The hereditary emir holds extensive executive powers. Sheikh Meshaal al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah became emir in December 2023, upon the death of his half-brother Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah. In June 2024, he appointed Sheikh Sabah Khalid al-Sabah, who served as foreign minister between 2011 and 2019 and as prime minister between 2019 and 2022, as crown prince. While the Kuwaiti constitution requires that the new crown prince be endorsed by parliament, the emir had dissolved parliament a month prior to Sheikh Sabah’s appointment.

The emir chooses the prime minister and appoints cabinet ministers on the prime minister’s recommendation. All prime ministers and most senior ministers have been members of the ruling family. In January 2024, Emir Sheikh Meshaal named former Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah prime minister and asked him to form a new cabinet. Only three members of the outgoing government retained their cabinet positions, and for the first time in Kuwait’s history someone from outside the ruling family, former diplomat Abdullah al-Yahya, was named foreign minister.

Following the dissolution of parliament and new elections in April 2024, Emir Sheikh Meshaal named former oil minister Sheikh Ahmad Abdullah al-Ahmad al-Sabah prime minister and tasked him with appointing new cabinet members. The appointment reportedly followed former Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed’s refusal to take the post again, which prompted the emir to delay the opening of, and eventually dissolve, the parliament.

The 50-member National Assembly is popularly elected. Elections occur on a formally nonpartisan basis, as political parties are illegal in the country. As many as 15 appointed cabinet ministers can sit as additional ex officio members of parliament, though they may not take part in confidence votes.

The parliament serves terms of up to four years. The emir and the Constitutional Court, which lacks independence, have the power to dissolve the legislature, and the executive can therefore time elections to suit its political priorities. This has occurred several times since 2011.

On February 15, 2024, Emir Sheikh Meshaal issued a decree that dissolved parliament, citing the National Assembly’s failure to “show due respect to the political leadership” and use of “uncontrolled and offensive language.” The cabinet called for snap parliamentary elections on April 4, which marked the fourth elections since 2020. In total, about 200 candidates competed, including 46 incumbents, 39 of whom were reelected. Opposition candidates won 29 of the 50 elected seats.

Under Kuwaiti law, parliament must meet within two weeks of elections. However, Sheikh Meshaal used his constitutional authority to delay legislative sessions for one month after the April elections. On May 10, days before the rescheduled opening session, Sheikh Meshaal announced the dissolution of the elected parliament. Unlike previous occasions on which parliament has been dissolved, the May dissolution is set to last for up to four years and involves the suspension of multiple articles of the constitution. This is the third time in Kuwait’s history that parliament has been unconstitutionally dissolved; previous instances occurred in 1976 and 1986.

According to the emir, the decision to dissolve the body followed the majority-opposition parliament expressing disapproval of an appointed cabinet member. Shortly after this announcement and the suspension of articles of the constitution requiring parliamentary governance, the emir announced the composition of a new 13-member cabinet.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because the elected parliament was unilaterally dissolved by the emir, who subsequently appointed a cabinet to manage political affairs for up to four years, leaving the country without a functioning legislature.

Past elections have been administered by the Interior Ministry rather than an independent institution, and the electoral system lacks transparency. In the past, the emir has implemented changes to electoral laws in close proximity to scheduled balloting. Elections have nevertheless been competitive by regional standards.

The parliament was working to amend the electoral law, but progress halted when it was dissolved in May 2024. The dissolution of parliament involved the suspension of multiple articles of the constitution and is set to last for up to four years. Following the dissolution, the emir has insisted that the now fully appointed government will undertake the “revision of the democratic process in its entirety.”

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the emir’s decision to dissolve the parliament and suspend elections for a period of up to four years was made by suspending provisions in the existing legal framework without adequate legal justification.

Formal political parties are banned, which significantly constrains political organization, but loose parliamentary blocs exist in practice. Following the dissolution of parliament, these blocs no longer have the means to obtain political power at the national level.

