Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview: Gangs

Sources indicate that in February 2024, Haitian gangs united under a large coalition called Viv Ansanm [living together] (UN 2025-03-27, para. 7; GCR2P 2025-03-14; GI-TOC 2025-04, 7). This coalition brings together the two federations of G9 an Fanmi (G9) and G-PEP (Program Manager 2025-07-04; GCR2P 2025-03-14; InSight Crime 2025-02-06). Within Viv Ansanm, the criminal groups act in a [Crisis Group English version] "concerted effort" (Program Manager 2025-07-04; Crisis Group 2025-02-19). This allows them to launch coordinated attacks against critical civilian infrastructure in the capital (GCR2P 2025-03-14; InSight Crime 2025-02-06; UN 2025-01-13, para. 23), such as the airport and [UN English version] "other symbols of State authority" (UN 2025-01-13, para. 23).

According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), an independent civil society organization based in Switzerland (GI-TOC n.d.), [GI-TOC English version] "[t]heir coordinated efforts have led to a decrease in infighting, allowing them to focus on expanding territorial control and challenging state authority" (GI-TOC 2025-04, 7). According to the same source, [GI-TOC English version] "gangs are now focusing more on establishing sustained economic [and social] control over communities" (GI-TOC 2025-04, 7). The UN Integrated Office in Haiti (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti, BINUH) also notes that criminal groups carry out attacks to expand their territory and [UN English version] "buttress their criminal governance" (UN 2025-01-13, para. 26).

GI-TOC states that the main source of income for armed groups is extortion, and explains the following:

[GI-TOC English version]

Each advance by the gangs leads not only to an explosion of violence, but also to the creation of local cells with one or more leaders, one of whose main tasks is to establish a local extortion regime, particularly against businesses in the area, residents in some cases, but also against people wishing to travel on the highways, through the immediate creation of checkpoints. (GI-TOC 2025-04, 8)

Sources from July 2025 estimate that the proportion of Port-au-Prince territory under the control of criminal groups is approximately 85% (Beckett 2025-07-14; political scientist 2025-07-03) or 90% (UN 2025-07-02; BBC 2025-07-24). They also note that all access routes to the capital from the rest of the country are now under gang control (Political scientist 2025-07-03; UN 2025-06-27, para. 15).

According to BINUH, [UN English version] "armed gangs have seized strategic locations across the [Ouest], Centr[e] and Artibonite [d]epartments" (UN 2025-06-27, para. 15). Sources also report that the violence has expanded into new territories, particularly in the Artibonite (InSight Crime 2025-02-06; GI-TOC 2025-01) and Centre departments (RNDDH 2025-04-10; UN 2025-07, 16). According to GI-TOC, between April 2024 and April 2025, the violence reached the border region with the Dominican Republic and areas of the southwest (GI-TOC 2025-04, 7). The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), a New York-based NGO working to mobilize the international community to save populations at risk of mass atrocity crimes (GCR2P n.d.), notes in a March 2025 report on Haiti that violence had reached the southern part of the Ouest department, which had until then been unaffected (GCR2P 2025-03-14).

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) states the following:

As gang control expands, the state's capacity to govern is rapidly shrinking, with social, economic, and security implications. In the vacuum left by the absence or limited delivery of public services, criminal groups are stepping in. They are establishing parallel governance structures and providing rudimentary public services. (UN 2025-07-02)

GI-TOC similarly reports that [GI-TOC English version] "gangs consolidated their capacity for criminal governance, which they have enforced through extortion and the enactment of ever stricter rules over the daily life of Haitians," and adds that "[w]hile there is no precise figure on total gang membership, the groups can muster thousands of personnel and far outnumber the security forces" (2025-01, 1, 5).

At the same time, the UNODC reports that the number of vigilante groups in the country continues to multiply (UN 2025-07-02). In June 2025, BINUH explained that

[UN English version]

[a]mid increasing public frustration with the State's limited protection capacity, vigilante or self-defence groups are gaining popularity. During the reporting period [15 April to 20 June 2025], these groups, as well as non-organized members of the population, lynched at least 100 men and one woman suspected of gang association or collaboration. Although these groups often serve as the last remaining security mechanisms in many areas, they violate fundamental human rights, including the right to life and the right to a fair trial, while simultaneously fuelling further violence in the form of retaliatory attacks by gangs. (UN 2025-06-27, para. 1, 16)

The UNODC notes that "[w]hile some are motivated by the urgent need to protect their communities, many operate outside existing legal frameworks, in some cases engaging in extrajudicial actions and colluding with gangs" (UN 2025-07-02).

