a. Extrajudicial Killings

There were no reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

b. Coercion in Population Control

There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.

a. Freedom of the Press

The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, and authorities generally respected this right. The influence by oligarchs and Russia over certain media outlets, a challenging advertising market that limited outlets’ commercial sustainability, and the lack of an independent judiciary created difficulties for independent media. Harassment and intimidation against journalists occurred in some instances, but there were no reports of national government involvement.

Hate speech was regulated by the Law on Freedom of Speech and the Audiovisual Code.

Several symbols representing Russia’s military operations remained banned, including the “Z” and “V” symbols used by Russia during its invasion of Ukraine and the black and orange St. George’s ribbon. The General Police Inspectorate reported 189 violations concerning banned symbols on May 9, Russian Victory Day.

In Transnistria, “authorities” used the 2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism to silence dissent and repress freedom of expression, complementing the existing “anti-extremism law.” Several individuals faced charges pursuant to the “anti-extremism law” for publicly criticizing “authorities” during the year or for expressing opposing viewpoints, including with regard to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Public insults of the region’s “leader” could be punished by a fine or up to five years in prison.

Physical Attacks, Imprisonment, and Pressure

Some journalists were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and lawsuits.

During the year, harassment and intimidation of journalists was most prominent in the autonomous region of Gagauzia. In January, Mihail Vlah, media advisor for Governor of Gagauzia Evghenia Gutul, declared it was time to “muzzle” journalists from independent media outlet Nokta.md for their criticism of Gutul’s government. Vlah said in a social media video in January that Nokta.md used grant money to insult the Gagauzia governor and deputies in Gagauzia’s People’s Assembly. Vlah also threated Nokta.md and Sirkeli at rallies in May and August.

Censorship by Governments, Military, Intelligence, or Police Forces, Criminal Groups, or Armed Extremist or Rebel Groups

In its 2024 Press Freedom Index report, the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Reporters Without Borders characterized the country’s media environment as “divided into pro-Russian and pro-Western camps” with oligarchs and political leaders strongly influencing editorial stances. The report noted the influence of fugitive, pro-Kremlin oligarch Ilan Shor on the media landscape, as well as the rapid and nontransparent changes to national legislation at the end of 2023, with the aim of blocking channels whose licenses were suspended during the state of emergency.

On January 16, several NGOs raised concerns about a December 2023 law, which went into effect in January, aimed at ensuring the integrity and functionality of the electricity market that granted the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance the authority to temporarily suspend television station licenses outside of a state of emergency and without a court order. The NGOs issued a statement criticizing the lack of transparency in the drafting, voting, and implementation processes.

A December 2023 law gave the Public Services Agency (PSA) authority to screen legal entities of interest to the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance, inclusive of media outlets, for illegal financing and affiliation with sanctioned or criminal individuals. During the year, based on the results of PSA screening, the council voted to cancel the broadcast licenses of 12 media entities. On June 18, the Council for Promoting Investment Projects of National Importance revoked the television broadcasting licenses of Orhei TV and TV6 based on their link to Media Resources Ltd., a company affiliated with U.S.-sanctioned fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. In addition, the council suspended the licenses of four media outlets for failing to provide requested documents during the screening process.

In some cases, journalists practiced self-censorship to avoid conflicts with the sponsors or owners of their media outlets, many of whom were politicians or oligarchs connected to political parties. Despite passage of a January 8 law on governing timely release of information of public interest, obstacles for accessing information persisted.

In Transnistria, “authorities” censored media outlets, including through controlling licensing and accreditation. Journalists regularly practiced self-censorship and avoided criticizing “authorities,” the separatists’ goal of independence and their “foreign policy,” or anything that would be deemed “extremist” under the 2020-2026 Strategy for Combating Extremism.

