de-trois-anciens-officiels-de-letat> visited May 2025.


Annex 9: Statistical data on human rights violations. January – June 2025.

Graphic 1. Comparison of crime incidents between 2nd Semester 2024 and 1st Semester 2025




Graphic elaborated by the Panel based on UNPOL data, 2025.

Graphic 2. Intentional homicide and injury by gender and age. Comparison between 2nd Semester 2024 and 1st Semester 2025.




Graphic elaborated by the Panel based on UNPOL data, 2025.

Graphic 3. HNP officers killed and injured. Comparison between 2nd Semester 2024 and 1st Semester 2025.




Graphic elaborated by the Panel based on UNPOL data, 2025.

Graphic 4. Percentage of intentional homicides by Haiti's Departments (January - June 2025)



Graphic elaborated by the Panel based on UNPOL data, 2025.


Graphic 5. Death toll in the prisons (per semester 2022-2025)



Graphic elaborated by the Panel based on UNPOL data, 2025.

Annex 10: IDPs following recent gang attacks in the department of Artibonite.

Population displacements caused by gangs that occurred on 16 July 2025 in the department of Artibonite, precisely in the 1st municipality section of Villars in the municipality of Dessalines and the 1st municipality section of Liancourt in the municipality of Verrettes. Data collection: 16 - 19 July 2025.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jul 19 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 68 — Displacement following armed attacks in Dessalines and Liancourt in Artibonite department (16 - 19 July 2025). IOM, Haiti..” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-68-displacement-following-armed-attacks-dessalines-and?close=true> visited July 2025

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 11: IDPs following recent gang attacks in the municipality of Mirebalais.

Population displacements caused by gang attacks since 3 July 2025 in the 2nd communal section of Sarazin located in the municipality of Mirebalais, Centre department. Data collection 3 - 9 July 2025.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jul 10 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 66.1 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in areas bordering the municipalities of Mirebalais and Lascahobas in Centre (3 - 9 July 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-661-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-areas?close=true> visited July 2025

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 12: IDPs following recent gang attacks in the municipality of La Chapelle.

Population displacements caused by gang attacks on 22 June 2025 in the municipality of La Chapelle, Artibonite department, more precisely in the 2nd Bossous section. Data collection: 22 — 27 June 2025.




“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jun 27 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 65.1 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of La Chapelle (22 — 27 June 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-651-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality?close=true> visited July 2025

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 13: IDPs following recent gang attacks in the municipality of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite.

Population displacements caused by gang attacks since 28 April in the municipality of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, specifically in the 1st and 2nd sections of Bas Coursin II. Data collection: 28 April — 3 May 2025.




"International Organization for Migration (IOM), May 05 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 63.1 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in the municipality of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite (28 April — 3 May 2025). IOM, Haiti." Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-63-1-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-municipality?close=true> visited July 2025

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 14: IDPs following recent gang attacks in the Centre Department.

Population displacements caused by armed attacks since 31 March in the Centre Department Saut d’Eau (in the 2nd Section La Selle, 3rd Section Coupe Mardi Gras, 4th Section Montagne Terrible, and 1st Section Canot or Rivière Canot) and Mirebalais (3rd Section Grand Boucan and 4th Section Crête Brûlée). Data collection: 31 March - 16 April 2025.





“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Apr 17 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 61.2 — Updates on displacement following armed attacks in the department of Centre (31 March - 16 April 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-612-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-department?close=true> visited July 2025.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 15: Internally Displaced Persons from the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince.

IDP following violence occurred since 14 February 2025 in Port-au-Prince metropolitan making these the largest mass displacements observed on record. Data collection: 14 February 2025 – 5 March 2025.



“International Organization for Migration (IOM), Mar 05 2025. DTM Haiti — Emergency Tracking Tool 57.3 — Updates on displacement following armed violence in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (14 February - 5 March 2025). IOM, Haiti.” Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-573-updates-displacement-following-armed-violences?close=true> visited July 2025


Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 16: Migration, Deportees/Returnees, Refugees and IDPs

The following information, collected from different organizations and States' data, provides a glimpse of the impact of gang violence on the different flows of Haitian population movements in and out of the country.

IOM


As of June 2025, a total of 1,287,593 Haitian nationals were internally displaced.²⁸¹ More than half of them are women and minors.



International Organization for Migration (IOM), Jun 10 2025. DTM Haiti — Report on the displacement situation in Haiti — Round 10 (June 2025). IOM, Haiti. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-report-displacement-situation-haiti-round-10-june-2025?close=true>

²⁸¹ <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/haiti>







According to the IOM from January to July 2025, 148,664 Haitians were deported to Haiti, out of which 97.97% came from the Dominican Republic.



IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix. Haiti 2025. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/fr/node/23491>

In 2024, a total of 199,178 Haitians were forcibly returned to Haiti, out of which 97% came from the Dominican Republic.

Figure 1. Number of Haitians deported in 2024 by sending country, and the number of individuals interviewed among them

	Number of deported ¹	Number of deported interviewed
 Dominican Republic	193,508 (97%)	8,481 (84%)
 Turks and Caicos	2,205 (1%)	1,123 (11%)
 United States of America	1,553 (1%)	257 (3%)
 Bahamas	1,140 (1%)	195 (2%)
 Turkey	735 (<1%)	0 (0%)
 Jamaica	37 (<1%)	0 (0%)
TOTAL	199 178 (100%)	10 056 (100%)

International Organization for Migration (IOM), 17 Mar 2025. DTM Haiti — Haitians deported to Haiti — Profiles, migration experience and intentions of Haitians deported in 2024 (January — December 2024). IOM, Haiti. Available at: <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-haitians-deported-haiti-profiles-migration-experience-and-intentions-haitians>

UNCHR


Haitian refugees and asylum seekers from 2018 to 2024.

Year	Country of origin	Refugees under UNHCR's mandate	Asylum-seekers
2018	Haiti	27,517	40,973
2019	Haiti	26,734	65,684
2020	Haiti	25,649	80,225
2021	Haiti	29,454	135,565
2022	Haiti	30,307	177,978
2023	Haiti	122,139	228,443
2024	Haiti	148,252	275,050

UNHCR Refugee Data Finder, 30 July 2025. Data as of December 2024. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download>

US Customs and Border Protection²⁸²

U.S. Customs and Border Protection data show a total of 220,798 Haitians encountered in 2024, while a total of 11,971 Haitians were encountered from January through June 2025.



Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY22-FY24; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY25 to date. Data is current as of 7/3/2025.

“U.S. Custom and Border Protection, Nationwide Encounters, Haiti.” Available at: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>

²⁸² Encounter data includes U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Title 8 Apprehensions, Office of Field Operations (OFO) Title 8 Inadmissibles, and Title 42 Expulsions for fiscal years (FY) 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Demographics for USBP and OFO include:

- Accompanied Minors (AM)
- Individuals in a Family Unit (FMUA)
- Single Adults
- Unaccompanied Children (UC) / Single Minors

US Customs and Border Protection. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters>, visited July 2025.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Between January and June 2025, the Directorate General of Migration (DGM) deported 184,001 Haitian nationals. Just in June 2025 more than 30,700 Haitians were deported.²⁸³

SEA INTERDICTIONS

Migrant smuggling operations have been thwarted through sea interdictions from countries neighbouring Haiti. For example, on 1 April 2025, the United States Coast Guard in Miami repatriated 99 aliens to Haiti, following a maritime interdiction approximately 35 miles north of Cap-Haitian, Haiti. The Panel was present when the Haitian nationals were returned to Cap-Haitian. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2025, the United States Coast Guard have repatriated a total of 412 Haitian nationals to Haiti, compared to 857 during 2024.²⁸⁴

TURKS AND CAICOS

As of June 2025, the Royal Turks and Caicos Islands Police Force Marine Branch, in coordinated efforts with the U.S. Coast Guard, reported two sea interdictions of vessels transporting Haitian nationals, one with 277 migrants on board,²⁸⁵ and the other with 98 migrants.²⁸⁶

BAHAMAS

On 22 June 2025, the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF), the Bahamas Department of Immigration, along with the United States Coast Guard interdicted 64 Haitian nationals (50 male and 14 females) near South Abaco island.²⁸⁷

JAMAICA

On 19 May 2025, 42 Haitian nationals including males, females, children and a pregnant woman, arrived on Jamaica by boat; all were repatriated the following day.²⁸⁸

²⁸³ <https://x.com/migracionrdo/status/1940150774215872947?s=48&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorQ5dwAnew>

²⁸⁴ See <https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4142280/coast-guard-repatriates-99-aliens-to-haiti/>

²⁸⁵ <https://magneticmediatv.com/2025/03/successful-interception-of-illegal-vessel-nearly-300-haitian-migrants-caught/>

²⁸⁶ <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/04/02/depoted-haitians-turks-and-caicos/>

²⁸⁷ See <https://rbdf.gov.bs/advanced-surveillance-leads-to-64-migrants-apprehended-near-south-abaco/>


²⁸⁸ <https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/42-haitian-migrants-repatriated-from-jamaica-despite-rights-groups-plea/>

Annex 17: Comparison of satellite imagery before and after *Viv Ansanm* attack on the Bernard Mevs Hospital in December 2024.