2. Recruitment of Men [1] by Gangs

GI-TOC reports that [GI-TOC English version] "[c]riminal groups … increased their recruitment in 2024" (2025-01, 5). According to Greg Beckett, an associate professor of anthropology at the University of Western Ontario who has been researching Haiti for over 20 years, and whose fieldwork has focused on the working-class neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, gang recruitment is currently at "unprecedented" levels in Haiti, and the consolidation of gangs into large federations has "systematized" recruitment processes: there has been a shift from neighbourhood-based recruitment to more organized, strategic approaches (Beckett 2025-07-14). According to the same source, these federations

• [c]oordinate recruitment across multiple neighbourhoods to build larger forces
• [t]arget specific skill sets and demographics …
• [u]se control over "chokepoints"—strategic locations that control movement and access to resources—to leverage recruitment
• [e]mploy both direct recruitment and absorption of smaller, independent groups and whole neighbourhoods. (Beckett 2025-07-14)
  
  

In an interview with the Research Directorate in July 2025, the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program stated that, for the past 18 to 24 months, armed groups have been recruiting primarily to increase their numbers in order to better control the ever-growing territory they dominate and to carry out new attacks (Director 2025-07-09). A report by the UN Panel of Experts on Haiti also mentions that [UN English version] "gangs have expanded their territories to increase revenue from kidnappings, extortion and drug trafficking" (UN 2024-09-30, 2). According to the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program, they recruit [translation] "just about everyone," and "that is why, among other things, there are so many children in the gangs" (Director 2025-07-09). BINUH notes that the enlistment of minors has helped gangs carry out [UN English version] "prolonged attacks lasting several days" (UN 2025-01-13, para. 23).

2.1 Recruitment Methods

In an interview with the Research Department, a political scientist specializing in Haiti who is a research fellow at the Centre tricontinental (CETRI), a [CETRI English version] "center for study … on North-South relations and the challenges of globalisation in Africa, Asia and Latin America" (CETRI n.d.), and who visited Haiti in May 2025, explained that the recruitment commonly practised by criminal groups is generally [translation] "forced," whether directly ("explicitly") or indirectly ("covertly") (Political scientist 2025-07-03). According to the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program, the situation has changed, compared to 2 to 5 years ago, when people used to join a gang [translation] "out of sympathy" or "out of opportunity" (Director 2025-07-09).

In an interview with the Research Directorate, the Program Manager at the National Human Rights Defense Network (Réseau national de défense des droits humains, RNDDH) [2] and Chairperson of the Together Against Corruption (Ensemble contre la corruption, ECC) platform [3] nonetheless gave the example of the "argentins," youth who already possess a weapon and offer their services temporarily to various criminal groups without being tied to them, like mercenaries, and who are different than the [translation] "soldiers" who make up the majority of gangs (Program Manager 2025-07-04). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.1.1 Recruitment Termed Voluntary

The first form of recruitment, which some have called [translation] "voluntary" [or [translation] "'flexible'" (Program Manager 2025-07-04)], drives men to join a gang for lack of other options (Beckett 2025-07-14) or [translation] "out of obligation" (Director 2025-07-09). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, RNDDH's Executive Director indicated that this type of recruitment [translation] "takes place in a context where there is misery, unemployment and no opportunities for young people" (Executive Director 2025-06-30). Beckett similarly stated that men who become gang members in this way are "driven by extreme poverty," unemployment, and food insecurity (2025-07-14). Similarly, according to Human Rights Watch, it is hunger and poverty that drive children to join criminal groups (2024-10-09). Sources indicated that the state is completely absent from many gang-dominated territories (Beckett 2025-07-14; Executive Director 2025-06-30); no support services are available there (Executive Director 2025-06-30).

Sources note that, in exchange for recruitment, armed groups offer young men

• income (Executive Director 2025-06-30; Beckett 2025-07-14; VBI 2024-04-19),
• food (Program Manager 2025-07-04; Beckett 2025-07-14; Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09),
• lodging (Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09),
• access to a weapon (Executive Director 2025-06-30; Beckett 2025-07-14),
• personal protection (Executive Director 2025-06-30; Beckett 2025-07-14; VBI 2024-04-19), and
• a certain social status in their community (Beckett 2025-07-14; Executive Director 2025-06-30).
  