Efforts to Preserve the Independence of the Media

A law expanding access to information of public interest came into effect on January 8. NGOs reported multiple media outlets successfully applied the law to access information. The 2024 Promo-LEX CSO Meter Moldova Country Report, released on December 2, showed improvements in civic space in the country, from 5.3 to 5.4 points, due in part to the new law, which allowed for more active participation by civil society actors in decision making.

b. Worker Rights

Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

The law provided workers the right to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The government generally respected these rights, but with limitations. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination but did not provide for the reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law prohibited strikes when the government declared an emergency, such as during natural disasters, epidemics, and pandemics. Authorities could impose compulsory arbitration at the request of one party to a dispute.

The State Labor Inspectorate and the Prosecutor General’s Office were responsible for overseeing labor laws, but they failed to monitor or enforce effectively the rights to collective bargaining and labor union organization. The law did not provide effective sanctions for abuses of freedom of association nor antiunion discrimination, nor stipulate penalties for violating trade union rights.

Penalties for violations of freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike were less than those for analogous violations such as civil rights violations, or of other laws related to civil rights, and penalties were rarely applied against violators.

The government and employers generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Worker organizations were generally independent of the government, political parties, employers, and employers’ associations.

There were no reports that the government, political parties, or employers interfered in the functioning of workers’ organizations. Prosecutors could reject appeals by trade unions alleging antiunion behavior, and authorities did not punish alleged violations of the trade union law, which was under the jurisdiction of the trade unions and not the national courts.

Forced or Compulsory Labor

See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

Acceptable Work Conditions

Wage and Hour Laws

The law provided for a national minimum wage that was less than the poverty level.

The law set the maximum workweek at 40 hours with overtime compensation, provided for at least one day off per week, and mandated paid annual leave of at least 28 calendar days (government holidays excluded). Different paid leave plans could be used in some sectors, such as education, health care, and public service. The law prohibited excessive compulsory overtime. Foreign, migrant, and domestic workers had the same wage and hour protections as other workers.

Occupational Safety and Health

The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate for the main industries in the country. Inspectors proactively identified unsafe conditions during announced and unannounced inspections. According to labor law, workers could remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement

The State Labor Inspectorate was responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor relations and OSH laws. Government efforts to enforce occupational health and safety standards were limited. The number of inspectors was insufficient to effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws. The law required the government to establish and monitor safety standards in the workplace, but inspections could only occur when a complaint was received, and not all complaints met the criteria for a workplace inspection. Penalties for violations were less than those for analogous crimes and were sometimes applied.

The government took additional steps to enforce labor laws in the informal sector during the year. The labor code required work contracts for employment, but the government did not have an effective mechanism to monitor compliance. According to data issued by the National Bureau of Statistics for the third quarter of the year, 14.7 percent of employed persons worked in the informal sector. The service, construction, transportation, and agricultural sectors had high levels of informality. The International Labor Organization and other outside sources estimated the share of employment in the informal sector at 20-56 percent. Workers in the informal economy did not have the same legal protections under wage, hour, and OSH provisions as employees in the formal sector.

c. Disappearance and Abduction

Disappearance

There were no reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.

There were no reports of enforced disappearances in the Transnistria region.

Prolonged Detention without Charges

The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government generally observed these requirements. In Transnistria, there were frequent reports that Transnistrian “authorities” engaged with impunity in arbitrary arrest and detention.

In Transnistria, arbitrary arrests, particularly of those who criticized de facto Transnistrian authorities, remained a significant problem. The Bureau for Reintegration confirmed that on November 3, Moldovan national Stanislav Derebcinschi was arrested by “law enforcement” at the administrative line in Grigoropol for defaming de facto Transnistrian leader Vadim Krasnoselsky on social media – a “crime” punishable with up to five years’ imprisonment. As of December, Derebcinschi was being held in Slobozia prison and a trial date had not been announced.

In Transnistria, lengthy pretrial detention resulting from a lack of respect for rule of law remained a problem.

d. Violations in Religious Freedom

See the Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report at https://www.state.gov/international-religious-freedom-reports/.

e. Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

a. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports government officials employed them.

The Antitorture Prosecution Office reported 13 allegations of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, mainly in public spaces, in the first six months of the year. Reports included cases of excessive force during arrest, mistreatment in pretrial detention centers in police stations, and one confirmed case of excessive force used when collecting DNA samples from an unwilling criminal suspect as part of a criminal investigation. Impunity persisted, but authorities increasingly initiated prosecutions regarding allegations of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment during the year.