On 16 and 17 December 2024, the Bernard Mevs Hospital in Port-au-Prince was attacked, vandalized, and set on fire by *Viv Ansanm* gang members.²⁸⁹ During the attack, at least three vehicles were set on fire including one ambulance.²⁹⁰ Gang members threw molotov cocktails to burn the hospital's affecting operating rooms, imaging room, scanners, and other important hospital spaces and materials.²⁹¹

Stills taken from Google Earth. Visited on July 2025. Maps Data: Google, ©2025 Airbus, Imagery Date: 31 October 2024 and 15 March 2025, respectively.

Figure 1. Bernard Mevs Hospital satellite image taken 31 October 2024.



²⁸⁹ <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article297252659.html>

²⁹⁰ <https://lequotidien509.com/nouvelle-attaque-contre-lhopital-bernard-mevs/>

²⁹¹ <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-43869-haiti-flash-gangs-set-fire-to-bernard-mevs-hospital-considerable-damage-video.html>

Figure 2. Bernard Mevs Hospital satellite image taken 15 March 2025.



The picture comparison depicts the damage caused to Bernard Mevs Hospital after its ransacking and burning by gang members in December 2024. The area within the circle shows a scorched section of the Hospital, degradation of the building, destruction of the hospital surroundings, and the removal of roof solar panels after the attack.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 18: Gran Grif gang attack to Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite, 14 March 2025.

Graphic images with gruesome content	Graphic images with gruesome content
Graphic images with gruesome content	Graphic images with gruesome content

Confidential Source.

Annex 19: Christ-Roi residents flee gangs launching an assault on Delmas 30 and Christ-Roi, 17 March 2025.



Confidential Source.

Annex 20: Furcy Police Station under the control of armed gangs from *Viv Ansanm*, 9 May 2025.



Confidential Source.

Annex 21: Seizures of UAVs in Haiti

The Panel already reported the increased use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV - drones) by non-state actors in Haiti (see S/2024/704).

Although commercial drones are not specifically covered by the UN arms embargo in Haiti, their acquisition has had a significant impact on the fighting capacity of gangs. It is important to monitor transfers of commercial drones as their provision to gangs constitutes assistance to criminal groups and therefore meets designation criteria - see criteria d), paragraph 16 of resolution 2653 (2022).

The Panel received information from the Haitian Customs which indicate that drones are regularly intercepted at ports of entry²⁹². Data indicates that since the beginning of 2025, drones have been seized in Cap-Haitien, North department, on a regular basis as well as in Miragoâne, Nippes department²⁹³. They arrived among goods shipped from the United States by boat or plane. Seizures often also include high frequency radios.

Interviews with Customs officers indicate that it is difficult to identify the end-user of the materiel, as commercial drones can be used for a range of civilian and commercial activities. On several occasions, Haitian Customs officers noted that the recipient of the intercepted packages did not come and claim their property as would typically be expected to do. This suggests that these individuals have been tipped off about the interceptions and hinting at criminal activities.

Table 2: Seizures of drones at ports of entry in Haiti March-August 2025

Date	Location	Materiel seized
20/03/25	Cap-Haitien Port	3 drones S116 1 drone E88 6 radios
24/03/25	Cap Haitien Port	2 drones 10 radios
25/03/25	Cap Haitien Port	2 drones 7 radios 2 fake pistols
26/03/25	Cap Haitien Port	1 drone 1 radio
01/04/25	Cap Haitien Port	1 drone
04/04/25	Cap Haitien Port	1 drone
03/05/25	Miragoane	1 drone Douane de Miragoane – Saisie d’armes et d’équipements tactiques impliquant un agent de l’État - Rezo Nòdwès
21/05/25	Aéroport Toussaint Louverture – FEDEX	1 drone ²⁹⁴
23/07/25	Miragoane	1 submarine drone
08/08/25	Aéroport Toussaint Louverture – MEAD MESDASA	1 drone
	TOTAL	15

Sources: Haitian Customs, 2025.

²⁹² Interview with senior Customs officers, April, June and July 2025.

²⁹³ See for instance Petit Frere Jean Rony, 04 May 2025, ‘Miragoane: saisie d’équipements tactiques et d’un drone dans une cargaison suspecte’. Le Placentin. [Miragoâne : saisie d’équipements tactiques et d’un drone dans une cargaison suspecte](#) or HC Network. 13 March 2025. Haiti : un individu arrete en possession de 8 drones. [Haïti : Un individu arrêté en possession de 8 drones - HC Network](#)

²⁹⁴ [Haïti - Actualité : Zapping... - HaitiLibre.com : Toutes les nouvelles d’Haïti 7/7](#)

Gangs also procure drones from the Dominican Republic. For instance, in June 2025 three individuals were arrested in Santo Domingo while purchasing drones for Izo (Hti.002), the leader of 5 Segond. One individual was residing in the Dominican Republic where he was responsible for purchasing a range of items for gang members in Port-au-Prince, including pieces of clothing and fancy sneakers as well as drones. He would transfer the items to one of his accomplices, who lived in the north of Haiti, through the Dajabon/Ouanaminthe border crossing. The individual would then transport the goods through Cap Haitian to Port-au-Prince²⁹⁵.

The Haitian police also continued to seize drones on the territory of Haiti. For instance, on 19 November 2024, during an operation against *Viv Ansanm* members in Petion-Ville, the HNP seized two drones along ammunition and other materiel²⁹⁶. On 17 June 2025, during its operation against Vitelhomme in Torcelle, the HNP has seized two commercial drones²⁹⁷.

Seizure of 8 August 2025, Toussaint Louverture Airport



Source: Confidential

²⁹⁵ Interview with police officer, July 2025.

²⁹⁶ See HNP Facebook page, 20 November 2025.

²⁹⁷ See HNP Facebook page, 19 June 2025.

Annex 22: The role of Magalie Habitant

Intermediaries are key to the continuation of the criminal-political nexus and armed violence in Haiti as they play a crucial role in enabling the relationship between gangs, political, security and economic actors, including in facilitating communications and transactions. Magalie Habitant has been a long-time intermediary between gangs, political and economic actors²⁹⁸.

According to data from the United States Customs and Border Protection, the travel history of Magalie Habitant includes more than 100 arrivals and departures in/from the United States over the last ten years²⁹⁹. She travelled on multiple passports, including a diplomatic one³⁰⁰. Mrs. Habitant is likely to possess assets in the United States (in Florida) procured from illicit financial activities, including support to gangs. An investigation made by the Haitian Court of auditors also found that significant embezzlement had occurred when she was in charge of the Service National de Gestion des Résidus Solides (SNGRS – National Solid Waste Management Service)³⁰¹. In July 2025, the Panel requested the United States authorities to provide information on Magalie Habitant, including her potential assets. On 14 August 2025, the authorities of the United States responded that they were unable to share information about possible bank accounts, property, and United States government investigations.

On 9 January 2025, Magalie Habitant was arrested by the HNP for criminal conspiracy and financing of armed gangs³⁰². The Police investigation concluded that she has indeed been financing the *Viv Ansamn* alliance³⁰³. On 8 May 2025, the Dean of the Court of First Instance appointed a judge to investigate the case against Magalie Habitant and Victor Prophane³⁰⁴.

²⁹⁸ Interviews with security officers, February 2025; a civil society representative, May 2025 and several former and current senior government officials, 2025. Confidential report, 2025 (on file with the Panel).

²⁹⁹ CPB, 2025.

³⁰⁰ Confidential source, June 2025.

³⁰¹ Interview with a confidential source, 2025. Confidential report, on file with the Panel.

³⁰² See HNP official Facebook page, 13 January 2025 and confidential report, 2025. On file with the Panel.

³⁰³ Interview with confidential sources, February 2025.

³⁰⁴ Confidential report, May 2025.