  

The RNDDH Executive Director listed the practices used by gangs to recruit men as follows:

[translation]

• Direct approach: A friend who is already a member of the gang can suggest to a friend that they join.
• Financial blackmail: Tempting offers of money or goods are made to those who hesitate.
• Climate of fear: Some young men join armed gangs to avoid being targeted in their own neighbourhood.
• Progressive indoctrination: Young people are seduced by the lifestyle of armed gang leaders, portrayed on social networks ([with] luxury cars, weapons, designer clothes, cash). This gives the impression that success can only come from violence or crime. (Executive Director 2025-06-30)
  
  

The RNDDH Program Manager described the process of [translation] "voluntary" gang membership for "soldiers" of armed groups:

They are generally poor and vulnerable young adults, and they become gang members … first by performing a few services (surveillance, odd jobs) in exchange for goods (food, etc.), and then … eventually [by] assuming greater responsibilities, receiving a weapon and pledging allegiance. (Program Manager 2025-07-04)

The same source indicated that once recruited, individuals cannot leave the gang, except in the case of the argentins, whose status is different (Program Manager 2025-07-04).

2.1.2 Forced Recruitment

According to RNDDH's Program Manager, it is rather [translation] "rare" that men are recruited directly "under threat" (Program Manager 2025-07-04). According to RNDDH's Executive Director, when that is the case, [translation] "forced" recruitment occurs through blackmail, death threats or threats of reprisals against the family (Executive Director 2025-06-30).

However, Beckett stated that "[f]orced recruitment has become increasingly common, particularly as gangs have consolidated into larger federations like the G9 Alliance (now part of the Viv Ansanm coalition)" (2025-07-14). The same source indicated that "outright abduction" is now part of forced recruitment methods and that, "[w]hile less common for adults, there are documented cases of forced recruitment by kidnapping, particularly of young men with specific skills" (Beckett 2025-07-14). Sources noted cases of doctors being abducted and forced to treat gang members (Program Manager 2025-07-04; Director 2025-07-09). According to RNDDH's Program Manager, however, doctors abducted in this way [translation] "are not gang members as such, but work for it 'by force'" (Program Manager 2025-07-04).

Among the other forced recruitment methods, Beckett listed the following:

• direct threats
• economic coercion (access to work, movement or basic services is contingent on membership in the gang) and
• gradual escalation (where initial voluntary cooperation escalates to forced participation) (2025-07-14).
  
  

3. Men Targeted for Recruitment by Criminal Groups

Sources indicated that gangs tend to target [translation] "vulnerable" individuals for recruitment, whether it be because of their poverty, youth (Political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30) or isolation (Political scientist 2025-07-03).

3.1 Location

Sources indicated that being in a territory dominated by a criminal group is also one of the main factors exposing a person to recruitment (Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03). According to the Program Manager at RNDDH, [translation] "gangs recruit in their 'fiefdom' because it is easier to control people you know and who are physically close to you" (Program Manager 2025-07-04). The political scientist added that the gangs also targeted the inhabitants of the coveted territories (2025-07-03). Beckett added that gangs also target neighbourhoods at the boundaries between different gang territories, transit zones around chokepoints, and along major transit routes (2025-07-14).

The Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program also indicated that everyone living in a neighbourhood dominated by a criminal group can be forced to work for it without necessarily joining it, for example by transporting people or goods, or preparing food for its members (Director 2025-07-09). The same source also stated that when armed groups take control of a service or industry, its employees find themselves working for the gang in spite of themselves as port handlers, for example, or truck drivers in an industry (Director 2025-07-09).

3.2 Age

Sources note that gang members are generally young [men (Beckett 2025-07-14)], under 35 years of age (Beckett 2025-07-14; Program Manager 2025-07-04; Director 2025-07-09). However, the RNDDH Program Manager explained that sometimes older men join an armed group as a result of a ripple effect when their son or a friend is a member:

[translation]

These men are not recruited because of their poverty or vulnerability, but in exchange for a salary. … In general, these men will perform in-house tasks, such as administration, accounting, preparing extortion letters, and so on, but, depending … on their criminal inclination, some may be assigned to attacks, assaults and violence of all kinds. These members are not as easy to handle, so there are fewer of them. But they also cannot leave the gang, or they and their families will be killed. (Program Manager 2025-07-04)