Politicians have historically had some space to criticize the government, but those who seriously challenge the emir’s authority have faced criminal charges. Several parliamentarians faced criminal charges for their political speech following the May 2024 decision to dissolve parliament. In May, the Public Prosecution Office ordered the detention of former parliamentary candidate Mesaed al-Quraifah, charging him with insulting the country’s political leadership during his electoral campaign. In June, former member of parliament Walid al-Tabtabai was charged with interfering with the authority of the emir through of a post he made on X about the constitutional rights of Kuwaitis. He was initially sentenced to four years in prison by the Kuwaiti Criminal Court, but in September an appeals court reduced his sentence to two years.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because institutional means for political blocs to obtain or increase their political power at the national level no longer exist following the dissolution of the parliament, although informal blocs still exist and are able to participate in municipal elections to a limited degree.

The constitutional system does not allow democratic transfers of power at the executive level. While candidates aligned with the opposition won 29 of 50 elected parliamentary seats in the April 2024 elections, after the dissolution of parliament in May 2024 all members of government have been chosen by the emir-appointed prime minister and approved by the emir.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 0 because following the emir’s decision to dissolve the parliament and suspend elections, the opposition has no realistic opportunity to participate in government or gain meaningful political power at the national level.

The hereditary emir and the ruling family have frequently interfered in political processes, including through the harassment of political and media figures. Senior members of the ruling family have allegedly provided economic resources to favored politicians and journalists to exert political influence.

In the absence of political parties, major tribes have held their own informal and technically illegal primary elections to unite members behind certain parliamentary candidates, who then typically used their public office to generate economic benefits for members of their tribe. The government has worked to stop such coordination, in some cases arresting people for participation in tribal primaries.

The electorate consists of men and women over the age of 21 who have been citizens for at least 20 years and have a Kuwaiti father. Most members of state security agencies are barred from voting.

Access to citizenship is tightly restricted. About 68 percent of the country’s residents are noncitizens, primarily from South Asian or other Arab countries, who have no right to vote even if they are lifelong residents. Naturalization is extremely rare for people born abroad or without a Kuwaiti father, and is prohibited entirely for non-Muslims.

Individuals have had their Kuwaiti citizenship revoked for political reasons. Additionally, in September 2024, the cabinet approved an decree by the emir that removed the right of foreign women to acquire Kuwaiti citizenship after marrying Kuwaiti men. In December, the country withdrew the Kuwaiti citizenship of 3,701 individuals following investigations by the Supreme Committee for Nationality Investigation.

More than 100,000 residents, known as bidoon, are stateless. Many bidoon claim Kuwaiti nationality and descent, but official processes to verify their eligibility for citizenship are slow, opaque, and largely ineffective.

The Shiite Muslim community makes up about a third of the citizen population but is not well represented in the political system. Shiite candidates won eight seats in the 2024 elections, compared with seven in 2023.

Women have had the right to vote and run for office since 2005, and some have been elected to the parliament, including one woman elected in 2024. Societal and legal discrimination against LGBT+ people prevents them from playing any open role in political affairs.

Prior to the dissolution of parliament, elected members of parliament could initiate legislation. Since May 2024, however, policymaking authority has been further concentrated in the hands of the hereditary emir and his appointed government.

Cabinet ministers, including members of the ruling family, are no longer subject to questioning by the parliament. In the past, this practice led to tension between the two branches of government.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the emir unilaterally dissolved the elected parliament and suspended elections in May; the prime minister he selected then appointed a new cabinet, which was approved by emiri decree.

Corruption is pervasive. While an Anti-Corruption Authority (Nazaha) has operated since 2015, its activities appear insufficient. Allegations of malfeasance lodged by lawmakers against ministers have been at the heart of the country’s recurring political crises.

In May 2024, former Minister of Social Affairs Mubarak Alarou was arrested upon his arrival in Kuwait; he had previously been sentenced to seven years in prison on corruption charges in November 2023. The court handed down similar sentences to a former ministerial undersecretary and the former head of the Federation of Cooperative Societies on related charges.

Transparency around government spending is inadequate, and there are few mechanisms that encourage officials to disclose information about government operations. Kuwait does not have any legislation guaranteeing the right to access public information. The State Audit Bureau provides some oversight on revenue and expenditures, reporting to both the government and the National Assembly, though not necessarily to the public. Defense spending is particularly opaque, and in the past detailed breakdowns have not been available to the parliament.