Annex 23: Seizures conducted on their way to Haiti or at Haitian ports of entry since the creation of the sanctions regime in October 2022

Table: Seizures conducted at Haiti's ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st August 2025

Date	Location/authorities	Firearms	Ammunition	Other materiel	Information
25 October 2022	Miami Airport USA	9mm handgun		1 magazine	The pistol was discovered in a parcel being shipped to Haiti
8 November 2022	Elias Pina, Dominican Republic		12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 10,160 rounds of 5.56x45mm		Two Haitian women were arrested while attempting to cross the border into Haiti in a private vehicle.
31 December 2022	Cap Haitien Haiti		989 rounds of 9x19mm		Seizure from a container coming from the US. One individual was arrested in Haiti.
11 January 2023	Miami port USA	One revolver	41 rounds		The revolver was concealed in a sofa
24 April 2023	Cap Haitien Haiti	One 9mm handgun	Eight 9mm rounds 4 boxes of 12-gauge rounds (100 rounds)	2 knives	Found in a container transported by the Sara Express coming from the Miami River (Antillean Marine Shipping).
7 June 2023	CPS container park – Port au Prince Haiti	PA-15 5.56mm rifle	340 rounds of 5.56x45mm 115 rounds of 9mm	5 magazines 1 helmet	Container coming from Miami. Some materiel concealed in a popcorn machine. The rifle was purchased for the first time in the US in 2017. Two individuals arrested in Haiti.
2023 (unknown date)	Miami USA	2 pistols		1 magazine	
2023 (unknown date)	Miami USA			23 vests	
18 October 2023	Dajabon Dominican Republic		1,850 rounds of 9mm		A minor was intercepted while trying to exit the DR
1 November 2023	Miami USA	1 revolver 357 Magnum	5 rounds of S&W .40 cal 36 rounds of 9x19mm		Commercial Vessel
30 November 2023	Miami USA			'35 cannon L-1 37mm' [the Panel was not able to identify what exact item it is]	Commercial aircraft
2 December 2023	International Airport Haiti		50 rounds of .45 40 rounds of 5.56x45mm 150 rounds of 9x19mm 25 of 12 gauge cartridges	19,390 USD in cash Six radios One video surveillance system One flak jacket	Passenger arriving from NY on commercial aircraft
22 December 2023	Cap Haitien Haiti	9mm handgun 5.56x45mm rifle	92 rounds of 9mm 9 rounds of .45 78 rounds of 5.56x45mm	3 flak jackets 1 helmet 7 magazines	Seizure from container from Florida Serial number of the handgun was erased

05 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns	999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9mm, .25 ACP)		Container coming from Florida
29 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	One .40 handgun One 9x19mm handgun	13 rounds of 9x19mm	2 magazines	Container from Port Everglades, Florida
11 June 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti		150 rounds of ammunition	Conversion kit (handgun to rifle)	
31 October 2024	Miami USA	One 5.56x45mm rifle One 22LR		2 magazines	Commercial vessel
16 January 2025	Miami USA	Seven 9mm handgun One .380 pistol One .45 handgun	900 rounds of .223 100 rounds of 5.56x45mm 640 rounds of 7.62 646 rounds of 9mm 2286	18 magazines Barrel extension for a handgun	Commercial vessel Container heading to Cap-Haitian
January 2025	Haina Port, Dominican Republic	Seven 9mm handguns Thirty rifles (mostly 7.62x39mm)		37 magazines	Commercial vessel Container from Brooklyn
25 February 2025	Haina Port, Dominican Republic	16 7.62x39mm rifles One 50. Rifle One 9mm sub- machine gun Five 9mm handguns	20 000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 16 000 rounds of 5.56x45mm 36,000	18 magazines for rifles 13 magazines for 9mm handguns 1 magazine for 50. Rifle 1 silencer	Commercial vessel Container in transit from Miami Heading to Belladère, Haiti
TOTAL		55 handguns 61 semi- automatic rifle One 50. Caliber Rifle	62,674 rounds of various calibers		

Source: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as well as Haitian, Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023, 2024, 2025.

Annex 24: Cases of illicit arms trafficking being prosecuted in the United States**Williamson Dossous case³⁰⁵**

On 16 January 2025, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted an inspection of a container awaiting departure for Cap Haitian, Haiti. X-ray scanning revealed anomalies with bundles of clothing inside the container. On further inspection, multiple firearms, ammunition and accessories were found, concealed in aluminium.

Shipping documents showed that Williamson Dossous was the shipper of the container and that the contents were wrongfully described as ‘lot of household goods and personal effects’.

Dossous is a part time freight-forwarder who has been shipping containers from the United States for the past 20 years with an average of 2 to 3 containers a year. The Panel previously explained in detail the role of freight-forwarder and the vulnerability of that type of shipments to concealed illicit goods (see S/2024/704).

Ten firearms were seized, including six 9x19mm pistols, one 9x19mm machine pistol, one .45 pistol and two .380 pistols. The seizure also included 2286 rounds of ammunition, including 900 x.223, 100 x 5.56x45mm, 640 x 7.62mm, and 646 x 9mm.

To distance himself from the firearms, Dossous used straw buyers. Many of the firearms were purchased by friends and family members of Dossous in the weeks and months prior to the seizure.

Dossous was arrested by the United States authorities on 13 July 2025 while he was boarding a plane to Haiti. He confessed that he had touched the guns (so that his DNA would be on them).

Jean Robert Casimir³⁰⁶

United States law enforcement agencies obtained information about illicit firearms located in Haiti, which they subsequently traced. Among these weapons were two rifles – used by gangs - that were purchased by Jean-Robert Casimir in October 2023. Mr. Casimir is a former HNP officer, residing in the United States.

Mr. Casimir was arrested on 7 August 2024 in the United States upon his return from Haiti. He admitted that he had bought a small number of firearms and smuggled them on four or five occasions to Haiti. However, the purchase history of Mr. Casimir in the United States shows that he bought at least 87 firearms between October 2021 and May 2024, including rifles, pistols, and shotguns. A search of his phone indicated that he had numerous pictures and conversations about the purchase of firearms in the United States and their sale in Haiti.

Mr. Casimir packaged firearms in boxes and handed them over to a crew of a commercial vessel operating between Miami, United States, and Miragoâne, Nippes department, Haiti. This case demonstrates the recurrent issue of current and former HNP officers’ as well as private security companies involvement in arms trafficking in Haiti (see S/2024/704).

³⁰⁵ United States of America v. William Dossous. Affidavit in support of a criminal complaint. Case No 25-mj-03347-Reid. Information provided by the United States in response to an enquiry of the Panel, August 2025. Interview with a confidential source, 2025.

³⁰⁶ USA v Jean Robert Casimir. Criminal Complaint. Case No 24-mj-6599-AOV. Interviews with confidential sources, 2025.

Annex 25: Diversion of ammunition from Dominican stockpiles and onward transfer to Haiti : the case of Mirebalais 5.56x45mm ammunition

Following the seizure in Haiti, the Dominican Government launched an official investigation, and the Dominican Police conducted an inventory of its armory in October 2024, identify corrupt officers and arrested them³⁰⁷.

This shed light on the diversion of 908,001 items, mostly ammunition, from the Dominican National Police stockpile including more than 489,000 rounds of 9mm, 230,000 rounds of 5.56x45mm, 26,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm, and 93,000 12 gauge shells. While it is difficult to estimate the amount of materiel that reached Haiti, some Dominican security experts explained to the Panel that, given the fact the market for 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm ammunition in the Dominican Republic is quite limited, it is likely that most of this materiel reached Haiti as these are the two main calibers used by gangs³⁰⁸.

Several security sources the Panel spoke to said that they believe that the quantities of ammunition diverted from the Police stocks is likely to be larger than the 908,001 rounds. They also said that diversions occur from the stockpiles of other Dominican security agencies, not just the Police.

The Panel spoke to representatives of law enforcement and the judiciary in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as well as to one individual part of the network.

Trafficking network

While still ongoing, the investigation clearly shows that a number of Police officers of different rank, as well as civilians, are involved in the network, which was led by the Head of *Departamento II de Intendencia de armas de la Policia Nacional*, in charge of managing the weapons and ammunition of the National Police Force. This Colonel and several of his subalterns are accused of organizing the theft of ammunition and its onward sale to various intermediaries. Several Police officers used backpacks to remove the ammunition from the facilities and even made fake ammunition boxes to deceive the inventory.

While at least nine Police officers have been identified as being involved in this network, a number of civilians are also being investigated, including several individuals involved in the selling of ammunition – using WhatsApp groups – as well as laundering the money through the use of multiple bank transfers to make the funds difficult to trace. Members of the criminal network managed to purchase buildings and expensive cars using the profit from the diversion.

Transfers to Haitians or to Haiti

While Dominican investigators told the Panel that some materiel had indeed been transferred to Haiti, they are still investigating the exact chains of custody and the Panel is looking forward to receiving further findings.

³⁰⁷ Information provided by the Dominican authorities, November 2024.

³⁰⁸ Interviews with security officers, Dominican Republic, 2025.