3.2.1 Recruiting Children

Sources also report an unprecedented spike in the recruitment of children by gangs (UN 2024-11-25; Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09). According to estimates by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), by 2024 [UN English version] "the number of children recruited by armed groups in Haiti increased by 70 per cent" between the second quarters of 2023 and 2024, and "[a]t present, up to half of all members in armed groups are children" (UN 2024-11-25). Sources note that criminal groups have increased recruitment of children as a response to the operations by the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission [4] (Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09; UN 2024-10, para. 15) and the police (Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09). The Panel of Experts on Haiti, which spoke to government representatives, police officers, and analysts, believes that by recruiting children, gangs are [UN English version] "aiming at leveraging potential incidents against them to undermine" the MSS mission (UN 2024-09-30, para. 47).

Sources indicated that children are easy to recruit and manipulate (Director 2025-07-09; Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03). Beckett further stated that the extremely young population structure—around 52.4% of Haiti's population is under 25 years of age and nearly one third is under 15—"explains why youth recruitment is such a central feature of gang strategy" (2025-07-14). The Panel of Experts on Haiti explains the following:

[UN English version]

The dire situation in Haiti makes children more vulnerable to recruitment by gangs. A lack of access to education, employment and basic necessities creates a situation where joining gangs is seen as the only viable means of survival. Gangs also lure children by giving them money, a mobile phone, motorbikes or other goods, promising further economic benefits upon joining and perhaps some sort of social recognition. If those tactics fail, gangs resort to death threats against the children or their families, leaving the minors with no option but to join the gangs. (UN 2024-09-30, para. 127)

In a report published in February 2025 on the recruitment of children by Haitian gangs, Amnesty International similarly indicates that [Amnesty International English version] "[a]ll of them spoke of not having a choice to work for the groups, considering their crushing economic reality and threats by gang members" (2025-02-12, 20). The same source states the following:

[Amnesty International English version]

[T]he children said they were compelled to do various tasks for gangs out of sheer fear even as gangs, at times, thrust weapons into their hands. Many said they were directly threatened with reprisals against themselves or their families if they refused. (Amnesty International 2025-02-12, 23)

3.3 Economic and Social Situation

Several sources point to the link between a difficult socio-economic situation and vulnerability to recruitment (Political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30; VBI 2024-04-19). According to Beckett, armed groups recruit predominantly from the urban poor, who struggle with unemployment, a lack of education and economic distress (2025-07-14). Other sources have also pointed to a link between a lack of education and vulnerability to recruitment (UN 2025-02-28; Executive Director 2025-06-30).

Some sources noted social isolation as a risk factor for recruitment (Beckett 2025-07-14; Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03), which affects returnees in particular (Political scientist 2025-07-03; Program Manager 2025-07-04) or migrants who have just arrived in Port-au-Prince (Beckett 2025-07-14). Sources have reported, however, that people with ties of kinship [or friendship (Executive Director 2025-06-30)] to gangs are also targeted more for recruitment (Executive Director 2025-06-30; Beckett 2025-07-14).

3.4 Trade or Skill Set

Sources indicated that practising certain trades or having specific skill sets can attract the attention of gangs for recruitment (Beckett 2025-07-14; Director 2025-07-09; Program Manager 2025-07-04).

According to some sources, people with police [and military (Beckett 2025-07-14)] experience may be sought for their knowledge of, among other things, tactics and weapons (Beckett 2025-07-14; Executive Director 2025-06-30). The Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program mentioned that gangs might recruit former police officers or former Haitian military personnel from the US army (expelled or returned to Haiti) who could serve as strategic advisors (Director 2025-07-09). The same source also noted that, over the past two years or so, gangs have been forming [translation] "elite fighting" units copied from public forces commando units, such as the Izo gang in Village de Dieu, whose new "'elite unit'" has been the subject of an online video propaganda campaign (Director 2025-07-09). The report of the UN Panel of Experts notes that, according to interviews with confidential sources, a former head of the National Palace General Security Unit had been involved in the video production of the group calling itself "Unité Village de Dieu" (UN 2024-09-30, para. 31, 48).

However, the political scientist indicated that armed groups are not so much looking for expertise as for [translation] "foot soldiers," people who are easy to manage (2025-07-03). Sources have also reported that police officers are [translation] "systematically killed" by gangs (Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03).