Many cases classified by authorities as suspected torture occurred in public spaces, through abusive physical or psychological treatment by the police, carabinieri, or border police officers initially encountering individuals, or by emergency security officers called to a scene.

There was an increase in the number of torture cases investigated compared to 2023, although no corresponding uptick in cases prosecuted. The Prosecutor General’s Antitorture Office attributed this increase to better implementation of a prosecutor-general directive mandating that all abuse complaints automatically trigger the opening of a criminal investigation. Two-thirds of investigations were self-initiated by the Prosecutor General’s Office.

In Transnistria, there were reports of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in detention facilities, including denial of medical assistance, detention in metal cages during court hearings, and prolonged solitary confinement. For example, former political prisoner Victor Plescanov, pardoned by the Transnistrian de facto leader and released from the Transnistrian prison on May 16, told the NGO Promo-LEX he was verbally and psychologically abused while in pretrial detention.

There was no known mechanism to investigate alleged acts of torture by Transnistrian “security forces.” Promo-LEX noted “authorities” perpetrated most inhuman and degrading treatment in the region to obtain self-incriminating confessions. Transnistrian “law enforcement” bodies did not report any investigations or prosecutions for torture or inhuman treatment by Transnistrian “security forces” during the year.

b. Protection of Children

Child Labor

See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .

Child Marriage

The legal minimum age for marriage was 18 for both men and women, or 16 with prior approval by the local public administration or a legal guardian. Child marriage was most common in Romani communities, where there were reports of girls between the ages of 12 and 16 being married. This either took the form of a forced marriage, whereby a girl was married off to an adult man against her will, or an arranged marriage, whereby matchmakers arranged for two children to be married in the future. In such cases, the marriage took place without official documentation or registration. After marriage, girls commonly dropped out of school to take on household duties.

c. Protection to Refugees

The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern. In Transnistria, “authorities” did the same.

Provision of First Asylum

The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees. The process for obtaining formal refugee status was slow but conducted in line with international and European standards.

Following the July 10 shooting of Izzet Eren, a criminal wanted by United Kingdom law-enforcement authorities for arrest and extradition who had been living in Moldova while final decision on his asylum request lingered in appeals courts, parliament passed an amendment reforming the asylum and extradition process, which entered into force on August 15. The reform extended the statuary limit on pretrial detentions from six to 12 months and introduced an accelerated process for asylum complaints.

d. Acts of Antisemitism and Antisemitic Incitement

The Jewish community numbered between 1,600 and 30,000 persons (depending on source and definition), including up to 2,000 living in Transnistria.

According to some members of the Jewish community, antisemitic discourse and hate speech online and in media against members of the Jewish community remained a problem. Online publications related to the community’s activities received hateful and insulting comments. In March and April, several graves and a memorial to Holocaust victims at the Jewish cemetery in Soroca were vandalized. Within several weeks, the municipality responded to Jewish community requests to install electricity poles at the site, enabling the community to install security cameras.

The law included administrative and criminal liabilities for Holocaust denial and insulting the memory of the Holocaust, as well as xenophobic, racist, and fascist propaganda. In 2023, the government appointed Serghei Diaconu as Special Envoy for Combating Antisemitism and Holocaust Issues and publicly supported multiple public commemorative events.

Civil society experts said general knowledge concerning Jewish community history in the country and laws governing hate-based crimes remained low. The Jewish Community of Moldova reported laws were infrequently enforced, as authorities were unwilling to prosecute or lacked understanding of what behavior the law prohibited. The Equality Council supported the attendance of prosecutors and investigators at workshops hosted by the Jewish Community of Moldova on discrimination and hate-based crimes.

For further information on incidents of antisemitism in the country, whether or not those incidents were motivated by religion, and for reporting on the ability of Jews to exercise freedom of religion or belief, see the Department of State’s annual International Religious Freedom Report at http://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.