Annex 26: Diversions of firearms and ammunition from Haitian national stockpiles

Diversions from the HNP stockpiles have continued during the mandate. Diversions occur in different manners, including from direct attacks and thefts by gangs onto police facilities and personnel as well as from theft by certain corrupt officers.

Since January 2025, gangs attacked at least 23 police facilities³⁰⁹. In addition, gangs have also managed to steal arms and ammunition after combats with the HNP, for instance in Lascahobas, in July 2025³¹⁰.

With regards to diversions by corrupt officers, the HNP has made several arrests this year. On 31 October 2024, an officer from the Counter-Ambush Team (CAT - based at the Presidential Palace) was arrested while transporting 2695 rounds of ammunition, mostly of 7.62x39mm to be delivered to a member of Krache Dife gang. The origin of the ammunition remains unclear. This is not the first time that this officer would have been selling ammunition to gangs and that he has been working with other corrupt officers³¹¹.

On 8 November 2024, a police officer from the Unité Temporaire Anti-Gang (UTAG) was arrested near the Champs-de-Mars (downtown Port-au-Prince), an area prone to gang activities, in possession of 2400 rounds of ammunition, including 1000 rounds of 5.56x45mm and 1400 of 7.62x39mm. These ammunition were traced back to the HNP central armoury where the officer's female partner worked as a secretary and stole from the stock³¹². Both officers were in contact with intermediaries in touch with main *Viv Ansanm* leaders including Jimmy Chérizier (HTi.001), Chrisla, Vitelhomme (HTi.005), Kempes Sanon and Chen Mechan. Analysis of transfers to their bank accounts revealed regular cash deposits that are inconsistent with their salary and for which they were unable to provide supporting evidence³¹³.

With the HNP operating in a constant emergency mode, stockpiles management, of ammunition in particular, has been severely eroded. Interviews of several police officers working in different units, indicate that weak accountability at unit-level often result in diversions. For instance, a primary witness explained to the Panel how the lack of control over the distribution of ammunition and its use during operations in his unit, enabled some officers to save unused ammunition that they then sold on³¹⁴.

HNP firearms continue to be found in the hands of criminals. In Haiti, a HNP 9mm handgun was recovered from a gang member in Carrefour in December 2024³¹⁵. In Jamaica, a 9mm handgun of the HNP was seized in June 2025, bringing the total number of HNP firearms seized in Jamaica to date to 48³¹⁶.

In July 2025, the HNP issued warrants for three soldiers of the FADH accused of deserting without returning multiple service weapons and ammunition, including two rifles, several pistols, six magazines loaded with cartridges and a bulletproof vest, and a military helmet. Legal proceedings were initiated following a request made by the FADH³¹⁷.

Finally, the HNP regularly confiscate and recover arms and ammunition from gang members which generally remain within the unit that operate the seizure³¹⁸. Given the lack of materiel, the seized materiel is automatically reinjected in the unit's stockpile for its own use. While some of these weapons are registered and tracked, there is a general lack of oversight and control over them. As a result, many of these firearms are unaccounted for and, given the very high price on the illicit market, some feed the illicit market again.

³⁰⁹ UNPOL report, 2025.

³¹⁰ Interview with local authorities, July 2025.

³¹¹ Interviews with senior police officers, January 2025.

³¹² Interview with confidential source, December 2024. See also HNP official Facebook page, 9 November 2024.

³¹³ Confidential report, 2025. Interview with confidential sources, July 2025.

³¹⁴ Interview with confidential source, March 2025.

³¹⁵ HNP Facebook page, 12 December 2024.

³¹⁶ Information provided by the Jamaican authorities, July 2025.

³¹⁷ Confidential report, July 2025.

³¹⁸ For data about the seizures of firearms in Haiti (January 2021 - April 2025) see the Annex of UNODC report, S/2025/303, May 2025.

Annex 27: Proliferation of firearms outside Haiti

According to the Panel's enquiries to Member States in the region, there is little evidence about the proliferation of firearms from Haiti to the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. Although the Bahamas authorities have not made any seizure of arms and ammunition coming from Haiti to date, intelligence indicates that firearms may occasionally be exchanged for narcotics and that local Haitian street gangs use their connections to Haiti to import some firearms³¹⁹.

Jamaica is the country most affected by the proliferation of firearms from Haiti. The Jamaican authorities told the Panel that the drug-for-guns trade between Jamaica and Haiti continues (see Section II.D)³²⁰. Maritime routes remain the dominant method of transportation, with fisher-folk continuing to act as key couriers navigating the coastal waters between both countries. Intelligence suggests emerging dynamics, including the smuggling of firearm components rather than fully assembled weapons to evade detection.

In August 2024, in Jacmel, an agent from a private security company, was arrested by the HNP for his participation in a arms-for-marijuana network operating between Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The Panel already reported in detail about this trend (see S/2024/704). Forensic exploitation of the agent's phone showed that a Haitian national living near the land border was purchasing firearms (including handguns and rifles) from Dominican nationals and transporting them by sea to Jacmel for an exchange for marijuana coming from Jamaica³²¹.

³¹⁹ Response to written enquiry by the Panel, July 2025.

³²⁰ Response to written enquiry by the Panel, July 2025.

³²¹ Interview with a confidential source, 2025.

Annex 28: Haitian northern region



Source: United Nations Geospatial

* Non-Self-Governing Territory"


The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



Map data: @2025 Google

The boundaries and names shown, and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Annex 29: A map showing the breeding zone (Sargasso Sea) and the spread of American glass eels with the water currents from their spawning area in the Sargasso Sea.



https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Panmictic-distribution-of-American-eel-and-their-migration-routes-from-their-spawning_fig1_370443366. Accessed on 15 July 2025

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Below are photos of mature eels (left) and of elvers (glass eels)

(Source : ANAPRA social media handle: https://www.instagram.com/anapra_haiti/)



Below: Elvers in plastic sachets with ice cubes, ready to be loaded in freezer boxes for export out of Port-au-Prince. (see, https://www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/Country_presentation_template_Haiti_1.pdf).



Annex 30: Traces of Haiti's elvers on the international markets

Available evidence points to a sharp increase in elver harvesting in Haiti,³²² with more than 50,000 families engaging in fishing with artisanal equipment along the country's 1,535 km coastline (see S/2025/356). Despite this widespread participation, the trade is monopolized by a select group of politically and economically influential elites who conceal their beneficial ownership. This lack of transparency contributes lack of accountability, tax evasion, to illicit financial flows that finance activities that threaten the peace and security of Haiti.

Several countries have continued to be transparent by publicising their data of imports in line with Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulations, and this has revealed some of Haiti's exports.

For instance, in 2018, some East Asian countries that imported elvers from Canada and the USA stated that the imports may have included re-exports originating from Haiti.³²³ During this period, the price per kilogram of *Anguilla rostrata* at destination markets was reported to be approximately US\$10,000. At the time, a Canadian buyer noted that his competitors were traveling to Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic to purchase elvers. In addition, it was noted that countries such as Canada offer assistance to their counterparts in regulating the trade in elvers.³²⁴

In 2019, Haiti's Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources naturelles et du Développement rural - MARNDR) informed the Sargasso Sea Commission that the country possessed an annual export capacity of 800 metric tonnes.³²⁵

³²² Two customs officials, a trade analyst and a freight agent in Miami. June 2025.

³²³ See, <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/ac/30/E-AC30-18-02.pdf>

³²⁴ <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/com/ac/30/E-AC30-18-02.pdf>

³²⁵ According to two customs officials, these were the latest formal statistics published. See also https://www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/documents/Presentation_American_Eel_Anguilla_rostrata.pdf and https://www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/documents/final_Haiti_American_eel_report_FS_updates.pdf

Annex 31: How the elvers supply chain operates

To understand the modus operandi of the supply chain the Panel spoke to fishermen, suppliers, customs officials, freight attendants, investigators, among others. According to these sources, the beneficial owner incorporates networks of actors in the supply chain involving fishermen, transporters and gang members to a smooth flow of his trade.

The fishing of elvers, which is between October and March, occurs at the mouth of rivers entering the sea. During this period, the elvers freshly hatched in the Sargasso Sea, dash for the fresh, cold river water entering the Atlantic Ocean.

The fishing of elvers

The fishing of elvers is predominant in the departments of the North (Cap-Haïtien, Bas-Limbé, Port Margot, Borgne, Limonade, Camp Louise, Labadie); the North-East (Caracol); Artibonite (Saint-Marc); Nord-West (Port-de-Paix); South (Les Cayes); South-East (Jacmel); Grande-Anse (Jérémie, commune des Roseaux) and Nippes (Kawouk, Petite-Rivière de Nippes).