The RNDDH Executive Director stated that criminal gangs sometimes target people because they possess a skill set that can be useful to them, such as truck or motorcycle drivers, or people who have mastered communication technologies on social networks (Executive Director 2025-06-30). In addition to drivers, Beckett mentioned mechanics and construction workers, and added that some people may also be targeted because they possess, for example, a vehicle, a weapon, or specialized technical knowledge (2025-07-14). The same source also noted that students may be targeted for their education (Beckett 2025-07-14).

At the same time, sources have stated that gangs may demand that some people work for them because of their profession; this is particularly the case for doctors (Director 2025-07-09; Program Manager 2025-07-04).

3.5 Delinquency and Criminal Records

Sources reported that people who are already "socialized" to illegal activities would attract the attention of criminal groups (Beckett 2025-07-14; Executive Director 2025-06-30). Beckett also added that someone whose relatives are already part of a gang would be more likely to be targeted (2025-07-14).

The Program Manager stated that RNDDH had not encountered any cases of people forcibly recruited because of their criminal past (2025-07-04). The political scientist stated that gangs would not prioritize the recruitment of people with criminal experience, as they focus on recruiting soldiers who are easy to control (2025-07-03).

According to the RNDDH representatives, the recruitment of delinquents or people with a criminal past happens [translation] "organically" (Program Manager 2025-07-04; Executive Director 2025-06-30). The RNDDH Executive Director of gave as an example the fact that, during an armed assault, gangs systematically release prisoners from prison (Executive Director 2025-06-30). RNDDH's Program Manager, for their part, explained that criminals who escape from prison, for example, have no choice but to go into neighbourhoods controlled by armed groups to hide, and they end up joining the gangs (Program Manager 2025-07-04).

3.5.1 Deported Persons

Regarding criminals who are deported to Haiti, RNDDH's Program Manager stated the following: [translation] "We know that deportees are part of gangs, they are often high up in the hierarchy, but we have no way of knowing whether they joined them voluntarily or were recruited" (Program Manager 2025-07-04). According to Beckett, who provided no further details, they are "sometimes specifically targeted" for recruitment (2025-07-14).

3.6 Returnees

Some sources are of the opinion that returnees to Haiti could be targeted for recruitment because of the vulnerability arising from their possible isolation (Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03) and their lack of familiarity with the country (Program Manager 2025-07-04). However, the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program indicated that returnees to a country [5] are unlikely to choose to return to areas controlled by armed groups: [translation] "Returnees tend to avoid gang-dominated territories. They travel to rural areas more often or to camps for displaced people" (2025-07-09). For further information on the situation of Haitian nationals returning to Haiti after a long absence, including their treatment by criminal groups, see Response to Information Request HTI202375 of August 2025.

4. Consequences of Refusing to Join a Gang

4.1 Consequences for the Individual

The oral sources consulted by the Research Directorate stated that refusing to join a criminal group carries serious risks (Beckett 2025-07-14; Director 2025-07-09; political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30). According to some, this can include threats, physical violence, and assassination attempts (Beckett 2025-07-14; Director 2025-07-09), as well as sexual violence and [translation] "torture" (Director 2025-07-09). Beckett stated that this can also include kidnapping, property destruction, forced displacement or confinement within the neighbourhood (2025-07-14). The same source added that the consolidation of Viv Ansanm has "systematized" these reprisal patterns (Beckett 2025-07-14).

Some sources state that anyone who refuses to join a gang will be killed (UN 2024-09-30, para. 129; Program Manager 2025-07-04). The report by the Panel of Expert's on Haiti provides an example concerning a minor boy, taken from an interview with a confidential source:

[UN English version]

In another testimony, a 16-year-old girl explained to the Panel how 5 Segond gang members had pressured her 17-year-old brother to join the gang. Initially, they had invited him to drink alcohol and party, but he refused due to his religious beliefs. This refusal angered the gang members, who began extorting money from him every time he left home. Eventually, he became too afraid to go outside. The gang then started interrogating his family about his whereabouts and demanding money. The family decided to leave the Village-de-Dieu area one by one. However, the brother was caught by the gang while attempting to escape and was killed on the spot. The witness managed to escape with a relative and left the country but is unaware of her mother's whereabouts. (UN 2024-09-30, para. 135)

4.2 Consequences for Those Around Them

Sources reported that punishment may also target the family, close friends or social circle of a person refusing to be recruited by a gang (Beckett 2025-07-14; political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30) or fleeing it (Executive Director 2025-06-30). According to sources, these punishments may include:

• sexual violence (Director 2025-07-09; Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03);
• property destruction (Beckett 2025-07-14; Program Manager 2025-07-04; political scientist 2025-07-03);
• threats or physical violence (Beckett 2025-07-14; Program Manager 2025-07-04);
• assassinations (Executive Director 2025-06-30) or [translation] "massacres" (Director 2025-07-09);
• kidnappings (Beckett 2025-07-14).
  
