Wider Europe Briefing: The Many Ways The EU Can Sanction Georgia

By Rikard Jozwiak

Briefing #1: Will The EU Sanction Pro-Government Georgian TV?

What You Need To Know: For the first time, European Union diplomats discussed a proposal last week made by the bloc’s diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS), to sanction two Georgian pro-government TV channels, Imedi TV and POSTV, for disseminating Russian propaganda. Imedi TV is considered the most popular TV channel in the country and is owned by the businessman Irakli Rukhadze, who has already been sanctioned by both Lithuania and Ukraine. Transparency International recently uncovered evidence that the founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party Bidzina Ivanishvili has financed the channel for some time. The sanctions, which would mean asset freezes in the bloc, visa bans imposed on the owners of the channels, and the suspension of broadcast licenses in the EU, would fall under a sanctions regime set up by Brussels late last year designed to target Russian hybrid activities. These activities include what is known as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) against EU institutions, its member states, as well as its partners.

Deep Background: This is not the first time Brussels has tried to hit Tbilisi with sanctions. In January, the EEAS was pushing to sanction lawmakers from Georgian Dream, as well as judges and Interior Ministry officials, for the crackdown on protests following the controversial parliamentary elections in October 2024. That time, Hungary and Slovakia vetoed the sanctions proposal, and it looks like they might do the same again. According to several diplomats familiar with the issue, the two central European countries have again voiced skepticism along with Belgium, Italy, and Greece.

The two arguments the skeptics used to justify their positions were concerns about limiting freedom of speech and the risk of Tbilisi accusing the EU of applying double standards as it gives both political and monetary support for the country's media, but, at the same time, is attempting to silence critical voices. On the other side of the debate, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Netherlands supported the sanctions proposals -- as did the Czech Republic, which has been one of the biggest drivers to target the Georgian regime. In late September, Prague imposed national sanctions on Georgian Deputy Interior Minister Aleksandre Darakhvelidze as well as three judges and a prosecutor, adding to the three Interior Ministry officials they blacklisted in January. Apart from the potential vetoes from individual member states, there is another potential stumbling block: The powerful legal service of the Council of the EU, which reviews sanctions proposals and checks if they can withstand a challenge in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), voiced some reservations.

Drilling Down:

• During the discussion, the legal servicenoted that the evidence packages put forward by the EEAS did not sufficiently prove a connection between the Georgian stations, Imedi TV and POSTV, and the Russian government.
• The EU diplomatic arm will now continue to work to strengthen and collect more evidence, also trying to garner support from more than the six countries that expressed enthusiasm about the initial proposal.
• Finland, Germany, Slovenia, and Sweden expressed political support for the sanctions if the legal case is bolstered. Bulgaria, France, and Romania also indicated that they could back the move but needed more time to study the implications.
• The key for those pushing for the sanctions will be to prove the links between the Kremlin and the two TV channels. And while the Russian hybrid sanctions blacklist -- which to date contains 47 individuals and 15 entities -- mainly consist of Russian citizens and entities, there are already quite a few that come from elsewhere. And this can strengthen the hand of those pushing for Imedia and POSTV to be included.
• Take for example the Moldovan businessman Anatolii Prizenko, who was sanctioned by the bloc in 2024. In late October 2023, he organized several Moldovan citizens traveling to France, where they painted the Star of David on the streets in exchange for financial compensation. That operation was widely reported by the media but, according to the EU, the images of that operation were first spread by the Recent Reliable News media network, which is associated with the Russian government.
• Harouna Douamba, an Ivorian businessman, has also been sanctioned by Brussels for running a disinformation network in the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso. According to the EU, his network launched a campaign that targeted “France in particular, including through accusations of conspiracy, terrorism, destabilization operations, or preparing coups against the Union or its Member States.”
• In the case of Douamba, the EU’s legal service was satisfied with evidence of links to the Kremlin, as they were when they greenlighted sanctions on the Istanbul-based AFA Medya A.S. This company operates RED, which according to the EU “comprises a number of media platforms, and which has close financial and organizational connections with Russian state propaganda entities and actors, and which shares deep structural ties, including interlinkages between, and rotation of, individual personnel with Russian state media organizations.”
• Even two EU citizens, the German bloggers Alina Lipp and Thomas Roeper, have been sanctioned by the bloc for “systematically disseminating misinformation about Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.”

Briefing #2: And Will Brussels Finally Suspend Georgia’s Visa Free Regime?