According to fishermen, the eels season is usually a “season of bounty” in which the whole community participates as cash flows from suppliers ready to pay as soon as the catch lands on the shores. A middleman who buys from Bas-Limbé, Borgne and Limonade and sells to traders, referred to the eel trade as “La cocaine d’Haïti” (the cocaine of Haiti) because of the high value payments associated with it, which makes people abandon other economic activities for elvers fishing.

At the estuaries, roles are shared out. As old and young men and some children wear flashlights on their forehead dive into the water to haul *Tizangi*, mothers and girlchildren sort organic waste from *Tizangi* before handing them to the suppliers who upon weighting, pay in cash. Night markets are created on the shores of the sea as generators roar endlessly, lighting up the night-long activities. An artisan in Borgne, informed the Panel that during the elvers season, he makes “cahiers” (i.e rectangular fishing instruments made of wood and mosquito netting) and sells to fishermen. He also repairs damaged cahiers, all at a fee.³²⁶ At night, he joins his seven workers on *Rivière Petit Bourg* for eel fishing, a venture more profitable than his daytime job during the elver season.³²⁷ He earns between 1,000 and 1,500HTG (\$7.6-11.5) in a night or two, an amount that would take him at least three to four days to earn in his workshop during other times. “And the fact that the buyers pay instantly makes it more attractive. During the 2024-2025 season the prices were more lucrative. The prices rose from 100HTG (\$0.76) to about 200 HTG (\$1.5USD), per kilogram,” added the respondent.

According to a fisherman from Bas-Limbé, eel fishing (on Rivière du Limbé) is a “chacun pour soi” (every man for himself) affair, devoid of any guarantees. For the last five years, he has seen seven people drown, of whom three were boys aged between 10-16 years, his own cousin whose boat capsized, and two women who drowned as they carried a load of elvers to the shore. Within this period, he has seen hundreds of people hospitalised for various ailments including infections, which he also suffered this year.³²⁸

People come from far, including from Port-au-Prince to fish elvers in Jérémie (Grand’Anse department), the Rivière de la Guinaudée and La rivière de la Grande-Anse, with buyers strategically positioned on the shores. In such a situation where people are unfamiliar to one another and with no licensing or supervision required, it’s impossible to control or organize

³²⁶ See an example of a fabricated sieve-like fishing net used in catching elvers at:

<https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=483752648784030>

³²⁷ Interview with a Borgne-based artisan who also doubles as an elvers fisherman. June 2025.

³²⁸ Interview with an elvers fisherman based in Bas-Limbé, 2025.

them into an association so the fishing and selling are undertaken independently. Several people drown due poor equipment or unfamiliarity with the river.³²⁹ Similarly, in La Petite Rivière de Jacmel villagers gather in large numbers to fish elvers.³³⁰

The intermediaries, all working under a coordinator, ensure that the collection of elvers from the various fishing hubs is done effectively and delivered to central points in nearby town where they are consolidated in freezer boxes. From there they are shipped/flown to Port-au-Prince where the final packaging is done, and then delivered to the relevant freight agents for export.³³¹

The issuance of eel export permits, under the responsibility of MARNDR, is overseen by an individual who coordinates the associations. From outside, the issuance of CITES-labelled export permits may seem as complying with CITES regulations, but the selective way in which they are issued serves the interest of the few exporters, protecting their monopoly.³³²

The supply chain

Two *zangi* fishermen from Borgne explained to the Panel the modus operandi of the eel supply chain and how the identities of those in the supply chain are concealed. According to the information, there are three level of operations.

Level one: At this level are the fishermen, who toil to get the elvers out of the water. Because they live in the same community/villages, and they work/fish together, they tend to know each other well. However, they have no say in the pricing of elvers. In the absence of the buyers, they would incur losses since the community does not farm or consume them.³³³ They lack the wherewithal to care for the elvers because once out of the water, and though they do not require feeding at that stage, they need to be kept in oxygenated polythene bags or tanks under 5°C for them to survive. This renders fishermen at the mercies of the buyers, who then set prices as they deem fit.

At this level, fishermen do not usually care about the identity of those who buy from them. "...they care less and simply want to sell their catch, that's all."³³⁴ Sometimes a middleman would make verbal 'agreement' with several fishermen beforehand to ensure that once they came offshore, they would sell their catch to him. In such cases the suppliers would peg a slightly higher price to entice the fishermen..³³⁵

Level two: This level comprises of intermediaries. These are agents of exporters who ensure that elvers leave the fishing zone and arrive at the exporter's storage facilities in good order. Suppliers carry on themselves bulk cash to fishing points and sometimes divide fishermen into groups for ease of operations and quick collection of stocks. The suppliers contract transporters (often motorcyclists due to their ability to manoeuvre the terrain) and ensure availability of ice cubes, polythene bags³³⁶ and tanks or simply buckets for transporting elvers.

Sometimes suppliers are attacked or kidnapped by gangs. To mitigate this risk, the coordinator commissions suppliers to engage with gangs upfront (at times via intermediaries) and pay the agreed sum to prevent disruptions that would lead to loss of eels. In the event of gangs kidnapping a transporter with elvers, instant negotiations take place to save the situation. Like in the case of two elvers traders who were kidnapped in the Artibonite department in 2024, the coordinator and her acolytes swiftly paid ransom of \$10,500USD to the Gran Grif gang to free them³³⁷.

³²⁹ Interview with two fishermen of elvers, based in Jérémie. March 2025. Also see, <https://ayibopost.com/la-peche-aux-anguilles-rapporte-de-largent-mais-tue-des-jeunes-a-jeremie/>.

³³⁰ Interview with a fisherman and a trader from Jacmel. May 2025.

³³¹ Interview with a supplier and a customs official. April 2025.

³³² Interview with a former finance minister and two trade analysts. June 2025.

³³³ See, https://www.sargassoseacommission.org/storage/Country_presentation__template_Haiti_1.pdf.

³³⁴ Interview with two buyers from Saint-Marc, Artibonite. June 2025.

³³⁵ Interview with a mother whose 11-year-old nephew drowned while fishing elvers Jérémie in 2024. February 2025.

³³⁶ See, <https://www.threads.com/@jnJerry.leogane/post/CuXrtI6gE96?hl=en>.

³³⁷ Two confidential sources and a law enforcement officer. June 2025.

The 400 Mawozo gang in Croix-des-Bouquets and Carrefour extort between \$200 – \$500 per tank (of 150-200kg of elvers), for elvers going from Jacmel, Artibonite and Les Cayes to collection points in Croix-des-Bouquets and Leogane, from where they are taken to the airport. Similarly, the beneficial owner emissaries pay nominal fees of between \$2,000-\$3,000 per week to the 400 Mawozo and to Grand Grif gangs for protecting their collection points in Martissant and Artibonite respectively.³³⁸

Level three: Transporters. They use motorbikes to deliver elvers to “porteurs” – i.e particular individuals who then move the elvers to central collection cold storage facilities concealed from public view. Oftentimes these are within residential places with restricted access in towns or city centres.³³⁹ Once enough stock has been accumulated it is transferred to a central point close to the Port-au-Prince Airport, ready for export under the watchful scrutiny of the owners.

Level four: this level comprises the ultimate beneficial owner and his top coordinators in the network, including all the permit holders who control the eel sector nationwide, extending across key fishing regions.³⁴⁰ The issuance of eel export permits, under the responsibility of MARNDR, is overseen by an individual who coordinates the associations. From outside, the issuance of CITES-labelled export permits may seem as complying with CITES regulations, but the selective way in which they are issued serves the interest of the few exporters, protecting their monopoly.³⁴¹

³³⁸ Interviews with two eyewitnesses, a freight agent in Port-au-Prince airport, two business analysts. March and April 2025.

³³⁹ Interview with an insider who has witnessed the process of exporting elvers. May 2025.

³⁴⁰ Interview with two transporters of elvers and a gang analyst. February 2025.


³⁴¹ Interview with a former finance minister and two trade analysts. June 2025.

Annex 32: Copies of two freight documents relating to elvers exported out of Haiti on 31 January and 5 February 2024. (Obtained from a confidential source).