  

Beckett added that beyond the consequences for the individual's social circle, there can also be consequences for an entire community: "[g]angs may pressure entire neighborhoods … to deliver specific individuals for recruitment" (2025-07-14). Other sources also mentioned [translation] "collective" punishments (Director 2025-07-09; political scientist 2025-07-03).

5. State Protection

The oral sources consulted by the Research Department responded that the state was unable to provide protection to a man threatened by gangs because of his refusal to join them (Beckett 2025-07-14; Director 2025-07-09; political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30). According to the political scientist, the state is [translation] "powerless" in the face of armed groups, who can act "with complete impunity" (Political scientist 2025-07-03). Beckett similarly indicated that the state's ability to provide protection is "extremely limited" or "non-existent" (2025-07-14). In addition, the police lack human resources and equipment and are absent from many neighbourhoods (Beckett 2025-07-14; Executive Director 2025-06-30). They are also [translation] "corrupt" (Political scientist 2025-07-03) and "infiltrated" by gangs (Beckett 2025-07-14).

Several sources further suggest that MSS is also powerless (Beckett 2025-07-14; political scientist 2025-07-03; GI-TOC 2025-01, 13).

According to Beckett,

This protection gap represents one of the fundamental ways that gang control has replaced state authority in much of Haiti, forcing individuals to navigate these threats through personal networks, flight, or capitulation rather than through formal institutional protection. (2025-07-14)

Furthermore, sources also mentioned that seeking state protection could subject a person to new risks (Beckett 2025-07-14; Director 2025-07-09). According to the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program, this person could be suspected by the police of belonging to a gang and executed for that reason, or handed over to a self-defence group who would carry out their execution (2025-07-09). A report by BINUH and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), dated July 2025, notes the following:

[UN English version]

One of the most concerning aspects, however, is the commission of numerous human rights violations and abuses, both by security forces (notably summary executions) and by self-defence groups (carrying out attacks against people suspected of supporting gangs). (UN 2025-07, 5)

In its report published in June 2025, BINUH documents [UN English version] "at least 874 instances of alleged human rights violations involving law enforcement officers … in the context of anti-gang operations" between 15 April and 20 June 2025, including "summary executions" (UN 2025-06-27, para. 1, 27).

According to the Director of GI-TOC's Haiti Program, coming from a gang-dominated territory is a [translation] "stigma" that a person will carry with them everywhere they go and make them look suspicious (2025-07-09). A report by Human Rights Watch mentions, regarding children recruited by armed groups, that [Human Rights Watch English version] "families and neighbors often reject and stigmatize children who return, human rights officials said" (2024-10-09). Amnesty International's report on child recruitment notes that [Amnesty International English version] "[s]everal interviewees [6] repeated that concern about being stopped by the police for identification checks and how affiliation to certain areas could lead to being unlawfully killed" (2025-02-12, 26). The same source reports the following about children recruited by gangs:

[Amnesty International English version]

Irrespective of the tasks for which children are used by the gangs, any mere association with the groups exposes them to risk. Children described immense fear of the police and community members. They also spoke of being stigmatized and shamed by virtue of belonging to neighbourhoods under gang control. (Amnesty International 2025-02-12, 25)

According to BINUH, [UN English version] "[h]eightened violence also led to a rise in mob killings and lynchings of alleged gang members, but also of non-gang affiliated individuals" (UN 2025-01-13, para. 47).

Beckett, for his part, stated that when a threatened person turns to official authorities, it could make the threats escalate rather than subside (2025-07-14).