In June 2024, elected Kuwait Municipality officials initiated weekly meetings where citizens could voice concerns. The Social Affairs and Education Ministers similarly started holding regular meetings to hear citizen complaints. The new Kuwaiti cabinet also announced that the new government plans to implement an open-door policy to hear and address citizens’ grievances.

Kuwaiti law assigns penalties for the publication of material that insults Islam, criticizes the emir, discloses information considered secret or private, or calls for the regime’s overthrow. Journalists also risk imprisonment under the restrictive 2016 Cyber Crimes Law, which criminalizes the dissemination of similar content online. In June 2024, the cabinet threatened legal action against news outlets and social media accounts deemed to be “rumor-mongering” or spreading disinformation.

While foreign media outlets operate relatively freely in Kuwait, the country’s media regulator, the Commission for Mass Communications and Information Technology, has sweeping powers to monitor, block, and censor online material. The government can also seek to revoke a media outlet’s license through the judiciary.

Thousands of books have been banned in the country for political or moral reasons, though a 2020 legal amendment requires a judicial order—rather than a government decision—to enforce such a ban. Films and television content are also subject to censorship.

Islam is the state religion, and blasphemy is a punishable offense. Defamation of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism is prohibited. The government appoints Sunni imams and oversees their sermons. Shiite Muslims have their own religious institutions, including Sharia courts, though the government does not permit training of Shiite clerics in the country. Several Christian churches are officially registered. Members of other non-Muslim minority groups are generally permitted to practice their faiths in private but are effectively forbidden from proselytizing.

Academic freedom is impeded by self-censorship on politically sensitive topics, as well as by broader legal restrictions on freedom of expression, including the prohibitions on insulting the emir and defaming religion. The National Union of Kuwaiti Students is not officially registered as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) but is nevertheless considered influential.

Freedom of personal expression is curtailed by state surveillance and the criminalization of some forms of critical speech. The Cyber Crimes Law imposes prison sentences of up to 10 years as well as fines for online speech that criticizes the emir, judicial officials, religious figures, or foreign leaders. Users who criticize the government on social media tend to be harassed by online trolls and automated “bot” accounts.

Activists and other individuals are occasionally summoned for questioning over their online comments, and some have been prosecuted. Activists from the Bidoon community are particularly likely to be targeted.

Since the dissolution of parliament, individuals who have criticized the decision on social media have been severely punished. In October, the Criminal Court sentenced Mansoor al-Muhareb in absentia to two years in prison with hard labor for statements he made on X about the unconstitutional nature of the dissolution of parliament. Another figure on X, known as Nero, was sentenced in September 2024 on similar charges.

Freedom of assembly is constrained by law and in practice. Organizers must notify officials of public meetings and protests. Citizens who participate in unauthorized protests are subject to imprisonment, while noncitizens face deportation. However, peaceful protests are sometimes allowed without a permit. After the outbreak of fighting in the Gaza Strip in October 2023, political and civic activists, including opposition members of parliament, organized large pro-Palestinian demonstrations that proceeded without incident. A similar protest was held in January 2024, marking 100 days since the start of the war. In March, however, calls to hold another protest in solidarity with Palestinians were met with roadblocks by the Ministry of Interior, which in turn led to negligible turnout.

The government restricts the registration and licensing of NGOs, forcing many groups to operate without legal standing. Representatives of licensed NGOs must obtain government permission to attend foreign conferences, and critical groups may be subject to harassment.

Private-sector workers who are Kuwaiti citizens have the right to join labor unions and bargain collectively and have a limited right to strike. However, labor laws allow for only one national union federation. Noncitizen migrant workers do not enjoy these rights and can face dismissal and deportation for engaging in union or strike activity. Civil servants and household workers are also denied union rights; most citizen workers are public employees and do not have the right to strike.

Migrant workers sometimes participate in risky illegal labor actions such as sit-ins and walkouts to protest nonpayment of wages and other abuses.

Kuwait lacks an independent judiciary. The emir has the final say on judicial appointments, which are proposed by a Supreme Judicial Council made up of senior judges, the attorney general, and the deputy justice minister. The executive branch approves judicial promotions. Judges who are Kuwaiti citizens are appointed for life, while noncitizens receive contracts for up to three years. The courts frequently rule in favor of the government in cases related to politics.