Nationality/Regn : _____ Owner/Operator : A [REDACTED]
 Point of loading : PAP Flight # & Date : [REDACTED] 5/02/2024
 Total PCS : 724 Tail No : [REDACTED]
 Gross Wt : 9023.00 K Point of Unloading : KIN
 EGM No : _____ MAWB No : _____
 Total AWB : 6

ULD#	AWB#	ORG	DEST	SCC	Comm Desc	SHC	Shipper	Consignee	Mft Pcs/Acc Pcs	Wt	UOM	For official use only
Summary :									Total :	0/0	0	
Transit :												
ULD#	AWB#	ORG	DEST	SCC	Comm Desc	SHC	Shipper	Consignee	Mft Pcs/Acc Pcs	Wt	UOM	For official use only
PAG07628M6	810-23883871	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	FISHERMEN QUATERS S.A 129 MARTISSANT RIVIERA PLAZA	[REDACTED]	95/331	1140.00	K	
PAG07737M6	810-23883871	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	FISHERMEN QUATERS S.A 129 MARTISSANT RIVIERA PLAZA	[REDACTED]	95/331	1140.00	K	
PAG08183M6	810-23883871	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	FISHERMEN QUATERS S.A 129 MARTISSANT RIVIERA PLAZA	[REDACTED]	16/331	192.00	K	
PAG09809M6	810-23883871	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	FISHERMEN QUATERS S.A 129 MARTISSANT RIVIERA PLAZA	[REDACTED]	95/331	1140.00	K	


PAG09926M6	810-23883871	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	FISHERMEN QUATERS S.A 129 MARTISSANT RIVIERA PLAZA	30/331	360.00	K		
PQA01614M6	810-23884302	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE TROPICAL FISH	PES	CARAIBES SEA LIFE HT 16 RUE CHARIER FONTAMARA 35	54/54	646.00	K		
PAG09926M6	810-23884372	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE tropICAL FISH	PES	BLUE STAR IMPORT EXPORT RTE NATIONALE 2 NO 11	48/48	832.00	K		
PAG09926M6	810-23884383	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE TROPICAL FISH	PES	AQUAPLUS HAITI ROUTE NATIONALE #2, MERGER	22/22	345.00	K		
PAG08183M6	810-23884405	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	LA PERLE ANTILLAISE IMPORT- EXPORT 34 RLE DESSALINES SARTHE	10/200	120.00	K		
PAG08736M6	810-23884405	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	LA PERLE ANTILLAISE IMPORT- EXPORT 34 RLE DESSALINES SARTHE	95/200	1140.00	K		
PAG09047M6	810-23884405	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	LA PERLE ANTILLAISE IMPORT- EXPORT 34 RLE DESSALINES SARTHE	95/200	1140.00	K		
PAG08183M6	810-23884416	PAP	MIA	1717	LIVE EELS KEEP COOL 15 DEGRES CELCIUS	PES	TRESOR DE MERS 12 RUE SHABISCO CLERCINE 16	69/69	828.00	K		
Total :								724/724	9023.00	K		
Summary :												
Transfer :												
ULD#	AWB#	ORG	DEST	SCC	Comm Desc	SHC	Shipper	Consignee	Mft Pcs/Acc Pcs	Wt	UOM	For official use only
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total :								0/0	0.00	-		
Summary :												



Annex 33: A copy of one of the permits used by one of the 20 exporters of elvers in 2024

A comparison of the information in this permit and the information in the CITES recommended standard form (see below) shows the omission of vital information such as Haiti's export quota, the value (in monetary terms) of the commodity, etc, that would allow the traceability of the supply chain and the relevant controls to take place. (Source: confidential).

Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural
Ministè Agrikilti Resous Natirel ak Devlopman Riral (MARNDR)



REPUBLIQUE D'HAÏTI
REPIBLIK D'AYITI

PERMIS
(En conformité de l'article X de la convention CITES)

Exportation
 Réexportation
 Importation


No. : EXP / DPA / DPAQ /091/ANG/2024 Valable jusqu'au 28 Février 2024
Port-au-Prince, le 18 Janvier 2024

Nom de l'Autorité Administrative émettant le Permis		Pays
Direction des Forêts, Pares et Sols	<input type="radio"/>	HAÏTI
Direction Pêches et Aquaculture	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	Exportateur AGRICOD S.A.
Conformément aux règlements régissant la protection de la flore et de la faune terrestre et marine. Le service compétent du Ministère autorise l'exportation des espèces et quantités ci-après décrites.		Nom [REDACTED]
Destinataire, Nom et Adresse Complète		Adresse Complète ROUTE DE TABARRE
[REDACTED]		Ce permis est émis en conformité de l'Article X de la Convention sur le Commerce International des Espèces de Faune et de Flore Sauvage Menacées d'extinction (CITES) parties ou dérivés de ces spécimens.


Pays d'origine des spécimens		
A Capturés ou récoltés dans la nature	* B Nés en captivité	C Reproduit Artificiellement

Description de l'Espèce		
Nom Commun	Nom Scientifique	Quantité
Anguilles bébés	Anguilla rostrata	Pds brut 1240 Kilos, Pds Net 50 Kilos 50 Boites
Parties ou dérivés de ces spécimens	Spécimens	Autres (sexe, âge, dimension)

Permis délivré uniquement pour exportation...Anguilles bébés



Jean
Vu et approuvé



Jean
Signature


Prolongation de validité.....
N.B. Permis non valide sans le sceau les signatures autorisées

Damien, Route Nationale #1. Port-au-Prince / Haïti / B.P. 1441
Phones : (509) 2298-3013 / Fax : (509) 2298-3012

Below is sample of a standard CITES form with all the relevant information such that enables traceability and controls of the supply chain, as recommended by CITES (see, <https://cites.org/sites/default/files/documents/COP/19/resolution/E-Res-12-03-R19.pdf>).

Annex 2

Standard CITES form

 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA		PERMIT/CERTIFICATE No. <input type="checkbox"/> EXPORT <input type="checkbox"/> RE-EXPORT <input type="checkbox"/> IMPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER:		Original 2. Valid until											
		3. Importer (name and address) 3a. Country of import		4. Exporter/re-exporter (name, address and country) Signature of the applicant											
5. Special conditions <small>If for live animals, this permit or certificate is valid only if the transport conditions comply with the IATA Live Animals Regulations; if for live plants, with the IATA Perishable Cargo Regulations; or, in the case of non-air transport, with the CITES Guidelines for the Non-Air Transport of Live Wild Animals and Plants</small>		6. Name, address, national seal/stamp and country of Management Authority													
5a. Purpose of the transaction (see reverse)		5b. Security stamp no.													
7.B. Scientific name (genus and species) and common name of animal or plant		9. Description of specimens, including identifying marks or numbers (age/sex if live)	10. Appendix no. and source (see reverse)	11. Quantity (including unit)	11a. Total exported/Quota										
A		7.B.	9.	10.	11.										
12. Country of origin * Permit no. Date		12a. Country of last re-export Certificate no. Date		12b. No. of the operation ** or date of acquisition ***											
B		7.B.	9.	10.	11.										
12. Country of origin * Permit no. Date		12a. Country of last re-export Certificate no. Date		12b. No. of the operation ** or date of acquisition ***											
C		7.B.	9.	10.	11.										
12. Country of origin * Permit no. Date		12a. Country of last re-export Certificate no. Date		12b. No. of the operation ** or date of acquisition ***											
D		7.B.	9.	10.	11.										
12. Country of origin * Permit no. Date		12a. Country of last re-export Certificate no. Date		12b. No. of the operation ** or date of acquisition ***											
* Country in which the specimens were taken from the wild, bred in captivity or artificially propagated (only in case of re-export) ** Only for specimens of Appendix-I species bred in captivity or artificially propagated for commercial purposes *** For pre-Convention specimens															
13. This permit/certificate is issued by: _____ Place Date Security stamp, signature and official seal															
14. Export endorsement:			15. Bill of Lading/Air waybill number:												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Block</th> <th>Quantity</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>A</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>B</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>C</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>D</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Block	Quantity	A		B		C		D		Port of export		Date	
Block	Quantity														
A															
B															
C															
D															
		Signature		Official stamp and title											

CITES PERMIT/CERTIFICATE No.

Annex 35: A snapshot of the 2025 prices of elvers sourced from Haiti, as of 22 July 2025. These prices showed no significant changes from 2024.

(Source: https://www.selinawamucii.com/insights/prices/haiti/live-eels/#google_vignette)

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Price Report

Price Report: Live Eels in Haiti

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Live Eels Market Report - Haiti

Market Price Report: Live Eels in Haiti

Report Date: July 22, 2025

Executive Summary

The live eel market in Haiti is currently classified as **Moderate Volatility** with estimated monthly price fluctuations between 5-15%, driven primarily by supply constraints and regulatory enforcement impacting export volumes. Pricing power is **Supplier-dominated**, reflecting limited local production and strong demand from East Asian markets for glass eel fry. The market is in a **Developing** stage, with increasing export activity but ongoing challenges related to illegal trade and supply chain transparency. Investment grade risk is assessed as **Medium**, due to regulatory uncertainties and market manipulation risks. The **Key Price Driver** is the high international demand for live eel fry combined with export quota enforcement and illegal trade dynamics[1][2].