5.1 Possibility of Escaping the Gangs

Sources noted that fleeing could be a way to escape recruitment (Political scientist 2025-07-03; Executive Director 2025-06-30). Some stated that it was unlikely that a gang would pursue an individual across the country who had refused to be recruited, unless they were an important figure of great interest to the group (Director 2025-07-09; political scientist 2025-07-03). The Program Manager at RNDDH responded that it was [translation] "possible" that a criminal group might try to track down an individual in the country who had fled recruitment, but that RNDDH had no information to this effect (Program Manager 2025-07-04).

However, other sources note that freedom of movement in Haiti is restricted by gangs (Beckett 2025-06-27; GCR2P 2025-03-14), which control "much of" of the country, especially through checkpoints in certain locations (Beckett 2025-06-27).

A report by the OHCHR states the following:

[UN English version]

Gangs' control of territories severely impacts the enjoyment of the right to liberty of movement. Gangs, equipped with weapons, control key roads in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite department, where they have set up checkpoints to extort and force the payment of "circulation taxes" from drivers, passengers and passersby passing through territories under their control. Victims may also be kidnapped or raped at these checkpoints. (UN 2025-03-27, para. 18)

According to an article in the Nouvelliste quoted by the Guardian, it has become "impossible" for Port-au-Prince residents to leave the city, as gangs control all exit routes (The Guardian 2025-03-23). The political scientist similarly reported that gangs [translation] "now control all road access" to the capital (2025-07-03). The Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program explained that a person attempting to leave the territory of a gang wishing to recruit them would have to cross territories and checkpoints monitored by other criminal gangs or by self-defence groups, and would run the risk of attracting attention and arousing their suspicions, which would put them at further risk (Director 2025-07-09).

According to the same source, merely being unknown or new to an area can make an individual suspicious in the eyes of the population, who will fear and suspect them of belonging to a gang, and may want to attack them for this reason (Director 2025-07-09). Indeed, the Panel of Experts on Haiti notes that children coming [UN English version] "from outside a gang-controlled area are viewed with suspicion and face the risk of being labelled as spies and potentially killed" (UN 2024-09-30, para. 129).

The Director of GI-TOC's Haiti program indicated that people can ask a gang leader for permission to leave a neighbourhood, but that the very act of seeking such permission can be punishable by death and that, in the [translation] "rare event" that it is granted, the person and their family are forced to abandon all their possessions to the armed group, including their home (Director 2025-07-09).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] This Response to Information Request focuses on the recruitment of men, but sources report that gangs also recruit women and girls into their ranks (IJDH 2025-07, 8; Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09; Amnesty International 2025-02-12, 6). According to Human Rights Watch, girls and boys receive some similar basic training (2024-10-09). However, sources note that women and girls are most often recruited to perform household chores and to be sexually exploited (Amnesty International 2025-02-12, 7, 22, 32; Human Rights Watch 2024-10-09).

[2] The National Human Rights Defense Network (Réseau national de défense des droits humains, RNDDH) is a Haitian NGO working to educate civil society about human rights and to monitor human rights violations by key state institutions (RNDDH n.d.).

[3] Together Against Corruption (Ensemble contre la corruption, ECC) is a platform created in 2018 that brings together 8 Haitian civil society organizations fighting corruption and impunity in Haiti (ECC n.d.).

[4] The Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission was created by the UN Security Council on 2 October 2023; led by Kenya, it works [UN English version] "in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti" and aims to provide support to the Haitian police to deal with the gangs and improve security in the country (UN 2023-10-02).

[5] International flights, as of July 2025, land at Cap-Haïtien [in the north of the country] (Director 2025-07-09; France 2025-07-02) due to the security situation in Port-au-Prince, and not at Toussaint-Louverture airport [in Port-au-Prince] (France 2025-07-02).

[6] Amnesty International representatives spoke to 80 people in Port-au-Prince in September 2024, including 51 children aged 10 to 17 (Amnesty International 2025-02-12, 5).

References

Amnesty International. 2025-02-12. "Je ne suis qu'une enfant, pourquoi cela m'est-il arrivé?" Haïti : l'offensive des gangs contre l'enfance. (AMR 36/8875/2025) [Accessed 2025-07-11]

Beckett, Greg. 2025-07-14. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Beckett, Greg. 2025-06-27. "Haiti's Political Impasse." North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). [Accessed 2025-07-07]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2025-07-24. "The Gangs of Haiti: 'We Become the Devil'." [Accessed 2025-07-25]

Centre tricontinental (CETRI). N.d. "Présentation." [Accessed 2025-07-03]