Arbitrary arrests and detentions sometimes occur despite legal safeguards. Authorities may detain suspects for four days without charge. Noncitizens arrested for minor offenses are subject to detention and deportation without due process or access to the courts.

Kuwait is generally free from armed conflict. No major terrorist attacks have been reported since 2015, and there are relatively low levels of criminal violence. Constitutional protections against torture and other forms of cruel and unusual punishment are not always upheld. Detainees, especially bidoon, continue to experience torture and beatings in custody. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions are significant problems at prisons and deportation centers.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported violations of due process in capital cases. Throughout 2023, Kuwaiti courts reportedly issued an average of one death sentence a month to people charged with drug-related offenses.

Despite some legal protections from bias and abuse, women remain underrepresented in the workforce and face unequal treatment in several areas of law and society. Women, especially foreign women, face public harassment.

LGBT+ people face societal discrimination, and the penal code prescribes prison sentences for sex between men.

Officials consider bidoon to be illegal residents, and they often live in poor conditions and have difficulty accessing public services and obtaining formal employment. In January 2024, bidoon activist Mohammad al-Barghash was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of “spreading false news” after he discussed the status of bidoon individuals in a television interview.

Noncitizen migrant workers are excluded from many of the legal protections granted to citizens. As of August 2024, Kuwaiti authorities also reported that they were deporting approximately 7,000 to 8,000 noncitizens every month as part of their crackdown on residency violations; they also reported that the citizenships of 850 people were revoked during this crackdown.

Kuwait generally does not constrain citizens’ movement, but migrant workers often face de facto restrictions on travel and place of residence. The labor sponsorship system limits migrant workers’ freedom to change jobs without permission from their existing employer. Bidoon generally lack travel documents, and the authorities sometimes restrict the travel of individual human rights defenders and researchers. As of August 2023, noncitizens were barred from leaving the country if they had unpaid water or electricity bills, and were not provided with any recourse if there were disagreements over the bills.

Kuwaiti law allows citizens and foreign nationals, but not bidoon, to own private property. Although the law permits the establishment of businesses, bureaucratic obstacles sometimes slow the process, and fair competition can be impaired by nepotism or corruption. Companies are legally prohibited from conducting business with citizens of Israel.

Sharia-based inheritance rules, particularly those pertaining to Sunni families, put women at a disadvantage.

Personal status laws favor men over women in matters of marriage, divorce, and child custody. For example, Sunni women must have the approval of a male guardian to marry and are only permitted to seek a divorce when deserted or subjected to domestic violence. Domestic abuse and spousal rape are not specifically prohibited by law, and rapists can avoid punishment if they marry their victims. A 2020 law designed to combat domestic violence provides for shelters, restraining orders, and legal assistance for victims, among other components. However, it does not criminalize domestic violence or cover gender-based violence outside the immediate household.

Article 153 of the penal code classifies crimes in which a man kills a close female relative whom he has caught in “an unsavory sexual act” as misdemeanors, punishable by at most three years in prison. Such incidents are rare but not entirely unknown; a local civil society campaign seeks to eliminate the penal code provision.

A 2022 Constitutional Court ruling found Article 198 of the penal code, which criminalized “imitating the opposite sex,” to be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, transgender people still experience discrimination based on their appearance, and several Islamist members of parliament have called for a new law to replace Article 198.

Foreign household workers and other migrant workers are highly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Despite some legal protections designed to prevent mistreatment, many employers reportedly confiscate their household workers’ passports, subject them to excessive working hours, and restrict their movements outside the home. Recruiting agents are known to hold female migrant workers for ransom, demanding money from their families before they can return home. Other migrant workers have been repatriated by the state labor bureau after their employers have refused to pay them or otherwise harassed or abused them.

In June 2024, 49 noncitizen migrant workers were killed and dozens more were injured in a major fire, which shed light on the poor living conditions of migrant workers in Kuwait. Kuwaiti prosecutors charged eight individuals with manslaughter, wrongful injury, perjury, and negligence in connection with the incident.