Data Reliability & Methodology Assessment

Source Portfolio Analysis

- **Primary Sources:**
 - Selina Wamucii (daily updated wholesale and retail prices, March-July 2025) — Confidence: ● Very High (official market data, updated daily)[1]
 - Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC) report on live eel trade and export quotas, 2024 — Confidence: ● Very High (government/industry report)[2]
- **Secondary Sources:**
 - Tridge global market price data (July 2025) — Confidence: ● Medium (aggregated secondary data, limited Haiti-specific detail)[3]
 - IndexBox Canada export/import price data (2023) — Confidence: ● Medium (relevant for comparative pricing)[4]
- **Data Coverage:** Estimated coverage represents approximately 70% of Haiti's live eel market volume, focusing on Port-au-Prince and Carrefour urban centers, with limited rural data[1].
- **Geographic Coverage:** Primarily urban wholesale and retail markets; production regions less documented.
- **Temporal Data Depth:** Daily price updates available for 6+ months; structural trade data available for 2 years[1][2].

Methodology Transparency

- **Price Discovery:** Prices are established primarily through negotiated wholesale transactions and posted retail prices in urban markets. Export prices are influenced by international demand and quota enforcement mechanisms[1][2].

Micros

Methodology Transparency

- **Price Discovery:** Prices are established primarily through negotiated wholesale transactions and posted retail prices in urban markets. Export prices are influenced by international demand and quota enforcement mechanisms[1][2].
- **Sampling:** Data collected via stratified sampling of major urban markets and export records; some reliance on broker reports for export pricing.
- **Bias Assessment:** Potential underreporting due to illegal trade and black market activity; export volumes may be underestimated[2].
- **Margin of Error:** Estimated $\pm 5\%$ for wholesale and retail prices; higher uncertainty for export volumes due to illegal trade.
- **Last Verification:** July 20, 2025, via Selina Wamucii and ASMFC data validation protocols[1][2].

Current Market Pricing Intelligence

Benchmark Pricing Framework

Segment	Unit	Price Range (USD)	Confidence	Source	Trend
Retail (Urban)	per kg	\$6.37 – \$10.29	● High	[1]	↔ Stable
Wholesale	per kg	\$4.46 – \$7.21	● High	[1]	↔ Stable
Export (Live Fry)	per gram	\$3.60 – \$4.50	● Very High	[2]	↗ Rising

- **Standard Trading Unit:** Kilogram for wholesale and retail; gram for live eel fry export.

- **Standard Trading Unit:** Kilogram for wholesale and retail; gram for live eel fry export.
- **Spot Price:** Current spot prices in Port-au-Prince and Carrefour retail markets range \$6.37-\$10.29/kg with wholesale prices \$4.46-\$7.21/kg[1].
- **Forward Prices:** No formal forward market; export contracts negotiated case-by-case.
- **Basis Differentials:** Prices in rural areas estimated 10-15% lower; urban centers command premium due to demand concentration.

Price Matrix

Market Segment	Price Range (USD/kg)	Notes	Confidence
Retail Premium	\$8.50 – \$10.29	High-end outlets in Port-au-Prince	● High
Retail Discount	\$6.37 – \$8.00	Local markets, Carrefour	● High
Wholesale Base	\$4.46 – \$7.21	Bulk purchases, 10+ kg	● High
Volume Discounts	5-15		

Related Reports

Live Eels in Other Countries

Search prices in other countries

Other Products in Haiti

Search prices for other products

Annex 36: Discontent against eel monopoly

In Haiti, trade sectors are often controlled by one merchant family or a small group of individuals (see S/2023/674). The elvers sector is therefore no exception. In the absence of a national structure governing the eel industry, the network of the few individuals with export permits run the activity.

The exclusive holders of *Tizangi* export permits have consistently blocked other interested parties access to the licenses. This resulted in the creation, by peasant fishermen and suppliers of an association known as ANAFARH (L'Association Nationale des Fournisseurs d'Anguilles de Rivière d'Haïti) which has been vocal in challenging the dominance of the few individuals in the eel sector. In the video below, the President of ANAFARH advocates for better prices for elvers fishermen, better working conditions and the opening of the licensing to other exporters.

See full video here: <https://www.facebook.com/RTGHAI/ideos/490973033464498/>.



L'Association Nationale des Fournisseurs d'Anguilles de Rivière d'Haïti (ANAFARH) dénonce la corruption dans le secteur de la pêche en Haïti....

In a bid to silence parties such as ANAFARH that challenge the domination of the few people in the network, in July 2024, the coordinator of the major exporter through intermediaries, mobilized about three hundred elvers fishermen and local political activists in Artibonite to undertake public demonstrations in solidarity with those holding the permits.³⁴²

³⁴² Interview with a member of ANAFARH and an intermediary in the elvers in Artibonite, aware of the matter. May 2025.

Annex 37: A summary of selected cases that are publicly available, relating to diversion of public funds. Panel (Source: Open resumés from ULCC investigated cases).

1. *False wealth declaration relating three former senators:*

The anti-corruption authorities use wealth declaration as one way of assessing the proportionality of the wealth of public servants. Often it has been established that several of them enrich themselves enormously though diversion of public funds once they take public positions. Three of these cases concluded in 2023 relate to amounts of 43,025,470HTG (\$326,000USD) (Senator Nenel Cassy); 1,066,007HTG (\$8,075USD) (Youri Latortue and Joseph Lambert) and Rony Célestin (see also S/2024/704, paras. 167-176 and Annex 144).

2. *Service National de Gestion des Résidus Solides (SNGRS)*

SNGRS is the government department in charge of solid waste management. Its director and deputy were implicated in the diversion of 125,000,000HTG (\$945,000USD). The file was ready for prosecution in September 2024.

3. *The investigations involving three members of the TPC³⁴³*

The matter involved a payment of bribery amounting to 100,000,000HTG (\$750,000USD), and the investigations were concluded in October 2024 (see also S/2025/356, para. 79). The suspects challenged the investigation process and the outcome was still pending at the time of writing.



**UNITÉ DE LUTTE CONTRE LA CORRUPTION
(ULCC)**

Liste des quinze (15) enquêtes sélectionnées

No de série	Institution	Sujet du dossier	Personnes impliquées	Date de clôture des enquêtes	État judiciaire/ La suite	La somme (Fonds) impliquée
1	Office National d'Assurance-Vieillesse (ONA) / Real Business Investment S.A. (RBI)	Détournement de biens publics, complicité de détournement de biens publics, blanchiment du produit du crime, abus de fonction, association de malfaiteur	L'Homme d'affaires, Monsieur Pierre Réginald BOULOS, Ancien Premier Jean Henry CEANT.	12 Août 2021	Cabinet d'Instruction	65, 000,000.00 millions gourdes
2	Autorité Aéroportuaire Nationale (AAN)	Agrandissement de l'Aéroport Toussaint Louverture	Ancien Directeur Général, Monsieur Irving MÉHU ; l'Ancien Ministre des Travaux Publics, Transports et communications (MTPTC), Monsieur Jacques ROUSSEAU et l'ancienne Ministre du Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (MEF), Madame Marie-Carmelle JEAN-MARIE	12 Août 2021	Cabinet d'Instruction	42, 534,450 USD

³⁴³ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/253481/ulccbnc-annulation-des-mandats-de-comparution-des-conseillers-presidentiels>.

No de série	Institution	Sujet du dossier	Personnes impliquées	Date de clôture des enquêtes	État judiciaire/ La suite	La somme (Fonds) impliquée
3	Fonds de Développement Industriel (FDI)	Abus de fonction et entrave à la justice	Messieurs Serge MERGER et Edgar JEUDY, ancien Directeur Général.	12 Août 2021	Cabinet d'Instruction	
4	L'Administration Générale des Douanes (AGD)	Enrichissement illicite, blanchiment du produit du crime, fausse déclaration de patrimoine, association de malfaiteurs.	L'Ancien Directeur Général, Monsieur Romel BELL, Madame Anna Dorvil BELL, Duckens AUGUSTE	09 mars 2023	Cour d'appel de Port-au-Prince	180, 405,764.22 gourdes
5	Sénat de la République	Fausse déclaration de patrimoine, enrichissement illicite	L'Ancien-sénateur Nènel CASSY	20 novembre 2023	Cour d'appel de Port-au-Prince	Quarante-trois millions vingt-cinq mille quatre cent soixante-dix et 82/100 (43, 025,470.82) gourdes
6	Sénat de la République	Prise illégale d'intérêt, détournement de fonds publics, entrave au bon fonctionnement de la justice	Messieurs Youri LATORTUE et Joseph LAMBERT	15 mars 2023	Cour d'appel	un million soixante-six mille sept et 50/100 (1,066.007.50) gourdes
7	Sénat de la République	Fausse déclaration de patrimoine	L'Ancien Sénateur Monsieur Rony CÉLESTIN	15 mars 2023	Cour d'appel