What You Need To Know: The European Union is set to approve new rules that would make it easier to suspend visa liberalization for third-country nationals traveling into the bloc, a measure aimed in large part at Georgia amid signs Tbilisi is drifting away from democratic reforms and back toward Moscow's sphere of influence. The European Parliament is expected on October 7 to give its thumbs up to the new legislation and EU member states are expected to follow suit on November 17 with the new rules set to enter into force in December. The measures will apply to all 61 countries that enjoy a visa-free regime with the club, including all the EU hopefuls in the Western Balkans, Moldova, and Ukraine. But European diplomats admit that the proposed updated rules, at least partly, target another country still enjoying EU visa liberalization: Georgia.

The South Caucasus republic has been on a collision course with Brussels for a long time with Tbilisi adopting both anti-LGBT legislation and a so-called "foreign agent" law -- similar legislation has been used by the Kremlin to crack down on free speech and civil society -- last year amid heavy EU criticism. The relationship deteriorated further after parliamentary elections in October last year in which the ruling Georgian Dream party controversially clung on to power and then decided to halt accession talks while adopting what many -- including Brussels -- see as Russia-friendly policies. The situation prompted massive demonstrations, which were put down violently by authorities. Local elections over the weekend, where Georgian Dream further cemented its grip on power, reignited demonstrations. Riot police responded with water cannons to break up what officials claim was "an attempted coup planned by foreign intelligence services." Further demonstrations are expected in the Georgian capital on October 6.

Deep Background: Since the October 2024 elections, the EU has refrained from high-level political contacts and made it easier for EU member states to impose national visa restrictions for high-ranking Georgian officials. Brussels has, however, failed to impose sanctions on high-ranking Georgian politicians as Hungary and Slovakia repeatedly have vetoed the move, which requires unanimity among the 27 member states. The bloc has instead looked into targeting the country’s visa-free regime, in place since 2017, as this doesn’t require consensus. The European Commission warned the Georgian government about this in a letter in July, asking for a number of clarifications by the end of August. Tbilisi responded but, according to several EU officials, Brussels was unimpressed with the response. In the meantime, EU member states and the European Parliament have spent the first half of 2025 negotiating new rules to trigger the visa-liberalization suspension mechanism, which may be used on Georgia later this year. The new rules open ways to trigger the mechanism. The reasons currently are tied mainly to classic “home affairs issues” such as large numbers of nationals from a country that enjoys visa-free travel overstaying the 90 days they are allowed to stay in the bloc, or even using the opportunity to seek asylum in the EU.

Drilling Down:

• A new ground for suspension includes a lack of alignment of a country’s visa-free regime with the EU’s visa policy. An example of this would be that a country that has visa-free travel with the EU and also has visa freedom for Russian citizens. With Brussels keen to limit the influx of Russian citizens, the new legislation would allow the EU to close a potential alternative route into the bloc.
• Another new ground for suspension is if a third country runs an investor citizenship scheme, known as “golden passports.”
• “Hybrid threats” is a third, new criteria. This can be something like what the EU calls “state-sponsored instrumentalization of migrants” -- an example being Belarus (which doesn’t enjoy visa liberalization with the EU) flying in people from Asia and Africa to Belarus and then pushing them toward the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
• But it is the fourth new reason that appears to be the one that puts Tbilisi’s visa liberalization in the crosshairs: a deterioration in the EU’s external relations with a third country, notably when it comes to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
• There are also a few other notable changes to the visa suspension rules. Visa liberalization suspension is always temporary at first. In the current legislation the temporary suspension is for nine months and can be extended for a further 18 months.
• In the new proposal, the initial suspension will be 12 months and the prolongation 24 months, bringing the potential total to three years. EU diplomats say this is to give extra time for the European Commission to engage with the third country to rectify any issues.
• But there is another change that specifically targets Georgia. Under the current legislation, one can limit the visa-free suspension to decision-makers such as ministers and officials in the first temporary suspension period, with it affecting a country's entire population during the prolongation period.
• Under the new rules, the entire population may be unaffected during the entire three-year period, thus sparing ordinary citizens. This is relevant for Georgia as many in Brussels are wary of hitting the population for something they feel is the responsibility of the government. Regular citizens would only be affected if their country fails to be removed from the visa-free list after the three-year period.
• It is worth remembering that for a temporary suspension, the European Commission can make the decision on its own, without a vote in the European Parliament or among EU member states.
• It is, however, common practice that the commission consults widely with national capitals. A qualified majority (55 percent of EU member states comprising 65 percent of the total EU population) is required to remove a country’s visa-free regime with the club. RFE/RL has learned that as many as 19 EU member states would consider supporting at least a temporary suspension.

Looking Ahead

The European Parliament plenary is in full swing this week, and it's worth watching out for Greenland Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen's address to the chamber on October 8. US President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in the giant Danish island ever since he reentered the White House earlier this year but Greenlanders seemingly rebuffed American overtures in parliamentary elections earlier this year. They might instead seek closer ties with the EU after withdrawing from the EU’s predecessor, the European community, back in 1985.