Director, Haiti program, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). 2025-07-09. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Ensemble contre la corruption (ECC). N.d. "Présentation." [Accessed 2025-07-03]

Executive Director, Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2025-06-30. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

France. 2025-07-02. Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. "Entrée et sortie du territoire haïtien." Conseils aux voyageurs. [Accessed 2025-07-03]

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). 2025-03-14. "Haiti." [Accessed 2025-07-03]

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 2025-07-15]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). 2025-04. "Violence des gangs en Haïti : le premier anniversaire de Viv Ansanm." Risk Bulletin. No. 3. [Accessed 2025-07-17]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). 2025-01. Observatory of Violence and Resilience in Haiti. Dernière chance? Sortir de l'impasse politique et criminelle en Haïti. [Accessed 2025-07-07]

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). N.d. "About Us / Our Story." [Accessed 2025-07-15]

The Guardian. 2025-03-23. Tom Phillips & Etienne Côté-Paluck. "Haitians Fear the Imminent Fall of Port-au-Prince to Rebel Gangs: 'We Will Die Standing'." [Accessed 2025-07-11]

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InSight Crime. 2025-02-06. "Haiti." [Accessed 2025-07-11]

Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH). 2025-07. Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Haiti: Key Recent Developments. December Through June 2025. [Accessed 2025-07-25]

International Crisis Group (Crisis Group). 2025-02-19. Une transition en panne : politique et violence en Haïti. [Accessed 2025-07-07]

Political scientist, Centre tricontinental (CETRI). 2025-07-03. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Program manager, Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2025-07-04. Interview with the Research Directorate.

Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). 2025-04-10. Chute de deux communes du département du Centre aux mains des bandits armés : Les autorités de la transition aggravent la situation sécuritaire du pays. [Accessed 2025-07-25]

Réseau national de défense des droits humains (RNDDH). N.d. "Vision & mission." [Accessed 2025-07-25]

United Nations (UN). 2025-07-02. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Haiti." By Ghada Waly. [Accessed 2025-07-09]

United Nations (UN). 2025-07. Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH) & Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Intensification de la violence des gangs et des abus des droits humains en dehors de Port-au-Prince. Risque majeur pour Haïti et la sous-région des Caraïbes. [Accessed 2025-07-11]

United Nations (UN). 2025-06-27. Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH). Rapport du Secrétaire général. (S/2025/418) [Accessed 2025-07-21]

United Nations (UN). 2025-03-27. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Situation des droits de l'homme en Haïti : Rapports du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme. (A/HRC/58/76) [Accessed 2025-07-14]

United Nations (UN). 2025-02-28. UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) "Haïti : l'éducation attaquée." [Accessed 2025-07-11]

United Nations (UN). 2025-01-13. Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti (BINUH). Rapport du Secrétaire général. (S/2025/28) [Accessed 2025-07-11]

United Nations (UN). 2024-11-25. UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). "En Haïti, le nombre d'enfants recrutés par des groupes armés a augmenté de 70 % en un an – UNICEF." [Accessed 2025-07-14]

United Nations (UN). 2024-10. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Rapport intérimaire du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme. [Accessed 2025-08-05]

United Nations (UN). 2024-09-30. Security Council. Rapport final du Groupe d'experts sur Haïti présenté en application de la résolution 2700 (2023). (S/2024/704) [Accessed 2025-07-15]

United Nations (UN). 2023-10-02. Security Council. "Haïti : le Conseil de sécurité autorise le déploiement pour douze mois de la Mission multinationale d'appui à la sécurité, une force de police non onusienne." (CS/15432) [Accessed 2025-07-15]

Vant Bèf Info (VBI). 2024-04-19. Belly-Dave Bélizaire. "Les jeunes, face au choix d'intégrer un gang ou de résister." [Accessed 2025-07-10]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant professor of anthropology at a Canadian university; associate professor of anthropology at a university in the US; cultural anthropologist and independent researcher; Fondasyon Je Klere; freelance journalist in Haiti; International Crisis Group; Nou Pap Dòmi.

Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Austrian Red Cross – ecoi.net; AyiboPost; Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme; Défenseurs plus; Fondasyon Je Klere; France 2; France 24; Gazette Haïti; The Haitian Times; Haïti Progrès; Miami Herald; Le National; The New Humanitarian; Radio France internationale; Réseau haitien de l'information; Rezo Nòdwès; Sud Ouest; UN – Economic and Social Council.