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No de série	Institution	Sujet du dossier	Personnes impliquées	Date de clôture des enquêtes	État judiciaire/ La suite	La somme (Fonds) impliquée
8	Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement (BMPAD)	Détournement et enrichissement illicite	L'Ancien Directeur Général Monsieur Patrick NORAMÉ	12 août 2021	Cabinet d'Instruction	Cent-vingt-quatre millions trois cent cinquante-cinq mille cent quarante-six mille124 355 146 gourdes
9	Office National d'Assurance-Vieillesse (ONA) – Acquisition d'une Propriété	Abus de fonction, prise illégale d'intérêt, blanchiment du produit du crime et association de malfaiteurs.	L'ancien Directeur Général, Monsieur Jemley Marc JEAN-BAPTISTE, l'ancienne Directrice adjointe, Madame Stéphanie MONDESTIN et l'ancien Député Alfredo Junior ANTOINE.	20 novembre 2023	Cabinet d'instruction	86 millions de gourdes
10	Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (MPCE)	Enrichissement illicite.	L'ancien Ministre, Me Aviol FLEURANT	03 septembre 2024	Cabinet d'instruction	75.000.000 millions de gourdes
11	Service National de Gestion des Résidus Solides (SNGRS)	Détournement de carburant.	Le Directeur général Monsieur Germain PAULÉMON et le Directeur Général Adjoint, Monsieur Max Alex JOSEPH.	03 septembre 2024	Cabinet d'instruction	125.000.000 millions de gourdes

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No de série	Institution	Sujet du dossier	Personnes impliquées	Date de clôture des enquêtes	État judiciaire/ La suite	La somme (Fonds) impliquée
12	Conseil Présidentiel de Transition (CPT)	Versement de pot-de-vin	Les conseillers Louis GÉRALD GILLES, Smith AUGUSTIN, Emmanuel VERTILAIRE et le Président du Conseil de la Banque Nationale de Crédit (BNC), Monsieur Raoul Pascal PIERRE-LOUIS.	3 octobre 2024	Cabinet d'instruction	100 millions de gourdes
13	Programme National de Cantines Scolaires (PNCS)	Abus de fonction, détournement de biens publics.	Ancienne Coordonnatrice Générale Madame Phanèse R. LAGUERRE	03 septembre 2024	Cabinet d'instruction	250 millions de gourdes
14	Office de la Protection du Citoyen (OPC)	Détournement de fonds publics, enrichissement illicite	L'ancien Protecteur du Citoyen, Me Renan HÉDOUVILLE	03 septembre 2024	Transféré au cabinet d'instruction	16 millions de gourdes
15	Office National d'Assurance-Vieillesse MART / ONA PHARMA	Détournement de biens publics, abus de fonction, trafic d'influence et association de malfaiteurs.	L'homme d'affaires Monsieur Réginald, l'ancien Sénateur Youri LATORTUE, ancien Directeur général, feu Chesnel PIERRE, Monsieur Albert Christian JEAN LOUIS.	17 août 2021		770 millions de gourdes

Annex 38: CBP data on bulk cash intercepted leaving and entering the United States from/to Haiti (January 2022 to June 2025). As shown, the bulk of the cash related to outbound movements.

Source: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) based on a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by the Panel in June 2025.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	Location							
2		INBOUND		OUTBOUND		Total Incidents	US Dollars	
3	(b)(7)(E)			1	\$10 020	1	\$10 020	
4	(b)(7)(E)	1	\$23 002	91	\$2 737 837	92	\$2 760 839	
5	(b)(7)(E)	1	\$1 404			1	\$1 404	
6	(b)(7)(E)			12	\$643 786	12	\$643 786	
7	(b)(7)(E)			1	\$24 153	1	\$24 153	
8	(b)(7)(E)	1	\$33 786			1	\$33 786	
9	Total	3	\$58 192	105	\$3 415 796	108	\$3 473 988	
10								
11								

Annex 39: A copy of the circular issued by the Ministry of Economy and Finance instructing the Customs not to allow the entry into Haiti of merchandise transiting via the Dominican Republic through the land border so as to combat cross-border trafficking

The impact of the circular had two notable consequences.

It led to an accumulation in the Port of Haina (Dominican Republic) of containers of goods that were already in transit to Haiti. In about 21 days after the MEF's instructions, the Dominican authorities could hardly bear with the magnitude of those containers and had to release them to their owners³⁴⁴. Trade resumed as usual on the Dominican-Haitian border. Most shipping lines are not impacted by the ban (still in force) and continue shipping transit-containers to the Dominican Republic destined to Haiti³⁴⁵.

Second, with the issuance of the circular, gangs anticipated an intensification of cargo through the ports. Therefore, they intensified their watch of seaports and control over the routes leading to them, and increased heavier tolls.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁴ Meetings with Dominican authorities, Santo Domingo, June 2025.

³⁴⁵ Interview with a shipping agent, July 2025.

³⁴⁶ Interview with a customs official, a truck driver and a trader. April 2025.



RÉPUBLIQUE D'HAÏTI

MINISTÈRE
DE L'ÉCONOMIE ET DES FINANCES

Le Ministre

No. DAJ/BM/AGD/03-25/00479

Port-au-Prince, le 25 MARS 2025

CIRCULAIRE No. 001

Relative aux marchandises en provenance de l'étranger via la République Dominicaine

Le Ministre de L'Economie et des Finances (MEF)

A

L'Administration Générale des Douanes (AGD)

Le Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (MEF) fait savoir aux Bureaux des Douanes sis à la frontière haïtiano-dominicaine que désormais :

- ils ne sont plus habilités à recevoir les marchandises en provenance de l'étranger via la République Dominicaine, ce, jusqu'à nouvel ordre;
- toutes ces marchandises doivent arriver en Haïti par voie maritime pour être prises en charge par les Bureaux des Douanes compétents.

Il est ordonné aux Responsables de ces Bureaux des Douanes de procéder, entre autres, à la saisie de toutes les marchandises qui franchiraient la frontière en violation des dispositions ci-dessus.

L'Administration Générale des Douanes (AGD) est instruite, de concert avec la Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH) et les Forces Armées d'Haïti (FADH), d'assurer la surveillance de tous les mouvements qui s'effectuent au niveau de la frontière terrestre.

Le non-respect de la présente circulaire expose les contrevenants à des sanctions administratives sans préjudice des sanctions pénales prévues par les lois régissant la matière.

La présente circulaire entre en vigueur à partir du lundi 7 avril 2025.

Port-au-Prince, le 25 MARS 2025

Alfred Fils METELLUS

Annex 40: Impact of increased extortion by gangs

Sources informed the Panel that the blockade of the Port-au-Prince – Cap-Haitian route at Mirebalais has led to transporters of basic goods and services to seek other alternative ways of ferrying their merchandise. Some have opted to use sea routes. This has led gangs to target seaports and routes leading to them, which has increased incidents of criminality in these areas³⁴⁷.

Consequences include exponential increase in the rates of revenue extorted by gangs. For instance from 2 May 2025, Wharf Jérémie and La Saline gangs (which compete in extorting trucks, and which had reduced their taxes to about \$150USD per truck, raised their extortion fees for trucks exiting the APN Port and Varreux oil terminal (a bulk fuel terminal that serves most of Haiti) to between \$250USD-\$450USD per truck to exit the port area.³⁴⁸

In addition, a truckload of petroleum products from Varreux to Cap-Haitian pays up to 600,000HTG (\$4,500USD) to gangs operating in Mirebalais. As a result, fuel transporters opted to transport their petroleum products to Cap-Haitian using the sea route, which is more expensive and time consuming (4-5 days), but safer. However, other transporters risked and used the road. In both ways, the transportation-related costs are borne by consumers at pump price³⁴⁹.

In May 2025, the Association of Petroleum Professionals wrote to the Prime Minister expressing their concerns about the insecurity facing their sector, and the impact that has on the country's economy, as costs are passed onto the ordinary consumer, thereby raising the prices of basic commodities.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁷ Interview with a customs official, a trader and a gang analyst. May 2025.

³⁴⁸ Interview with a Varreux freight agent, a truck driver and two civil society members. April and May 2025.

³⁴⁹ Interview with a former member of the Chamber of Commerce, a truck driver and two petroleum retailers in Cap-Haitian. June 2025.

³⁵⁰ Interview with a cargo transporter, a customs official and two business analysts. May 2025. Also see <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/256126/combien-coute-le-transport-des-produits-petroliers>.